Brandon T. Roser v. State of Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-CR-704 | October 20, 2026 	Page 1 of 7
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any
action in reliance upon this memorandum decision until it is certified.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not
binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value
or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
I N 	T H E
Court of Appeals of Indiana
Brandon T. Roser,
Appellant-Defendant
v.
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Plaintiff
October 20, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-CR-704
Appeal from the Vanderburgh Superior Court
The Honorable Molly E. Briles, Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
82D06-2408-CM-4951
Memorandum Decision by Judge Scheele
Judges May and Pyle concur.

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Scheele, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] 	Brandon T. Roser appeals his conviction for Class A misdemeanor resisting law
enforcement, arguing the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We
agree and reverse.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] 	On August 1, 2024, Lieutenant Stetson Sunderman of the Vanderburgh County
Sheriff’s Office observed a green truck “roll[]” through a stop sign. Tr. Vol. II p.
37. Because Lieutenant Sunderman was driving an unmarked car, he reported
this information to Deputy Shelly Wallace, who located the truck and initiated
a traffic stop. The driver of the truck was later identified as Roser.
[3] 	Deputy Wallace requested Roser’s driver’s license, insurance, and car
registration. Roser “bec[a]me argumentative and refused to give [Deputy
Wallace] the requested” documents. Id. at 46. Deputy Wallace instructed Roser
to step out of the car, and Roser refused. Lieutenant Sunderman arrived and
“grabbed [Roser] by the arm” and instructed him to exit the vehicle. Id. at 39.
Roser “resist[ed]” and “pull[ed] away” from the officers but eventually got out
of the car and was arrested. Id.
[4] 	The State charged Roser with Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement
and Class C misdemeanor refusal to identify self. A bench trial was held in
January 2026. Lieutenant Sunderman testified that after he grabbed Roser’s
arm Roser “resist[ed]” and “pull[ed] away[,]” although Lieutenant Sunderman

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clarified Roser “wasn’t fighting” the officers. Id. Deputy Wallace similarly
testified that Roser “pull[ed] his arm away and lean[ed] back into the vehicle.”
Id. at 47. The State admitted video footage from Deputy Wallace’s body-worn
camera, which showed Roser refused to step out of the vehicle and pulled his
arms away from officers as they grabbed him. See Ex. A.
[5] 	The trial court found Roser not guilty of the Class C misdemeanor. As to the
resisting count, the trial court found Roser “pull[ed] [his] arm back” when
Deputy Wallace reached for him, and for that “reason” the court found him
guilty of Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. Tr. Vol. II p. 78. The
court sentenced Roser to thirty days executed in the local jail. Roser now
appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[6] 	Roser argues the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for Class A
misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. Our standard for reviewing a claim of
insufficient evidence is well settled:
For sufficiency of the evidence challenges, we consider only
probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the
judgment of the trier of fact. On sufficiency challenges, we will
neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. We will
affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find
the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021) (citations omitted). “Although
the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard of review is deferential, it is not
impossible to overcome, nor should it be.” R.W. v. State, 147 N.E.3d 378, 387

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(Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. “An impossible standard of review under
which appellate courts merely ‘rubber stamp’ the fact-finder’s determinations,
no matter how unreasonable, would raise serious constitutional concerns
because it would make the right to an appeal illusory.” Id.
[7] 	To convict Roser of resisting law enforcement, the State was required to prove
that he “(1) knowingly or intentionally (2) forcibly (3) resisted, obstructed, or
interfered with (4) a law enforcement officer, (5) while the officer was lawfully
engaged in the execution of the officer’s duties.” Runnells v. State, 186 N.E.3d
1181, 1184 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1)). Roser
argues there is insufficient evidence he “forcibly” resisted.
[8] 	Our Supreme Court has held “the word ‘forcibly’ is an essential element of
[resisting law enforcement] and modifies the entire string of verbs—resists,
obstructs, or interferes—such that the State must show forcible resistance,
forcible obstruction, or forcible interference.” Walker v. State, 998 N.E.2d 724,
726 (Ind. 2013).
[A] person “forcibly” resists, obstructs, or interferes with a police
officer when he or she uses strong, powerful, violent means to
impede an officer in the lawful execution of his or her duties. But
this should not be understood as requiring an overwhelming or
extreme level of force. The element may be satisfied with even a
modest exertion of strength, power, or violence.
Id. at 727 (emphasis added).
[9] 	Here, the evidence does not show Roser forcibly resisted the officers. While he
was noncompliant with officers and resisted their attempts to arrest him, such

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“lack of cooperation [is] not forcible resistance.” McNary v. State, 269 N.E.3d
1245, 1250 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). And although he pulled away from officers
when they grabbed him, the evidence does not show an “exertion of strength,
power, or violence” rising to the level of forcible resistance. Denney v. State, 219
N.E.3d 784, 788 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023).
[10] 	Our Supreme Court addressed a similar situation in K.W. v. State, 984 N.E.2d
610 (Ind. 2013). There, a law enforcement officer attempted to handcuff K.W.,
who “turned to walk away, pulling against [the officer’s] grasp on his wrist.”
K.W., 984 N.E.2d at 611. Our Supreme Court determined this was insufficient
evidence of forcible resistance, stating:
[The law enforcement officer’s] testimony was merely that K.W.
“began to resist and pull away,” or “turned, [and] pulled
away[.]” But nothing in either description suggests any “strength,
power, or violence” in K.W.’s maneuver, beyond what is
inherent in taking a step away, see [Spangler v. State, 607 N.E.2d
720, 723-24 (Ind. 1993)], “lean[ing] away,” see [A.C. v. State, 929
N.E.2d 907, 912 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)], or “twisting and turning a
little bit,” see [Ajabu v. State, 704 N.E.2d 494, 495 (Ind. Ct. App.
1998)]—none of which amount to “forcible” resistance.
Id. at 612-13 (internal citations to the record omitted). Following K.W., we have
continued to hold that pulling or turning away from officers, without more, is
insufficient to show forcible resistance. See Runnells, 186 N.E.3d at 1185
(insufficient evidence of forcible resistance where defendant “pull[ed] away”
while officers attempted to handcuff him); Couch v. State, 224 N.E.3d 317, 320
(Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (insufficient evidence of forcible resistance where
defendant “attempted to pull away from officers” while “twist[ing] and

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turn[ing]”); McNary, 269 N.E.3d at 1250 (insufficient evidence of forcible
resistance where defendant “pull[ed] against” the arresting officer’s hand).
[11] 	The State points us to a recent memorandum decision, Muse v. State, No. 25A-
CR-3229 (Ind. Ct. App. May 19, 2026) (mem.). In Muse, we found sufficient
evidence of forcible resistance where the defendant repeatedly pulled away from
a law enforcement officer as he was attempting to handcuff her. However, we
emphasized that in pulling away from the officer, the defendant used “enough
strength that she knocked him off balance and caused him to ‘go with her a
little bit.’” Muse, No. 25A-CR-3229 at *3. Finding this to be an exertion of “at
least a modest amount of strength against [the officer,]” we affirmed.1 Id. at *4.
[12] 	The same cannot be said here. Neither officer’s testimony established the use of
strength. Both officers testified Roser pulled away from them, but neither
testified he did anything more. The footage from the arrest similarly shows
Roser refused to comply with officer commands to exit the vehicle, and that he
attempted to pull his arms away from officers when they grabbed him. See Ex.
A, 5:05-6:00. But Roser does not appear to use any force beyond what is
inherent in pulling away. For these reasons, we conclude there is insufficient
1 To the extent Muse holds pulling away from an officer, without more, constitutes forcible resistance, we
disagree. While we respect the decisions of other panels of this Court, “Indiana does not follow horizontal
stare decisis, meaning each panel of this Court has coequal authority on an issue and considers any previous
decisions by other panels but is not bound by those decisions.” Burton v. State, 283 N.E.3d 224, 230 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2026).

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evidence Roser committed Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement and
we reverse his conviction.2
[13] 	Reversed.
May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Cara Schaefer Wieneke
Wieneke Law Office, LLC
Brooklyn, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Indiana Attorney General
Brandyn L. Arnold
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
2 In his brief, Roser proposes a bright-line test for evaluating whether the “forcible resistance” element has
been shown. We decline his invitation to adopt such a test, as our Supreme Court has stated, “whether
conduct is ‘forcible,’ such that it may support a conviction for resisting law enforcement” is not suited for a
“strict bright-line test[.]” Walker, 998 N.E.2d at 728.