Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1981-019

1981-019Kanag

Full text

January 20, 1981
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 81 - 19
Douglas A. Price
Humboldt City Attorney
701 Bridge Street
Humboldt, Kansas 66748
Re: Intoxicating Liquors and Beverages--Cereal Malt
Beverages--Fees for Retailers' Licenses
Synopsis: Pursuant to its constitutional home rule powers, a city
may, by charter ordinance, exempt itself from the
provisions of K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 41-2702 prescribing
license fees cities may charge cereal malt beverage
retailers, since such provisions are not uniformly
applicable to all cities. In lieu thereof, a city
may establish a classification scheme for such retailers
whereby the classes of retailers so established are
charged license fees in differing amounts. Such
classification is a valid exercise of the city's police
power and does not deny equal protection of the laws,
if the distinctions effected by the classification
scheme are reasonably related to the purpose of the
of the ordinance, i.e., the regulation of cereal malt
beverage retailers. Similarly, since the classification
scheme is regulatory in nature, the amount of any license
fee established thereby must be reasonably related to
the cost of regulating the retailer from whom it is
exacted. (Affirming Attorney General Opinion No. 78-357.)
Cited herein: K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 41-2702, Kan. Const.,
Art. 12, §5, U.S. Const. . , Amend. XIV.
Dear Mr. Price:
As city attorney for the City of Humboldt, Kansas, you have posed
essentially three questions concerning the city's issuance of cereal
malt beverage licenses.
First, you have inquired whether the Humboldt City Council may adopt
a charter ordinance exempting the city from the application of K.S.A.
1980 Supp. 41-2702. An identical question posed by the City of
Humboldt was answered in the affirmative by Attorney General Opinion
No. 78-357. There, Attorney General Curt Schneider concluded that,
because subsection (d) of 41-2702 authorized the imposition of license
fees of varying amounts, depending on the size of the county in which
the city issuing the license was located, the statute was of non-
uniform application to cities and subject to exemption therefrom, by
charter ordinance, under the city's home rule powers. (See Kan. Const.,
Art 12, §5.) We concur in that opinion. Even though 41-2702 was amended
subsequent to the issuance of Opinion No. 78-357 (see L. 1978, ch. 189,
§2), the conclusion reached therein remains valid, since the 1978
amendments did not alter the non-uniform applicability of the statute.
Your second and third questions are interdependent, permitting them
to be considered together. Anticipating our answer to the first
question, you have asked whether a city, having exempted itself from
41-2702 by charter ordinance, may differentiate, with respect to the
amount of license fees, between retailers licensed to sell cereal
malt beverages for off-premises consumption. You also have inquired
whether a similar differentiation may be made in the amount of fees
charged various retailers licensed to sell cereal malt beverages for
on-premises consumption. Specifically, your second question inquires
whether the city may establish fees for taverns that are different from
the fees for other "establishments, such as restaurants, which obtain
the bulk of their revenue from sources other than the sale of cereal
malt beverages."
In considering these questions, it should first be noted that we are
aware of no statutory provisions, other than 41-2702, that classifies
cereal malt beverage retailers. Thus, in adopting a charter ordinance
exempting the city from the provisions of 41-2702, the city "may provide
substitute and additional provisions on the same subject" covered
by the statute. Kan. Const., Art. 12, §5. Since 41-2702 establishes
a classification of cereal malt beverage retailers, it is abundantly
clear that the city's charter ordinance may also provide for a classi-
fication of such retailers.
However, any classification scheme so established must be scrutinized
in light of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which
guarantees, inter alia, that no state shall "deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Such guarantees
apply with equal force to a state's political subdivisions, such as
cities. City of Atchison v. Beckenstein, 143 Kan. 440 (1936) (and
cases cited therein.) Such proscription does not, however, preclude
a state or any of its political subdivisions from making reasonable
classifications in the exercise of its regulatory powers. As the
Kansas Supreme Court declared in State, ex rel., v. Consumers Warehouse
Market, 185 Kan. 363 (1959):
"[A] state has broad discretion in classification
in the exercise of its power of regulation, and
the Constitution of the United States does not
require that things which are different in fact are
to be treated in law as though they were the same,
but discrimination in a state regulatory statute
must be based on differences that are reasonably
related to the purpose of the statute, and the
constitutional guaranty of equal protection of the
laws is interposed against discriminations that are
entirely arbitrary. Distinctions cannot be justified
if the discrimination has no reasonable relation
to the differences." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 369-370.
Furthermore, as the court in Matheny v. City of Hutchinson, 154 Kan.
682 (1942), pointed out at 690: "As long as the classification is
a reasonable one the ordinance is valid." The Court went on to state:
"[A] city may differentiate between classes when levying a license
tax as long as the tax is levied equally and without discrimination
on all businesses or avocations exercising the same privileges within
each class." Id.
Therefore, it would appear that the city may establish its own classi-
fication scheme for the issuance of retail cereal malt beverage licenses,
as long as the different classifications are based on differences which
are reasonably related to the purpose of the ordinance, and as long as
the various classifications do not discriminate between businesses within
each class. "In any event, differing license exactions on businesses,
activities or things are justified only upon the basis of classification
that is reasonable and not discriminatory." (Footnote omitted.)
9 McQuillin Mun. Corp. §26.32c (3rd ed.), at 68.
In this instance, since the fees are imposed as a condition precedent
to engaging in business as a retailer, it is apparent that the purpose
of such classification is regulatory in nature and is established as
an exercise of the city's police power. As noted in Duff v. Garden
City, 122 Kan. 390 (1927), "license fee" is a "term usually applied
to charges for regulation, restriction and control." Id. at 393.
Also, a "regulatory charge has sometimes been said to be a condition
precedent to the right 'to carry on' an occupation, whereas the tax
for revenue is exacted merely because the occupation 'is carried on'
within the municipal limits." (Footnotes omitted.) 9 McQuillin Mun.
Corp. §26.19 (3rd ed.), at 35, 3 .6. This distinction is clearly apparent
here. Thus, the relative amounts of the fees charged the various
classes of retailers must be judged accordingly.
"The general rule is that a license fee or tax or a charge for a
permit must be reasonable in amount, and an excessive exaction is void."
(Footnotes omitted.) 9 McQuillin Mun. Corp. §26.32c (3rd ed.), at 68.
In considering the reasonableness of a city ordinance, the Court in
Watson v. City of Topeka, 194 Kan. 585 (1965), concluded that it was
a factual question requiring a determination of "whether the fees fixed
by the ordinance are reasonably related to the expenses they were
intended to pay." Id. at 591. In Matheny v. City of Hutchinson, supra,
the Court quoted from City of Leavenworth v. Booth, 15 Kan. 627 (1875),
regarding the elements to be considered in justifying the amount of
a license fee:
"'In granting licenses the items which may be taken
into consideration as elements in fixing the costs
of the same would seem to be about as follows: First,
the value of the labor and material in merely allowing
and issuing the license; second, the value of the
benefit of the license to the person obtaining the
same; third, the value of the inconvenience and cost
to the public in protecting such business, and in
permitting it to be carried on in the community; fourth,
and in some cases an additional amount imposed as a
restraint upon the number of persons who might otherwise
engage in the business. (p. 634.)'" (Emphasis added.)
Matheny v. City of Hutchinson, supra, at 689.
The determination of reasonableness, in the first instance, rests
within the sound discretion of the governing body enacting the
regulatory measure. "Ordinarily, the courts will decline to interfere
on the ground that the amount is oppressive or unreasonably large,
unless there is a manifest abuse of police power in fixing the amount."
(Footnotes omitted.) 9 McQuillin Mun. Corp., supra. As stated in
City of Beloit v. Lamborn, 182 Kan. 288 (1958): "This court has
held that there must be a wide discretion vested in the governing
bodies of cities as to the amount of a license fee; that the courts
will not interfere unless the fee imposed is flagrantly excessive."
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 294. In that case, the Court was unable to
conclude that the ordinance there under consideration was "excessive or
oppressive." Id. at 295.
From the foregoing, it is to be concluded that the amounts of the
various license fees established by the City of Humboldt must be
reasonable. They must be reasonably related to the cost of regulating
the various classes of cereal malt beverage retailers to which they are
applicable. However, such fees are to be regarded as unreasonable only
if they are so excessive or oppressive as to constitute a manifest
abuse of the city's police power.
In summary, it is our opinion that pursuant to its constitutional home
rule powers, a city may, by charter ordinance, exempt itself from
the provisions of K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 41-2702 prescribing license fees
cities may charge cereal malt beverage retailers, since such provisions
are not uniformly applicable to all cities. In lieu thereof, a city
may establish a classification scheme for such retailers whereby the
classes of retailers so established are charged license fees in differing
amounts. Such classification is a valid exercise of the city's police
power and does not deny equal protection of the laws, if the distinc-
tions effected by the classification scheme are reasonably related
to the purpose of the ordinance, i.e., the regulation of cereal
malt beverage retailers. Similarly, since the classification scheme
is regulatory in nature, the amount of any license fee established
thereby must be reasonably related to the cost of regulating the
retailer from whom it is exacted.
Because the determination of reasonableness is a factual question and
we have not been apprised of all the relevant facts necessary thereto,
we cannot express an unequivocal opinion as to the validity of the
classification scheme outlined in your letter. However, we trust
that the foregoing will be of assistance to you in this regard, and that
the principles of law enunciated herein may be applied to the factual
circumstances so as to properly evaluate said classification scheme.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
W. Robert Alderson
First Deputy Attorney General
RTS:WRA:phf

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