State of Idaho v. James Dean Miller

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 51923

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: May 20, 2026
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
JAMES DEAN MILLER, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Jason D. Scott, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm and possession of drug
paraphernalia, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jenny C. Swinford, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; T. Michael MacEgan, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

TRIBE, Chief Judge
James Dean Miller appeals from his judgment of conviction for unlawful possession of a
firearm and possession of drug paraphernalia. Miller argues the district court improperly
instructed the jury on reasonable doubt. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The State charged Miller with unlawful possession of a firearm (Idaho Code § 18-3316)
and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia (I.C. § 37-2734A). The charges arose after
law enforcement conducted a traffic stop while investigating a reported shoplifting incident.
Miller initially pled not guilty to the charges but later entered a guilty plea to the paraphernalia
charge. The case proceeded to a one-day jury trial on the remaining charge of unlawful possession
of a firearm.

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At trial, the State called two witnesses: Officer Bonas and Officer Anderson. Officer
Bonas testified that he stopped a vehicle driven by Miller while searching for a man and woman
suspected of shoplifting from a store. Miller had two passengers in the backseat of his vehicle--a
man, identified as Kodee, and a woman. Officer Bonas determined that Kodee was the individual
suspected of the theft. Miller told Officer Bonas that he was the registered owner of the vehicle
and that he was merely giving Kodee a ride.
Officer Anderson testified that he responded to assist with the shoplifting investigation
involving Kodee. Anderson confirmed that Miller was not involved in the theft. According to
Anderson, Miller indicated that he had met Kodee approximately two days earlier. After Kodee
was arrested for the shoplifting offense, he informed officers that Miller had a firearm in the glove
box of the vehicle.
Officer Anderson subsequently searched Miller’s vehicle and located a firearm in the
locked glove box. Miller denied that there was a gun in his vehicle and denied that Kodee could
have placed one there. At trial, the parties stipulated that the weapon recovered from the vehicle
was a firearm and that Miller had previously been convicted of a felony. Officer Anderson testified
that neither Miller nor Kodee were legally permitted to possess a firearm.
Neither party submitted proposed jury instructions, nor objected to the district court’s
reasonable doubt instruction. During closing argument, the State contended that it had proven
each element of unlawful possession of a firearm beyond a reasonable doubt. Miller argued the
firearm belonged to Kodee and the State had failed to prove that Miller possessed it.
The jury found Miller guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm. The district court
thereafter entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced Miller to a unified term of five years,
with one year determinate, for the firearm offense. The court also awarded Miller credit for time
served for his conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia. Miller appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether a jury has been properly instructed is a question of law over which we exercise
free review. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710, 215 P.3d 414, 430 (2009). When reviewing
jury instructions, we ask whether the instructions as a whole, and not individually, fairly and
accurately reflect applicable law. State v. Bowman, 124 Idaho 936, 942, 866 P.2d 193, 199 (Ct.
App. 1993).

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Generally, issues not raised below may not be considered for the first time on appeal. State
v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992). However, when a defendant alleges that
a constitutional error occurred at trial and the alleged error was not followed by a contemporaneous
objection, the claim of error must be reviewed under the fundamental error doctrine. State v.
Miller, 165 Idaho 115, 119, 443 P.3d 129, 133 (2019). In order to obtain relief under the
fundamental error doctrine, the defendant must demonstrate three things. First, the defendant must
show that one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights were violated. Id. Second,
the error must be clear and obvious, meaning the record must demonstrate evidence of the error
and evidence as to whether or not trial counsel made a tactical decision in failing to object. Id.
Third, the defendant must demonstrate that the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights,
which means the error identified in the first and second prongs of the fundamental error doctrine
actually affected the outcome of the trial. Id. at 119-20, 443 P.3d at 133-34.
III.
ANALYSIS
Miller contends the district court committed structural error by giving a reasonable doubt
instruction that differed from Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction (ICJI) 103. According to Miller, the
instruction improperly limited the jury’s ability to acquit him by directing it to find him not guilty
only if it believed there was a “real possibility” he was not guilty. Miller’s argument is foreclosed
by controlling precedent.
When a defendant challenges a reasonable doubt instruction as violating due process, the
relevant question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instruction
to allow conviction based on proof insufficient to satisfy the constitutional standard that the State
prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 6 (1994); In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Idaho courts apply that same principle when reviewing
challenges to reasonable doubt instructions. See State v. Laramore, 145 Idaho 428, 434, 179 P.3d
1084, 1090 (Ct. App. 2007).
The instruction given here stated:
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced
of the defendant’s guilt. Few things in this world are known with absolute certainty,
and in criminal cases the law does not require proof that overcomes every possible
doubt. If, based on your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced
that the defendant is guilty, you must find the defendant guilty. If, on the other

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hand, you think there is a real possibility that the defendant is not guilty, you must
give the defendant the benefit of the doubt and find the defendant not guilty.
This instruction is derived from the Federal Judicial Center pattern criminal jury
instructions and has repeatedly been upheld by Idaho appellate courts. In State v. Lovelace, 140
Idaho 53, 90 P.3d 278 (2003), the Idaho Supreme Court considered a nearly identical instruction
defining reasonable doubt as proof leaving the jury “firmly convinced” of guilt and requiring
acquittal if the jury believed there was a “real possibility” the defendant was not guilty. The Court
held that the instruction, based on the Federal Judicial Center pattern instruction, “has been held
not to misstate the law or mislead the jury,” and therefore, its use was not reversible error. Id. at
66, 90 P.3d at 291.
Miller’s challenge mirrors the argument rejected in Lovelace. Like the defendant there,
Miller contends that requiring jurors to be “firmly convinced” of guilt and to acquit only if there
is a “real possibility” of innocence reduces the State’s burden because the instruction does not
repeat the phrase “beyond a reasonable doubt” in the final two sentences. Lovelace rejected that
precise argument. Because the instruction used here is materially indistinguishable from the
instruction upheld in Lovelace, Miller cannot demonstrate that the instruction misstated the law or
misled the jury.
In the reply brief, Miller acknowledges that Lovelace applies to the challenged instruction
here. Mindful of this acknowledgment, Miller nonetheless argues the district court still erred by
giving this “nearly obsolete” instruction. Miller states, “[i]t appears that the First, Third, Fifth,
Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have abandoned the [Federal Judicial Center’s] pattern
instruction on reasonable doubt, and only the Tenth Circuit has retained the FDC’s language”
(noting that counsel was unable to locate pattern jury instructions for the Second and Fourth
Circuits, nor does it address which instruction is used in the Seventh Circuit).
While federal circuits may no longer provide that instruction, Idaho courts have upheld
instructions derived from the same federal pattern language. In State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642,
962 P.2d 1026 (1998), the Court recognized that instructions differing from ICJI 103 may still be
proper so long as they correctly state the law. Id. at 647-48, 962 P.2d at 1031-32. Similarly, in
State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 77 P.3d 956 (2003), the Court upheld a comparable instruction
and concluded that, when read as a whole, it did not lessen the State’s burden of proof. Id. at 275,
77 P.3d at 964. Although the Court in Sheahan encouraged trial courts to use the approved pattern

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jury instruction to avoid unnecessary controversy, it nevertheless determined that the deviation in
that case did not constitute reversible error.
Consistent with those authorities, the instruction given in Miller’s case accurately
described the State’s burden of proof. It defined proof beyond a reasonable doubt, clarified that
the standard does not require proof overcoming every possible doubt, and directed the jury to
convict only if it was firmly convinced of Miller’s guilt. Conversely, it instructed the jury to acquit
if it believed there was a real possibility Miller was not guilty. Idaho appellate courts have
repeatedly held that such language does not lessen or relieve the State’s burden of proof.
Moreover, the jury instructions as a whole reinforced the proper burden. The jury was
instructed that Miller was presumed innocent unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and
that the State was required to prove each element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. The elements instruction explicitly directed the jury to find Miller not guilty if the State
had not proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, every element of the charged crime. When read
together, the instructions clearly informed the jury that conviction required proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Because the instruction did not misstate the law, mislead the jury, or lessen the State’s
burden of proof, Miller has failed to demonstrate a violation of his constitutional rights.
Accordingly, he cannot satisfy the first prong of the fundamental error doctrine.
Even if Miller could establish error, he cannot satisfy the second prong of the fundamental
error doctrine. To meet that requirement, the defendant must demonstrate that the alleged error
plainly appears from the record and that existing authorities have unequivocally resolved the issue
in the defendant’s favor. See State v. Hadden, 152 Idaho 371, 375, 271 P.3d 1227, 1231 (Ct. App.
2012).
The record here reveals no such clear error. Neither party proposed jury instructions, and
neither party objected to the reasonable doubt instruction given by the district court. Given the
consistent line of cases approving instructions derived from the Federal Judicial Center pattern
instruction--including Lovelace, Merwin, and Sheahan--trial counsel could reasonably have
concluded that an objection would be unsuccessful or unnecessary. Decisions regarding whether
to propose or object to jury instructions fall within the realm of trial strategy. See State v. Dopp,
129 Idaho 597, 609, 930 P.2d 1039, 1051 (Ct. App. 1996).

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Miller does not demonstrate from the record that counsel’s failure to object was not tactical.
Instead, he relies on cases addressing waiver of the right to a jury trial, including State v. Haggard,
166 Idaho 858, 465 P.3d 1097 (2020) and State v. Vasquez, 163 Idaho 557, 416 P.3d 108 (2018).
Those decisions concern rights that must be personally waived by the defendant and therefore do
not govern strategic decisions about jury instructions. Thus, because Miller has not shown that
the lack of objection was anything other than a possible strategic choice, he fails to satisfy the
second prong of the fundamental error doctrine. See Miller, 165 Idaho at 119, 443 P.3d at 133.
Since Miller has failed to show that the reasonable doubt instruction violated his
constitutional rights or that any alleged error plainly appears from the record, he cannot establish
fundamental error. Consequently, we need not address the third prong of the fundamental error
doctrine. Id. at 119-20, 443 P.3d at 133-34.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The jury instruction on reasonable doubt by the district court was proper. Accordingly,
Miller’s judgment of conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm and possession of drug
paraphernalia is affirmed.
Judge HUSKEY and Judge Pro Tem MELANSON, CONCUR.

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