Termination: A C v. Indiana Department of Child Services

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-JT-989 | October 16, 2026 	Page 1 of 13
Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not
take any action in reliance upon this memorandum decision until it is
certified.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not
binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value
or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
I N 	T H E
Court of Appeals of Indiana
In re the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: E.H.,
(Minor Child),
and
A.C. (Mother),
Appellant-Respondent
v.
Indiana Department of Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner
October 16, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-JT-989
Appeal from the Howard Circuit Court
The Honorable Lynn Murray, Judge

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-JT-989 | October 16, 2026 	Page 2 of 13
Trial Court Cause No.
34C01-2511-JT-000373
Memorandum Decision by Judge Felix
Chief Judge Tavitas and Bradford concur.
Felix, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] 	E.H. (“Child”) was removed from A.C.’s (“Mother”) care due to unsanitary
living conditions and Mother’s arrest after she participated in a stand-off with
law enforcement. Child was adjudicated a child in need of services (“CHINS”),
and Mother failed to meaningfully engage in court-ordered services.
Consequently, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to Child.
Mother now appeals and raises one issue for our review: Whether the trial
court’s decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights was clearly erroneous.
[2] 	We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] 	The Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) first became involved with
Child’s family in mid-August 2024 when Child’s 26-day-old half-sister died
while in the care of Mother and Mother’s then-boyfriend M.C. (“Stepfather”).1
1 Child was born on December 16, 2021. Child’s father is unknown.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-JT-989 | October 16, 2026 	Page 3 of 13
DCS substantiated allegations of neglect against Mother and Stepfather because
they had failed to seek medical treatment for “several hours” despite noticing
the half-sister’s “decline in health,” including her “struggl[es] to breathe” and
“pale” appearance. Tr. Vol. II at 16–17.
[4] 	In the early morning hours of November 27, Howard County Sheriff’s
Department deputies arrived at the trailer Mother, Stepfather, and Child resided
in to serve an arrest warrant on Stepfather. Stepfather had been convicted of
sexual misconduct with a minor, he was serving a suspended sentence for that
conviction, and a petition to revoke his probation had been filed. “Mother and
[Stepfather] refused to comply with law enforcement’s commands to exit the
trailer, and a dangerous stand-off ensued.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 111.
During the stand-off, “Mother yelled profanities at the deputies and refused to
comply with repeated demands for her and [Stepfather] to surrender and exit
the trailer.” Id. “Sheriff’s [d]eputies forcibly breached the deadbolted door to
the trailer, entered the residence with guns drawn, and apprehended Mother
and [Stepfather] inside.” Id. Deputies “immediately found a visibly frightened
[Child] in the same room where Mother and [Stepfather] were being arrested.”
Id. at 111–12. “Once restrained, Mother stated to law enforcement that she
‘didn’t have to come to the door, because her duty is to her child’ and that ‘if
my man is going to jail I’m going too.’”2 Id. at 112.
2 Mother was charged with neglect of a dependent as a Level 6 felony and resisting law enforcement as a
Class A misdemeanor; she pled guilty to the resisting charge, and the neglect charge was dismissed.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-JT-989 | October 16, 2026 	Page 4 of 13
[5] 	When deputies entered the trailer, they encountered “poor and unsanitary
living conditions for a young child.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 112. There
was “a foul odor coming from within the residence,” “[u]nflushed feces and
urine filled the toilet bowl in the bathroom,” “[d]irty clothes and objects littered
the floor,” “[m]ounds of trash were piled in different areas,” and there was no
running water. Id. Child was “suffer[ing] from an infestation of lice and was
generally dirty.” Id. Child “was transported to the Howard County Criminal
Justice Center, where DCS removed him from the care of his incarcerated
mother.” Id.
[6] 	DCS filed a CHINS petition due to the events of November 27 and the
unsanitary conditions of Mother’s residence. In late January 2025, based on
Mother’s stipulation, the trial court adjudicated Child a CHINS. In the ensuing
dispositional order, the trial court ordered Mother to, among other things, (1)
maintain safe and suitable housing, (2) secure and maintain a legal and stable
source of income, (3) complete certain assessments and follow the
recommendations therefrom, and (4) participate in supervised visitation with
Child. Mother failed to meaningfully engage in these services, so on November
6, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights over Child. Five
days later, Mother married Stepfather, a registered sex offender who was
prohibited from having contact with children, including Child.
[7] 	By the time of the factfinding hearing in February 2026, Child was in a stable
foster placement, and DCS’s plan was for Child to be adopted. After that

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-JT-989 | October 16, 2026 	Page 5 of 13
hearing, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to Child. In
support, the trial court entered the following relevant findings and conclusions:
24. On December 2, 2024, while she was still incarcerated at the
Howard County Jail, Mother spoke with [a DCS family case
manager (“FCM”)] regarding the events preceding her arrest and
the removal of [Child] from her care. Mother described
[Stepfather] as a controlling partner, verbally abusive, and
physically violent. In the days before their arrest, [Stepfather]
struck Mother in the face. As proof of the battery, Mother
showed [the] FCM . . . swelling and a still visible injury on the
bridge of her nose. She described separate occasions wherein
[Stepfather] threatened to kill her, placed a knife to her neck, and
pointed a rifle at her face. Mother stated that [Stepfather] pushed
[Child]. [Stepfather] threatened her in front of his own child,
who stayed at the trailer from time to time. [Stepfather]
controlled and isolated her by keeping her away from family and
by restricting her phone usage. Because of this tense home
atmosphere, Mother reported issues with suicidal ideation.
While still incarcerated, Mother stated she wanted to leave her
abusive relationship with [Stepfather] and work with DCS to
regain custody of her Child.
25. Although Mother initially appeared eager to make necessary
changes for the sake of her son, her willingness to cooperate and
gain independence for herself and her Child evaporated upon her
release from jail, and the same level of accountability and desire
for change never rematerialized over the course of the next fifteen
(15) months of services in the CHINS case. Instead, Mother
consistently exhibited defiance to DCS’[s] efforts at reunification
while she prioritized her loyalty to [Stepfather] over making
positive changes to reunify with her son.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 113–14.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-JT-989 | October 16, 2026 	Page 6 of 13
43. The Court finds that there is now a reasonable probability
that the conditions that resulted in [Child]’s removal and the
reasons for his placement outside the home of his Mother will
not now be remedied. Mother has not made any consistent or
significant progress towards having her Child placed safely back
in her care within the near future. Except briefly upon her arrest,
Mother has never taken responsibility for her role in endangering
[Child] just prior to his removal. . . . [Mother]’s inability to
recognize the trauma that [the November 27, 2024,] events could
cause [Child], and the immense physical danger in which she
placed her Child, highlight to the Court that there has been no
substantive change in the parent’s mindset since the date of
removal. She continues to defend [Stepfather] and blame others
for the events of that day, rather than accept that in defending
[Stepfather], she jeopardizes the physical safety and mental
health of her dependent child.
44. Ever since her release from incarceration, Mother has never
attempted to seriously address the unhealthy dynamic that has
evolved between herself and [Stepfather] over time. While still
incarcerated, and outside of [Stepfather]’s ability to exert control,
Mother acknowledged the abusive and unhealthy nature of their
relationship. But upon her release from jail, she quickly reverted
to defending [Stepfather] and depending upon support from his
family for shelter and subsistence. Another path was open to
Mother at that time: Mother could have achieved safety and
independence for herself and [Child] by engaging with DCS in
the hard work necessary for reunification. Instead, she chose the
easier, well-trodden path of relying on [Stepfather] and his orbit
of influence to survive, no matter the cost to her relationship to
[Child]. [Mother] has made no progress in extricating herself
from her harmful relationship with [Stepfather]. Rather, she has
chosen to marry [Stepfather] and to bind herself even more
closely to an individual with a history of victimizing minors.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-JT-989 | October 16, 2026 	Page 7 of 13
45. Mother believes that because she has maintained a residence
and because she insists that residence is now appropriate, DCS
has failed to show that the reasons for removal have not been
remedied. Mother fails to recognize that it is not just the
condition of her home that has caused the continuing removal of
her Child. Her Child remains outside of her care because of the
poor decision making she has shown and because of the
individuals she allows to control her life while she lives within
that home. Mother’s narrow perception of the reasons for
removal reinforce the evidence heard that Mother has not done
any serious work or made any significant progress towards
understanding how she endangered her Child while protecting
her partner, how her dependency on others creates a dangerous
environment for herself and her Child, and how this dynamic
could further endanger [Child] and her relationship to him
moving forward.
* * *
47. While Mother has consistently attended scheduled visits,
meetings, and case management sessions, she has remained
equally consistent in her refusal to learn, benefit, or change from
any application of her services. . . . At a Child and Team
Meeting two weeks prior to the hearing, Mother bluntly stated
that she refused to change her style of parenting. Mother’s
intransigence and closed-mindedness resulted in her making no
significant progress towards safe reunification over the course of
fifteen months. By her own choice, she gained virtually nothing
from her providers that would benefit her in reunification or in
building a healthy relationship to [Child].
48. Since the onset of this CHINS case, Mother has made
defying DCS and defending her husband her top priorities. She
has rebuffed and shut out any individual—whether it be a
provider, CASA, or DCS—who suggested to her a different path
towards achieving stability, independence, and healthy parenting

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-JT-989 | October 16, 2026 	Page 8 of 13
without [Stepfather]. As a result, she remains as stubborn and
unwilling to yield as she was on the day she herself was arrested
in front of her Child for shielding her partner and endangering
[Child].
49. [Mother] has consistently shown that her priorities lie not
with protecting her dependent Child from dangerous people and
situations, but with her husband, upon whom she depends to
subsist. . . . Since [Child] was removed from Mother’s care over
a year ago, her loyalty to [Stepfather], and the choices that flow
from that loyalty, have resulted in completely static progress
towards reunification: her time with her child has not increased,
her bond with [Child] remains strained, and her parenting
remains as deleterious to her young child’s well-being as it was
on the day of removal.
50. Rather than do everything in her power to learn from the
past and to better herself as a parent through services, Mother
created barriers to her own progress and impeded her own ability
to move forward with [Child]. Her insistence on incorporating
[Stepfather] into the process of reunification and into the services
distracted from the end goal of those very services: safe and
stable reunification with [Child]. Today, [Mother] remains
entirely resistant to services, to the change those services offer,
and to the possibility of healthy relationships that prioritize and
serve the well-being of her child.
51. . . . Mother has failed to utilize services to improve her
situation, to gain independence and safety for her child, to learn
from safe parenting, and to grow into mature decision making.
Her lifestyle today remains as deleterious to [Child]’s well-being,
safety, and physical health as it was when his Mother was
arrested and he was removed from the home. Mother has not
shown that she has learned from the tragedies of her past, and
she has not shown that she is now willing to prioritize [Child]’s
safety and well-being. To the contrary, Mother has only

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-JT-989 | October 16, 2026 	Page 9 of 13
consistently demonstrated that her poor decision making and her
dependent relationships with others will persist for some time yet
to come. [Child]’s future welfare should not be further
jeopardized by ongoing exposure to the habitual immaturity of
his Mother.
* * *
53. [Mother] remains wholly dependent upon [Stepfather] to
make decisions, provide housing, and maintain her lifestyle. She
continues to prioritize [Stepfather]’s wants and needs over the
well-being and safety of her child. . . .
54. As it is, continuing to expose [Child] to visits with his
Mother and to her belligerent style of parenting causes the Child
undue distress and constitutes an unnecessary risk to his ongoing
well-being and mental health.
Id. at 121–27. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
The Trial Court’s Decision to Terminate Mother’s Parental Rights to
Child Was Not Clearly Erroneous
[8] 	Mother challenges the trial court’s termination of her parental rights over Child.
“Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not
absolute. When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities,
their parental rights may be terminated.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45–46
(Ind. 2019) (internal citations omitted) (citing In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225,
1230 (Ind. 2013)), cert. denied.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-JT-989 | October 16, 2026 	Page 10 of 13
[9] 	We will affirm a trial court’s termination of parental rights unless that decision
is clearly erroneous. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636,
642 (Ind. 2014)). In reviewing for clear error, “we determine whether the
evidence supports the court’s findings and whether those findings support the
court’s judgment.” Norris v. Norris, 275 N.E.3d 505, 509 (Ind. 2026) (citing
Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 123 (Ind. 2016)). A decision is clearly
erroneous “only if the findings lack factual support in the record or if the
judgment applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.” Id. (citing
Wysocki v. Johnson, 18 N.E.3d 600, 603–04 (Ind. 2014)). We will not reweigh
the evidence or judge witness credibility, id. (citing Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at
123), and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support
the trial court’s decision, Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing In re K.E., 39 N.E.3d
641, 646 (Ind. 2015)). Furthermore, we accept as true any findings which
Mother does not challenge on appeal. See R.M. v. Ind. Dep’t Child Servs., 203
N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686,
687 (Ind. 1992)).
[10] 	To terminate Mother’s parental rights, DCS had to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that, among other things, there is a reasonable probability
that the conditions that resulted in Child’s removal or the reasons for placement
outside Mother’s home will not be remedied. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(1),
(d)(3). To determine whether the conditions that resulted in Child’s removal
are not likely to be remedied, the trial court first “identif[ies] the conditions that
led to removal” and then “determine[s] whether there is a reasonable

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-JT-989 | October 16, 2026 	Page 11 of 13
probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” K.E., 39 N.E.3d at 647
(quoting E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643); see also In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1134 (Ind.
2010). “The second step of the analysis requires judgment of the parent’s fitness
at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of
changed conditions. Changed conditions are balanced against habitual patterns
of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future
neglect.” K.E., 39 N.E.3d at 647 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). “We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has
discretion to weigh a parent’s prior history more heavily than efforts made only
shortly before termination.” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643 (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d
at 1234).
[11] 	Mother argues that she remedied both reasons for Child’s removal—her arrest
and the unsanitary state of her residence. In making her arguments, Mother
does not specifically challenge any of the trial court’s findings; consequently, we
take all those findings as true. See R.M., 203 N.E.3d at 564 (citing Madlem, 592
N.E.2d at 687). To the extent Mother’s arguments can be read to challenge
particular findings, those arguments are merely invitations for us to reweigh the
evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do. See Ma.H., 134
N.E.3d at 45 (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642). For instance, Mother asserts that
“there was plenty of testimony . . . that [she] had remedied [the unsanitary]
conditions at the time of the” factfinding hearing. Appellant’s Br. at 12. Just
days before the termination hearing, the visit facilitator found Mother’s home to
be “cluttered,” smelling of cat urine, “[n]ot very clean,” and “[n]ot very

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-JT-989 | October 16, 2026 	Page 12 of 13
sanitary.” Tr. Vol. II at 54. The trial court expressly found that “[t]he
conditions of the trailer were poor and unsuitable for hosting” Child.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 118. Mother also ignores the trial court’s findings
that she (1) was “unwilling[] to work with providers,” which “left her firmly
rooted to the exact same lifestyle and environment that were untenable to
[Child]’s safety and well-being at the time of his removal from her care,” id. at
121, and (2) has “fail[ed] to recognize” that Child “remain[ed] outside of her
care because of the poor decision making she has shown and because of the
individuals she allows to control her life,” id. at 123.
[12] 	Considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial
court’s decision, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in concluding
that Mother has not and likely will not remedy the reasons for Child’s removal
or placement outside of Mother’s care.3 The trial court therefore did not clearly
err by terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child, and we affirm that
decision.
3 Additionally, DCS alleged and the trial court concluded that Mother’s parental rights to Child should be
terminated because the continuation of their parent-child relationship posed a threat to Child pursuant to
Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d)(4). Mother challenges this conclusion, as well, but DCS only needed to
prove either that there was not a reasonable probability Mother would remedy the reasons for removal or that
Mother’s relationship with Child posed a threat to Child’s well-being. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(1), (d).
Because we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in concluding there was not a reasonable
probability Mother would remedy the reasons for removal, we need not address her argument regarding the
threat posed to Child by the continuation of the parent-child relationship. However, we note that Mother’s
arguments thereon are requests for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we
cannot do. See In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019) (citing In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014)).
And the evidence clearly demonstrates that Mother remains a risk to Child because of her unchanged
mentality and resistance to services.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-JT-989 | October 16, 2026 	Page 13 of 13
[13] 	Affirmed.
Tavitas, C.J., and Bradford, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Eric Grzegorski
Howard County Public Defender
Kokomo, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Indiana Attorney General
Lela Rae
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana