Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1982-157

1982-157Kanag

Full text

July 12, 1982
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 82- 157
E. A. Mosher, Executive Director
League of Kansas Municipalities
112 West Seventh Street
Topeka, Kansas 66603
Re: Automobiles -- Serious Traffic Offenses -- Driving
While Under Influence of Alcohol; Effect of Amend-
ments Concerning Fines, Diversion Programs, and
Community Service Time Required of Defendant
Synopsis: Section 10 of 1982 Senate Bill No. 699 establishes
a state alcohol and drug safety action program,
which is funded through the assessment of an $85
fine against any person who is convicted of, pleads
nolo contendere to, or participates in, a diversion
program stemming from a violation of K.S.A. 1981
Supp. 8-1567. As subsection (n) of the statute
(contained in Section 5 of the bill) provides that
a city ordinance on this subject must contain mini-
mum penalties equal to those of the statute, the
fee must be assessed against the above three groups
of persons in municipal court, as well as in dis-
trict court, proceedings.
While a city attorney is required to establish pro-
cedures and guidelines for a diversion program under
Sections 11 through 18 of the bill, he or she is
not required to offer diversion to any violator.
However, should the prosecutor so elect, the pro-
cedures and guidelines set forth therein must be
followed. A person who performs community service
work, either as a result of such a diversion pro-
gram or as a condition of a sentence, is an employee
of the city for the purposes of the Tort Claims Act,
K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 75-6101 et seq., creating the
potential for tort lability for damages caused by
the individual's negligent or wrongful acts or
omissions. Cited herein: K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-1567,
K.S.A. 22-2908, both as amended by 1982 Senate
Bill No. 699, K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 75-6101, 75-6102,
75-6103, 75-6104, 1982 Senate Bill No. 699.
Dear Mr. Mosher:
As Executive Director of the League of Kansas Municipalities,
you request our opinion on several questions regarding recent
amendments to K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 3-1567 and related statutes
concerning the offense of operating a vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol. Specifically, you inquire as to the effect
on cities of 1982 Senate Bill No. 699, which contains provisions
on diversion programs, the performance of community service hours
by violators and the imposition of stricter penalties than currently'
exist in municipal ordinances on this subject. In that the bill
has an effective date of July 1, 1982, we have attempted to
expedite our replies to your inquiries.
In Section 10 of the bill the legislature has created a new
program under the direction of the secretary of social and
rehabilitation services. Designated as the state alcohol and
drug safety action program, the purpose of the program is to
provide, through community based agencies, presentence eval-
uation reports on persons convicted of, or pleading nolo
contendere to, a violation of K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-1567. The
program also provides for follow-up services designed to
assist such a person with treatment and educational programs
or other conditions of probation. The program is funded (pursu-
ant to subsection (d)] by the imposition of an $85 fine against
any person who is convicted of, or pleads nolo contendere to,
such a violation. Your question concerns the effect of this
additional fine on persons who are convicted or who enter such
pleas in municipal courts.
Specifically, you ask whether subsection (h) of Section 10
contains a loophole for certain violators. There, it is provided:
"The provisions of this section, including the
assessment required by subsection (d), shall
apply to any person who is to be or is charged
with a violation of K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-1567
and amendments thereto, or the ordinance of a
city in this state which prohibits the acts
prohibited by that statute, and participates
in a diversion program." (Emphasis added.)
As no mention is made in Section 10, subsection (d) of persons
who are convicted or enter a no contest Plea in municipal court,
you inquire whether such courts may impose the fee only' upon
those persons who participate in a diversion program, per
subsection (h).
In our opinion, such is not the case, for a reading of the
entire bill discloses that Section 3, subsection (h) requires
a city ordinance to provide the same minimum penalties as
does K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-1567, as amended. As the $35 assess-
ment is expressly imposed in addition to all other fines, fees,
penalties or costs, a municipal court would have no alternative
(assuming the city ordinance properly reflected the minimum
penalties of the statute) in the case of a Person who is convicted
or who enters a nolo contendere plea. However, as a diversion
program can be in lieu of any or all fines, fees, etc., the
$83 assessment would not, in the absence of subsection (h),
necessarily be imposed. To insure adequate funding for the
program, the legislature has seen fit to expressly provide for
the imposition of the assessment.
A second inquiry concerns sections 11 through 13 of the bill,
which deal with diversion programs by a city. At Section 11(b),
it is provided:
"Upon the filing of a first complaint, citation
or notice to appear alleging a person has vio-
lated a city ordinance which prohibits the acts
prohibited by K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-1567, and
amendments thereto, and prior to conviction
thereof, the city attorney shall determine
whether the defendant shall be allowed to en-
ter into a diversion agreement in accordance
with this act." (Emphasis added.)
Although somewhat repetitious, Section 13 goes on to state:
"(a) After a complaint has been filed charg-
ing a defendant with violation of an alcohol
or drug related offense and prior to convic-
tion thereof, and after the city attorney has
considered the factors listed in section 14,
if it appears to the city attorney that diver-
sion of the defendant would be in the interests
of justice and of benefit to the defendant and
the community, the city attorney may propose
a diversion agreement to the defendant. The
terms of each diversion agreement shall be
established by the city attorney in accordance
with section 15.
"(b) Each city attorney shall adopt written
policies and guidelines for the implementation
of a diversion program in accordance with sec-
tions 11 to 18, inclusive. Such policies and
guidelines shall provide for a diversion con-
ference and other procedures in those cases
where the city attorney elects to offer diver-
sion in lieu of further criminal proceedings
on the complaint." (Emphasis added.)
Additionally, Section 14 sets forth 10 factors which the cit y,
attorney is required to consider in determining whether the
diversion of a particular defendant is in the interest of
justice and of benefit to the defendant and the city. We
note that these factors are taken almost verbatim from K.S.A.
22-2908 (as amended by section 6 of this bill), which relates
to diversion programs established by a district or county
attorney. You inquire whether these sections mandate the
establishment of a diversion program by each city along these
guidelines.
In our opinion, Sections 11 through 13 of 1982 Senate Bill
No. 699 do not require each Kansas city attorney to offer a
diversion program to any violator of a city ordinance patterned
after K.S.A. 8-1567, as amended. Rather, the sections set fort.,
factors which are to be considered and procedures which are
to be followed if a diversion agreement is entered into. It
is clear that a city attorney does have an affirmative duty
under section 13(b) to adopt written procedures and guidelines
to be used in those cases where diversion is offered in lieu
of further proceedings. He or she must also inform the defen-
dant in writing of the diversion program and the procedures
and guidelines which have been adopted.
However, a city attorney is under no obligation to offer di-
version to any violator of a city ordinance dealing with the
operation of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol,
nor can a defendant claim diversion as a right. State v.
Greenlee, 228 Ran. 712, 720 (1980). Indeed, like the situation
presented in Greenlee, a city prosecutor may use his or her
discretion to determine that no person accused of a driving
offense involving alcohol will be offered diversion (223 Ran.
at 721.). Such a classification by the district attorney as
to drug offenders was approved by the court in Greenlee, which
cited the serious nature of the drug problem in society today.
Given the far-reaching scope of Bill No. 699, the legislature
obviously has similar concerns as to drunk drivers, and has
left the final decision on diversion to the prosecuting attorney,
whether at a city, county, or district level.
Your third question deals with the potential liability of a
city for injury or damages suffered or caused by the acts of
a person performing community service work, either as a result
of a diversion program or as a condition of sentence. In
that K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-1567(c), as amended by section 5,
requires first-time offenders to be sentenced to not less
than 48 hours imprisonment or 100 hours of public service,
it can be anticipated that a larger number of persons will
be performing such work in the future than at present, where
only those in diversion programs are so engaged. Additionally,
defendants may perform such work in lieu of paying their fine,
as Provided by subsection (g) of section 3.
In determining questions concerning the liability of a Kansas
city for negligent acts, reference must be had to the Tort Claims
Act, K.S.A. 1931 Supp. 75-6101 et sea. While the act recog-
nizes (at K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 75-6103) that a city is liable
for the negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of its employ-
ees, it contains a number of exceptions (at K.S.A. 1981 Supp.
75-6104). Therefore, it must first be determined whether indivi-
duals performing community service work in the above-mentioned
situations are "employees" within the scope of the act, and,
if so, whether any exceptions apply to them, thereby removing
the city from liability.
The definition of "employee" found at K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 75-6102(d)
is extremely broad in its scope, stating:
"'Employee' means any officer, employee or
servant or any member of a board, commission
or council of a governmental entity, including
elected or appointed officials and persons
acting on behalf or in service of a govern-
mental entity in any official capacity, whether
with or without compensation, but such term
shall not include an independent contractor
under contract with a governmental entity.
The term 'employee' shall include former em-
ployees for acts and omissions within the
scope of their employment during their former
employment with the governmental entity." (Em-
phasis added.)
As can be seen from the underscored portions above, the statute
applies even to those individuals who work without pay and who
do not have a formal employee-employer relationship with the
city. The use of the term "servant" is of particular importanc e
inlightofestablishedlawonthesubjectofmaster-servant
relationships.
General rules describing the existence of such a relationship
are set out in Atwell v. Maxwell Bridge Co., 196 Kan. 219,
224 (1966).
"[Al master is a principal who employs another
to perform service in his affairs and who con-
trols or has the right to control the physi-
cal conduct of the other in the performance
of the service. A servant is a person employed
by a master to perform service in his affairs
whose physical conduct in the performance of
the service is controlled or is subject to the
right to control by the master. (Evans v.
Board of Education of Hays, 178 Kan. 273, 273,
234 P.2d 1063.) It is not the exercise of
direction, supervision or control over a work-
man which determines whether he is a servant
or an independent contractor, but the right
to exercise such direction, supervision or con-
trol. (Bowler v. Elmdale Developing Co., 183
Kan. 785, 787, 347 P.2d 391; Schroeder v.
American Nat'l Bank, 154 Kan. 721, 121 P.2d
186; Davis v. Julian, 152 Kan. 749, 756, 107
P.2d 745.) The necessity of the control ele-
ment was also recognized in Henderson v.
Sutton's Food City, 191 Kan. 143, 379 P.2d
300."
From the above, it is evident that it is the right to control
which is the most important aspect of the relationship, not
the payment of compensation by the master. As it is the city
which will control the tasks given to the defendants engaged
in community service, as well as issuing them the necessary
equipment and determining if the tasks have been satisfac-
torily completed, the right to control test would appear to
be met.
Associated with the right to control in such a relationship
is the liability of the master for the torts of the servant
while the latter is acting within the scope of his or her
assigned duties. As stated in Hall v. Atchison, Topeka and
Santa Fe Railway Company, 349 F. Supp. 326 (D. Han. 1972):
"The doctrine of respondent superior is predi-
cated upon the master-servant relationship.
The vicarious liability of the master is not
based upon the knowledge or lack of knowledge
of a third party concerning that relationship
but upon the relationship itself." 349 F.Supp.
at 329.
An instructive, though by no means exhaustive, discussion of
the scope of authority concept is found in Hollinger v. Stor-
mont Hospital and Training School for Hurses, Kan.app.2d
302, 311-12 (1973):
"An employee is acting within the scope of his
authority when he is performing services for
which he has been employed or when he is ding
anything which is reasonably incidental 713 his
employment. The test is not necessarily
whether the conduct was expressly authorized
or forbidden by the employer, but whether such
conduct should have been fairly foreseen from
the nature of the employment and the duties
relating to it. The liability of an employer
for the acts of his employee depends not noon
whether the injurious act of the employee was
willful and intentional or was unintentional,
but upon whether the employee, when he did the
wrong, was acting in the prosecution of the
employer's business and within the scope of
his authority or had stopped aside from that
business and had done an individual wrong."
Having determined that a participant in community service
grams under order of the court or prosecuting attorney is a
servant of the city and hence an employee for purposes of the
Tort Claims Act, it remains to be determined whether any of th e
exceptions of K.S.A. 1931 Supp. 75-6104 apply. In examining
the exceptions set forth therein, it is our opinion that none
would apply to the city, which receives benefits from the
work performed. While we would reaffirm with the conclusion
the judge pre-
judicial function
other exemption
city for whose benefit
of Attorney General Opinion No. 81-222 that
scribing such service hours is performing a
[and so is exempt under subsection (b)], no
in the lengthy list appears to apply to the
the work is done.
You further inquire whether a city could, through the use of
a waiver or release form, protect itself from liability. In
our opinion, such a procedure is not available to a city. We
base this conclusion on the belief that the intent of the Act
was to place cities and other units of government in the same
position vis-a-vis liability for negligent acts as private
employers, thereby codifying the demise of governmental immunity
that was begun earlier by Correll v. City of Parsons, 223 Kan.
643 (1973). At K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 75-6103(a), it is stated:
"Subject to the limitations of this act, each
governmental entity shall be liable for damages
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any of its employees while acting
within the scope of their employment under
circumstances where the governmental entity,
if a private person, would be liable under
the laws of this state."
A private employer's efforts to protect itself from liability
through the completion of a release or waiver by its employees
has been held to violate public policy, both as expressed by
the common law (53 Am.Jur.2d Master & Servant, 5137) and by statute
[Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Fronk, 74 Kan. 319 (1906)].
Accordingly, a city's efforts toward *.=i-12 same end would like-
wise be without effect.
In the situation where a person performing community service
work is himself injured, liability of a city would be heavily
dependent on the particular facts and circumstances. This
subject was discussed in Murphy v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass
Corp., 447 F. Supe. 557, 561 (D. Kan. 1977):
"Under Kansas law, there is no question but
that an employer has a duty not to expose his
employees to perils and dangers against which
the employer may guard by the exercise of rea-
sonable care, and that a part of this duty is
to furnish a reasonably safe place in which
to work. E.q., Taylor v. Hostetler, 136 Kan.
788, 352 P.2d 1042 (1960); Fishburn v. Inter-
national Harvester Co., 157 Kan. 43, 138 P.2d
471 (1943). It is equally clear, however,
that a master is not an insurer against all
injuries which his servants may suffer in the
discharge of their duties. E.g., Uhlrig v.
Shortt, 194 Kan.. 68, 397 P.2d 321 (1964);
Blackmore v. Auer, 187 Kan. 434, 357 P.2d 765
(1960). The Kansas Supreme Court has reiter-
ated time and time again the legal axiom that
an employer's duty to furnish safe working
conditions is not absolute and that an em-
ployee's recovery for breach thereof is depen-
dent upon proof of negligence. In Allen v.
Shell Petroleum Corp., 146 Kan. 67, 68 P.2d
651 (1937), the Kansas Supreme Court formu-
lated the test of employer negligence as
follows:
"'The master is not required to furnish the
best, the safest, or the newest appliances or
methods of operation, nor to adopt extraordi-
nary or unusual safeguards against risks and
dangers. The limit of his duty here is to ex-
ercise ordinary care to supply reasonably safe
places, appliances, and methods. The test of
his discharge of this duty is the exercise of
ordinary care to supply such places, appliances
and methods as persons of ordinary intelligence
and prudence commonly furnish in like circum-
stances.'"
Accordingly, it would be mere speculation on our ?art to say
whether liability would attach in any individual situation.
The potential for liability does, however, exist.
For your final inquiry, you ask what the effect of 1932
Senate Bill No. 699 will be on city ordinances which are
modeled on K.S.A. 1931 Supp. 3-1567 as it now reads. In that
this question has been dealt with in an opinion issued simu-
ltaneously with this one, we are attaching a copy for your
reference rather than repeating our conclusions here.
In conclusion, Section 10 of 1932 Senate Bill No. 699 estab-
lishes a state alcohol and drug safety action program, which
is funded through the assessment of an $35 fine against any
person who is convicted of, pleads nolo contendere to, or
participates in, a diversion program stemming from a violation
of K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-1567. As subsection (n) of the statute
(contained in Section 5 of the bill) provides that a city or-
dinance on this subject must contain minimum penalties equal
to those of the statute, the fee must be assessed against the
above three groups of persons in municipal court, as well as
in district court, proceedings.
While a city attorney is required to establish procedures and
guidelines for a diversion program under Sections 11 through
18 of the bill, he or she is not required to offer diversion
to any violator. However, should the prosecutor so elect,
the procedures and guidelines set forth therein must be
followed. A person who performs community service work,
either as a result of such a diversion program or as a condi-
tion of his or her sentence, is an employee of the city for
the purposes of the Tort Claims Act, K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 75-6101
et seq., creating the potential for tort liability for damages
caused by the individual's negligent or wrongful acts or omissions.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
JeffreyS.Southard
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:BJS:JSS:hle:jm

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.