State v. Martin

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 52520

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: April 8, 2026
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
JAKE ALLISTER MARTIN, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Derrick J. O’Neill, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction for robbery, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Andrea W. Reynolds, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Alison C. Jaros, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

LORELLO, Judge
Jake Allister Martin appeals from his judgment of conviction for robbery. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A man wearing a camouflage mask robbed a bank. After reviewing surveillance video
footage and identifying a vehicle license plate number, a police officer identified the primary
suspect as Martin. The police officer learned that Martin was on felony probation and contacted
his probation officer. Martin’s probation officer told the police officer that, as a condition of
Martin’s probation, he signed a waiver of his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Pursuant to the probation agreement waiver, Martin consented to searches

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by “any agent” of the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC). Martin’s probation officer then
informed the police officer that Martin was “due” for a probation search.
In the following days, Martin’s probation officer went to Martin’s residence to conduct a
search of his person, residence, and vehicle. Gloves found in Martin’s vehicle matched the ones
worn by the robber. Upon discovering the gloves, Martin’s probation officer contacted local law
enforcement to assist with the continued search of Martin’s residence and vehicle. Two law
enforcement officers arrived and subsequently located additional suspected items used in the
robbery in Martin’s vehicle and residence.
The State charged Martin with robbery. Martin filed a motion to suppress, arguing that his
probation agreement waiver was invalid, the search of his residence violated the waiver, and no
other exception to the warrant requirement applied. Following a suppression hearing, the district
court denied Martin’s motion, concluding that he provided valid consent as part of his probation
agreement. Martin entered a conditional guilty plea to robbery (I.C. §§ 18-6501 and 18-6502),
reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. Martin appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion
to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by
substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts
as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a
suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts,
weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina,
127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d
659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).
III.
ANALYSIS
“Mindful” of this Court’s decision in State v. Armstrong, 158 Idaho 364, 347 P.3d 1025
(Ct. App. 2015), Martin asserts the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.
Specifically, Martin argues that the Fourth Amendment waiver in his probation agreement was
limited to searches conducted by agents of the IDOC, not law enforcement. The State argues that

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the search was lawful pursuant to his probation waiver and the search conformed to the waiver’s
language. We hold that Martin has failed to show that the district court erred in denying his motion
to suppress.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches
and seizures. Although a warrantless entry or search of a residence is generally illegal and
violative of the Fourth Amendment, such an entry or search may be rendered reasonable by an
individual’s consent. State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 522, 716 P.2d 1288, 1294 (1986); State v.
Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704, 707, 963 P.2d 387, 390 (Ct. App. 1998). In such instances, the State has
the burden of demonstrating consent by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho
747, 749, 947 P.2d 420, 422 (Ct. App. 1997). Fourth Amendment waivers are viewed under the
scope of consent searches. State v. Maxim, 165 Idaho 901, 907, 454 P.3d 543, 549 (2019). When
evaluating the scope of a Fourth Amendment waiver, the court must examine the language used in
the probation condition to determine whether the search was objectively reasonable. State v.
Jaskowski, 163 Idaho 257, 261, 409 P.3d 837, 841 (2018).
The waiver in Martin’s probation agreement provides:
SEARCH: I consent to lawful searches by any agent of the IDOC and
understand that searches may be conducted of my person, residence, vehicle,
personal property, and other real property or structures owned or leased by me, or
for which I am the controlling authority. I hereby waive my Fourth Amendment
rights under the Idaho and United States Constitutions concerning searches.
The district court found that, pursuant to the foregoing waiver, Martin consented to
searches “by any agent of the IDOC.” The district court determined that it was the probation
officer’s decision to conduct the search of Martin’s person, residence, and vehicle. The district
court found that, when Martin’s probation officer received information from law enforcement, the
search was not tainted. The district court further found the search was reasonable because the law
enforcement officers “were clearly acting as agents of the [IDOC]” in their assistance of the
probation officer conducting the search. As such, the district court concluded the search did not
violate the Fourth Amendment waiver in Martin’s probation agreement.
Martin argues that the waiver was limited to searches conducted by agents of the IDOC,
not local law enforcement. Martin makes his arguments “mindful” of this Court’s decision in
Armstrong, 158 Idaho 364, 347 P.3d 1025. There, we held that, if a parole or probation officer is

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justified in making a search, he or she may enlist the aid of police officers in performing that duty.
Id. at 370, 347 P.3d at 1031. We further noted that mutually beneficial cooperation between law
enforcement officials and parole officers is not precluded. Id. The search here was initially
conducted by Martin’s probation officer, and Martin does not dispute that his probation officer is
employed by the IDOC. It was not until Martin’s probation officer discovered the gloves that were
suspected in the robbery that law enforcement officers were contacted to aid in the search. We
agree with the district court that the law enforcement officers were properly acting as agents of the
IDOC. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Martin’s motion to suppress.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Martin has failed to show the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress
because law enforcement officers were acting as agents of the IDOC when the search was
conducted. Therefore, Martin’s judgment of conviction for robbery is affirmed.
Chief Judge TRIBE and Judge HUSKEY, CONCUR.

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