Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1981-027

1981-027Kanag

Full text

February 2, 1981
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 81-27
Dr. Merle R. Bolton
Commissioner of Education
State Department of Education
120 East 10th Street -
Topeka, Kansas 66612
Re: Schools--Miscellaneous Provisions--Therapeutic
Psychological and Speech and Hearing Services
Synopsis: To be consistent with requirements of the United States
Constitution, the provisions of K.S.A. 72-5393 can,
and must, be construed as neither requiring nor
authorizing the provision of therapeutic psychological
and speech and hearing services, at public expense
and by public employees, on parochial school premises.
Instead, said provisions must be construed as re-
quiring that such services be provided at the "truly
religiously neutral locations" specified in the statute,
i.e., in the public schools of the school district, in
public centers, or in mobile units located off the
parochial school premises. Cited herein: K.S.A. 72-5392,
73-5393, U.S. Const., Amend. I, XIV.
Dear Dr. Bolton:
You seek our opinion on whether certain provisions of K.S.A.
72-5393 authorize a unified school district to provide, at
public expense and through the services of public employees,
therapeutic psychological and speech and hearing services on
parochial school premises.
Two decisions of the United States Supreme Court relate directly
to the issue presented by your inquiry. In Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349, 95 S.Ct. 1753, 44 L.Ed.2d 217 (1975), the Court
held unconstitutional a portion of a Pennsylvania statute which
authorized certain services, including therapeutic speech and
hearing services, to be provided, at public expense and by public
employees, on parochial school premises.
In a later case, Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 97 S.Ct. 2593,
53 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977), the United States Supreme Court said:
"In Meek the Court acknowledged the danger that
publically employed personnel who provide services
analogous to those at issue here [i.e., 'therapeutic
psychological and speech and hearing services to
pupils attending nonpublic schools' (433 U.S. at
footnote number 12)], might transmit religious
instruction and advance religious beliefs in
their activities. But, as discussed in Part V,
supra, the Court emphasized that this danger arose
from the fact that the services were performed in
the pervasively sectarian atmosphere of the church-
related school. 421 U.S., at 371, 44 L.Ed.2d 217,
95 S.Ct. 1753. See also Lemon, 403 U.S., at 618-
619, 29 L.Ed.2d 734, 91 S.Ct. 2105. The danger
existed there, not because the public employee
was likely deliberately to subvert his task
to the service of religion, but rather because
the pressures of the environment might alter
his behavior from its normal course. So long
as these types of services are offered at truly
religiously neutral locations, the danger perceived
in Meek does not arise." (Emphasis added.) 433 U.S.
at 247.
Notwithstanding the above referenced decisions of the United
States Supreme Court, there should be noted the decision of
the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York in National Coalition for Public Education and Religious
Liberty v. Harris, 489 F.Supp. 1248 (1980), an appeal of which
is pending before the United States Supreme Court. There, the
court upheld the use of funds appropriated under the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (Title I funds) for the
provision of remedial education of parochial school students
in the City of New York by public school teachers of the city
on the premises of parochial schools during regular school
hours. The decision indicates that the separation of church
and state required by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
in the field of education is not yet firmly established. However,
until a final decision is rendered by the United States Supreme
Court on the appeal of the New York case, we believe it incumbent
on us to base our opinion on the Court's statement in Wolman,
supra. Pursuant to that decision, the provision of therapueutic
psychological and speech and hearing services is permissible
under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution,
which is made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment
(see Meek v. Pittenger, supra, at 421 U.S. 351), only "[s]o long
as these types of services are offerred at truly religiously
neutral locations." (Emphasis added.) 433 U.S. at 247. Therefore,
we must regard it as settled that the United States Constitution
prohibits the furnishing of such services, at public expense and
by public employees, on parochial school premises. Thus, the
question in the instant matter is whether the provisions of
K.S.A. 72-5393 authorize a practice which violates a prohibition
provided in the United States Constitution.
The statute here under consideration is far from a model of
clarity. In pertinent part, it provides:
"[1] Any school district which provides
auxiliary school services to pupils attending
its school shall provide on an equal basis
the same auxiliary school services to every
pupil, whose parent or guardian makes a request
therefor, residing in the school district and
attending a private, nonprofit elementary or
secondary school whether such school is located
within or outside the school district. No
school district shall be required to provide
such services outside the school district.
Any such school district may provide auxiliary
services to all pupils attending a private,
nonprofit elementary or secondary school located
within the school district whether or not all
such pupils reside in the school district.
[2] Speech and hearing diagnostic services and
diagnostic psychological services, if provided
in the public schools of the school district,
shall be provided in any private, nonprofit
elementary or secondary school which is located
in the school district. [3] Therapeutic psy-
chological and speech and hearing services and
programs and services for exceptional children,
which cannot be practically provided in any
private, nonprofit elementary or secondary school
which is located in the school district, shall be
provided in the public schools of the school
district, in a public center, or in mobile units
located off the private, nonprofit elementary
or secondary school premises as determined by
the school district . . . ." (Emphasis and bracketed
numbers added to facilitate further discussion.)
It is apparent that the first three sentences of the statute
specify those pupils for whom a public school district is either
required or authorized to provide auxiliary school services. It
is important to note that the duty to provide such services is
imposed upon each "school district," which term is defined in
K.S.A. 72-5392 to mean "any public school district organized under
the laws of this state." (Emphasis added.)
The statute next requires that certain diagnostic services, if
provided in the public school, "shall be provided in any private,
nonprofit elementary or secondary school which is located in the
school district." Unfortunately, while the statute requires that
the prescribed diagnostic services be provided, it fails to
specify by whom such services are to be provided. Thus, the
question arises whether such services are to be provided by the
public school district (i.e., at public expense and by public
employees), or by the private, nonprofit school.
In our judgment, the legislative intent, based upon the context
of the statute, is that such diagnostic services are to be
provided by the public school district in (i.e., on the premises
of) any private, nonprofit elementary or secondary school located
in the school district. This conclusion is supported by the fact
the diagnostic services required to be provided are part of the
"auxiliary school services" public school districts are required
to provide under that portion of K.S.A. 72-5393 which follows
bracketed number 1 in the above quote, and, as indicated above,
the duty of providing such auxiliary school services is imposed
upon the public school districts. However, the duty imposed upon
public school districts to provide diagnostic services in parochial
schools is permissible under the First Amendment. (See Wolman v.
Walter, supra.)
Finally, the statute requires that certain therapeutic services
(as distinguished from diagnostic services),
"which cannot be practically provided in
any private, nonprofit elementary or secondary
school which is located in the school district,
shall be provided in the public schools of the
school district, in a public center, or in
mobile units located off the private, nonprofit
elementary or secondary school premises."
(Emphasis added.)
Here, again, there is a question as to upon whom the legislature
is imposing the duty to provide the therapeutic services, i.e.,
the public school district or the private, nonprofit school; but,
for the reasons specified above in regard to whose duty it is
to provide diagnostic services, it must be concluded that said
duty is being imposed upon the public school district.
However, the further question arises as to where these services
are to be provided. Inferentially, the statute authorizes them
to be provided in the private schools, since it requires such
services to be provided in designated public locations whenever
the same cannot be "practically provided" in the private schools.
As previously noted, though, the United States Supreme Court has
determined that therapeutic services such as those specified in
72-5393 can be provided at public expense and by public employees
only if such services "are offered at truly religiously neutral
locations." Wolman v. Walter, supra, at 433 U.S. 247.
Given that conclusion of the Court, the question becomes: Can
the provisions of K.S.A. 72-5393 be interpreted to be consti-
tutionally valid? In our judgment, they can. Since the high
court has interpreted the United States Constitution to preclude
the rendering of therapeutic services such as those mentioned in
K.S.A. 72-5393 at public expense and by public employees on
parochial school premises, it is proper to conclude that such
services cannot be "practically provided" in private, nonprofit,
parochial elementary and secondary schools, and, thus, must be
provided in the alternative public locations specified in the
statute.
In Harris v. Shanahan, 192 Kan. 629 (1964), the Court said:
"It is the court's duty to uphold legislation
rather than defeat it. It is presumed that the
legislature intended to pass a valid law. If
there is any reasonable way to construe legisla-
tion as constitutionally valid it should be so
construed. (Parker v. Continental Casualty Co.,
191 Kan. 674, 383 P.2d 937, and cases cited.)"
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 635.
Therefore, it is our opinion that the provisions of K.S.A. 72-5393
can, and must, be construed as neither requiring nor authorizing
the provision of therapeutic psycholocial and speech and hearing
services, at public expense and by public employees, on parochial
school premises. Instead, said provisions must be construed as
requiring that such services be provided at the "truly religiously
neutral locations" specified in the statute, i.e., in the public
schools of the school district, in a public center, or in mobile
units located off the parochial school premises.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
RodneyJ.Bieker
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:BJS:RJB:jm

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