State of Idaho v. Toni Kay Lynskey

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 52377

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: January 30, 2026
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
TONI KAY LYNSKEY, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Nancy A. Baskin, District Judge.

Order revoking probation and ordering execution of previously suspended
sentence, affirmed; order denying Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Stacey M. Donohue, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kacey L. Jones, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

Before GRATTON, Judge; HUSKEY, Judge;
and LORELLO, Judge
________________________________________________

PER CURIAM
Toni Kay Lynskey pleaded guilty to felony driving under the influence, Idaho Code §§ 18-
8004, -8005(9). In exchange for her guilty plea, an additional charge was dismissed. The district
court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with a minimum period of incarceration of two
years, but after a period of retained jurisdiction, suspended the sentence and placed Lynskey on
probation. Subsequently, Lynskey admitted to violating terms of the probation, and the district
court consequently revoked probation and ordered execution of the original sentence. Lynskey
filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion, which the district court denied. Lynskey appeals,
contending that the district court abused its discretion in revoking probation and denying her
I.C.R. 35 motion.

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It is within the trial court’s discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and conditions
of the probation has been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 325,
834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct.
App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988). In determining
whether to revoke probation a court must examine whether the probation is achieving the goal of
rehabilitation and consistent with the protection of society. State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275,
899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; Hass, 114 Idaho
at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. The court may, after a probation violation has been established, order that
the suspended sentence be executed or, in the alternative, the court is authorized under I.C.R. 35
to reduce the sentence. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976,
977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989). The court may also order a period of retained jurisdiction.
I.C. § 19-2601(4). A decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal only upon a showing
that the trial court abused its discretion. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327. In reviewing
the propriety of a probation revocation, the focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial
court’s decision to revoke probation. State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 621, 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct.
App. 2012). Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the record before the trial court relevant
to the revocation of probation issues which are properly made part of the record on appeal. Id.
Next, we review whether the district court erred by denying Lynskey’s I.C.R. 35 motion.
A motion for reduction of sentence under I.C.R. 35 is essentially a plea for leniency, addressed to
the sound discretion of the court. State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 319, 144 P.3d 23, 24 (2006);
State v. Allbee, 115 Idaho 845, 846, 771 P.2d 66, 67 (Ct. App. 1989). In presenting an I.C.R. 35
motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional
information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the motion. State v. Huffman,
144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). Applying the foregoing standards, and having
reviewed the record in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in either
revoking probation and ordering execution of Lynskey’s sentence or denying Lynskey’s I.C.R. 35
motion. Therefore, the order revoking probation and directing execution of Lynskey’s previously
suspended sentence and order denying Lynskey’s I.C.R. 35 motion are affirmed.

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