Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1981-074

1981-074Kanag

Full text

March 30, 1981
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 81-74
Ms. Carol Wertenberger
Norton City Clerk
301 East Washington
Norton, Kansas 67654
Re: Cities of the Second Class -- Mayor-Council Form
of Government -- Incompatibility of Officers
Doctrine; Municipal Judge, Fire Chief, Members of
Volunteer Fire Department
Synopsis: The doctrine of incompatibility of offices pre-
cludes one person from holding the position of
municipal judge or fire chief while at the same
time serving as mayor or city councilman in a
city of the second class having the mayor-council
form of government. However, a person could hold
either of such elective positions and still serve
as a member of the volunteer fire department, as
such volunteers are neither officers nor employees
of the city for the purposes of the doctrine. How-
ever, to avoid any potential conflict of interest,
a person in such an elected position should abstain
in the making of any decisions affecting the com-
pensation of the volunteer firemen, as required
by K.S.A. 75-4304. Cited herein: K.S.A. 14-201,
14-301, 14-1204, 14-1302, 14-1307, 14-1402,
75-4301, 75-4304.
*
Dear Ms. -Wertenberger:
On behalf of the City of Norton, you request our opinion on
two questions regarding the simultaneous holding of two city
positions by one person. Specifically, you ask whether it
is proper: (1) for an individual to be appointed municipal
judge while also a member of the city council, or (2) for the
fire chief or a member of a volunteer fire department to also
serve as city councilman or mayor? You additionally inform
us that while the municipal judge and fire chief positions
are salaried, the volunteer firemen receive compensation
only for each business or practice session attended, and
each fire call they respond to.
In the absence of a charter ordinance, cities of the second
class in Kansas (of which Norton is one) are allowed by statute
to have two types of city government. The first, set out by
K.S.A. 14-101 et seq. and currently in use in Norton, involves
a mayor-council system whereby the city is divided into wards
from which members of the council are elected. The mayor is
elected from the city as a whole, and presides at council
meetings, as well as having "the superintending control of
all the officers and affairs of the city." K.S.A. 14-301.
The second, found at K.S.A. 14-1101 et seq., provides for
a mayor-commission system whereby the commissioners, like the
mayor, are elected from the city as a whole. K.S.A. 14-1204.
Additionally, the duties of the mayor are less extensive under
this system than that above, as he is responsible only for
certain city departments (K.S.A, 14-1307), and serves in other
respects as a co-equal member of the board of commissioners.
K.S.A. 14-1402.
The distinction between these two systems is critical to this
inquiry, for the latter is governed by the provisions of K.S.A.
14-1302, which states that "[n]o member of the board of com-
missioners shall hold any office of profit under the laws of
any state or the United States, or hold any county or other city
office." However, we find no similar provision dealing with the
mayor-council form of government now in effect in Norton.
Therefore, this situation would appear to be governed by
decisions of the Kansas Supreme Court which state that an
individual can hold more than one public office, provided
there is no "incompatibility" between the offices. Dyche v.
Davis, 92 Kan. 971 (1914); Congdon v. Knapp, 106 Kan. 206
(1920).
The question of whether the offices at issue here are incompa-
tible in a city such as Norton has not been dealt with specifi-
cally by any Kansas case law. However, there are authorities
which deal with the problem of incompatibility generally which
can be applied here. In Abry v. Gray, 58 Kan. 148 (1897), the
Kansas Supreme Court adopted the essential language of 19 American
and English Encyclopedia of Law, 562, as follows:
"'The incompatibility which will operate to
vacate the first office must be something more
than the mere physical impossibility of the
performance of the duties of the two offices
by one person, and may be said to arise where
the nature and duties of the two offices are
such as to render it improper, from considera-
tions of public policy, for one person to re-
tain both.'"
Subsequently, in Dyche v. Davis, supra, the Court held:
"Offices are incompatible when the performance of
the duties of one in some way interferes with
the performance of the duties of the other . . .
It is an inconsistency in the functions of the
two offices." Id. at 977.
And, in Congdon v. Knapp, supra, the court ruled that "if one
person holds two offices, the performance of the duties of
either of which does not in any way interfere with the duties
of the other, he is entitled to the compensation for both."
Id. at 207.
General authorities also provide practical guidance on the
types of interference which gives rise to incompatibility.
For example:
"[A] conflict of interest exists where one
office is subordinate to the other, and subject
in some degree to the supervisory power of its
incumbent, or where the incumbents of one of
the offices has the power of appointment as to
the other office, or has the power to remove
the incumbent of the other, as to punish the
other. Furthermore, a conflict of interest
may be demonstrated by the power to regulate
the compensation of the other, or to audit his
accounts." 67 C.J.S. Officers §27.
Applying the above principles to the offices involved here,
it is apparent that a municipal judge or fire chief appointed
by the mayor and approved by the city council (pursuant to
K.S.A. 14-201) would be subject to the latter, thus making
the dual holding of both an appointive and an elective position
incompatible. Members of the council, in addition to approving
such appointees initially, specify their duties and compensa-
tion, and can, by ordinance, abolish any office created by
them, i.e., fire chief. Clearly, it cannot be said that the
simultaneous holding of either of these appointive positron's
would not "in any way interfere with the duties" of city
councilman or mayor. For these reasons, the appointment of
a current elected city official to either of these posts
would, uncle.' Kansas law, result in the ipso facto vacation
by the official of the post to which he was elected. The
same would be true, but in reverse, if a person who is muni-
cipal judge or fire chief was elected mayor or to the council.
Abry v. Gray, supra, 58 Kan. at 148-49.
However, in our opinion such a result is not required in the
case of a member of the volunteer fire department who is also
the mayor or a councilman. Firemen generally have been held
not to occupy the status of public officers 116 McQuillin,
Municipal Corporations §45.11, 3rd ed. revised (1979)], and
the fact that the positions at issue here are volunteer makes
it doubtful that the men who fill them could be considered
ordinary employees of the city, since they exercise fire-
fighting anthority only following the receipt of a call.
16 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, §45.05, 3rd ed. revised
(1979). Rather, in our opinion such persons have the legal
status of independent contractors who, banded together in an
unincorporated association, are paid only on a services-rendered
basis. Accordingly, the doctrine of incompatibility of offices
would not apply, as that concept is limited to situations
involving two offices (Congdon v. Knapp, supra) or an office and
a position of employ whose salaries are drawn from the same
fund. (Dyche v. Davis, supra)
We would, however, add one caveat. Inasmuch as the volunteers
are compensated for each run in an amount set by the council,
the participation of a councilman/volunteer in deliberations
concerning such compensation would create a conflict of inter-
est of the type prescribed by K.S.A. 75-4304. That statute
forbids a public officer from participating in the making of
contracts in which he or she has a "substantial interest,"
which is defined at K.S.A. 75-4301 as including the receipt
of $1,000 or more annually in salary, compensation or renumer-
ation. While the possibility of a volunteer fireman receiving
this much in one year may be remote, a person faced with such
a possibility would be well-advised to abstain in such deter-
minations, and so avoid any problems later. K.S.A. 75-4304(a).
In conclusion, it is our opinion that the doctrine of incom-
patibility of offices precludes one person from holding the
position of municipal judge or fire chief while at the same
time serving as mayor or city councilman in a city of the
second class having the mayor-council form of government.
However, a person could hold either of such elective positions
and still serve as a member of the volunteer fire department,
as such volunteers are neither officers nor employees of the
city for the purposes of the doctrine. However, to avoid
any potential conflict of interest, a person in-such an
elected position should abstain in the making of any decisions
affecting the compensation of the volunteer firemen, as
required by K.S.A. 75-4304.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas Jef
JeffreyS.Southard
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:BJS:JSS:hle

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