Joy Sullivan v. Purdue University Small Animal Hospital, et al.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-SC-1333 | October 20, 2026 	Page 1 of 12
Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not
take any action in reliance upon this memorandum decision until it is certified.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is
not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive
value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
I N 	T H E
Court of Appeals of Indiana
Joy Sullivan,
Appellant-Petitioner
v.
Purdue University Small Animal Hospital, et al.,
Appellees-Respondents
October 20, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-SC-1333
Appeal from the Tippecanoe Superior Court
The Honorable Sarah M. Wyatt, Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
79D04-2512-SC-847
Memorandum Decision by Judge DeBoer

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Judges Foley and Felix concur.
DeBoer, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] 	Joy Sullivan appeals the dismissal of her small claims action against Purdue
University Small Animal Hospital (Purdue) and Dr. Elizabeth Thomovsky,
arguing the trial court erred when it determined she did not comply with the
Indiana Tort Claims Act (ITCA) and dismissed her claims. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] 	On December 5, 2023, Sullivan took her dog, Huston, to Purdue for a
cardiology consultation. Although Sullivan “expressly declined any diagnostic
procedures, including an echocardiogram and [x-rays],” Thomovsky performed
them. Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 2 at 17. As a result, Huston was apparently
injured and died two days later.
[3] 	On December 8, Sullivan sent the following email to Purdue’s client concerns
address:
My dog, Huston, was seen [at Purdue] on Tuesday 12/5/23. I
called on Wednesday morning to report an issue with the care he
received and have not received a call back despite being told
someone would call back on Wednesday.
My dog received treatment that I did not authorize, and
specifically told . . . Thomovsky and other staff that I did not

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want done to him. Huston was injured during the unauthorized
procedures which directly impacted his health causing death
yesterday. I expect a call today to address this issue.
Id. at 20. Afterwards, “Purdue representatives contacted her and discussed the
matter.” Id. at 25.
[4] 	On November 19, 2025, Sullivan emailed a Supplemental Notice of Tort Claim
to the Office of the Indiana Attorney General (AG). Sullivan specified the
notice was “intended to clarify, preserve, and supplement [her] previously
submitted written notice” to Purdue and was “not a new claim but an
additional written notice to ensure full compliance with [the ITCA].” Id. at 16.
The same day, the AG responded that “[Purdue] is not a State of Indiana
agency and therefore is not a valid agency to file a tort claim against.” Id. at 28.
[5] 	On December 2, Sullivan filed a notice of claim in small claims court against
Purdue and Thomovsky [collectively, the Defendants]. On January 12, 2026,
Thomovsky filed a motion to dismiss under Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6) on the
grounds that Sullivan did not comply with the ITCA. Three days later, Purdue
also filed a motion to dismiss on the same grounds.1
Purdue attached the
following exhibits to its motion: (1) Sullivan’s email to Purdue (which Purdue
refers to as Sullivan’s “Initial Notice”); (2) Sullivan’s email to the AG; and (3)
1 Purdue did not specify under which section of Rule 12(B) it moved for dismissal. But because Purdue
challenged the substance of Sullivan’s claim, we treat the motion as a request for dismissal for failure to state
a claim under Rule 12(B)(6).

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Sullivan’s Supplemental Notice of Tort Claim (Supplemental Notice). On
January 28, Sullivan responded to the motions and argued that she substantially
complied with the ITCA’s requirements and that Purdue was equitably
estopped2
from asserting an ITCA notice defense. She also requested leave to
amend her claim. To her response, Sullivan attached the email reply from the
AG.
[6] 	After considering the parties’ submissions, the trial court entered its order on
February 26, 2026, and concluded Purdue is subject to the ITCA and Sullivan
did not substantially comply with the ITCA’s requirements. The court granted
both motions and dismissed Sullivan’s claims with prejudice. Then, she filed a
motion to correct error on March 30, which the court summarily denied.
Sullivan now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
1. Standard of Review
[7] 	Sullivan argues the trial court erred when it dismissed her claims. As an initial
matter, we note that Defendants did not file appellees’ briefs. In such
circumstances, we will not “develop arguments on [their] behalf” and will
reverse the trial court’s decision if Sullivan makes a “prima facie showing of
reversible error . . . .” Davidson v. Hammond, 269 N.E.3d 1219, 1221 (Ind. Ct.
2 Sullivan did not use the term “equitable estoppel,” nor did the trial court in its ruling on the motions to
dismiss. But because her assertions appeared to set forth concepts of estoppel, and because she now uses this
language on appeal, we refer to her argument as such.

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App. 2025) (quoting Ayers v. Stowers, 200 N.E.3d 480, 483 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022)).
“Prima facie error is error ‘at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of
it.’” Ayers, 200 N.E.3d at 483 (quoting Front Row Motors, LLC v. Jones, 5 N.E.3d
753, 758 (Ind. 2014)).
[8] 	We also note that Sullivan proceeds in this matter pro se. “A litigant is not
given special consideration by virtue of [her] pro se status.” Kelly v. State, 166
N.E.3d 936, 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). Rather, “pro se litigants are bound to
follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the
consequences of their failure to do so.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983-84
(Ind. Ct. App. 2016), reh’g denied.
[9] 	Sullivan appeals from the denial of her motion to correct error. In an appeal
following a motion to correct error, our review necessarily involves both the
motion to correct error and the underlying order. Coronado v. Coronado, 243
N.E.3d 1121, 1124 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). While we generally review a ruling on
such a motion for an abuse of discretion, if the issues are purely questions of
law, our review is de novo. Ind. BMV v. Charles, 919 N.E.2d 114, 116 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2009). Here, the underlying order is the trial court’s dismissal of
Sullivan’s notice of claim under Trial Rule 12(B)(6), which is an issue of law.
See Higgason v. State, 789 N.E.2d 22, 29 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (for a Rule
12(B)(6) motion we “determine whether the trial court misapplied the law”).
[10] 	When reviewing a 12(B)(6) order of dismissal, we view the complaint in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff and will affirm unless “it is apparent that the

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facts alleged in the complaint are incapable of supporting relief under any set of
circumstances.” Id. (quoting Baker v. Town of Middlebury, 753 N.E.2d 67, 70
(Ind. Ct. App. 2001), reh’g denied, trans. denied). Small Claims Rule 2(B)(4)
requires a notice of claim to include “[a] brief statement of the nature and
amount of the claim.”3
Our Supreme Court has long held that where the brief
statement “reveals that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff cannot prevail,”
dismissal under Trial Rule 12(B)(6) is appropriate. Niksich v. Cotton, 810 N.E.2d
1003, 1006 (Ind. 2004), cert. denied.
2. The Indiana Tort Claims Act
Substantial Compliance
[11] 	First, Sullivan argues the trial court erred when it determined that she did not
substantially comply with the ITCA notice requirements. The ITCA governs
tort claims against the State of Indiana and its political subdivisions. Ind. Code
§§ 34-13-3-1 – 34-13-3-25. The term “political subdivision” includes state
educational institutions like Purdue. Ind. Code § 34-6-2-110(7) (2007) (repealed
2025) (current version at Ind. Code § 34-6-2.1-155(7) (2026)).
[12] 	A person bringing a claim against a political subdivision must notify the
political subdivision’s governing body and the Indiana Political Subdivision
3 By design, this is less stringent than the standard provided by Indiana Trial Rule 8(A)(1), which requires a
plaintiff’s complaint to provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.”

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Risk Management Commission (IPSRMC) within 180 days of the loss.4 Ind.
Code § 34-13-3-8 (2023). The notice must be in writing, “describe in a short
and plain statement the facts on which the claim is based,” and “be delivered in
person or by registered or certified mail.” Ind. Code §§ 34-13-3-10 (1998), 34-
13-3-12 (1998). The purpose of the notice requirement is to ensure the
governmental entity can investigate the underlying incident and prepare a
defense accordingly. Schoettmer v. Wright, 992 N.E.2d 702, 707 (Ind. 2013).
[13] 	When a governmental entity raises the plaintiff’s noncompliance with the ITCA
as an affirmative defense, the plaintiff bears the burden to prove compliance
prior to trial. Waldrip v. Waldrip, 976 N.E.2d 102, 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
However, not all technical violations of the ITCA’s notice requirements are
fatal to a claim. Brown v. Alexander, 876 N.E.2d 376, 381 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007),
trans. denied. A tort claim notice is substantially compliant with and satisfies the
purpose of the ITCA if “a claimant has attempted to provide notice, has fallen
short of the strictures of the statute, and yet has supplied the appropriate
governmental entity with sufficient information to investigate the claim.” Id. at
382. Substantial compliance is a question of law that examines “the efforts
made by the claimant to notify the governmental entity of the claim.” Id.
[14] 	Here, Sullivan failed to substantially comply with ITCA’s notice requirements.
Her “Initial Notice” was the December 8, 2023 email to Purdue’s client
4 In contrast, a person bringing a claim against the State must notify the AG or the relevant agency within
270 days of the loss. Ind. Code § 34-13-3-6 (1998).

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concerns address. While she sent the email well within the 180-day window
and included a short and plain statement of the underlying facts, it did not
substantially comply with ITCA. First, the email was not delivered in person or
sent via registered or certified mail to the governing body of Purdue or the
IPSRMC. Second, nowhere did Sullivan indicate that she intended to bring a
claim against Purdue. Although she requested to speak on the phone with a
Purdue representative, Sullivan did not indicate she was considering legal
action.
[15] 	Sullivan’s November 19, 2025 Supplemental Notice also failed to constitute
substantial compliance. Although this notice contained a detailed statement of
the facts and specified that Sullivan intended to seek relief under the ITCA, it
was not delivered in person or sent via registered or certified mail to the
governing body of Purdue or the IPSRMC. And it was sent almost two years
after the underlying incident occurred—well beyond the 180-day deadline.
Therefore, neither of Sullivan’s notices substantially complied with the ITCA
requirements.
Equitable Estoppel
[16] 	Next, Sullivan argues the trial court erred when it rejected her argument that
Purdue was equitably estopped from asserting an ITCA notice defense. The
principle of estoppel is that “one who by deed or conduct has induced another
to act in a particular manner will not be permitted to adopt an inconsistent
position, attitude, or course of conduct that causes injury to such other.” Brown
v. Branch, 758 N.E.2d 48, 52 (Ind. 2001). The equitable estoppel “doctrine

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provides that if a party’s actions prevent another party from obtaining the
requisite knowledge to pursue a claim, then ‘equity will toll the statute of
limitations until the equitable grounds cease to operate as a reason for delay.’”
Kenworth of Indianapolis, Inc. v. Seventy-Seven Ltd., 134 N.E.3d 370, 383 (Ind.
2019) (quoting Perryman v. Motorist Mut. Ins. Co., 846 N.E.2d 683, 690 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2006)).
[17] 	A plaintiff claiming estoppel in response to an ITCA notice defense “must show
[her] ‘(1) lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge as to the facts in
question, (2) reliance upon the conduct of the party estopped, and (3) action
based thereon of such a character as to change [her] position prejudicially.’”
Schoettmer, 992 N.E.2d at 709 (quoting Story Bed & Breakfast, LLP v. Brown Cnty.
Area Plan Comm’n, 819 N.E.2d 55, 67 (Ind. 2004)). “[E]quitable estoppel will
not be applied against governmental authorities . . . in the absence of clear
evidence that its agents made representations upon which the party asserting
estoppel relied.” Story Bed & Breakfast, 819 N.E.2d at 67. And “the crucial
question is whether the governmental unit had actual knowledge of and
investigated the [claim yet] . . . induced the plaintiff to believe that formal
notice was unnecessary.” Coghill v. Badger, 418 N.E.2d 1201, 1208 n.6 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1981), reh’g denied.
[18] 	The crux of Sullivan’s estoppel argument is that “Purdue’s conduct reasonably
induced [her] to continue using Purdue’s internal complaint process” instead of
filing an ITCA claim. Appellant’s Brief at 14. But Sullivan did not allege any
facts showing that Purdue suggested—let alone induced her to believe—that its

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internal process was intended to satisfy the prerequisites or take the place of a
formal tort claim notice. Therefore, Sullivan’s estoppel argument also fails, and
we cannot say the trial court erred when it granted Purdue’s motion to dismiss.5
Dr. Thomovsky
[19] 	Finally, Sullivan argues that her notice of claim alleged, as to Thomovsky,
operative facts sufficient to state a claim under Indiana’s notice pleading
standard6
and thus should not have been dismissed. But an employee of a
political subdivision has immunity from personal suit when the conduct giving
rise to the claim occurred within the scope of her employment. Ind. Code § 34-
13-3-5(b) (2003) (“A lawsuit alleging that an employee acted within the scope of
the employee’s employment bars an action by the claimant against the
employee personally.”).
[20] 	Here, Sullivan’s notice of claim named Thomovsky “c/o Purdue” as
“Defendant 2” and listed contact information identical to Purdue’s.
5 Throughout her brief, Sullivan argues the trial court should have considered the affidavit and eight exhibits
attached to her motion to correct error. We disagree. A motion to correct error may address “[n]ewly
discovered material evidence . . . capable of production within thirty (30) days of final judgment which, with
reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered and produced at trial.” Ind. Trial Rule 59(A)(1).
Sullivan does not allege the evidence was newly discovered and thus, it is improper for the trial court—and
this court—to consider it. And even if it was, for the reasons outlined above, Sullivan’s claims still would not
comply with the ITCA.
6 As we have already discussed, Small Claims Rule 2(B)(4) controls and requires Sullivan to provide “[a]
brief statement of the nature and amount of the claim.”

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Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 6. In the brief statement section, the notice of claim
stated:
Plaintiff brings this claim for unauthorized veterinary procedures
performed on December 5, 2023 at [Purdue] despite explicit
written and verbal refusal. Procedures performed without
[co]nsent included sedation, [x-rays], and an echocardiogram.
These unauthorized procedures caused physical injury to the dog,
Huston, leading to collapse, paralysis, and euthanasia on
December 7, 2023. Plaintiff paid the charges under distress out
of fear the dog would not be released. Two witnesses corroborate
refusal, distress, and coercion. Plaintiff seeks reimbursement for
all out-of-pocket losses directly resulting from the unauthorized
procedures.
Id. On its face, the claim clearly alleged that Thomovsky was acting within the
scope of her employment as a Purdue employee. Taken as true, the facts of this
notice of claim bar Sullivan’s suit against Thomovsky personally. See I.C. § 34-
13-3-5(b).7
[21] 	Finally, Sullivan argues the trial court erred when it did not allow her to amend
her notice of claim against Thomovsky as of right. Under Trial Rule 12(B),
“[w]hen a motion to dismiss is sustained for failure to state a claim under
(B)(6), the pleading may be amended once as of right . . . .” “Accordingly, a
7 As part of her argument, Sullivan relies on the trial court’s application of subsection (c), which states, “[a]
lawsuit filed against an employee personally must allege that an act or omission of the employee that causes a
loss is: (1) criminal; (2) clearly outside the scope of the employee’s employment; (3) malicious; (4) willful and
wanton; or (5) calculated to benefit the employee personally.” I.C. § 34-13-3-5(c)). But because we conclude
Sullivan’s claim against Thomovsky is barred under subsection (b), we need not address this subsection.

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[Rule 12(B)(6)] dismissal is without prejudice, since the complaining party
remains able to file an amended complaint within the parameters of the rule.”
Platt v. State, 664 N.E.2d 357, 361 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied, cert. denied.
However, even if the trial court erred here by dismissing Sullivan’s claim with
prejudice, Sullivan has not shown us on appeal how she would have amended
her claim to overcome the ITCA immunity afforded to Thomovsky. Thus, we
must conclude that the trial court’s error was harmless. See Springbrook Vill.
Batesville LLC v. Se. Ind. Title Inc., 195 N.E.3d 398, 402 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022)
(dismissal with prejudice was harmless error where appellant failed to indicate
how it would have amended its complaint to survive 12(B)(6) dismissal), reh’g
denied, trans. denied.
Conclusion
[22] 	For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s decision.
[23] 	Affirmed.
Foley, J., and Felix, J., concur.
APPELLANT PRO S E
Joy Sullivan
Avon, Indiana