State of Idaho v. Carol Lynn Penagos

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 52179

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: May 13, 2026
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
CAROL LYNN PENAGOS, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Blaine
County. Hon. Ned C. Williamson, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Kiley A. Heffner, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Neil Paterson, Deputy Attorney General,
Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

TRIBE, Chief Judge
Carol Lynn Penagos appeals from her judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled
substance. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Penagos was a passenger in a vehicle her husband was driving when an officer stopped the
vehicle with the purpose of arresting Penagos’ husband for a prior criminal incident involving drug
trafficking. During the stop, officers observed drug paraphernalia in the vehicle’s ashtray. Based
on this discovery, Penagos was detained. Following the stop, the vehicle was towed and
impounded. The vehicle was searched, including a search of Penagos’ personal belongings inside
the vehicle. Multiple illegal substances were found during the search of Penagos’ personal
belongings.

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The State charged Penagos with two counts of felony possession of a controlled substance
and one count of misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance. Penagos filed a motion to
suppress the evidence of the illegal substances on various grounds. Neither party called witnesses
at the motion to suppress hearing.1 The district court denied the motion, concluding the search
was reasonable under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Pursuant to a plea
agreement, Penagos pled guilty to one count of felony possession of a controlled substance (Idaho
Code § 37-2732(c)(1)), and the remaining charges were dismissed. Penagos appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. Generally, when a decision
on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported
by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the
facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App.
1996). However, because this Court is presented with the same evidence that was before the
district court, this Court’s role on appeal is to “freely review the evidence and weigh the evidence
in the same manner as the trial court would do.” State v. Andersen, 164 Idaho 309, 312, 429 P.3d
850, 853 (2018).
III.
ANALYSIS
Penagos argues the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress, asserting that the
search of the vehicle was not justified under the automobile exception. Penagos further asserts
that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho
Constitution should offer heightened protection to the automobile exception. Finally, Penagos
argues that the State had ample time to secure a search warrant, and therefore the automobile
exception was inapplicable. The State contends the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement was justified because there was probable cause to stop and subsequently search the

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The district court took judicial notice of the following at Penagos’ motion to suppress
hearing: the transcript of one responding officer’s testimony from Penagos’ husband’s motion to
suppress hearing; the transcript of the preliminary hearing in Penagos’ husband’s case; and the
transcript of the preliminary hearing in Penagos’ case.

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vehicle. The State further argues that no heightened protection should be afforded to Penagos as
that argument is refuted by both Idaho and United States Supreme Court precedent. The State
maintains the automobile exception allowed officers to search the vehicle and that the exception
was valid even after the vehicle was towed. We hold that Penagos has failed to show the district
court erred in denying her motion to suppress.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches
and seizures. Warrantless searches are presumed to be unreasonable and therefore violative of the
Fourth Amendment. State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 290, 900 P.2d 196, 198 (1995). The State
may overcome this presumption by demonstrating that a warrantless search either fell within a
well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the
circumstances. Id. One well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement is the automobile
exception. State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 898, 821 P.2d 949, 953 (1991). In determining
whether a search is authorized pursuant to the automobile exception, the question is whether there
is probable cause to believe the automobile contains contraband. Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 155-56 (1925). Probable cause is established when the totality of the circumstances
known to the officer at the time of the search would give rise--in the mind of a reasonable
person--to a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place. State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 706, 302 P.3d 328, 331 (2012). Probable cause is a
flexible, common-sense standard. A practical, nontechnical probability that incriminating
evidence is present is all that is required. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983); State v.
Johnson, 152 Idaho 56, 61, 266 P.3d 1161, 1166 (Ct. App. 2011).
The automobile exception applies even if the vehicle is secured and there are no exigent
circumstances other than the vehicle’s mobility. Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466-67 (1999).
Police officers with probable cause to search a vehicle at a scene can constitutionally do so later
at the station house without first obtaining a warrant. Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 68 (1975) (per
curiam).
On appeal, “mindful” of the decisions in Dyson and State v. Fletcher, ___ Idaho ___, 571
P.3d 444 (2025), Penagos argues the automobile exception does not apply because no exigent
circumstances were present to justify the warrantless search. Penagos further argues her rights
were violated under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,

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Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution and that this Court should impose a heightened standard for
the automobile exception that would require an exigent circumstance beyond a vehicle’s mobility.
Penagos maintains that, because neither she nor her husband were within reaching distance of any
part of the vehicle, no exigency existed and therefore the automobile exception could not apply.
In response, the State contends the district court did not err in finding that probable cause existed
for the warrantless search and that exigent circumstances were not necessary to find that the
automobile exception was justified. We agree with the State that the automobile exception has no
separate exigency requirement. See Dyson, 527 U.S. at 466-67 (holding that established precedent
has made clear that probable cause is threshold for satisfying automobile exception, and
nothing more is required). Moreover, the Idaho Supreme Court specifically declined to impose a
heightened standard for the automobile exception under Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho
Constitution. Fletcher, ___ Idaho at ___-___, 571 P.3d at 450-51. Much like in Fletcher, Penagos
also fails to demonstrate sufficient Idaho-specific unique circumstances that would dictate a
heightened standard. Therefore, Penagos has failed to establish that this Court should depart from
existing Idaho Supreme Court precedent.
Penagos further argues the later search of the vehicle after it was towed was unlawful and
not subject to the automobile exception. Penagos also maintains that the State had ample time to
secure a warrant prior to the search of the vehicle. However, justification to conduct a warrantless
search does not vanish once the vehicle has been immobilized. Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S.
259, 261-62 (1982) (per curiam). A vehicle lawfully in police custody may be searched later on
the basis that the officers had probable cause to believe that it contains contraband, without
requiring an exigent circumstance to justify such a warrantless search. Id. Practicality of obtaining
a warrant does not control in an automobile exception analysis. State v. Williams, 120 Idaho 386,
389, 816 P.2d 342, 345 (1991). The State asserts that the search did not need to be
contemporaneous with the stop. Further, the State contends the search was supported by probable
cause, which extended to Penagos’ belongings inside the vehicle at the time probable cause was
found. Both parties rely on State v. Maloney, 168 Idaho 936, 489 P.3d 847 (2021) for the holding
that the location of the container at the point at which probable cause arises is the critical
determination. In Maloney, probable cause to search within the defendant’s vehicle arose once the
officer discovered drug paraphernalia after the defendant consented to a vehicle search. Id. at 943,

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489 P.3d at 854. The Idaho Supreme Court held that probable cause extended to all containers
found within the vehicle that could contain additional contraband but that it did not extend to the
defendant’s purse because it was not within the vehicle at the time probable cause
arose. Id. Contrary to the facts in Maloney, Penagos’ belongings were inside the vehicle at the
time probable cause arose. Finally, as the Court held in Fletcher, the automobile exception does
not require any heightened standard, and the practicality of obtaining a warrant was not controlling
here. Thus, we are unpersuaded by Penagos’ argument. Accordingly, Penagos has failed to show
the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Penagos has failed to show the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress
because probable cause supported the search pursuant to the automobile exception. Furthermore,
no heightened standard is applicable to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement under
either Idaho or United States Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, Penagos’ judgment of
conviction for possession of a controlled substance is affirmed.
Judge HUSKEY and Judge Pro Tem MELANSON, CONCUR.

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