Puckett v. Evans

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 50292

ROYAL VON PUCKETT, )
) Filed: October 4, 2023
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
RODNEY EVANS, individually; ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
PARTNERS, P.L.C.C., ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
)
Defendants-Respondents, )
)
and )
)
CITY OF EAGLE, MAYOR OF EAGLE, )
EAGLE CITY COUNCIL MEMBERS, )
PLANNING AND ZONING )
DEPARTMENT, ADA COUNTY )
COMMISSIONERS, and COUNTY )
PLANNING AND ZONING )
DEPARTMENT, )
)
Defendants. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Samuel Hoagland, District Judge.

Amended judgment dismissing case without prejudice and awarding attorney fees,
affirmed.

Royal Von Puckett, Eagle, pro se appellant.

Givens Pursley LLP; Alexander P. McLaughlin and Morgan D. Goodwin, Boise,
for respondents.
________________________________________________

HUSKEY, Judge
Royal Von Puckett appeals from the amended judgment and award of attorney fees to
Rodney Evans and Rodney Evans Partners, PLLC (Evans). Puckett argues the court abused its
discretion in awarding fees to the prevailing party because the complaint was not frivolous and the

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awarding of fees results in double recovery for defense counsel. Evans argues the court acted
within the appropriate discretionary bounds of their authority. We affirm the amended judgment
and award of attorney fees.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The underlying suit arises from a proposed housing development by Evans that would
require land to be annexed into the City of Eagle. As is required before an application of
annexation is submitted to the City of Eagle, Evans held a neighborhood meeting with local
property owners to discuss the proposed annexation. Puckett attended the meeting. Puckett states
that he and other residents were opposed to the development.
Puckett filed suit against Evans, the City of Eagle, the Mayor of Eagle, Eagle City Council
members, the Eagle Planning and Zoning Department, the Ada County Commissioners, and the
Ada County Planning and Zoning Department. He sought to enjoin the annexation of 171 acres
into the City of Eagle. He alleged the annexation would amount to impermissible gerrymandering,
diminish water availability, and detrimentally affect his property. Evans filed a motion to dismiss
based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. The Ada County Commissioners and the Ada County Planning and Zoning Department
filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The City of
Eagle, Mayor of Eagle, Eagle City Council Members, and the Eagle Planning and Zoning
Department (collectively “the City”) filed an answer to the complaint and a motion of joinder to
the motion to dismiss.
A hearing on the motions to dismiss was held, and the district court dismissed the complaint
with prejudice against the Ada County Commissioners and the Ada County Planning and Zoning
Department on the basis that the complaint failed to state a valid claim for relief because the county
has no role or authority in annexation under Idaho Code § 50-222. The district court dismissed
the complaint without prejudice against the remaining defendants finding the matter was not ripe
because the City had not yet taken action on the annexation application.
Evans filed a memorandum of attorney fees, requesting $13,203.00 in total costs and fees.
Puckett timely objected to the fees. Evans filed a response to Puckett’s objection. Evans also filed
a response and notice of clarification for the fee request to clarify the role of a third party. Puckett
filed responses. The district court, after finding Puckett’s arguments frivolous, entered an

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amended judgment awarding Evans $7,755.00 in reasonable attorney fees as the prevailing party.
Puckett timely appealed.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the lower court: (1) correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently
with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision
by an exercise of reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194
(2018).
III.
ANALYSIS
Puckett appeals from the amended judgment and argues the district court abused its
discretion in awarding attorney fees to Evans because his claim was not frivolous or without merit.
He further asserts the granting of fees equates to a double recovery for Evans.
A. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Granting Attorney Fees Because
the Case Was Frivolous
Puckett contends the district court abused its discretion in granting attorney fees because
the lawsuit was filed with a serious purpose. Evans contends the district court correctly determined
there was no legal basis for Puckett’s opposition, Puckett frivolously pursued the case, and as a
result, the award of attorney fees was justified. Puckett does not contest the finding of Evans as
the prevailing party on appeal.
An award of attorney fees may be granted under I.C. § 12-121 and Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure 54(e)(2) to the prevailing party. The court “can determine that a party is a prevailing
party even when the proceedings against the party are dismissed without prejudice. That dismissal
terminates the proceedings against that party.” Charney v. Charney, 159 Idaho 62, 65, 356 P.3d
355, 358 (2015); see also Parkside Schools, Inc. v. Bronco Elite Arts & Athletics, LLC, 145 Idaho
176, 179, 177 P.3d 390, 393 (2008) (finding district court erred in dismissing case without
prejudice and not giving party against whom case was dismissed opportunity to request award of
attorney fees). Such an award is appropriate when the court finds the case has been brought or
defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. I.C. § 12-121.

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Under I.C. § 12-123(b), frivolous is defined as conduct that “obviously serves merely to
harass or maliciously injure another party” or “not supported in fact or warranted under existing
law and cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law.” “When deciding whether the case was brought or defended frivolously,
unreasonably, or without foundation, the entire course of the litigation must be taken into account.”
Idaho Military Historical Soc’y v. Maslen, 156 Idaho 624, 631, 329 P.3d 1072, 1079 (2014)
(stating, in part, assertion that party set forth at least one argument that has merit is no longer a
basis to evade an award of fees and costs). The district court has discretion to grant attorney fees
after finding an action is frivolous. Id.
The district court correctly perceived it had discretion to determine whether, and in what
amount, it could award attorney fees; an issue conceded by Puckett. The district court also acted
within the outer bounds of its authority because it concluded it did not have subject matter
jurisdiction. The district court cannot act on a case for which there is no live or actual controversy.
The district court found the case not ripe for consideration as annexation had not yet been approved
by the City--a fact acknowledged by Puckett during the hearing--and therefore an actual
controversy did not exist. Despite that knowledge, instead of conceding the issue of ripeness (and
the fact that no judicial remedy was available), the district court found that “Puckett unreasonably,
and without any factual or legal basis, increased the cost of litigation by pursuing this action and
arguing at length that the annexation--that has not occurred--is illegal.” Therefore, the district
court acted within its boundaries to award attorney fees based on Puckett’s frivolous, unreasonable
pursuit of the claim.
The district court also exercised reason in reaching its conclusion for the award of attorney
fees. The district court determined Evans was the prevailing party and having met the conditions
enumerated under I.C. § 12-121, the award of attorney fees could be granted; Puckett does not
challenge the district court’s finding that Evans was the prevailing party. The court then reasoned
that Puckett was required to conform to the same standards and rules as litigants represented by
counsel. Puckett pursued a claim for which there was no justiciable controversy and, as a result,
was subject to bearing the cost of an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party. After a
thorough analysis of the submitted fee request, the district court exercised discretion in
determining the amount of attorney fees, reducing the amount requested, and awarding Evans
$7,755.00.

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Puckett objects to the characterization of his case being frivolous, repeatedly insisting that
it was pursued with a “very serious and very purposeful objective.” While Puckett’s intentions in
filing and pursuing his claim may have been subjectively serious, his intentions are not relevant.
See e.g., Garner v. Povey, 151 Idaho 462, 467, 259 P.3d 608, 613 (2011) (holding that for purposes
of I.C. § 12-121, the only relevant inquiry is the legal or factual basis for bringing the action).
Although Puckett may have initially believed the annexation was already completed, he also later
acknowledged that he knew the annexation was not complete. Further, the district court found that
even once Puckett became aware of concerns regarding ripeness, he continued to pursue the case
and argue the illegality of the annexation while opposing attorney fees and failing to address the
issue of ripeness. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees to
Evans as the prevailing party because litigation was pursued frivolously.
B. The District Court Did Not Award Double Recovery to the Prevailing Party
Puckett asserts the district court abused its discretion by awarding attorney fees because it
resulted in double payment to Evans’ attorneys for the same legal work when a third party already
paid for the services on Evans’ behalf. Evans contends the award is supported by I.C. § 12-121
which permits the award of attorney fees to the prevailing party and as the prevailing party, Evans
was entitled to it.
Idaho Code § 12-121 entitles an award of “reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party
or parties when the judge finds that the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously,
unreasonably or without foundation.” A plain reading of I.C. § 12-121 indicates it is the party to
the suit, not their counsel or nonparties, that are eligible for the award of attorney fees. Further,
the Idaho Supreme Court held the identical language in I.C. § 12-120(3) was clear that it entitles
the “prevailing party” to the award and not the “prevailing party’s lawyer.” Inclusion, Inc. v. Idaho
Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 161 Idaho 239, 241, 385 P.3d 1, 3 (2016). The Court has “held that a
prevailing party may recover a reasonable attorney fee award even if that party never actually
incurred any attorney fees.” Id.
“Reasonable” attorney fees do not necessarily equate to “actual” attorney fees. Id. In
Inclusion, the district court awarded fees based on the actual fees billed by the Attorney General,
despite the billed amount being below market rates. Id. The district court considered the prevailing
party’s request for fees and acknowledged, “the hourly rate requested is reasonable and certainly
well within the rate in the marketplace in the Fourth District in Ada County, in particular,” but

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then awarded an amount based on actual fees. Id. at 240, 385 P.3d at 2. The Court found the
district court abused its discretion by misinterpreting I.C. § 12-120(3) and further, by overlooking
well established Idaho jurisprudence, conclusively finding that “a prevailing party may recover a
reasonable attorney fee award even if that party never actually incurred any attorney fees.”
Inclusion, 161 Idaho at 241, 385 P.3d at 3 (quoting Kidwell v. U.S. Mktg., Inc., 102 Idaho 451,
459, 631 P.2d 622, 630 (1981)).
Puckett asserts that because a third party, who was not a party to the suit, paid the legal
fees, an award to Evans results in a double recovery for the law firm and, therefore, the district
court abused its discretionary ability to award fees. Puckett conflates counsel with actual parties
to the lawsuit. Evans is the prevailing party in this case. Evans’ status as the prevailing party is
not dependent upon who paid its attorney fees. As the Court explained in Inclusion, the award of
fees to a party is not the property of their counsel. Inclusion, 161 Idaho at 241, 385 P.3d at 3.
Idaho Code § 12-121 would not permit recovery of fees by defense counsel, and the court
did not award it. The district court correctly awarded the fees to Evans and, thus, did not abuse its
discretion.
C. Evans’ Request for Attorney Fees on Appeal Should Be Granted Because the Appeal
Was Frivolously Sought
Evans requests an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal under Idaho Appellate
Rule 40, I.A.R. 41, I.C. § 12-121, and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2) on the basis that Puckett’s appeal advanced
redundant, conclusory allegations unsupported by sufficient argument and authority and asked the
Court to second guess the district court’s findings.
“Under I.C. § 12-121, a party is entitled to attorney’s fees if the appeal merely invites the
appellate court to second guess the trial court on the weight of evidence.” Crowley v. Critchfield,
145 Idaho 509, 514, 181 P.3d 435, 440 (2007). Further, an appeal is found frivolous if it advances
“a number of redundant, conclusory allegations on appeal that are not supported by sufficient
argument or authority.” Owen v. Smith, 168 Idaho 633, 647-48, 485 P.3d 129, 143-44 (2021).
On appeal, Puckett continued to argue that his subjective intent in filing the complaint
rendered the case nonfrivolous but he cites no authority for this proposition. Puckett failed to
advance arguments supported by authority that would support reversal or a finding of a valid
factual or legal basis for appeal. There are no fairly debatable issues nor genuine issues of law or
fact. Additionally, Puckett argued the award of attorney fees compensated a nonparty, which was

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unsupported by fact or authority. As a result, we award Evans costs and attorney fees under
I.A.R. 40, I.A.R. 41, and I.C. § 12-121.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees to Evans.
Therefore, the amended judgment and order of attorney fees of the district court are affirmed. We
award attorney fees under I.A.R. 41 and I.C. § 12-121 to Evans. Further, we award costs to Evans
under I.A.R. 40.
Judge GRATTON and Judge Pro Tem MELANSON CONCUR.

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