Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1982-010

1982-010Kanag

Full text

January 20, 1982
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION 82-10
Mr. A. C. Cooke
Cooke, Ballweg, Borth,
Wilson & Simpson
P. 0. Box 8228
Prairie Village, Kansas 66208
Re: Counties and County Officers -- Parks, Museums,
Lakes and Recreational Grounds -- Competitive Bid
Procedures
Synopsis: Competitive bid statutes are to be strictly con-
strued regarding procedures to be followed. There-
fore, a park board, having only those powers ex-
pressly granted by statute or necessarily implied
therefrom, may not adopt a procedure for submission
and tabulation of bids which deviates from the
competitive bid procedure prescribed for the board
by statute. Cited herein: K.S.A. 19-2881.
Dear Mr. Cooke:
As attorney for the Johnson County Park and Recreation District,
you ask whether the scope of the competitive bid procedure
set forth in K.S.A. 19-2881 would permit the Park Board to
change the manner in which it receives bids. You state that
the Board currently receives sealed bids at its monthly meet-
ing where they are opened, tabulated and an award made. The
Board would like to change the procedure to permit the Dis-
trict's staff to receive, open, and tabulate the bids prior
to the meeting and then submit the bid tabulation at the
meeting for the Board's consideration.
K.S.A. 19-2881, the statute in question, states in pertinent
part:
"The purchase of materials, contracts for pur-
chase or sale, lease contracts and other con-
tractual services which are estimated to ex-
ceed one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500),
shall be made upon competive bids. All bids
shall be made in writing and signed by the
bidder, and presented by the bidder, his agent
or attorney, to the board, at a meeting there-
of, and all bids shall be considered and ac-
cepted or rejected immediately after their sub-
mission." (Emphasis added.)
Competitive bidding statutes are to be strictly construed to
protect the public against waste of public funds. 72 C.J.S.
Supp. Public Contracts, §9 (1975). In addition "[a]ll . .
statutory provisions . . . as to time, place, and method of
procedure should be strictly followed, since such provisions
are usually held to be mandatory . ." McQuillin Municipal
Corporations, §29.70 (1981). A strict reading of 19-2881 re-
quires us to conclude that only the bidder, his agent or
attorney may submit the bid to the Board and such submission
must take place at a meeting of the Board. Requiring that
the bids be first submitted to the staff, then permitting a
staff member, rather than the bidder or his agent, to present
the bids to the Board, would conflict with the strict require-
ments of the statute, and would, therefore, not be permissible.
We note further that the district is a quasi-municipal cor-
poration. As such, the district has only those powers which
are expressly authorized by statute or clearly implied there-
from. State v. Kansas City, 60 Kan. 518 (1899); Kaw Valley
Drainage District v. Kansas City, 119 Kan. 368 (1925). The
board is given no power to alter the procedure set forth in
the statute, and in our judgment no power may be clearly im-
plied therefrom. From our review of the case law regarding
implied powers of governmental bodies, it is clear that the
only time powers will be implied is when they are necessary
to actually accomplish the purpose behind a specific statute,
i.e., the courts' determination of implied powers has been
limited to situations where, without them, the governmental
agency would have no way to carry out its express statutory
powers. See, e.g., Edwards County Commissioners v. Simmons,
159 Kan. 41 (1944); Womer v. Aldridge, 155 Kan. 446 (1942);
The State, ex rel., v. Wooster, 111 Kan. 830 (1922); State,
ex rel., v. Davis, 114 Kan. 270 (1923); The State, ex rel.,
v. Younkin, 108 Kan. 634 (1921); Young v. Regents of State
University, 87 Kan. 239 (1912); and Brown County v. Barnett,
14 Kan. 627 (1875).
With these principles in mind, we have considered the present
statutory procedure for receiving bids, and it is apparent
that the change proposed in this procedure by the Johnson
County Park and Recreation Board is not necessary to accom-
plish the express powers granted the Board by K.S.A. 19-2881.
In fact, it is clear that the Board has been able to carry
out these powers in the absence of the proposed change. There-
fore, it is our opinion, the Board may not adopt the new pro-
cedure.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Brenda L. Hoyt
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:BJS:BLH:hle

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