Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1975-343

1975-343Kanag

Full text

August 27, 1975
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 75- 343
Ms. Patricia M. Stuenkel
City Clerk
City of Andover
Post Office Box 295
Andover, Kansas 67002
Re: Cities--Officers--Vacancies
Synopsis: In a city of the third class under the mayor-
council form of government, a vacancy in the office
of chief of police must be filled by appointment
by council, pursuant to K.S.A. 1974 Supp. 15-209,
unless provided otherwise by lawful charter ordinance.
Dear Ms. Stuenkel:
You advise that the governing body of the City of Andover
by formal motion on August 20, 1975, has requested an opinion
from this office concerning appointments to city offfices
at times other than at the May organizational meeting. The
City of Andover, you advise, is a city of the third class,
governed by the mayor-council form of government. Upon the
resignation of the chief of police, the mayor made an appoint-
ment of a person then holding the part-time position of
assistant police chief to that of chief of police. The council
refused to confirm that appointment. The mayor nonetheless
proceeded to appoint the individual as chief of police, who was
given the oath of office by the city clerk. The question is
raised concerning the status and effect of the appointment.
K.S.A. 1974 Supp. 15-209 provides for the filling of vacancies
in cities of the third class under the mayor-council form of
government:
"All vacancies in office, except in the
offices of mayor and councilman, may be
filled until the next regular time for
appointment by appointment by the govern-
ing body."
Thus, the appointment of a person to fill a vacancy in the
position of chief of police is vested not in the mayor, but
in the council itself. The present appointment, as stated
above, was made solely by the mayor, and is thus ineffective
to vest title to the office in the person so appointed. The
vacancy thus remains, and the council must proceed to fill
it, either by appointing the person previously appointed by
the mayor, thus ratifying that action, or by appointing some
other individual.
The filling of vacancies under this section is thus unlike
the procedure prescribed for appointments made at the May
organizational meeting, at which appointments are made by
the mayor with the consent of the council. In filling those
vacancies mentioned above, the appointment is made not by the
mayor, but by the council itself. The taking of the oath
is not sufficient to vest title to the office in the person
appointed by the mayor, if the appointment has not been made
in the manner required by law, in this instance, by the council.
The question may arise as to the legal effect of acts performed
by the present chief of police pursuant to this appointment by
the mayor. It is very likely that in any legal proceeding
questioning such actions, they would be upheld as those of an
officer de facto. In Parvin v. Johnson, 110 Kan. 356 (1922),
the court stated thus:
"The things required in order to
constitute an officer de facto are stated
in the opinion in a leading case in these
words:
"'An officer de facto is one whose acts,
though not those of a lawful officer, the
law, upon principles of policy and justice,
will hold valid, so far as they involve the
interests of the public and third persons,
where the duties of the office were exer-
cised: 1. Without a known appointment or
election but under such circumstances of
reputation or acquiescence as were calcu-
lated to induce people without inquiry to
submit to or invoke his action, supposing
him to be the officer he assumed to be."'
However, from the receipt of this opinion, the legal defect
in the appointment being known, action must be taken promptly
to fill the vacancy.
Yoursverytruly,
CURT T. SCHNEIDER
Attorney General
CTS:JRM:kj

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