Alice Luebke v. Indiana Department of Local Government Finance

ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONERS: ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENTS:
JAMES P. FENTON THEODORE E. ROKITA
ATTORNEY AT LAW ATTORNEY GENERAL OF INDIANA
Fort Wayne, IN J. DEREK ATWOOD
TRENT D. BENNETT
DEPUTY ATTORNEYS GENERAL
Indianapolis, IN

MARK J. CRANDLEY
BARNES & THORNBURG LLP
Indianapolis, IN

IN THE
INDIANA TAX COURT

ALICE LUEBKE, TINA HUGHES, AMANDA )
SCHEITLIN, and ANN CORNEWELL, )
)
Petitioners, )
)
v. ) Cause No. 24T-TA-00007
)
INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL ) FILED
GOVERNMENT FINANCE, ALLEN COUNTY, ) Sep 13 2024, 3:24 pm
INDIANA (an Indiana municipality), ALLEN )
COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, ) CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
being F. NELSON PETERS, THERESE M. ) and Tax Court

BROWN, and RICHARD BECK, in their )
official capacities only, and the ALLEN )
COUNTY, INDIANA BUILDING )
CORPORATION, )
)
Respondents. )

ON APPEAL FROM A FINAL DETERMINATION OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE

FOR PUBLICATION
September 13, 2024

WELCH, Special J.
A coalition of Allen County taxpayers is objecting to the Allen County Board of

Commissioners’ plan to build a new jail, challenging the legality of a lease approved by

the Department of Local Government Finance (the “DLGF”).1 These taxpayers contend

that the lease is unlawful because the statutory framework for county leases does not

permit the sale-leaseback of historical buildings long owned by the county, such as the

venerable Allen County Courthouse. They further argue that the jail’s construction

cannot proceed because a resolution lacks the statutorily required determination of

need for the Courthouse sale-leaseback. The Commissioners, however, assert that their

plan to build the new jail must move forward, arguing that the taxpayers lack standing to

challenge it and that the lease and resolution comply with the law. Finding no merit in

the Commissioners’ standing claim or the taxpayers’ challenge to the lease and the

resolution, the Court holds the lease is legally valid for purposes of the disputed

statutory framework and affirms the final determination of the DLGF.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Allen County Jail, which started operations in 1981, has undergone several

renovations and currently has 732 permanent beds. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 446.) In

recent years, its occupancy has ranged from 700 to 900 inmates, regularly exceeding its

maximum occupancy of just 586 beds.2 (See Cert. Admin. R. at 390, 448.) The

overcrowding issue, along with concerns about understaffing and safety threats, led to

1
For purposes of this opinion, Allen County and the Allen County Board of Commissioners are
used interchangeably, as the Commissioners are the executive body of the Allen County
government. See IND. CODE § 36-2-3.5-3 (2024).
2
“A jail is overcrowded long before every bed is filled. This is because there must be enough
beds in the proper cell locations so that prisoners can be adequately classified and separated.”
Morris v. Sheriff of Allen Cnty., No. 1:20-CV-34 DRL, 2022 WL 971098 at *9 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 31,
2022).
2
legal action, resulting in the United States District Court for the Northern District of

Indiana holding in 2022 that the conditions at the Jail violated inmates’ constitutional

rights. See Morris v. Sheriff of Allen Cnty., No. 1:20-CV-34 DRL, 2022 WL 971098, at *1

(N.D. Ind. Mar. 31, 2022). The court mandated corrective measures and ordered the

Commissioners to propose a long-term solution. Id. at *16-17.

In response to the court’s ruling, the Commissioners engaged Elevatus, a local

architectural firm, to evaluate options for addressing the Jail’s issues. (See Cert. Admin.

R. at 388.) Elevatus’s report analyzed several solutions, including expanding the current

Jail, establishing a regional facility, outsourcing inmates to nearby county jails, and

constructing a new jail at a different location. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 384-421.) The

Commissioners ultimately determined that building a new jail was the best course of

action. (See, e.g., Cert. Admin. R. at 204-73.)

The new jail was projected to take at least three years to build, with an estimated

cost of roughly $320 million. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 379, 408.) The Commissioners

undertook several steps to move this project forward. For instance, they established the

“Allen County, Indiana Building Corporation” to assist the County in financing its

facilities by acquiring, owning, constructing, renovating, and leasing both existing and

new county buildings. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 284-96.) In addition, they planned to

convey the historic Courthouse to this newly formed entity, which would then lease the

property back to the County during the new jail’s construction. (See Cert. Admin. R. at

284-89.) The sale-leaseback plan for the Courthouse sought to reduce overall costs by

avoiding approximately $28 million in capitalized interest expenses during the initial

construction period, thereby lowering the lease payments for the new jail. (See Cert.

3
Admin. R. at 195-96, 506-07 ¶ 67, 516 ¶ 104.) The Building Corporation and the

Commissioners executed a lease-purchase agreement (“the Lease”) to implement the

sale-leaseback plan and formalize the terms for leasing the new jail. (See Cert. Admin.

R. at 21-44.) Furthermore, the Commissioners reviewed two reports that analyzed

additional financing options for the new jail, primarily through either an adjusted gross

income tax (the “Jail LIT”) or an ad valorem property tax. (See Cert. Admin. R. 24-25,

368-83, 512-13 ¶¶ 91-94.)

Opposition to the new jail project soon emerged from the Allen County Residents

Against the Jail and others, proposing a vertical expansion of the existing Jail instead of

building a new facility. (See, e.g., Cert. Admin. R. at 470-73.) Over ninety Allen County

taxpayers filed a petition with the County Auditor, raising multiple objections to the

Lease. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 1-20, 218.) The Auditor certified the petition to the DLGF

on December 15, 2023, and a public hearing was held on January 4, 2024. (See Cert.

Admin. R. at 490 ¶¶ 16-18, 520-664.) On February 22, 2024, the DLGF issued a final

determination rejecting all the taxpayers’ objections and denying their petition. (Cert.

Admin. R. at 488-519.)

On March 21, 2024, Alice Luebke, Tina Hughes, Amanda Scheitlin, and Ann

Cornewell (the “Objectors”) initiated this original tax appeal, seeking to terminate the

Lease and halt the construction of the new jail. (See Pet’rs’ V. Pet. Jud. Rev. Final

Determination of the Dep’t Loc. Gov. Fin. Dated Feb. 22, 2024 (“Pet’rs’ Pet.”), ¶¶ 18-

38.) The Commissioners then moved to compel the Objectors to post a bond, arguing

that delays in the new jail project due to this lawsuit could add over $91 million in costs

for Allen County taxpayers. (See Resp’ts’ Br. Supp. Mot. Require Pl. Post Bond

4
Pursuant to Ind. Pub. Lawsuit Statute at 1-2.) The Objectors filed a brief in response to

the Commissioners’ motion for bond on May 8, 2024, followed by the Commissioners’

reply brief on May 15, 2024. The Objectors then submitted additional documents

regarding the motion on June 10, 2024. After an evidentiary hearing and oral argument

on June 12, 2024, the Court denied the Commissioners’ motion for bond on July 5,

2024. See Luebke v. Indiana Dep’t of Loc. Gov’t Fin., Case No. 24T-TA-00007, 2024

WL 3310423 (Ind. Tax Ct. July 5, 2024).

On June 28, 2024, the Objectors submitted a brief on the merits. The

Commissioners and the DLGF filed separate response briefs on July 12, 2024, with the

Objectors reply following on July 26, 2024. On August 9, 2024, the Court held an oral

argument on the merits in Allen County. During the argument, the Objectors requested

that the Court take judicial notice of the DLGF’s final determination, the bond hearing

transcript, and the related briefs. (See Oral Arg. Tr. at 9-10.) The Court granted this

request. (See Oral Arg. Tr. at 15.)

In addition, the Objectors moved for the Court to admit or take judicial notice of

the four exhibits previously admitted during the bond hearing. (Oral Arg. Tr. at 9-10.)

These exhibits were (1) a lease dated December 1, 2023, between the Building

Corporation and the Commissioners; (2) a letter dated January 18, 2024, written by

Mark J. Crandley; (3) a letter dated September 23, 2023, written by the Honorable

Frances C. Gull; and (4) a copy of the disputed resolution. (Notice, June 13, 2024.) The

Commissioners promptly objected to the Court taking judicial notice of Judge Gull’s

letter, arguing that it was not part of the certified administrative record. (See Oral Arg.

Tr. at 10-13.)

5
The Court sustained their objection, clarifying that, unlike the bond proceedings,

it is now limited to considering only the evidence within the certified administrative

record when reviewing the DLGF’s final determination. (See Oral Arg. Tr. at 13-15.) See

also, e.g., Bd. of Comm’rs of Clark Cnty. v. Indiana Dep’t of Loc. Gov’t Fin., 31 N.E.3d

552, 555 n.3 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2015); State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs v. Gatling Gun Club, Inc.,

420 N.E.2d 1324, 1326-29 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (discussing the limited nature of the

scope of judicial review of administrative agency decisions in general). While three of

the four exhibits were part of the record, Judge Gull’s letter was not. Consequently, the

Court cannot consider Judge Gull’s letter or any portion of it presented in the parties’

briefs.3

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The party seeking to overturn a final determination of the DLGF bears the burden

of demonstrating its invalidity. See Indianapolis Pub. Transp. Corp. v. Indiana Dep’t of

Loc. Gov’t Fin., 988 N.E.2d 1274, 1277 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2013). Accordingly, the Objectors

must demonstrate to the Court that the DLGF’s final determination is arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion, unsupported by substantial evidence, or in excess of

statutory authority. See id.

DISCUSSION

The Objectors’ challenge to the legality of the Lease centers on two alternative

arguments based on Indiana Code section 36-1-10-7(c) (“Section 7”), which they

contend should halt the new jail’s construction. First, the Objectors claim that Section 7

3
The Objectors made an offer of proof regarding Judge Gull’s letter. They argued that the letter
was critical to determining whether the construction of a new jail is necessary. (See Oral Arg. Tr.
at 15-16.)
6
does not permit the sale-leaseback of the Courthouse. (See Pet’rs’ Br. Supp. [Pet’rs’

Pet.] (“Pet’rs’ Br.”) at 2-6.) Alternatively, they argue that the County Council failed to

determine in Resolution No. 2023-11-16-01 (the “Resolution”) that the sale-leaseback of

the Courthouse is “needed,” as required by Section 7. (See Pet’rs’ Br. at 3-5.) The

Commissioners and the DLGF respond that both the Lease and the Resolution comply

with Section 7. (See Comm’rs’ Br. Opp’n Pet. Jud. Rev. (“Comm’rs’ Br.”) at 8-17; Dep’t

Loc. Gov’t Fin. Br. at 10, 14-15.) Additionally, the Commissioners argue that the

Objectors lack standing to bring this challenge. (See Comm’rs’ Br. at 18-20.)

Given these competing claims, the Court must first determine whether it has the

authority to consider the merits of the case. “To seek judicial review of a dispute, a

litigant must have standing – that is, it must be a proper party to invoke the court’s

authority.” Solarize Indiana, Inc. v. S. Indiana Gas & Elec. Co., 182 N.E.3d 212, 215

(Ind. 2022). “Standing is a threshold issue: if it is lacking, the court cannot consider the

merits of the claim.” Id. Accordingly, the Court will first address the Commissioners’

argument on standing before proceeding to the substantive arguments raised by the

Objectors concerning Section 7.

The Objectors’ Right to Challenge the Lease Affirmed

The Commissioners argue that this case is not properly before the Court

because the Objectors lack standing “to challenge the lease of the Courthouse[.]” (See

Comm’rs Br. at 19.) They contend that the Objectors have not established an injury

sufficient to confer standing because they have focused solely on the use of the

Courthouse as a financing method for the new jail. (See Comm’rs Br. at 19-20.)

“Standing requires litigants to demonstrate a sufficient injury before a court can

7
decide the substantive issues of their claims.” Holcomb v. Bray, 187 N.E.3d 1268, 1286

(Ind. 2022) (citation omitted). This determination is made by examining the allegations

in the lawsuit, not by considering its outcome. Id. “An injury must be personal, direct,

and one the [petitioners] ha[ve] suffered or [are] in imminent danger of suffering.” Id.

(citation omitted). While a statute can confer standing, it does so only if it requires an

injury. City of Gary v. Nicholson, 190 N.E.3d 349, 351 (Ind. 2022) (citing Solarize, 182

N.E.3d at 215, 218 n.4).

The Commissioners suggest that the Objectors have not been injured by the

sale-leaseback of the Courthouse, when viewed as a separate, unrelated transaction

from the jail project. However, they have provided no reason to consider these

transactions in isolation. On the contrary, the Commissioners have consistently

emphasized that the sale-leaseback of the Courthouse is integral to the new jail project.

Indeed, the sale-leaseback is designed to generate revenue that will reduce lease

payments by avoiding millions in capitalized interest during the new jail’s construction.

(See Cert. Admin. R. at 195-96.) This demonstrates that the construction of the new jail

and the sale-leaseback of the Courthouse are inherently interrelated, with the financing

and execution of one directly impacting and supporting the other.

An examination of the relationship between the sale-leaseback of the Courthouse

and the new jail project confirms the Objectors’ standing in this case. The sale-

leaseback of the Courthouse is a means of funding the new jail project that directly

impacts each of the Objectors individually as taxpayers and property owners. The

Commissioners and the Building Corporation executed a single lease encompassing

both the Courthouse and the new jail, creating a unified funding structure. The sale-

8
leaseback is not merely an isolated transaction, but plays a critical role in generating

substantial revenue to reduce the overall financial burden on other funding sources. The

funds required to cover lease payments are sourced from the Jail LIT, economic

development revenues from a local income tax and, if necessary, the County’s property

tax. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 24-25.) Without this revenue stream, any shortfall would

likely be offset by increasing reliance on the Jail LIT, economic development funds, or

property taxes, directly affecting the taxpayer Objectors. Thus, the sale-leaseback and

new jail project are not just parallel transactions, but form an interdependent funding

framework that materially impacts the taxpayers and property owners of Allen County.

The Commissioners’ own arguments demonstrate that the sale-leaseback of the

Courthouse is designed solely to fund the new jail project. Similarly, the Objectors

challenge to the legality of the sale-leaseback, inherently involves the entire financing

structure, which directly relies on taxpayer contributions, including the Jail LIT and

potentially the County’s property tax. As taxpayers and property owners, the Objectors

are directly impacted by the commitment of their tax liabilities in support of this funding

arrangement. Thus, their challenge is not just to the isolated transaction of the sale-

leaseback of the Courthouse, but to a funding scheme that imposes a personal and

imminent financial burden. Consequently, the Court finds that this impact constitutes a

personal and direct injury, satisfying the requirement for standing.

The Courthouse Sale-Leaseback and the Resolution Comply with Section 7

The Objectors challenge the lawfulness of the Commissioners’ plan to construct

the new jail pursuant to Section 7 on two grounds. First, they argue that Section 7 does

not explicitly authorize the sale-leaseback of the Courthouse. (See Pet’rs’ Br. at 2-5.)

9
Second, they assert that the Resolution violates Section 7 because the County Council

failed to determine that the sale-leaseback of the Courthouse is “needed.” (See Pet’rs’

Br. at 3-5.)

Section 7 Authorizes the Courthouse Sale-leaseback Transaction

The Objectors claim that the term “structure” under Section 7 does not

encompass a “project” like the sale-leaseback transaction at issue here. (See Pet’rs’ Br.

at 3-5.) In support of their argument, they reference a seminal treatise on textualism and

a dictionary definition, contending that “structure” must be interpreted in its ordinary

sense to mean “‘something (such as a building) that is constructed.’” (See Pet’rs’ Br. at

3-4 n.2 (citation omitted).) This interpretation, however, contradicts several principles of

statutory construction.

“The first step in statutory interpretation is to determine ‘whether the legislature

has spoken clearly and unambiguously on the point in question.’” Study v. State, 24

N.E.3d 947, 951-52 (Ind. 2015) (citation omitted). Clear and unambiguous statutes are

not subject to judicial construction; instead, courts must interpret the statute’s words

according to their plain and ordinary meanings. Id. Moreover, the words in a specific

section of a statute must be read within the context of the entire statutory act. See

Kokomo Urb. Dev., LLC v. Heady, 125 N.E.3d 15, 19 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2019); Minser v.

DeKalb Cnty. Plan Comm’n, 170 N.E.3d 1093, 1100 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). The Court

may not expand or contract the meaning of an unambiguous statute by reading into it

language to correct supposed omissions or defects or substituting language that it feels

the Legislature may have intended. Hutcherson v. Ward, 2 N.E.3d 138, 142 (Ind. Tax

Ct. 2013). Thus, the Court begins its analysis with the text of the statute itself, which is

10
clear and unambiguous.

At the time the Lease was executed, Section 7 provided as follows:

(a) As used in this section, “threshold amount” means two hundred
fifty thousand dollars ($250,000).

(b) This section does not apply if the total annual cost of the lease
is less than the threshold amount.

(c) A leasing agent for a political subdivision, other than a school
corporation, may not lease a structure, transportation project, or
system unless:

(1) the leasing agent receives a petition signed by fifty (50)
or more taxpayers of the political subdivision or agency; and

(2) the fiscal body of the political subdivision determines,
after investigation, that the structure, transportation project,
or system is needed.

IND. CODE § 36-1-10-7 (2023). For purposes of Section 7, the term “structure” is

statutorily defined as either “(1) a building used in connection with the operation of a

political subdivision; or (2) a parking facility.” IND. CODE § 36-1-10-2 (2023). A “leasing

agent” is defined as “the board or officer of a political subdivision or agency with the

power to lease structures.” I.C. § 36-1-10-2.

Given the facts of this case, Section 7 unambiguously specifies that a political

subdivision (excluding school corporations) cannot lease a structure (e.g., “a building

used in connection with the operation of a political subdivision”) if the total annual cost

exceeds $250,000 unless two conditions are met: (1) the leasing agent receives a

petition signed by 50 taxpayers from the political subdivision, and (2) the fiscal body of

the political subdivision determines, after investigation, that the lease is needed. I.C. §

36-1-10-7. Here, the estimated annual lease rental of $22.2 million for a 20-year term

exceeds the $250,000 threshold, requiring that the two conditions under Section 7 be

11
met. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 23-24, 518-19 ¶ 118.)

On the most fundamental level, a sale-leaseback transaction comprises two

separate yet related components: the sale of the Courthouse and its subsequent lease.

See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1068 (11th ed. 2019) (defining a “leaseback” as

“[t]he sale of property on the understanding, or with the express option, that the seller

may lease the property from the buyer, usu[ally] immediately after the sale”). The

Courthouse is unmistakably a “structure” under Section 7 as it is “a building used in

connection with the operation of a political subdivision[.]” I.C. 36-1-10-2. Thus, the

Objectors’ focus on whether the sale-leaseback transaction is consistent with the

dictionary definition of “structure” overlooks the statutory definitions and requirements

for leasing the Courthouse and is misplaced. See Minser, 170 N.E.3d at 1100 (“‘A

legislative purpose, shown by the context of a statute, should not be defeated by mere

blind adherence to definitions of words found in dictionaries, however reputable.’”)

(citation omitted).

Under Indiana’s Home Rule Act, a governmental unit like the Commissioners,

has the authority to “‘exercise any power it has to the extent that the power: (1) is not

expressly denied by the Indiana Constitution or by statute; and (2) is not expressly

granted to another entity.’” See Anderson v. Gaudin, 42 N.E.3d 82, 86 (Ind. 2015)

(citations omitted). “Any doubt as to the existence of a unit’s power must be resolved in

favor of its existence.” Id. (citation omitted). In the absence of statutory prohibition, it is

reasonable to presume that the Commissioners have the authority to transfer the

Courthouse – a property that the Objectors concede the County has owned in fee

simple for over 120 years – to the Building Corporation. Moreover, the right to convey

12
property is a fundamental aspect of the “bundle of rights” inherent in property

ownership. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1332 (defining “ownership” as “[t]he bundle of

rights allowing one to use, manage, and enjoy property, including the right to convey it

to others”). Indiana’s Home Rule Act grants the Commissioners broad discretion to

manage and leverage county assets, including engaging in financial transactions like

sale-leasebacks that are neither expressly prohibited nor limited by statute.

From a functional perspective, the sale-leaseback’s predominate purpose is not

the sale of the Courthouse but is its lease back to the County, which is governed by

Section 7. Sale-leaseback transactions are structured to facilitate leasing, providing

immediate use of the asset while leveraging it for financial purposes. See, e.g., 2

Richard R. Powell, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY Ch. 17A (Michael A. Wolf ed., 2024)

(characterizing the sale-leaseback as an example of a modern lease); 2 Richard R.

Powell, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 17.04 (Michael A. Wolf ed., 2024) (examining the

financial and tax implications of the lease component in sale-leaseback transactions);

APPRAISAL INSTITUTE, THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE 466 (14th ed. 2013) (describing

sale-leasebacks as “financing vehicles”). Here, the sale is an integral but auxiliary step

designed solely to enable the lease, bringing the sale-leaseback of the Courthouse

within the statutory framework governing the leasing of structures by counties.

The Objectors nonetheless argue that this transaction could not have been

authorized under Section 7 because the statute does not apply to sale-leasebacks. (See

Pet’rs’ Br. at 5-6.) They maintain that Indiana Code section 36-1-10-16 is the only

statute within the statutory framework for county leases that authorizes sale-leasebacks,

and it limits these transactions solely to refinancing situations. (See Pet’rs’ Br. at 5-6.)

13
Indiana Code section 36-1-10-16 provides that “[a] political subdivision or agency

owning a structure with respect to which its revenue bonds are outstanding may, to

refinance those bonds, convey the structure to the lessor in fee simple and lease it from

the lessor[.]” IND. CODE § 36-1-10-16(a) (2024). As just mentioned, Allen County has

owned the Courthouse in fee simple for over a century. The Objectors’ arguments

regarding Indiana Code section 36-1-10-16 therefore fail to gain traction because the

statute addresses circumstances not relevant to this case, and nothing within the terms

of Section 7 suggests it does not apply to sale-leaseback transactions. See ESPN, Inc.

v. Univ. of Notre Dame Police Dep’t, 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1195 (Ind. 2016) (providing that

courts must be “mindful of both what [a statute] does say and what it does not say”)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, Section 7 explicitly addresses

leases of governmental structures and does not restrict the financing methods used;

thus, it encompasses, rather than excludes, the sale-leaseback model employed here.

The Objectors emphasize that the Commissioners claimed, but did not provide

evidence, that sale-leasebacks like the one in this case are routine financing methods

used by municipalities. (See Pet’rs’ Reply Br. Supp. [Pet’rs Pet.] (“Pet’rs’ Reply Br.”) at

2-4.) However, the absence of evidence proving the widespread nature of this practice

does not alter the statutory authority that permits engaging in such transactions. By its

plain language, Section 7 authorizes the Commissioners to lease the Courthouse after

its sale, provided the statutory conditions are met. The certified administrative record

establishes that the first condition was satisfied: 91 Allen County property owners – well

exceeding the 50-taxpayer threshold – signed a petition supporting the Commissioners’

lease negotiations with the Building Corporation. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 218-73.) As for

14
the second condition, the Objectors have not contested the adequacy of the fiscal

body’s investigation into the need for the lease of the Courthouse on appeal. (See

Pet’rs’ Br. at 2-11; Pet’rs’ Reply Br. at 2-11.) Thus, the sole remaining issue on the

Lease’s legality is whether the County Council determined in the Resolution that leasing

the Courthouse is needed. If this determination was made, the Lease stands as legally

valid under Section 7.

The County Council Determined the Courthouse Sale-leaseback is “Needed”

The Objectors’ next argument is twofold. First, they contend that the County

Council failed to expressly determine in the Resolution that the leaseback of the

Courthouse was “needed,” as required by Section 7. (See Pet’rs’ Br. at 4-5.) Second,

they maintain that no implicit determination of need can be inferred because “[t]he

ordinary meaning of the term ‘project, as used in the [County] Council’s Resolution[,]

does not mean ‘structure.’” (Pet’rs’ Br. at 4-5.) These arguments, like their other claims,

misinterpret the principles of statutory construction by narrowly focusing on isolated

terms without considering the full context of the Resolution.

The interpretation of a county resolution is subject to the same rules that

governed the construction of Section 7, requiring the text to be read in its entirety and

understood within the broader context. See Hochstedler v. St. Joseph Cnty. Solid Waste

Mgmt. Dist., 770 N.E.2d 910, 914 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied; Payne v. Town of

Austin, 523 N.E.2d 245, 248 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988), trans. denied. With these principles in

mind, the pertinent portions of the Resolution provide as follows:

WHEREAS, to provide for [the] acquisition of certain real
estate in the County, including the existing Allen County
Courthouse located at 715 Calhoun St, Fort Wayne, Indiana (the
“Existing Real Estate”), and the real estate located at 3003 Meyer

15
Road, Fort Wayne, Indiana (the “New Facility Real Estate”), and the
financing of the acquisition, construction, improvement, and/or
equipping of all or any portion of a new county jail facility to be
located at the New Facility Real Estate, together with any related
improvements, all to be used for the purposes of providing
incarceration, community corrections, or other law enforcement or
criminal justice services by Allen County, Indiana (the “Project”), the
[Commissioners] will consider a resolution approving the terms and
conditions of a lease between a building corporation (the “Building
Corporation”), as lessor, and Allen County, Indiana (the “County”),
as lessee (the “Lease”), for all or a portion of the Existing Real
Estate, the New Facility Real Estate, and the Project, including any
appurtenances or improvements thereto[.]

*****

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE COUNTY
COUNCIL OF ALLEN COUNTY, INDIANA, AS FOLLOWS:

Section 1. Findings: Approval of Lease. After investigation, the
[County] Council hereby finds and determines that a need exists for
the Project and that the Project to be financed through the Lease
will be of public utility and benefit to the County. The [County]
Council further determines that the Project cannot be acquired,
constructed, improved, and equipped from any funds available to
the County. The County shall proceed to take such steps as may
be necessary to secure the acquisition, construction, equipping,
and leasing of the Project as provided by Ind. Code 36-1-10.

(Cert. Admin. R. at 275-76.)

The Resolution’s text demonstrates that the determination of need for the

leaseback of the Courthouse was made as part of the broader Project. The Courthouse,

identified as the “Existing Real Estate,” is explicitly included within the scope of the

property to be acquired, improved, and leased under the Project. In Section 1, the

County Council expressly finds and determines that there is a need for the Project,

which necessarily includes the leaseback of the Courthouse given its inclusion as part

of the defined Project.

The Resolution further clarifies that the County Council’s approval of the Lease

16
encompasses all property within the Project, including the Courthouse. This explicit

connection supports the conclusion that the leaseback of the Courthouse was

determined to be needed as an integral part of the Project. The County Council’s

approval and findings satisfy the statutory requirement of need under Section 7, a

conclusion also reached by the DLGF.

The certified administrative record establishes that the statutory conditions were

met regarding the Courthouse sale-leaseback, and the Resolution’s language is

sufficient to conclude that the County Council determined the leaseback of the

Courthouse was “needed,” both expressly and implicitly. Therefore, the Court holds that

the Lease is legally valid under Section 7.

Finally, during oral argument, the Objectors introduced an entirely new complaint

against the construction of the new jail, asserting that the Lease does not comply with

Indiana Code section 36-1-10-17 because the County imposed an income tax instead of

a property tax to fund the project. (See Oral Arg. Tr. at 20-24.) However, this issue was

not raised during the administrative proceedings, as the certified administrative record

contains no evidence of it being discussed. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 488-664.)

Procedurally, issues must be raised at the administrative level to be considered on

appeal; thus, the Objectors have waived this issue. See, e.g., Inland Steel Co. v. State

Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 739 N.E.2d 201, 220 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2000), review denied.

Even if waiver did not apply, the Objectors’ argument lacks merit. The statute

cited by the Objectors permits the use of property taxes to pay lease rentals but does

not require property taxes to be the exclusive funding source or prohibit funding lease

payments through other means, such as income taxes. See IND. CODE § 36-1-10-17(a)

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(2024) (“A political subdivision or agency that executes a lease under this chapter shall .

. . make an annual appropriation and tax levy at a rate to provide sufficient money to

pay the rental payable from property taxes stipulated in the lease.”).

CONCLUSION

For all these reasons, the final determination of the DLGF that upheld the sale-

leaseback of the Courthouse as one of the financing methods for the new jail is

AFFIRMED.

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