People v. Hackleman

2026 IL App (2d) 250226-U
No. 2-25-0226
Order filed October 16, 2026
NOTICE: This order was filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not
precedential except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
BARRY J. HACKLEMAN, Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake County.
Honorable Davis C. Lombardo, Judge, Presiding.
No. 24-CF-2065
JUSTICE JORGENSEN delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Kennedy and Justice Birkett concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: Defendant forfeited review of all 15 issues in his pro se appeal because he did not
cogently argue them. Additionally, six issues were forfeited because he failed to
include those issues in a posttrial motion. Of the claims addressed, discovery,
witness, perjury, date-change, and leniency claims were all properly denied by the
circuit court. Affirmed.
¶ 2 Following a jury trial, defendant, Barry J. Hackleman, was found guilty of eight counts of
theft (720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(1)(A), (a)(4)(A) (West 2024)), stemming from a law enforcement stop
where stolen boat parts and accessories were recovered. Defendant was sentenced to seven and a
half years of imprisonment. Defendant, pro se, appeals, raising 15 issues. Overall, he challenges
the handling of witnesses and evidence, the court’s requirement that his pro se actions be held to

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the same standards as a lawyer, and the refusal to dismiss a juror who allegedly tainted the jury.
We affirm.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 A. Pretrial Proceedings
¶ 5 On October 4, 2024, defendant was charged with two counts (counts I and II, respectively)
for theft of property with a value between $300 and $10,000 (id. § 5/16-1(a)(4) (Class 3)) and
improper use of registration (625 ILCS 5/3-703 (West 2024)). The State amended the charges on
December 30, 2024, adding eight counts of theft (720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(1)(A), (a)(4)(A) (West 2024)
(two Class 3 felonies and six Class 4 felonies)), relating to the theft of Mario Juarez’s outdrive
(counts III through VI), his ATF curtain (counts VII and VIII), and dock carpeting (counts IX and
X). At the time of these offenses, defendant had pending misdemeanor charges in Lake County in
case No. 24-CM-1061, and was detained in that case (those charges were ultimately dismissed).
¶ 6 On October 30, 2024, defendant moved to proceed pro se, and his public defender moved
to withdraw. At a hearing, defendant indicated he had successfully proceeded pro se in two other
cases, knew how to conduct legal research, and understood that representing himself was “not as
simple as just going in front of a jury and telling [his] story.” Defendant was aware that he would
not get extra preparation time or assistance because he was pro se, and “[he] was going to be
treated the same as if [he] had an attorney representing [him].” In addition to this exchange, the
court substantially admonished defendant in accordance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401 (eff.
July 1, 1984). Defendant was allowed to proceed pro se. At the conclusion of the hearing,
defendant asked to file a motion for a “sub report” and to gain access to his truck and property for
his defense. The court recommended defendant file a written motion, and noted it would address

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the motion after defendant’s arraignment. As to his property, the State advised that defendant’s
property was still being held as evidence.
¶ 7 On November 12, 2024, the court arraigned defendant, advised him that he was eligible for
an extended term sentence, and reappointed counsel. On the next court date, defendant, again,
moved to proceed pro se. The court questioned defendant about his education, explained the nature
of his felonies and sentences, and granted defendant’s request. Thereafter, the State indicated it
had tendered discovery; however, defendant asserted that he did not have access to his full
discovery. Ultimately, the State agreed to tender discovery to the jail, and defendant was ordered
to submit any specific discovery requests in writing.
¶ 8 Nearly a week after his arraignment, defendant orally moved to place the truck involved in
this investigation, which he did not own, on an investigative hold and asked to gain access to files
in the jail’s custody. The court ordered the State to investigate the status of the truck and property
being held at the jail. On November 20, 2024, the State reported it had tendered discovery to
defendant at the jail on a USB drive. Defendant responded that he was still missing his paper
discovery, photographs, jury instructions, and an evidence sheet. The prosecutor agreed to print
any discovery, and the court remarked that it would find a way to allow defendant to watch any
video discovery.
¶ 9 On December 4, 2024, the lead prosecutor stepped down, as defendant had left him
incriminating voicemails and he would likely be called as a foundational witness at trial.
Thereafter, defendant moved to secure his storage lockers, “where there [are] more things for this
alleged victim to get—pick up his stuff.” The court did not accept defendant’s filing, and it
admonished defendant to “[b]e careful of what you want to say about—*** possessing things of
victims.” Defendant moved to gain access to his “papers, phone numbers, and [his] personal

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property” being held at the jail, and he asserted that he still did not have access to the State’s
discovery. Five days later, the State tendered discovery (five DVDs, a CD, and 52 photographs) to
defendant, and the court ordered that defendant have access to the discovery, via laptop, and his
property at the jail to help with his defense.
¶ 10 On December 14, 2024, defendant filed a motion in limine, seeking to exclude his criminal
history, preclude his testimony at trial, and advance his theory that he was hired to tow and store
the missing boat for six months. Nearly two weeks later, the State filed motions in limine, asking
the court to preclude, inter alia, defendant from raising a contract as an affirmative defense,
mentioning false confessions, and calling any witness not previously disclosed. Further, it moved
to introduce as evidence a jail call to the initial prosecutor; defendant’s in-court statements; and
defendant’s prior convictions for theft, burglary, and unlawful possession of a controlled substance.
Defendant objected to the use of his in-court statements, as “[he] gave the State this information
to go get those belongings back to the alleged victim. I think it’s unjust they are charging me for
giving a victim back his property ***.”
¶ 11 At a hearing on December 30, 2024, the State’s motions in limine, regarding defendant’s
prior convictions and his jail call, were granted by agreement. The court also allowed the admission
of defendant’s in-court statements, and the State struck its request to bar defendant from raising
his contractual defense. Defendant confirmed he had access to a laptop and the DVD discovery,
and the court granted defendant’s request for a jail tablet during trial to present evidence of his jail
calls. The State tendered a transcript, titles, a business certification, photographs, and a receipt to
defendant. Thereafter, defendant asked the court to complete and file subpoenas on his behalf. The
court refused.

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¶ 12 One week later, on January 6, 2025, defendant answered ready for trial. The State tendered
business certificates, a boat title, and photographs to defendant. Defendant confirmed that he had
issued subpoenas; however, none of his witnesses were present, as he ordered them to be present
on January 7, 2025. The court ordered defendant’s subpoenas to remain in effect until January 8,
2025, and held the case over until January 7, 2025, to order any subpoenaed witnesses to be present
the following day for trial. Thereafter, defendant argued for his release, as to case No. 24-CM-
1061, because he had been held in custody for more than 90 days. In making his arguments,
defendant alleged that the court’s minute orders and transcripts were false, as they falsely showed
continuances by agreement where, defendant asserted, he objected. Defendant requested that the
court listen to all audio recordings of his hearings to verify that defendant continuously objected
to continuances. The court continued the case for defendant to list the hearings for which he wanted
audio recordings.
¶ 13 The next day, the court asked defendant which audio recordings he wanted subpoenaed;
however, defendant did not submit any dates. The court informed defendant that it did not represent
him, so, he would need to compile his own evidence and present it to the court. Defendant
responded, “[b]asically[,] this is not a legal court, so I’m powerless at this point.” He then asked
the court whether it had admonished his subpoenaed witnesses about the continued trial. The judge
stated, “I don’t walk out of the courtroom and look [for] people’s witnesses.” However, the court
advised that, if defendant’s witnesses were present, it would admonish them to be present for trial
the following day.
¶ 14 B. Trial
¶ 15 Trial began on January 8, 2025. The State moved to nolle prosequi counts one and two,
and defendant was readmonished regarding his choice to proceed pro se. Defendant advised that

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his primary witness, Joe Jerome, was not present; however, defendant wanted to ensure his exhibits
and jail calls would be properly admitted into evidence. The court advised defendant that it was
his responsibility to lay an evidentiary foundation, state an appropriate basis for admission, and
offer the authenticity and accuracy testimony for admission. Based on this, defendant stated that
he anticipated testifying at trial; however, later, he stated that he would not testify because he did
not want the State to enter evidence of his prior convictions. Defendant, next, argued that he could
not get any of his witnesses to appear for court and, “in [his] eyes[,] the Court is responsible for
that, not [him]. [He,] as a pro se layman[,] who is indigent[,] should have all the advantages of
having a witness through the Court to provide and adjust to those circumstances as written by law.”
In response, the court again told defendant, “[i]t is your burden as [sic] acting as your own attorney
to secure witnesses by way of subpoena. And if you have witnesses who fail to abide by the
subpoena that’s properly served, you can offer that evidence; you should bring it to my attention.”
Defendant stated that he was not asking for a continuance to secure his witnesses.
¶ 16 Voir dire began, and the judge advised the venire to not discuss or research this case. During
a break in voir dire, the court received a note from Juror 246 that stated, “Defendant stole from his
friend $5,000.” The court remarked that Juror 246 should not be questioned, and, instead,
dismissed for cause. Defendant objected, as he wanted to question Juror 246 because “[he was]
worried about [Juror 246] speaking with the other jurors,” and he wanted an opportunity to “defend
[him]self.” The court overruled defendant’s objection, as Juror 246 had been ordered not to discuss
the case with anyone, and it did not want defendant to prejudice himself by discussing the note in
front of the other veniremembers. The court dismissed Juror 246, over defendant’s objection. With
defendant’s agreement, however, the court asked the venire if they talked about the case or the

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parties during their break to ensure that Juror 246 did not taint the jury. No veniremember indicated
that he or she discussed anything related to the case. Thereafter, a jury was selected and sworn.
¶ 17 Before opening statements, the State indicated that its first witness was Mario Juarez.
Defendant objected to beginning trial after the conclusion of voir dire, asserting he was not ready
to proceed with witnesses. He believed trial would begin the day after voir dire, and it was “unfair
for trial I’m [sic] being pushed up today.” The court proceeded with trial, as defendant, again,
answered ready, and the court was not “bringing the witness back tomorrow that’s here ready to
start today.”
¶ 18 Juarez testified that he owned a boat, a 1995 Regal Valanti, named Aventura. He purchased
the boat in August 2021 for $9,500. Juarez’s boat also had an outdrive—a transmission—with a
stainless steel Solarus propeller on it that he purchased after he bought the boat. He also purchased
a camper enclosure for the boat, which allowed him to spend the night on it. On September 29,
2024, Juarez fueled up his boat and took it, on its trailer, to World Wind Motor Sports (“World
Wind”) in Antioch to be winterized. Juarez notified the owner, Michael Gucito, via text message
and phone call, that he had dropped off his boat. Ultimately, Juarez left his boat, his boating items
(the camper enclosure, safety devices, fire extinguishers, bedding, life jackets, tubes, and some
dock carpet), the trailer, and boat cover at World Wind.
¶ 19 On October 3, 2024, Juarez learned from Gucito that his boat was no longer at World Wind.
Juarez contacted the Lake County sheriff and met with a sheriff’s deputy in person to make a
report. The next evening, Juarez spoke with Deputy Seth Thomas over the phone and in person.
He, ultimately, met Deputies Thomas and Nirva on Lake Street, where defendant was arrested.
Juarez, however, did not see defendant on scene; he only saw a white GMC truck. Within the truck,
Juarez located his outdrive and propeller (based on serial number identification), camper top, boat

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cover, boat cushions, fire extinguishers, and life jackets, among other things. Prior to this case,
Juarez had never met defendant and had not given defendant permission to take his boat.
¶ 20 On cross-examination, Juarez stated that he did not know Joe Jerome or Ricky
Michniewicz, and he did not frequent Mutiny Marina. Juarez boated on Lake Michigan, not Chain
O’Lakes, where Mutiny Marina was located. Defendant admitted to possessing Juarez’s boat and
trailer, and he asked Juarez whether he knew if defendant had picked up his boat while under
contract with Jerome to store the boat and upgrade the outdrive. Juarez stated that he did not know
Jerome and had no connection with Mutiny Marina. Juarez followed up multiple times with the
sheriff’s office about retrieving his items; however, he never retrieved his items from defendant’s
storage unit, as an online auction posting of defendant’s storage unit showed Juarez’s personal
boating items but not his boat or trailer.
¶ 21 Defendant attempted, on multiple occasions, to discuss or admit exhibits showing that he
tried to reunite Juarez with his property. The court did not allow defendant to question Juarez or
admit evidence on this topic. Defendant then objected to continued questioning, stating that trial
was not supposed to start until January 9, 2025, and only voir dire was slated for January 8, 2025.
The court announced that defendant had no further questions and released Juarez.
¶ 22 On January 9, 2025, prior to trial, Lieutenant Kalfus informed the court that defendant
could not proceed with a jail tablet in court, as it would not operate outside the jail. Instead, Kalfus
was directed to present paper copies of defendant’s inmate requests made on the tablet and locate
defendant’s DVDs contained in his property. Kalfus stated he would try to have the documents
prepared by lunch, and the court stated it would try to have all defendant’s DVDs available before
cross-examination of the State’s first witness. Defendant stated, “fair enough.” Ultimately, the

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court provided defendant with 10 DVDs, three written inmate requests, and two pages of messages
sent and received on defendant’s inmate tablet after the conclusion of the third witness’ testimony.
¶ 23 Gucito testified that he owned and operated World Wind. It has two main buildings and a
large area for outdoor storage. There were no cameras at the facility in September or October of
2024. As a part of Gucito’s job, he serviced and maintained watercraft, including: “building
engines, replacing engines, winterizing, maintenance, [and] oil filter changes.” Generally, if
someone wanted to winterize his or her boat, he or she would schedule an appointment then drop
the boat off; however, with repeat customers, they tended to leave their boat and then notified
Gucito after drop-off. After customer drop-off, the boat would be stored in World Wind’s outdoor
storage area until Gucito could complete winterization. Once the process was complete, Gucito
contacted the customer, and the boat would be collected and moved to off-site storage.
¶ 24 Gucito knew defendant, as defendant asked Gucito for work on September 28, 2024. On
only this occasion, Gucito asked defendant to dispose of an old jet ski that World Wind owned that
was no longer operational. Gucito photographed defendant outside of a white truck after loading
the jet ski into the bed of the truck. Defendant was never given permission to remove Juarez’s boat.
On cross-examination, Gucito stated that he knew defendant would return to his property to pick
up additional scrap metal for disposal. However, he did not recall that Jerome was on his property
on September 29, 2024, or that he gave defendant a clear folder containing receipts for Juarez’s
boat and instructions to tow the boat to defendant’s storage property for outdrive upgrades and
winter storage. Gucito, ultimately, was informed that Juarez’s boat was transported to a storage
facility, but when sheriff’s deputies attempted to retrieve it from the storage facility, it was not
there.

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¶ 25 Gucito knew Juarez, as Juarez had been a customer of World Wind for five years and
routinely had his boat winterized there. Gucito believed that Juarez’s outdrive would cost between
$5,000 and $6,000 new, or around $2,500 if purchased used. He testified that Juarez’s aftermarket
propeller likely cost between $700 and $900. The last time Gucito saw Juarez’s boat was in 2023;
however, Juarez notified Gucito in September 2024 that he left his boat at World Wind for
winterization. Gucito recalled that Juarez left his boat on Sunday, the day after Gucito received
defendant’s assistance. The Thursday after Juarez left his boat, in early October 2024, Gucito
recalled receiving a phone call from Juarez about collecting his boat after it was winterized. Gucito
panicked, as he had forgotten about winterizing Juarez’s boat because it was not at World Wind.
This was the first time Gucito realized that Juarez’s boat was missing.
¶ 26 On October 4, 2024, Juarez called Gucito and asked him to meet him with his truck, as
Lake County sheriffs recovered some of Juarez’s property and Juarez could not haul the property
in his vehicle. Gucito met Juarez and deputies at a stopped white truck, the same truck that was at
his shop in late September 2024. He did not observe defendant at the scene.
¶ 27 Matthew Palm testified that he was an operations manager at Bob’s Marina in Antioch. On
October 4, 2024, Palm met with defendant at the marina. Palm testified that, generally, he was not
familiar with defendant’s business, but he knew defendant and that defendant solicited marine-
disposal jobs. On this date, defendant asked if Palm would like to purchase a mint condition
Mercury Alpha Generation Two outdrive with a stainless-steel propeller for $400. Based on
defendant’s description of the condition of the outdrive, Palm believed the offer was below market
value, as he would value this outdrive at $1,000. He did not accept the offer, so defendant dropped
the price to $300. Palm told defendant that, before purchasing, he needed to discuss any offer with
the owner of the marina. Defendant left the marina. Palm then called Gucito, recalling a previous

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conversation they had about a stolen boat, and recounted that he was suspicious of the outdrive
defendant was trying to sell him, as it matched the description and condition of the stolen boat.
Shortly thereafter, a sheriff’s deputy and Juarez arrived at the marina. Palm provided them with
security footage of defendant entering and leaving the service area of the marina on October 4,
2024.
¶ 28 Next, Deputy Thomas, a Lake County highway patrol deputy, testified that, on October 3,
2024, he met Juarez and Gucito at World Wind. He learned that Juarez’s boat and trailer, which
had been dropped off there, were missing. Deputy Thomas ran Juarez’s trailer and license plate
information through an automated license plate reader (ALPR) system, and he observed, via that
system, a white truck towing Juarez’s boat and trailer at 6:58 a.m. on Illinois Route 83 at Ainsley
Road.
¶ 29 On October 4, 2024, Deputies Thomas and Nirva went to Bob’s Marina to speak with the
owner and Juarez. Later that day, Thomas observed a white truck, like the one seen in the ALPR
system, turn westbound onto Illinois Route 173 from Third Avenue. Thomas followed the vehicle
into a private parking lot and witnessed defendant exit the vehicle. Dispatch informed Thomas that
there was no record of defendant’s vehicle, so he made contact with defendant. Ultimately,
defendant was placed in the rear of Thomas’ squad car, and Juarez responded to the parking lot
where defendant was pulled over.
¶ 30 During break, after the foregoing testimony, defendant challenged the dismissal of Thomas
as a witness. Defendant indicated that he subpoenaed all the deputies involved in his case, and
Thomas should have been served. The court asked whether he was, in fact, served, and defendant
chastised the court and noted that the court denied all defendant’s subpoenas; thus, he was
“bamboozled out of all [his] witnesses.” The court, ultimately, released Thomas as a witness.

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¶ 31 Heather Hoyt testified that she was the property manager at Clear Homes Self-Storage. On
September 12, 2024, defendant rented storage unit No. 2001; it was an outdoor, drive-up, 10 x 10
unit. By October 2024, defendant obtained a second storage unit, No. 4033, and was in the process
of transferring from one storage unit to another. On November 14, 2024, Hoyt met with sheriff’s
deputies as they investigated defendant’s storage units regarding a stolen boat. Hoyt testified that
she never saw, and the deputies never found, Juarez’s boat at Clear Homes. Defendant attempted
to elicit, on cross examination, that she was lying and saw a boat on the storage unit property,
however, he did not do so.
¶ 32 Next, defendant was admonished about his right to testify, especially regarding the State’s
ability to cross-examine him with his prior convictions, and he initially decided to take the stand.
In court, defendant requested preapproval of the admission into evidence of a business contract,
unrelated to any witness in this case, and a civil suit between defendant and two witnesses, the
Lunardis. The court refused, and defendant stated he would not testify. When defendant was asked
if he rested his case, he objected, as “[he] [did]n’t wish to rest, but [he] [was]being forced to and
[he]want[ed] the jurors to know.” Defendant asserted that he did not wish to testify and that he had
“plenty” of witnesses that he wished to call but they were “suppressed” by the court. The court,
ultimately, rested on defendant’s behalf.
¶ 33 During closing arguments, defendant argued that he obtained control over Juarez’s property
“under permission contract,” but, during trial, he “was suppressed [sic] all my witnesses,” because
“[n]o subpoenas went out for [him].” Defendant asserted that he was denied witnesses and his right
to a “legal trial,” but, despite this, the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he knowingly
took stolen property. Defendant also asserted that the State failed to show he intended to
permanently deprive Juarez of his property because defendant tried to help reunite Juarez with his

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possessions. Defendant also claimed he did not steal anything, as he was hired by Jerome to tow
and store the boat. The jury found defendant guilty on all counts.
¶ 34 C. Posttrial Proceedings
¶ 35 On January 15, 2025, the State dismissed defendant’s pending misdemeanor case, and, one
week later, defendant appeared and was represented by a public defender. A motion for an
extension of time to file a posttrial motion was heard and granted; the court did not set a motion
due date. On April 25, 2025, the court allowed defendant to discharge his attorney, and counsel
was directed to return to defendant “anything in the attorney’s possession,” absent initial discovery,
including defendant’s transcripts, if the attorney had them.
¶ 36 On May 1, 2025, the court admonished defendant about his right to continue pro se;
defendant ultimately chose to proceed pro se, despite his initial wish to have counsel other than
the Public Defender’s Office appointed “because they have miserably failed.” Defendant then
orally moved for his “full original discovery,” arguing that his public defender stated he “did not
have [his] full original discovery.” The court directed defendant to draft a written motion.
¶ 37 On May 14, 2025, defendant moved to set aside the judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Therein, defendant argued that the court improperly denied his request for transcripts and access
to his complete discovery after his public defender indicated that defendant did not receive his
original discovery. Defendant also alleged that he was denied the fundamental right to mount a
meaningful defense, as his subpoenas were denied by the court, so he was unable to call witnesses
in his defense, and the clerk improperly told at least one witness, Jodi Lunardi, that she was not
required to appear for defendant’s trial. Also, defendant argued that the court improperly moved
his trial from January 6, 2025, to January 8, 2025, over objection, and he was unable to contact his
witnesses to apprise them of such. Further, the court delayed defendant’s access to discovery

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materials during trial, which left him unable to adequately cross-examine two of the State’s
witnesses. The court also allowed, defendant alleged, crucial evidence to be destroyed after he
filed motions to preserve evidence. Finally, defendant asserted that his judgment was tainted by
fraud, as the quantity and price of the stolen goods was falsified.
¶ 38 At a hearing that same day, defendant moved for a background check of Hoyt, as he
believed that she had a criminal history that the State failed to disclose. The court denied the motion
because it would not entertain a discovery motion after trial had concluded. Additionally, defendant
requested his full discovery and transcripts. The court denied this request.
¶ 39 On May 21, 2025, defendant filed a letter with the court seeking the appointment of
counsel, with the following conditions: (1) counsel would argue defendant’s posttrial motion to set
aside the judgment before the end of May 2025, and (2) defendant would receive the “full entire
missing original discovery,” background information on all State and defense witnesses, and
transcripts from the last four hearing dates and the hearings from October and November 2024.
¶ 40 Two days later, at a hearing, the court addressed defendant’s motion to reappoint counsel;
however, the court refused to consider defendant’s conditions. Defendant chose to continue pro se
but challenged the court’s contention that he should be held to the same standard as an attorney.
The court then turned to defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict. First, the court denied
defendant’s requests for his “original discovery” and transcripts. Defendant argued that the
transcripts he possessed were “missing defense wording” and needed to be corrected. The court
denied this request. As to the remainder of the motion, the court found that defendant’s motion was
“conclusory, lacking any specificity as to what was the basis of his complaints[,] [and] [h]e relies
on, in essence, conspiracy theories of everyone involved from the court reporter to the clerk’s
office.” The court denied the motion, finding no fraud “by the State, by the Court, or anyone else

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who may be tangentially involved in this case” and noting that defendant failed to cite any authority
supporting his relief.
¶ 41 Thereafter, the court found an extended-term sentence appropriate and sentenced defendant
to seven and a half years’ imprisonment for theft (count III). All other counts merged for
sentencing. Defendant did not file a postsentencing motion; however, he timely appealed on May
30, 2025.
¶ 42 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 43 In this pro se appeal, defendant raises 15 issues for review. He asserts that we should
reverse (with no remand) or dismiss this case because: (1) the circuit court suppressed his right to
subpoena witnesses and improperly suppressed favorable evidence; (2) Lake County sheriffs and
prosecutors illegally ignored defendant’s motions and released evidence, namely the GMC truck
and storage lockers, prior to trial and without notification; (3) Lake County sheriffs improperly
allowed Juarez to search defendant’s truck unsupervised at the arrest site; (4) Juarez provided false
property-valuation amounts to deputies, which impacted the felony class of defendant’s charge;
(5) the circuit court ignored his demands to delay trial, as he had not been provided with
discovery—the GTL tablet recordings and recorded phone messages—until after the first two
State’s witnesses were called; (6) the court repeatedly “denied, ignored and lied” to him regarding
his oral and written motions; (7) the court and prosecutors improperly withheld Hoyt’s criminal
history prior to and posttrial; (8) the court and prosecutors improperly admitted illegally obtained
evidence at trial; (9) the court ignored his objections and changed his trial date at the “eleventh
hour,” which prevented his witnesses from appearing at trial; (10) the court held defendant, pro se,
to the same standards and procedures as those required of an attorney, which contradicted legal
authority; (11) the court’s transcripts contained “over 500 infractions,” wherein his argument was

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improperly transcribed as “slashes”; (12) the court violated his due process rights by refusing to
tender subpoenas on his behalf and by refusing to admit his contract with Jerome; (13) the court
failed to preserve evidence contained in the GMC truck and storage lockers; (14) Juror No. 246
poisoned the jury; and (15) the court, prosecutors, and sheriff’s deputies all improperly ignored his
attempts to reunite Juarez with his missing property. We conclude that defendant’s claims are
forfeited or, otherwise, lack merit.
¶ 44 A. Forfeiture
¶ 45 The State argues that defendant’s arguments are forfeited, as he “fails to specify error or
any basis for relief” and he is “foisting the burden of factual and legal development onto the
opposing party and court.” We agree.
¶ 46 Defendant fails to cohesively argue his points and/or cite relevant authority for his claims,
thereby, forfeiting them for review. A reviewing court is not a repository into which an appellant
may foist the burden of argument and research, and the failure to clearly define issues and support
them with authority results in forfeiture of the argument. People v. Olsson, 2014 IL App (2d)
131217, ¶ 16. The courts do not apply more lenient standards to pro se litigants. In the Interest of
A.H., 215 Ill. App. 3d 522, 529-30 (1991). Here, defendant raises 15 issues for review and, in some
issues, cites a multitude of case law, statutes, and constitutional provisions to “support” his
position; however, he fails to raise any cohesive argument or support his arguments with citations
from the record. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (“Argument, which shall contain
the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the
pages of the record relied on. Evidence shall not be copied at length, but reference shall be made
to the pages of the record on appeal where evidence may be found.”). Throughout his brief,
defendant fails to specify how his constitutional rights were violated; cite appropriate factual and

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legal authority that support his arguments; and adduce facts, not just conclusory statements and
speculation, that would support his legal claims. Thus, defendant’s claims are forfeited.
¶ 47 Moreover, defendant has forfeited several issues (issues 3, 7, 8, 11, 14, and 15) because he
did not include his contentions of error in his posttrial motion. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d
176, 186 (1988) (to preserve an issue for review, the defendant must object at trial and raise the
issue in a written posttrial motion). And defendant has not asserted that these claims are reviewable
as plain error. People v. Nieves, 192 Ill. 2d 487, 503 (2000) (finding that the failure to argue “that
the evidence was closely balanced [or that] the error is so severe that it must be remedied to
preserve the integrity of the judicial process” forfeited plain error on appeal). Accordingly, we
recognize defendant’s forfeiture and will not address claims that were not presented to the circuit
court.
¶ 48 B. Merits
¶ 49 Despite defendant’s forfeiture, we will address, to the best of our ability, the merits of
defendant’s claims, raised in his posttrial motion, grouped by subject matter.
¶ 50 1. Discovery Motions and Violations
¶ 51 Defendant argues in issues 1, 2, 5, 6, and 13 that a discovery violation occurred, which
violated his constitutional rights, or that he was denied an opportunity to collect evidence and
subpoena witnesses, which left him without a meaningful opportunity to mount a defense.
Defendant’s claims here lack meaningful support and, primarily, are the result of his own actions.
Accordingly, we conclude these issues are meritless.
¶ 52 First, in issues 1, 2, and 13, defendant asserts that the court failed to preserve his evidence—
namely, a GMC truck and his storage lockers—which violated his constitutional rights. The court
never entered orders for the preservation of defendant’s evidence. However, the record shows that,

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nonetheless, defendant’s evidence was preserved. At the May 23, 2025, hearing, a prosecutor
relayed that she spoke with police the day prior to the hearing and confirmed that defendant’s truck
was still being held as evidence. This was well after defendant’s trial. Defendant’s rebuttal claim
that the truck was sold is based on speculation without proper evidentiary support. Any evidence
defendant now alleges supports his position was not admitted as evidence in the circuit court and,
thus, cannot justify his claims on appeal. People v. Blankenship, 406 Ill. App. 3d 578, 590 (2010)
(noting evidence not admitted at trial may not be considered on appeal).
¶ 53 Even if we assume, arguendo, that defendant’s evidence was not preserved, defendant has
not established a due process violation. The due process clause does not “impos[e] on the police
an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain and to preserve all material that might be of
conceivable evidentiary significance in a particular prosecution.” Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S.
51, 58 (1988). Rather, “unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police,
failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process.” Id.
Police act in bad faith where they act dishonestly or with ill will, not negligence or sloppiness.
People v. Nunn, 2014 IL App (3d) 120614, ¶ 17; People v. Gentry, 351 Ill. App. 3d 872, 878 (2004).
Here, defendant has completely failed to allege and show bad faith by the police. As such, his
claims fail.
¶ 54 Next, in issue six and the latter portion of issue two, defendant asserts that the court
“suppressed,” ignored, and unjustly refused to follow up on his motions and orders on numerous
occasions. This failure, defendant asserts, violated his right to mount a meaningful defense.
However, as to both issues, defendant fails to note which motions were ignored and specifically
describe the resulting prejudice. Because defendant failed to present a cogent argument, which we
may readily address, we recognize his forfeiture (supra ¶ 46).

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¶ 55 Defendant then asserts, in issue five, that he was denied the opportunity to cross-examine
the first two State’s witnesses, as the court “deliberately suppressed” evidence found on
defendant’s inmate tablet. The record does not support defendant’s contention of error. When
defendant asserted that he needed inmate request forms and messages found on his jail tablet, the
court enlisted Lieutenant Kalfus to obtain physical copies of those records midtrial. Kalfus stated
he would have the records available, “[h]opefully by lunch.” Defendant did not object. During the
same hearing, defendant requested that DVDs, located in his jail property, be brought to trial. The
court told defendant that, while deputies looked for his DVDs, trial would continue—”[h]opefully
we’ll have located the DVDs you’re talking about before cross examination.” Defendant stated,
“Fair enough.” Then, the record reflects that, by lunch time, defendant was tendered 10 DVDs
from his property and, from his inmate tablet, three pages of handwritten inmate request forms and
two pages of sent and received messages. The court also admonished defendant that, “if there is
something else that is missing or you’re concerned about, we’ll make a record before I bring the
jury in.” Defendant did not make a record about missing exhibits from his jail tablet during the
remainder of his trial.
¶ 56 Defendant’s arguments regarding discovery violations are procedurally barred, as he failed
to object to the proposed timing for receiving discovery and repeatedly objected to delaying trial.
As an initial matter, defendant failed to object at trial to the projected timing of receiving his jail
tablet exhibits and DVDs from his property. And, even after he was admonished by the court that
he could make a record about any missing exhibits, he failed to do so. Failure to object and preserve
an issue for review results in forfeiture. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 186. Moreover, throughout pretrial
and trial proceedings, defendant staunchly objected to any continuance for discovery purposes.
Defendant’s active participation in the timing of the proceedings (by refusing continuances) is in

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direct conflict with his arguments now on appeal. We find that defendant’s fifth argument is also
waived under the doctrine of invited error, as defendant may not request to proceed in one manner
then later challenge this same course of action on appeal. People v. Wachter, 2026 IL App (2d)
250318, ¶ 17 (noting that “[a] party’s invitation, agreement, or active participation in the direction
of the proceedings or procedure that he or she later challenges on appeal goes beyond mere
waiver.”).
¶ 57 2. Perjury
¶ 58 Next, in issue four, defendant contends that the court and prosecutors relied on false
information from Juarez, and prosecutors failed to correct his testimony. Specifically, defendant
contends that sheriff’s reports showed that Juarez suffered $3,000 in damages after his ATF curtain
was stolen but receipts and testimony showed less than $500 in damages, a fraudulent amount was
charged for the outdrive and Solaris propeller costs, and only one carpet was stolen from the victim
resulting in a loss of $80, not $241.20. A conviction was entered on theft (count III – outdrive) in
this case, so we will only address defendant’s perjury claims undercutting the sufficiency of the
evidence regarding this count. See People v. Releford, 2017 IL 121094, ¶ 71 (finding that the court
lacks jurisdiction to address unsentenced convictions).
¶ 59 As to the outdrive and propeller, defendant asserts that Juarez reported false amounts to
deputies on October 3, 2024, and October 4, 2024, which erroneously resulted in charges of felony
theft because the projected loss of the property was more than $500. To support this proposition,
defendant claims that the amounts contained in the sheriff’s reports do not match the homemade
receipts filed by Juarez. However, neither the sheriff’s reports nor the receipts are included in the
record. The record does, however, contain Juarez’s testimony that he purchased his boat (which
contained the outdrive and propeller) and trailer for $9,500. Gucito then testified that he was

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familiar with Juarez’s boat and with the pricing of new and used outdrives. He believed that a new
outdrive would cost between $5,000 and $6,000. He posited a used outdrive, like the one on
Juarez’s boat, would cost around $2,500. Additionally, an after-market propeller, like Juarez’s,
would cost between $700 and $900. Palm then testified that, after he heard about the theft of
Juarez’s boat, defendant attempted to sell him an outdrive for $400, which he believed was well
below the market value of $1,000. This testimony does not show that Juarez committed perjury.
Rather, the evidence reflects that, as far as the amount of the theft goes, the testimony was
consistent that defendant was properly charged and convicted of a felony, as all the estimates
conclude that the total valuation of the loss of Juarez’s outdrive was more than $500. And any
inconsistency between witnesses as to the monetary valuation of the missing property does not
establish perjury. People v. Tyner, 40 Ill. 2d 1, 3 (1968) (“Inconsistencies between the testimony
of witnesses and an alleged improbability of testimony go only to the weight and credibility of the
evidence and fall short of establishing a knowing use of perjury.”). Accordingly, defendant’s
perjury claim fails.
¶ 60 3. Trial Date and Witnesses
¶ 61 Defendant, in issues 9 and 12, contends that the court violated his due process rights and
“ ‘under speedy [sic] jury trial act’ ” by changing the date of his trial at the “11th hour.” Further,
defendant asserts, his trial date was changed and the court clerk encouraged a witness to ignore his
subpoenas, all of which diverted his witnesses from appearing at trial. In response, the State argues
that the court controls its own docket, defendant waived this issue, and he cannot establish a basis
for reversal. We agree.
¶ 62 On November 20, 2024, defendant’s case was set for jury trial on January 6, 2025. On
December 4, 2024, defendant confirmed his trial date and the timing of voir dire. During its

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discussion with defendant, the court admonished him that voir dire was a part of his trial and would
precede trial. Further, it stated that trial, as in the events following voir dire, could begin on January
6, 2025, or later—“It could start at 9:00; it could start at 10:30; it could start at 1:30 on the 6th. I
may not start it until Tuesday morning. It depends on what’s going on in the courthouse.”
Defendant responded, “Okay. Great. Thank you. That’s what I needed to know.” On January 6,
2025, defendant answered ready for trial. The court indicated that defendant’s case was second on
its jury priority call, thus, defendant’s case was held over to January 8, 2025, for trial. Defendant
objected, and the court explained that it could preside over only one case at a time and an older
case needed to proceed to trial first. The court pushed trial until January 8, 2025, and ordered that
defendant’s subpoenas remain in full force and effect through that date. The court could not,
specifically, admonish defendant’s witnesses of this on January 6th, as defendant advised he did
not subpoena his witnesses to appear until the following day. To accommodate defendant, the court
recalled the case on January 7th to admonish defendant’s witnesses; however, none appeared in
the courtroom. The cause was then set for trial the following day. Considering the time between
the date of arrest in this case—October 4, 2025—and trial, 96 days lapsed.
¶ 63 On January 10, 2025, Roger and Jody Lunardi submitted letters to the court noting they
had been subpoenaed for trial but did not have any information pertaining to defendant’s case.
Moreover, Jody stated that she called the clerk’s office on January 6, 2025, as she could not attend
trial the following day, and she was told that defendant’s case was not on the calendar for January
7, 2025.
¶ 64 Based on the foregoing, defendant has not established a speedy-trial violation or a
violation of his due process rights. The Speedy Trial Act provides that “[e]very person in custody”
shall be tried within 120 days of the date he was taken into custody, unless certain circumstances

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are met. 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2024). Here, defendant’s trial began 96 days after his arrest;
this is well before the 120 days allowed by statute. As such, defendant’s speedy trial claim fails.
¶ 65 Defendant also alleged that his due process rights were violated where the court continued
trial at the last minute, which precluded his witnesses from appearing at trial. Defendant’s claims
are not supported by the record. “ ‘The core of due process is the right to notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard ***.’ ” World Painting Co. v. Costigan, 2012 IL App (4th) 110869, ¶ 14
(quoting LaChance v. Erickson, 522 U.S. 262, 266 (1998)); see also People v. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d
1, 12-13 (2007). However, “Illinois courts have the inherent power, independent of rule or statute,
to manage their own dockets to dispose of cases in an orderly and expeditious manner.” Panos
Trading LLC v. Forrer, 2023 IL App (1st) 220451, ¶ 38 (citing J.S.A. v. M.H., 224 Ill. 2d 182, 196
(2007)); see also People v. Johnson, 2018 IL App (2d) 160674, ¶ 14 (same). Here, the court was
within its authority to briefly delay defendant’s case, as it noted another, older case had priority in
selecting jury trial dates. Further, defendant was immediately notified of his trial date change, the
court appropriately explained the reason for the delay, it only briefly delayed his trial, and it did
not violate his right to a speedy trial. The court also went to great pains to accommodate defendant
and his potential witnesses by calling a hearing on January 7, 2025, with the expressed intent to
admonish any potential defense witness that appeared. Overall, the record is simply devoid of
evidence showing that the court violated defendant’s due process rights by briefly delaying
defendant’s trial.
¶ 66 Next, defendant argues that the clerk deliberately diverted defendant’s witnesses from
appearing at trial. An error in quashing a subpoena is subject to a harmless error analysis. People
v. Ward, 13 Ill. App. 3d 745, 752 (1973). To determine whether an error is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, the court must consider: “(1) whether the error contributed to the conviction;

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(2) whether the other evidence presented overwhelmingly supports conviction; and (3) whether
the evidence that was excluded was duplicative or cumulative.” People v. Tabb, 374 Ill. App. 3d
680, 690 (2007).
¶ 67 Regardless of the existence of error, defendant’s claim here is harmless. In this case, the
Lunardis both wrote letters stating they did not have evidence or information related to the case.
Accordingly, their testimony was not duplicative or cumulative; rather, it was irrelevant to this
case. Moreover, defendant failed to make a record at trial, or even now clearly assert on appeal,
the relevance of the Lunardis testimony to his defense and how it would have undercut the State’s
case, considering the totality of evidence at trial overwhelmingly supported defendant’s
conviction. Defendant was at World Wind near the time Juarez dropped off his boat for
winterization. After Juarez’s boat was reported stolen, police retrieved photographic evidence from
an ALPR system showing defendant towing Juarez’s boat and trailer. Further, at the time of
defendant’s arrest, Juarez’s outdrive and after-market propeller were in the bed of defendant’s
truck, and testimony from witnesses familiar with buying and selling used outdrives stated that the
value of Juarez’s stolen outdrive was greater than $500. Considering this, defendant’s claim is
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 68 4. Standard of a Lawyer
¶ 69 Finally, in issue 10, defendant contends that the court unjustly held defendant, pro se, to
the standard of an attorney. We conclude that the court’s actions were not erroneous. “[W]here a
defendant elects to proceed pro se, he is responsible for his representation and is held to the same
standards as any attorney.” People v. Richardson, 2011 IL App (4th) 100358, ¶ 12. Meaning, pro se
defendants must comply with all rules of procedures required of attorneys, and they cannot expect
the court to provide any legal assistance to them. People v. Allen, 401 Ill. App. 3d 840, 854 (2010).

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Here, defendant was admonished of these principles on multiple occasions, as early as October 7,
2024. Throughout much of defendant’s case, he informed the court that he fully understood the
court’s admonitions and that he wanted to proceed pro se. It was not until after trial that he
bemoaned being held to the same standard as an attorney. Defendant now generally complains of
pitfalls he was fully advised of and, ultimately, are entirely of his own making. It is well settled
that a defendant may not be heard to complain of errors that he injected into his own trial. Wachter,
2026 IL App (2d) 250318, ¶ 17. Accordingly, we will not reverse defendant’s conviction.
¶ 70 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 71 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County.
¶ 72 Affirmed.

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