Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1982-150

1982-150Kanag

Full text

July 2, 1982
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 82- 150
The Honorable Sam K. Bruner
Associate District Judge
Tenth Judicial District
Johnson County Courthouse
Olathe, Kansas 66061
Re: Domestic Relations -- Custody of Children --
Prohibited Contracts
Synopsis: A contract which determines the custody of a child
is void as against public policy. Cited herein:
K.S.A. 23-128, 23-129, 23-130.
*
Dear Judge Bruner:
You have requested that this office prepare an opinion con-
cerning the legality of the proposed establishment and opera-
tion of a corporation to deal in surrogate motherhood and
adoption. As we understand the proposal, a for profit Kansas
corporation, doing business solely within the State of Kansas,
would be organized to locate and thereafter contract with
single women to serve as surro gate mothers on an independent
contractor basis. Pursuant to contract, artificial insemination
between the surrogate mother and father (sperm donor) would
be clinically handled and the surrogate mother would thereafter
carry the child to term under provisions of the contract.
After delivery an adoption would be completed.
The subject contract would specify the expenses and compensa-
tion to be received by the surrogate and outline the respon-
sibilities of the father. The adoption by the father's wife
would complete the corporation's involvement with the parties.
The corporation would not be a custodial agency for the child,
but would be the paid intermediary between the individuals
and a party to the contracts. The procedure presumes that
the child would be the natural child of the sperm donor and
the adoption would be necessary by the wife of the sperm
donor only.
The major legal impediment to the commercial practice out-
lined above is the long-standing legal principle and public
policy that children are not chattel and therefore may not
be the subject of a contract or gift. Hamm v. Hamm, 207 Kan.
431 at 435 (1971), In re Rhea, 207 Kan. 610 at 612 (1971),
Wood v. Shaw, 92 Kan. 70 at 72 (1914), Tucker v. Finnigan,
139 Kan. 496 at 499 (1934), Wood v. Lee, 123 Kan. 669 at
670-671 (1927), Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650 at 652 (1881).
This is a well-recognized principle which has been invoked in
various factual situations where the custody of children has
been at issue. For example, in In re Rhea, supra, the appel-
lant brought a habeas corpus action to gain custody of her
natural child. The trial court's summarization of the facts
was reprinted in the appellate opinion as follows:
"This is an unusual factual situation. Both
parties agreed prior to the birth of this child
that the custody of the child when born would
be vested in the Respondent [appellee], and
the agreement was consummated and was abided
by until December 8, 1969, when this petition
for writ of habeas corpus was filed, in which
consent to custody was attempted to be changed
by Petitioner [appellant] in this case." Id.
at 611-612.
The trial court allowed the appellee to retain custody of
the subject minor child and stated, inter alia:
"At the time this case was filed there was no
showing that this child was not being properly
taken care of; that the child was not in the
possession of one agreed to; and therefore I
am going to order that this writ of habeas
corpus be denied." Id.
In reversing the trial court's ruling the Supreme Court of
Kansas opined:
"Undoubtedly acting in good faith in its con-
ception of the child's best interest, the trial
court patently placed reliance on the fact the
child was in the custody of its aunt agreeable
to its mother's arrangement. However, such
reliance was juridically misplaced. Our cases
are legion that a minor child cannot be the
subject of a valid gift and a parent cannot
merely by giving away a child be deprived of
the right to its custody. (See e.g., Wood v.
Shaw, 92 Kan. 70, In re Jackson, 164 Kan. 391).
Custody of a minor child is simply not a mat-
ter to be determined by contract. (Chapsky
v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650)." (Emphasis added.) Id.
We are mindful of the fact that an adoption is contemplated
by the proposed commercial activity and that such adoption
would serve to sever all rights of the natural (here, surro-
gate) mother. However, the proposed commercial activity con-
templates that the final determination of custody of the
minor child is a matter of contract. This contractual cus-
todial arrangement is prohibited by the mandate set out in
Chapsky v. Wood, supra, and its progeny.
We realize that the decision to "bear or beget a child" is
essentially a private one and, as such, has certain constitu-
tional protections. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 433 (1972) and Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). However, the contemplated com-
mercial activity triggers a compelling state interest, i.e.,
custody of a minor child, and such compelling state interest
cannot be mitigated by commercial contract. In re Rhea, supra
and Chapsky v. Wood, supra. At 15 Williston, Contracts,
51744 A (3d ed 1957) it is stated:
"The sovereign has an interest in a minor
child held superior to that of the parent;
hence, there is a public policy against the
custody of a child becoming the subject of
barter."
We recognize that the commercial activity contemplated here
might be characterized as a "contract for services" rather
than a contract to determine custody of a child. However, we
cannot escape the fact that custody of the minor child is de-
cided as a contractual matter between the parties thereto.
It is our considered opinion that such contract is void as
contrary to the public policy enunciated in the above-cited
authorities.
Additionally, we are cognizant of the fact that K.S.A. 23-128
to 23-130 specifically authorize the "commercial" use of the
male's reproductive system by artificial insemination. How-
ever, this artificial insemination process has been legiti-
mated by the legislature as a matter of public policy. Such
is not the case with the proposed commercialization of mother-
hood, and in the absence of a legislative declaration legiti-
mating such practice, we are constrained to consider this
matter in the light of existing public policy.
In summary, it is the considered opinion of this office that
a contract which determines the custody of a child is void
as against public policy.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Robert Vinson Eye
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:BJS:RVE:hle

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