Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1982-080

1982-080Kanag

Full text

April 1, 1982
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 82-80
Mr. Jack Mendenhall
Rush County Sheriff
La Crosse, Kansas 67548
Re: Intoxicating Liquors and Beverages -- Cereal Malt
Beverages -- Qualifications of Manager of Licensed
Premises
Synopsis: Although K.S.A. 41-2708(j) requires the suspension or
revocation of a cereal malt beverage retailer's license
because of the licensee's employment of a person convicted
of a felony, K.S.A. 41-2703 permits a place of business
to be conducted under such license by a manager or agent
who has been convicted of a felony, if the conviction
occurred more than two years preceding the application for
such license. When these provisions are considered in
conjunction with the legal distinction between a manager
or agent and an employee, it is apparent the legislature
intended to prescribe qualifications for a manager or agent
that are different from those of other employees of such
place of business. Thus, a person convicted of a felony
may be the manager of a place of business licensed to sell
cereal malt beverages at retail, if such person's conviction
occurred more than two years prior to the date of application
for the cereal malt beverage retailer's license applicable
to such place of business. Cited herein: K.S.A. 41-2703,
41-2708.
Dear Sheriff Mendenhall:
You have inquired whether a license for the retail sale of cereal
malt beverages should be suspended or revoked, if the manager of the
licensed premises has been convicted of a felony, but such conviction
occurred more than two years prior to the date of the application
for such license.
In relating the factual circumstances prompting your request, you note
that the Board of County Commissioners of Rush County has issued a
cereal malt beverage retailer's license to an individual, whose license
application stated that the place of business covered by the license
was to be conducted by a manager. You indicate that the person identi
fied in the application as the manager has been convicted of a felony,
and even though such conviction occurred more than two years prior to
the date of said application, you have asked whether such conviction
requires the suspension or revocation of the license for said place of
business pursuant to K.S.A. 41-2708.
The pertinent portion of K.S.A. 41-2708 reads as follows:
"The board of county commissioners . . . shall revoke
or suspend such license for any one of the following
reasons: . . .
"(j) for the employment of persons who have been
adjudged guilty of felony or of any violation of the
intoxicating liquor law . . . ."
Considered in isolation, the foregoing statutory provisions evidence an
apparent legislative intent that persons convicted of a felony are
ineligible for employment in a place of business licensed to sell cereal
malt beverages at retail, irrespective of the time elapsed between such
conviction and the person's employment in such place of business. Thus,
the above statute would appear to compel the suspension or revocation
of the cereal malt beverage retailer's license in question. However,
"[i]n order to ascertain legislative intent, courts are not permitted
to consider only a certain isolated part or parts of an act but are
required to consider and construe together all parts thereof in pari
materia." Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 200 (1978).
In pursuance of this principle, we have considered the other statutes
pertaining to the licensing and regulation of the retail sale of cereal
malt beverages, and we believe the following portions of K.S.A. 41-2703
are pertinent to your inquiry:
"(b) No retailer's license shall be issued to:
"(4) A person who within two (2) years immediately preceding
the date of making application has been convicted of a felony,
any crime involving a moral turpitude, drunkenness, driving
a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor or violation of any other intoxicating liquor law of
any state or of the United States.
"(7) A person whose place of business is conducted by a
manager or agent unless the manager or agent possesses
all the qualifications of a licensee."
Therefore, in seeming contradiction to the previously-quoted provisions
of K.S.A. 41-2708, the portions of K.S.A. 41-2703 set forth above would
appear to sanction a licensee employing as a manager or agent a person
convicted of a felony, as long as the conviction occurred more than two
years prior to the date the licensee made application for the license.
At first blush, then, a consideration of the previously-quoted provisions
of both K.S.A. 41-2703 and 41-2708 reveals a conflict. That is, it raises
the possibility that, pursuant to 41-2703, a license may be issued to an
applicant who proposes to have the licensed place of business conducted by
a manager or agent who has been convicted of a felony, if such conviction
occurred more than two years prior to the license application; yet, once
the license has been issued, the same conviction compels its suspension
or revocation under 41-2708. Thus, by this interpretation, the pertinent
provisions of the latter statute effectively nullify the relevant provisions
of the former.
In our judgment, however, such interpretation produces an absurd result
and ignores established rules of statutory construction. Of course,
"[t]he fundamental rule of statutory construction, to which all others
are subordinate, is that the purpose and intent of the legislature governs
when that intent can be ascertained from the statute . . . ." Brown v.
Keill, supra at 199, 200. Moreover, "[ilt is a cardinal rule of statutory
construction that the legislature intended a statute be given a reasonable
construction so as to avoid unreasonable and absurd consequences."
Williams v. Board of Education, 198 Kan. 115, 125 (1967), citing Equitable
Life Assurance Society v. Hobbs, 154 Kan. 1 (1941) and Commerce Trust Co.
v. Paulen, 126 Kan. 777 (1928). Furthermore, it is established that
statutes in pari materia should be construed together so as to harmonize
their respective provisions, if reasonably possible to do so [ Callaway
v. City of Overland Park, 211 Kan. 646, 650 (1973)1, and as noted in
Marshall v. Marshall, 159 Kan. 602, 606 (1945):
"It is the function and duty of courts to reconcile
apparent inconsistencies in laws to the end that all
may be given full force and effect in their intended
field and scope of operation. Whenever that reasonably
can be done it never should be held that one law
overturns or destroys another." (Citations omitted.)
Finally, we believe the following statement in Rogers v. Shanahan,
221 Kan. 221 (1977), to be of pertinence:
"When, as here, the resolution of a question requires
construing a statute, the court is guided by certain
presumptions. It is presumed the legislature understood
the meaning of the words it used and intended to use
them; that the legislature used the words in their
ordinary and common meaning; and that the legislature
intended a different meaning when it used different
language in the same connection in different parts of
a statute. See 82 C.J.S. Statutes §316(b) (1953);
See also, Rausch v. Hill, 164 Kan. 505, 190 P.2d 357."
Id. at 223, 224.
Relying on these principles, we have considered in pari materia the
seemingly conflicting statutory provisions referenced above, in order
to ascertain the legislature's intent and purpose. From this we have
concluded that the legislature intended to distinguish between a manager
or agent and other employees of a place of business licensed to sell
cereal malt beverages at retail. As is evident from the statutory
provisions quoted above, in K.S.A. 41-2703 the legislature specifically
identified the "manager or agent" of such place of business, while in
K.S.A. 41-2708, the language used is broader, referring generally to
"the employment of persons who have been adjudged guilty of felony."
From the legislature's use of different terminology, we may presume
that the legislature intended to distinguish between managerial and
other types of employees of a licensed place of business. Rogers v.
Shanahan, supra.
In this regard, it is relevant to review Attorney General Opinion
No. 81-241, where we noted the substantial equivalency of the terms
"manager" and "agent." We concluded that, "[w]ithin the context of
subsection m(7) of 41-2703, . . . we find little or no difference
between 'manager' and 'agent.' In either case, the manager or agent
must be a person who conducts a licensee's place of business." Id. at
p. 4. Thus, we decided that, "whether determining if a person is a
manager or agent, the principles of agency must be applied." Id. at P. 5.
And in affirming a previous letter opinion of Attorney General Harold R.
Fatzer, our Opinion No. 81-241 recognized the distinction between a
mere employee of a place of business licensed to sell cereal malt
beverages at retail, and the manager or agent of such place of business.
Thus, the designation of a person who is in "actual control and management"
of the licensed premises as an employee does not alter the fact that
such person is the "manager or agent" of such premises.
The basis for distinguishing between a manager and an employee is provided
in 2A C.J.S. Agency, §16;
"The distinction between agent and servant is one of
degree only, the essential distinction being that the
agent is employed to represent his principal in
business dealings and to establish contractual
relations between him and third persons, while the
servant is not, and is not allowed the use of his
discretion as to the means to accomplish the end
for which he is employed."
Accordingly, we believe the legal distinction between a manager or agent
and an employee, when considered in conjunction with the legislature's
separate treatment of the qualifications of a manager or agent in
41-2703(b)(7), compels the conclusion that the legislature
intended to distinguish between the qualifications of a manager or
agent of a place of business licensed to sell cereal malt beverages at
retail and those of the other employees of such place of business. Thus,
it is our opinion that the provisions of K.S.A. 41-2708(j), which require
the suspension or revocation of a cereal malt beverage retailer's license
because of the employment of a person convicted of a felony, have no
application to a license issued for a place of business conducted by a
manager or agent who was convicted of a felony more than two years
prior to the date of application for such license.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General
W. Robert Alderson
First Deputy Attorney General
RTS:WRA:may

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.