Linda D Donovan v. Clark County Assessor

PETITIONERS APPEARING PRO SE: ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT:
LINDA DONOVAN AYN K. ENGLE
FILED
Jeffersonville, IN ATTORNEY AT LAW Dec 22 2025, 2:05 pm

Indianapolis, IN CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
WILLIAM DONOVAN Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Jeffersonville, IN

IN THE
INDIANA TAX COURT

LINDA DONOVAN and WILLIAM DONOVAN, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Case No. 25T-TA-00002
)
CLARK COUNTY ASSESSOR, )
)
Respondent. )

ON APPEAL FROM A FINAL DETERMINATION OF
THE INDIANA BOARD OF TAX REVIEW

FOR PUBLICATION
December 22, 2025

MCADAM, J.

Linda Donovan and William Donovan, appearing pro se, appeal the Indiana

Board of Tax Review’s final determination that increased the 2023 assessment of their

condominium to match the price they paid to purchase it just over four months before

the assessment date. The Donovans challenge the Board’s determination as a matter of

law and fact, arguing that their purchase price could not serve as reliable valuation

evidence. Instead, they provide evidence from the sales of other condos but do not

compare them to their own property. After reviewing the certified record, the Court is not
persuaded that the Board’s decision was erroneous. There is no legal impediment to the

use of a property’s purchase price to value the property, and the totality of the evidence

in the record here can support the Board’s inference of assessed value.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Donovans own a condominium unit located in Jeffersonville, Indiana, within

a complex known as The Harbours. The property is on the 11th floor—the top floor of

the building. The Donovans purchased this property on August 24, 2022, for $810,000.

For the January 1, 2023, assessment date, the Donovans’ property was

assessed at $700,000, which was approximately $300,000 more than the prior year.

The increased assessment led the Donovans to initiate an appeal. The Donovans

appealed first to the Clark County Property Tax Assessment Board of Appeals

(“PTABOA”), which affirmed the original assessed value for 2023. The Donovans then

appealed to the Indiana Board of Tax Review.

At the hearing before the Indiana Board, the Assessor had the burden of proof

because the assessment had increased by more than 5% over the prior year and so

presented first. The Assessor presented the property record card for the subject

property as well as the Sales Disclosure Form and MLS listing detailing the August 24,

2022, purchase of the condo by the Donovans. 1 The Assessor presented testimony

from an assessor-appraiser, who testified that the August 2022 sale was an

arm’s-length transaction, was valid to be used in the trending process for the 2023

1
A sales disclosure form is a document detailing a property sale that must be filed with the
county auditor after transferring real property in a sale. See generally IND. CODE §§ 6-1.1-5.5-3,
-5. MLS stands for “multiple listing service” and acts as a private database for sharing property
listings and storing information about them. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, Multiple
Listing Services (MLS): What Is It, available at https://www.nar.realtor/mls-online-
listings/multiple-listing-service-mls-what-is-it (last visited December 18, 2025).

2
assessment, and was representative of the market value-in-use of the property as of

January 1, 2023.

The Donovans presented evidence including sales and assessment data for

other units in The Harbours building, property record cards, photographs, and

information from the 2023 Clark County real property assessment records. The

Donovans argued that their evidence indicated an assessed value of $558,800 for their

unit and showed an unconstitutional lack of uniformity in their assessment when

compared to others in their complex. They also contended that the Assessor’s evidence

was not sufficient to prove the market value-in-use of their condo.

In its final determination, the Board ordered the 2023 assessment increased to

$810,000 in accordance with Indiana Code § 6-1.1-15-20. The Board concluded that the

totality of the evidence submitted by the parties supported a finding that the Donovans’

$810,000 purchase price represented the property’s true tax value as of January 1,

2023. The Board also found that the Donovans failed to prove a lack of uniformity and

equality in the assessment.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court’s review of Indiana Board decisions is governed by Indiana Code

§ 33-26-6-6, which closely mirrors the language governing judicial review of

administrative decisions from Indiana’s Administrative Orders and Procedures Act.

Compare IND. CODE § 33-26-6-6(e) (2025), with IND. CODE § 4-21.5-5-14(d) (2025).

Under Indiana Code § 33-26-6-6, the party seeking to overturn a final determination of

the Board bears the burden of demonstrating its invalidity. IND. CODE § 33-26-6-6(b).

Challengers must demonstrate that they have been prejudiced by a final determination

3
of the Board that is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in

accordance with law; contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; in

excess of or short of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations; without observance of

the procedure required by law; or unsupported by substantial or reliable evidence.

IND. CODE § 33-26-6-6(e). The Board’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo and its

factual determinations are afforded deference when they are supported by substantial

and reliable evidence. Majestic Props., LLC v. Tippecanoe Cnty. Assessor, 241 N.E.3d

642, 644 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2024).

DISCUSSION

The Donovans claim that the Board’s final determination is contrary to law,

unsupported by substantial evidence, an abuse of discretion, and a violation of the

Indiana Constitution’s guarantee of uniform and equal assessments. They make four

arguments based on these assertions: First, they contend the Board’s decision is

contrary to law, arguing that the purchase price of a property is distinct from its market

value-in-use and cannot prove the property’s true tax value without other supporting

evidence. Second, they contend that, even if their condo’s purchase price could be used

to prove true tax value, the Board’s decision is unsupported by substantial evidence

because the evidence in the record contains factual errors and fails to account for the

circumstances surrounding the sale and its proximity to the valuation date. Third, they

contend that the Board’s decision is an abuse of discretion because the totality of the

evidence compels an alternative assessment of $558,800. Fourth, and finally, they

contend that, even if the Board’s valuation is supported by the evidence, the resulting

assessment creates a lack of uniformity and equality in violation of the Indiana

4
Constitution’s Property Tax Clause, Article 10, Section 1. Ultimately, each of these four

arguments fail, as the Donovans did not accurately apply Indiana law or demonstrate

that the evidence in the record compelled a different result. As such, the Court affirms

the Board’s determination.

I. The Board’s reliance on the purchase price was not contrary to law

The Donovans raise two arguments as part of their first claim that the Board’s

reliance on the purchase price of the Donovans’ condo was contrary to law: (1) They

argue that the purchase price represents the fair market value of the condo rather than

the market value-in-use, which is the standard for Indiana assessments. (2) They argue

that this Court has held that the purchase price of a property, standing alone, is not

sufficient to support an inference of value for the property. Both arguments, however,

misapprehend the law.

A. Fair market value and market value-in-use may converge when

the pre- and post-sale uses of a property are the same

The first contention—that the purchase price of a property cannot be used to

value that property because the price reflects the property’s fair market value while

Indiana’s assessment system is founded on market value-in-use—fails to account for

circumstances where fair market value converges with market value-in-use. When such

a convergence occurs, a recent purchase of the property can reflect a property’s value-

in-use.

Although true tax value does not mean “fair market value,”

IND. CODE § 6-1.1-31-6(c), regulations governing Indiana assessments acknowledge

that true tax value and market value overlap when there are regular exchanges of a

5
type of property for its current use. See 2021 REAL PROPERTY ASSESSMENT MANUAL

(“2021 Manual”) (incorporated by reference at 50 IND. ADMIN. CODE 2.4-1-2 (2020)) at 2.

Property assessments in Indiana are based on “true tax value,”

IND. CODE § 6-1.1-31-6(b)(6), which simply means “[t]he market value-in-use of a

property for its current use.” 2021 Manual at 2. Put differently, a property’s market

value-in-use is “the price that would induce the owner to sell the real property and . . .

the buyer would purchase the real property for a continuation of the use of the property

for its current use.” Id. Market value focuses instead on the price resulting from a

property’s “reasonable exposure in a competitive market under all conditions requisite to

a fair sale, with the buyer and seller each acting prudently, knowledgeably, and for self-

interest,” regardless of the property’s pre- or post-sale use. 2021 Manual at 6. Market

value-in-use therefore emphasizes the specific use of the property, while fair market

value does not. When the use of the property before and after its sale is the same, fair

market value and market value-in-use can converge when there are regular exchanges

of the same type of property, ensuring a competitive market. See generally THE

APPRAISAL INSTITUTE, THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE 48–53 (15th ed. 2020) (defining,

comparing, and contrasting market value, fair value, use value, and market

value-in-use).

Here, the record firmly supports the Board’s determination that the Donovans’

purchase price represented the market value-in-use of the property. The determination

of whether a sale represents the market value-in-use of a piece of property is a factual

question because it turns, at least in part, on a comparison of the use of the property

before and after sale. The Donovans do not claim that they used the condo for a

6
different purpose than the previous owner. The record shows that both the Donovans

and the seller used the condo for a residential purpose. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 74, 128;

see also Cert Admin. R at 38 (showing that condo was classified as owner-occupied

homestead property for tax cap purposes beginning in 2018).) The Donovans also do

not argue that the purchase and sale of condos similar to the subject property are

uncommon. The extensive sales evidence in this case suggests that condos in the

Donovans’ building are regularly exchanged in the open market. The Donovans fail to

identify any evidence that would suggest that their purchase of the subject property was

not representative of a convergence of fair market value and market value-in-use. 2

B. This Court’s precedent does not preclude the use of a property’s

purchase price to value the property

The second contention is that existing precedent precludes the use of the

purchase price of a property to value that property, pointing to this Court’s decision in

Hubler Realty Co. v. Hendricks Cnty. Ass’r, 938 N.E.2d 311 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2010). The

Donovans argue that the purchase price of the property at issue in Hubler was “only

persuasive because it was accompanied by appraisals, supporting testimony, and

documentation of utility to the buyer.” (Pet’rs’ Reply at 6.) They maintain that “a

property’s sale price may be indicative of market value-in-use only if it results from an

arm’s-length transaction and is supported by credible and probative evidence.” (Pet’rs’

Reply at 6 (emphases removed).)

2
Residential sales are regularly used when determining true tax value for Indiana taxation
purposes. See, e.g., Bougie v. Chapman, 244 N.E.3d 987, 991–92 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2024) (affirming
Board’s value determination that relied on comparing recently-sold homes near the subject
property); DuSablon v. Kaufman, 160 N.E.3d 587, 589 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2020) (same); Marinov v.
Tippecanoe Cnty. Assessor, 119 N.E.3d 1152, 1154 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2019) (same).

7
The Donovans are correct that Hubler does not automatically make the purchase

price of a property determinative of assessed value, but they wrongly infer restrictions

on the use of such evidence that are not found in the Court’s decision. Hubler never

reached the question of whether the purchase price of a property could support an

inference of value for the same property. The question before the Court in Hubler was

whether the evidence indicated that the assessor in that case had engaged in the

practice of selective reappraisal and sales chasing. 3 Hubler, 938 N.E.2d at 313. The

Court concluded that the evidence did not support such a finding. Id. at 315. The Court

also held that the use of the property’s purchase price by the PTABOA and the Board to

determine the value of the property as part of an administrative assessment appeal did

not amount to selective reappraisal or sales chasing. Id. Neither of these questions

required the Court to consider the probative value of a property’s purchase price in

determining the property’s value.

The price paid for a property can be used to prove the value of that property.

See, e.g., Pachniak v. Marshall Cnty. Assessor, Case No. 49T10-0904-TA-18, 2010 WL

2284248, *2 (Ind. Tax Ct. June 8, 2010) (finding purchase price of subject property

“evidence as to its actual value” for purposes of assessment). But like any other sale

offered to prove value, the extent of a purchase price’s persuasiveness turns on the

facts and circumstances surrounding the sale. These facts and circumstances must be

3
“Sales chasing, also known as selective reappraisal, is the practice of selectively changing
values for properties that have been sold, while leaving other values alone . . . . [s]elective
reappraisal cases have been characterized as those in which either one taxpayer or a small
group of taxpayers are singled-out for revaluation or for first-time assessment when similar
property is not assessed for any additional tax liability.” Big Foot Stores LLC v. Franklin Twp.
Assessor, 919 N.E.2d 621, 623 n.5 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2009) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).

8
evaluated to determine whether they permit an inference that the purchase price is

representative of market value-in-use at the time of assessment. See, e.g., Millennium

Real Est. Inv., LLC v. Assessor, Benton Cnty., 979 N.E.2d 192, 194–95 (Ind. Tax Ct.

2012) (rejecting previous purchase prices for a property for various reasons, including

that a sale involved related parties and that a sale related to a foreclosure), trans.

denied; cf. Shepard v. Clatsop Cnty. Assessor, No. TC-MD 170163R, 2018 WL

1299284, at *3, *8–9 (Or. Tax Ct. Mar. 13, 2018) (finding the purchase price of a home

unpersuasive because the home was not adequately marketed and was immediately

relisted after purchase for nearly double the purchase price). In this regard, the

purchase price of the subject property may represent the best indication of value for that

property because it eliminates the need to adjust for differences between the subject

and comparison properties. 4

Ultimately, both the probative and persuasive value of a property’s sale in

determining that property’s market value-in-use is a factual question, not a legal one.

Such questions are committed to the discretion and judgment of the finder of fact.

Hubler placed no restrictions or corroboration requirements on the use of a property’s

purchase price to infer the value of that property. The Board, as the trier of fact, is best

equipped to examine the evidence underlying the purchase price and determine

whether the sale represents the market value-in-use of the subject property.

4
This principle has been formalized in other jurisdictions, such as Oregon, where “[a] recent
sale of property is ‘very persuasive’ in determining the property’s fair market value, if the sale
was a voluntary, arm’s-length transaction between a knowledgeable and willing buyer and
seller.” Miller v. Dep’t of Revenue, State of Or., 958 P.2d 833, 837 (Or. 1998).

9
II. The Board’s value determination is supported by substantial evidence

Notwithstanding their arguments that the use of a purchase price to value a

property was legally erroneous, the Donovans lodge an alternative claim that the

Board’s conclusion of value for their condo is unsupported by substantial evidence. The

Donovans claim that the evidence of their purchase price contained three flaws that

render it incapable of supporting the Board’s value determination: (1) the MLS listing

contained unverified and inaccurate data, (2) the purchase price was not adjusted for

the time between the sale and the assessment date, and (3) the evidence failed to

account for the Donovans’ atypical motivations as buyers. While the evidence in the

certified record may be imperfect, the Court will uphold the Board’s decision if there is

more than a mere scintilla of evidence to support the Board’s findings. See CVS Corp.

v. Searcy, 137 N.E.3d 1053, 1056 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2019). Here, the evidence is sufficient to

support an inference that the Donovans’ purchase of the subject property represented

the market value-in-use of the property for the 2023 assessment date.

A. Evidence relied upon by the Board to determine true tax value

The Donovans first note that the MLS listing contained incorrect data pertaining

to the square footage and number of balconies for their condo. (Pet’rs’ Reply at 8; see

Cert. Admin. R. at 67–69, 78.) But they do not explain why these two inaccuracies

preclude the Board from relying on the body of evidence surrounding the sale to infer a

value. Determining the value of a property must often rely on imperfect market data.

See Madison Cnty. Assessor v. Kohl’s Indiana, LP, 268 N.E.3d 873, 884 (Ind. Tax Ct.

2025) (citing Lake Cnty. Assessor v. O’Day Holdings, LLC, 249 N.E.3d 677, 688 (Ind.

Tax Ct. 2024), opinion superseded on reh’g, No. 24T-TA-00009, 2025 WL 3202637

10
(Ind. Tax Ct. Nov. 17, 2025). The Donovans do not identify factual errors in the other

evidence detailing their purchase of the subject property, nor do they explain how these

two errors in the MLS listing affected the price they paid for the property. The Board

found the sale to be a “valid, arm’s length transaction in which both parties were

represented by realtors,” which is sufficient to overcome the minor inaccuracies

contained in the MLS listing. (Cert. Admin. R. at 108 ¶ 24.)

B. Difference between purchase date and assessment date

The Donovans next argue that the unique market conditions prevailing at the

time they purchased the condo and the lapse of time between their August 2022

purchase and the January 1, 2023, assessment date deprive the sale price of

persuasive value absent adjustments. In its final determination, the Board found that

there was “no evidence showing a significant change in the market” between the sale

date and the assessment date and concluded that the sale was “sufficiently close to the

valuation date for it to be reliable evidence” of the condo’s value as of the assessment

date. (Cert. Admin R. at 108 ¶ 24.) Although the Donovans offered a different

perspective in their testimony, the Board’s finding is supported by the testimony of the

Assessor’s expert who testified that the August 24, 2022, purchase price was

representative of the market value-in-use for the January 1, 2023, assessment date.

This testimony combined with the fact that the sale occurred a little more than four

months before the assessment date was sufficient to support an inference by the Board

that the sale price reflected the value of the Donovans’ condo on the assessment date.

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C. The Donovans’ personal considerations at time of purchase

The Donovans also challenge the Board’s finding that their purchase is “reliable

evidence of the subject property’s true tax value” by arguing that they were atypically

motivated buyers, which led them to pay a price that outpaced the market. (Cert. Admin.

R. at 108, ¶ 24.) Because of their age and health issues, the Donovans claim that they

decided against buying another similarly sized condo in the same complex that would

have required several months of renovation. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 127:22–31.) But

the Donovans provided no evidence suggesting that such motivations are atypical or

demonstrating that such motivations affected the eventual sale price. See DuSablon v.

Kaufman, 160 N.E.3d 587, 595 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2020) (rejecting taxpayer’s claim that they

overpaid for personal reasons because there was objective evidence that the purchase

price resulted from an “open, competitive, fair, arm’s-length transaction). Paying a

premium for a fully renovated property does not seem at all unusual, and buyers are

likely to be motivated by an array of factors when purchasing residential property. 5

Notwithstanding the Donovans’ stated motivations, the Board was empowered to weigh

that testimony against the other evidence of the sale.

Here, the record contains substantial evidence supporting the Board’s

determination that the sale was probative and reliable, as the sale bore many hallmarks

of an arm’s-length transaction: the buyer and seller were unrelated parties (see Cert.

Admin. R. at 74–75, 124); both were represented by their own agents from different

5
Paying a premium for a renovated space is not only usual but also accounted for in standard
valuation approaches. “If the subject property requires some expenditure immediately after the
purchase to reach its full utility, the adjustment amount is subtracted from the sale prices of all
comparable sales that do not require a similar expenditure to adjust those transactions for
differences from the subject property.” THE APPRAISAL INSTITUTE, supra, at 386.

12
brokerages (see Cert. Admin R. at 125–26); the property was actively marketed on the

MLS for 122 days (see Cert. Admin. R. at 78, 126); and the final sale price was

negotiated down from the asking price (see Cert. Admin. R. at 80). There was also

testimony from the Assessor’s expert that the transaction appeared to be a valid arm’s-

length sale that was representative of the market value-in-use for the 2023 assessment

date. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 124–25.) This evidence cuts against the Donovans’ stated

motivations and is capable of supporting a finding by the Board that the Donovans’

purchase was not atypical. As such, the evidence is sufficient to support an inference

that the Donovans’ purchase was indicative of the property’s true tax value.

III. The evidence does not compel a different result

The Donovans contend that the Board abused its discretion by finding that the

Donovans offered no reliable market-based evidence showing their condo’s true tax

value. On the contrary, the Donovans claim that they submitted evidence that

conclusively demonstrates the value of their property in 2023 was $558,800. Like its

review for substantial evidence, the Court’s review for an abuse of discretion sets a

highly deferential standard. “An abuse of discretion may occur if the Indiana Board’s

decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it,

or if the Indiana Board misinterprets the law.” Hubler, 938 N.E.2d at 315 n.5.

While the certified record contains several pieces of evidence which the

Donovans believe support their argument, there are substantial differences between

those units and the subject property which the Donovans do not reconcile. The record

shows that units in The Harbours vary significantly in floor level, views, bedroom and

bathroom counts, condition, and upgrade quality. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 39–65, 134–

13
38.) While the Donovans estimated costs for some upgrades when comparing

properties, they did not establish how those costs translated into value differences.

(See, e.g., Cert. Admin. R. at 130.) Ms. Donovan confirmed this in her testimony to the

Board, agreeing when cross-examined that she did not adjust any of the properties she

offered as comparables for differences such as condition, location in the complex,

number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, and condition or quality of the amenities.

(See Cert. Admin. R. at 134–35, 138.) More fundamentally, the Donovans did not

establish that they selected sales of comparable units when accounting for all value-

affecting characteristics.

Rather than showing that the Board’s conclusion is against the logic and effect of

the facts and circumstances before it, the evidence in the record supports the Board’s

finding that the Donovans’ evidence is unreliable. And while the Donovans demonstrate

in their briefing that they are familiar with the concept of generally accepted appraisal

principles, as the Board found, no evidence in the record shows that the Donovans used

these principles to explain their valuation method or analyze their data to support their

proposed valuation. Taken together, the evidence does not compel a result different

than the Board’s, and the Court will not disturb the Board’s determination on this basis.

IV. The Donovans failed to show entitlement to an equalization adjustment

The Donovans contend that the assessment of their condo is unconstitutional

and requires an equalization adjustment because it is abnormally high when compared

to the average assessment of other properties in their complex. The Board found that

the Donovans failed to complete a ratio study or compute an assessment-to-price ratio,

which left the Donovans unable to demonstrate an entitlement to an equalization

14
adjustment of the subject property’s assessment. After reviewing the evidence, the

Court finds ample support for the Board’s finding against an equalization adjustment

and is not persuaded by the Donovans’ ratio-study-type analysis that a constitutional

violation exists in this case.

An equalization adjustment provides a method to bring assessments into

compliance with Article 10, Section 1 of the Indiana Constitution. BP Prods. N. Am. Inc.

v. Matonovich, 842 N.E.2d 901, 904 n.4 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2006). That provision of the

Constitution states, in part, that “[t]he General Assembly shall provide, by law, for a

uniform and equal rate of property assessment and taxation.” IND. CONST. art. 10, § 1.

This requires a “uniform, equal, and just system” of assessment and taxation in Indiana,

where “each taxpayer’s property wealth bear[s] its proportion of the overall property tax

burden.” State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs v. Town of St. John, 702 N.E.2d 1034, 1039–1040

(Ind. 1998) (internal citation omitted); accord Boehm v. Town of St. John, 675 N.E.2d

318, 327 (Ind. 1996). For the Donovans to prevail on such a claim, they must

demonstrate that their property was “assessed and taxed on a different basis as

compared to taxpayers with substantially similar property.” Indianapolis Hist. Partners v.

State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 694 N.E.2d 1224, 1229 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1998).

This Court has previously explained that one way to measure uniformity and

equality in property assessment is through a ratio study. Westfield Golf Practice Ctr.,

LLC v. Washington Twp. Assessor, 859 N.E.2d 396, 399 n.3 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2007). A ratio

study analyzes sales data to examine the relationship between an assessed value of a

property and its market value-in-use. 50 IND. ADMIN. CODE 27-2-10. This can

demonstrate a lack of uniformity and equality by “compar[ing] the assessed values of

15
properties within an assessing jurisdiction with objectively verifiable data.” Thorsness v.

Porter Cnty. Assessor, 3 N.E.3d 49, 51 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2014). To do so accurately, a ratio

study “must be based on data that has been both appropriately stratified and statistically

analyzed” with “all the properties . . . divided (i.e., stratified) into two or more

subpopulations” before “a statistical measure of assessment uniformity [is] calculated.”

Id. at 53–54. The coefficient of dispersion, which “indicates the average deviation from

the median sale/assessment ratio,” is the most widely accepted statistical measure of

tax assessment uniformity. Id. at 54.

As the Board found in its determination, the Donovans “offered a significant

amount of raw sales and assessment data” but failed to use the data to develop a ratio

study or compute an assessment-to-sales price ratio. 6 (Cert. Admin R. at 111 ¶ 33; see

Cert. Admin. R. at 104–5 ¶ 14.) The Assessor’s expert witness testimony confirmed that

the Donovans’ calculations differed from those in a traditional ratio study. (See Cert.

Admin. R. at 145:18–146:4.) Instead of calculating a coefficient of dispersion, or another

established measure of uniformity, the Donovans testified that they compared similar-

sized condos in their complex and calculated an average assessment, which they then

compared to their own assessment. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 52, 139–40.) The

Donovans also compared these assessments based on an assessment-to-area ratio.

(See Cert. Admin. R. 39, 50.) These comparisons were made without any adjustments

6
Throughout the certified record, the Donovans conflate the term “ratio study” with the data
used for such a study, referred to by the Donovans as a “ratio file.” (E.g., Cert. Admin. R. at 34,
114, 133–34.) A ratio study is a form of applied statistics used to draw conclusions about a
group of properties sold during a given timeframe. INT’L ASSOCIATION OF ASSESSING OFFICERS,
Standard on Ratio Studies 8 (2013), available at
https://www.iaao.org/wp-content/uploads/Standard_on_Ratio_Studies.pdf. While a ratio study
can only be as accurate as its data, that data must be analyzed and used in calculations to
derive meaningful conclusions about valuation levels or uniformity. See id. at 11, 13–14.

16
to the previous sales. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 138:23–24, 140:20–23, 143:29–30,

144:14–16, 147:22.)

Indiana law does not require taxpayers to present ratio studies or present their

findings in a particular format to demonstrate a constitutional infirmity in their

assessment. See Westfield Golf, 859 N.E.2d at 399 n.3. But when the Donovans

“present[ed] evidence to the Indiana Board, it [wa]s their duty to walk the Indiana Board

through every element of their analysis.” Blesich v. Lake Cnty. Assessor, 46 N.E.3d 14,

17 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2015) (emphasis omitted).

In this case, the Donovans relied on data from a previous ratio study and applied

basic statistical analysis to that data. If the Donovans were attempting to complete a

ratio study, the Board correctly determined that they failed to conform with

professionally accepted standards for such a study. If instead the Donovans were

attempting to use another method to demonstrate a lack of uniformity and equality, then

the Board correctly determined that the Donovans’ evidence was insufficient because it

lacked the rigor and thoroughness necessary to demonstrate the validity of their

alternative method for showing a lack of uniformity and equality. The Donovans failed to

explain how comparing the average assessments of condos with square footage similar

to their own demonstrated a nonuniform or unequal assessment. They never explained

how such measures related to the market value-in-use of the analyzed properties.

While the Donovans used techniques that may be somewhat similar to valuation

statistics used in ratio studies, they did not demonstrate that these alternative methods

produce accurate results for comparing uniformity. Furthermore, while the Donovans

may have presented some probative evidence of their property’s value, the Board’s

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findings against the Donovans are supported by substantial and reliable evidence in the

certified record and did not violate the law. The Donovans failed to sufficiently analyze

their data or explain their methodology in such a way as to prove a lack of uniformity

and equality in their assessment. Because the Board’s findings in this case were not

shown to be illegal, unsupported by evidence, or unconstitutional, the Court will not

disturb the Board’s resulting determination.

V. Warning regarding the use of artificial intelligence

In their briefing, the Donovans cited “Rawles v. Monroe Cnty. Ass’r, 48T10-1705-

TA-00014, slip op. at 5–6 (Ind. Tax Ct. May 13, 2019)”—a case which neither the Court

nor the Donovans were able to locate, because it does not exist. (Pet’rs’ Reply at 10;

see generally Pet’rs’ October 6, 2025 Memo.) Ms. Donovan confirmed at the hearing

that she had relied on artificial intelligence to aid in drafting her briefs, leading the Court

to believe that this citation was an AI hallucination. (Oral Arg. at 24:24–25:15.) The

Donovans also appear to quote this Court’s Piotrowski, O’Donnell, and Westfield Golf

cases in their reply brief, but the quoted language is not present in any of these Indiana

Tax Court cases. Compare Piotrowski v. Shelby Cnty. Ass’r, 144 N.E.3d 887, 892 (Ind.

Tax Ct. 2020), and O’Donnell v. Department of Local Government Finance, 854 N.E.2d

90 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2006), and Westfield Golf Practice Ctr., LLC, 859 N.E.2d 396, with

(Pet’rs’ Reply at 5, 9–10).

Courts have sanctioned both attorneys and pro se litigants for citing fictitious

cases in briefs. Williams v. Kirch, 268 N.E.3d 284, 288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025); see also In

re Baby Boy, --- N.E.3d ----, ----, 2025 WL 2046315, at *23 (Ill. App. Ct. July 21, 2025)

(requiring an attorney who cited fictious cases in his briefs to pay monetary sanctions

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and sending a copy of the opinion to the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary

Commission). False citations may also have negative effects on the outcome of a case.

See, e.g., Kruse v. Karlen, 692 S.W.3d 43, 52–53 (Mo. Ct. App. 2024) (determining that

the appellant’s use of fictitious citations in his brief mandated a dismissal of the appeal),

reh’g denied, trans. denied. Citing fictious cases adversely affects all parties in a case.

See Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 443, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2023). It “wastes time

and money in exposing the deception” and takes a court’s time “from other important

endeavors.” Id. Moreover, “client[s] may be deprived of arguments based on authentic

judicial precedents.” Id.

The Court admonishes the Donovans for failing to confirm the accuracy of their

legal presentations but will impose no further penalties. Particularly when using

generative AI, attorneys and pro se litigants alike have a duty to independently verify the

authenticity of authoritative sources cited to the Court and to ensure they are used

accurately. Judges must be able to rely on the authenticity of the authorities cited by the

parties to make just decisions. Williams, 268 N.E.3d at 288.

CONCLUSION

The Board’s final determination in this matter is AFFIRMED.

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