In re D.S.

2026 IL App (4th) 260672-U
NO. 4-26-0672
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re D.S., a Minor
(The People of the State of Illinois,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v.
Sammy W.,
Respondent-Appellant).
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Appeal from the
Circuit Court of
Sangamon County
No. 24JA161
Honorable
Sierra Senor-Moore,
Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Vancil and Harris concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding the trial court’s unfitness and best-interest
findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 2 Respondent father, Sammy W., appeals the trial court’s judgment terminating his
parental rights to his son, D.S. (born June 2024). On appeal, respondent argues the court’s findings
he was an unfit parent and it was in the minor’s best interest to terminate his parental rights are
against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 The minor’s mother, Sherika S., is not a party to this appeal. Her parental rights
were terminated during the proceedings below pursuant to a voluntary surrender. The following is
gleaned from the record as it relates to respondent and the arguments presented in this appeal.
¶ 5 A. Petition to Terminate Parental Rights
NOTICE
This Order was filed under
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed
under Rule 23(e)(1).
FILED
October 14, 2026
Carla Bender
4th District Appellate
Court, IL

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¶ 6 In February 2026, the State filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights.
In part, the State alleged respondent was an unfit parent in that he failed to maintain a reasonable
degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the minor’s welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West
2024)). The State further alleged it was in the minor’s best interest to terminate respondent’s
parental rights and appoint the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) as
guardian, with the power to consent to adoption.
¶ 7 B. Fitness Hearing
¶ 8 In June 2026, the trial court conducted a fitness hearing. The court took judicial
notice of the adjudicatory and dispositional orders entered in this case, as well as certain
information from Sangamon County case Nos. 24-CF-774 and 25-CF-1024. The court also heard
testimony from a child welfare supervisor who had been assigned to the minor’s case. The
following is gleaned from the evidence presented.
¶ 9 At the time of the minor’s June 2024 birth, respondent was incarcerated on pending
felony charges in case No. 24-CF-774. Additional felony charges were later filed against him in
case No. 25-CF-1024. Respondent remained incarcerated throughout the proceedings in this case.
¶ 10 Shortly after the minor’s birth, DCFS took temporary custody of him due to his
mother’s substance abuse. He was then adjudicated neglected based upon a stipulation from his
mother and made a ward of the court.
¶ 11 Respondent was asked to submit to genetic testing and cooperate with the agency
assigned to the minor’s case. Respondent submitted a sample for genetic testing, met with
caseworkers when they came to the jail, and participated in an integrated assessment.
¶ 12 The agency assigned to the minor’s case did not refer respondent to service
programs due to his incarceration. Respondent reported participating in domestic violence and

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alcohol abuse programs offered through the jail. He also reported looking into a life skills program.
The agency did not seek permission for visits between respondent and the minor.
¶ 13 The case supervisor indicated the caseworkers contacted respondent in person and
by phone, with most contact occurring in person. The case supervisor described the contact as
“sporadic.” She explained caseworkers usually contact parents once a month, but the caseworkers
here occasionally missed monthly contact. The case supervisor was unaware of any attempts by
respondent to contact the caseworkers.
¶ 14 The case supervisor, who met with respondent around March 2025, was never
contacted by respondent. She acknowledged respondent did not have her direct phone number but
indicated he could have contacted the agency to reach her.
¶ 15 The case supervisor indicated she was unaware of any communication between
respondent and the minor’s foster parents or the minor. She also indicated she was unaware of any
cards or gifts sent to the minor from respondent.
¶ 16 The caseworker testified the agency was never close to placing the minor in the
care of respondent due to his incarceration.
¶ 17 Based on this information, the trial court found the State had shown respondent was
an unfit parent in that he failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or
responsibility as to the minor’s welfare. In support, the court emphasized respondent did not
contact those involved in monitoring the welfare of the minor, nor did he contact the minor or send
cards or gifts to him. The court noted respondent’s incarceration did not prevent him from making
such efforts.
¶ 18 C. Best-Interest Hearing
¶ 19 Also in June 2026, the trial court conducted a best-interest hearing. The court took

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judicial notice of the evidence from the fitness hearing. The court also heard testimony from the
case supervisor. The following is gleaned from the evidence presented.
¶ 20 The minor, who was approximately two years old, had been placed with his foster
family since shortly after the case opened. The foster father is the maternal grandfather, and the
foster mother is the maternal grandfather’s paramour. The minor was bonded to his foster parents.
The foster family included siblings of the minor who had been previously adopted by the foster
parents. The foster parents allowed the minor’s mother to visit the adopted children. The family
lived in a two-story townhouse, in which the minor had his own bedroom. The foster parents
ensured the minor’s educational, social, and medical needs were met. The foster parents were
willing to provide the minor with permanency through adoption.
¶ 21 The case supervisor believed it was in the minor’s best interest to terminate
respondent’s parental rights.
¶ 22 Based on this information, the trial court, after considering the statutory best-
interest factors found in section 1-3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1-
3(4.05) (West 2024)), found it would be in the minor’s best interest to terminate respondent’s
parental rights. The court entered a written order terminating respondent’s parental rights.
¶ 23 This appeal followed.
¶ 24 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 25 On appeal, respondent argues the trial court’s findings he was an unfit parent and
it was in the minor’s best interest to terminate his parental rights are against the manifest weight
of the evidence. The State disagrees.
¶ 26 A. Unfitness Finding
¶ 27 Respondent argues the trial court’s finding he was an unfit parent is against the

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manifest weight of the evidence. In support, respondent (1) emphasizes his cooperation when the
caseworkers and case supervisor contacted him and (2) faults the agency for not facilitating contact
between him and the minor.
¶ 28 The State must prove parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence. In re
N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 28. A trial court’s finding of parental unfitness will not be disturbed on
appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. ¶ 29. A finding is against the
manifest weight of the evidence “only where the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent.” Id.
¶ 29 The trial court found respondent was an unfit parent as defined in section 1(D)(b)
of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2024)). Section 1(D)(b) states a parent will be
considered an “unfit person” if he or she fails “to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern,
or responsibility as to the child’s welfare.” Id.
¶ 30 In determining whether a parent showed a reasonable degree of interest, concern,
or responsibility as to a child’s welfare, the trial court must examine “the parent’s conduct
concerning the child in the context of the circumstances in which that conduct occurred.” In re
Adoption of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 255, 278 (1990). “This ground does not focus on the parent’s success
but, rather, the reasonableness of her efforts and takes into account the parent’s difficulties and
circumstances.” In re Nicholas C., 2017 IL App (1st) 162101, ¶ 24.
¶ 31 While respondent highlights his cooperation when the caseworkers and case
supervisor contacted him and faults the agency for not facilitating contact between him and the
minor, he does not dispute his own lack of effort to contact the minor or inquire about the minor’s
welfare during the periods when the caseworkers did not meet with him. Essentially, respondent
suggests the shortcomings of others should excuse the lack of effort on his part, a suggestion which
we reject. As the trial court noted, the evidence does not indicate respondent’s incarceration

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prevented him from contacting the caseworkers, the case supervisor, the foster parents, or the
minor or from sending cards or gifts to the minor. Given this record, we find the unfitness finding
based on respondent’s failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility
as to the minor’s welfare is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 32 In so finding, we reject respondent’s suggestion this case is like In re Overton, 21
Ill. App. 3d 1014, 1018 (1974), which reversed a finding that a mother failed to maintain a
reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to her children’s welfare. In Overton,
the evidence showed (1) the caseworker communicated to the mother she should not visit her
children and (2) the assigned agency never delivered a gift the mother sent to her children. Id. at
1019. Conversely, in this case, there is no evidence of official acts intended to frustrate attempts
by respondent to contact the minor. Overton, therefore, is distinguishable. See In re Bales, 83 Ill.
App. 3d 348, 351 (1980) (distinguishing Overton on similar grounds).
¶ 33 B. Best-Interest Finding
¶ 34 Respondent also argues the trial court’s finding it was in the minor’s best interest
to terminate his parental rights is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In support,
respondent asserts the minor’s background and familial ties are best served by maintaining parental
rights.
¶ 35 The State must prove termination is in a child’s best interest by a preponderance of
the evidence. In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 367 (2004). A trial court’s best-interest finding will not
be disturbed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re J.B., 2019 IL
App (4th) 190537, ¶ 33. Again, a finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only where
the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. Id.
¶ 36 When considering whether termination of parental rights would be in a child’s best

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interest, the trial court must consider several statutory factors within the context of the child’s age
and developmental needs. See 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2024). The focus is on the child, and
the parent’s interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield to the child’s interest
in a stable, loving home life. D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 364.
¶ 37 The evidence showed the minor had been in the care of his foster family for most
of his life. He was related to his foster father and foster siblings. His needs were being met, and
his foster parents were willing to provide him with permanency through adoption. Conversely,
respondent remained incarcerated and had never communicated with the minor. Regardless of the
background and familial ties which would be severed by terminating respondent’s parental rights,
the minor’s needs for permanency and stability supported termination of respondent’s parental
rights. Given this record, we conclude the finding it was in the minor’s best interest to terminate
respondent’s parental rights is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 38 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 39 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 40 Affirmed.

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