State v. Carter

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 50666

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: February 12, 2026
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
)
SAMUEL CHRISTOPHER CARTER, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Twin
Falls County. Hon. Roger B. Harris, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction for four counts of lewd conduct with a child under sixteen
and one count of sexual abuse of a child under sixteen years of age, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Kimberly A. Coster, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________
TRIBE, Chief Judge
Samuel Christopher Carter appeals from his judgment of conviction for four counts of lewd
conduct with a child under sixteen and one count of sexual abuse of a child under sixteen years of
age. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A five-year-old child disclosed to her mother that the child’s father, Carter, had engaged
the child in sexual acts. Eleven days later, and before any medical assessment had taken place, the
child was brought to St. Luke’s Children at Risk Evaluation Services (CARES) clinic for an
interview. The interview was conducted by a licensed master social worker and observed by a
nurse practitioner and law enforcement officers through a live feed. Immediately after the

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interview, the nurse practitioner performed a medical examination, including a physical and genital
exam, to assess the child’s health and document any trauma.
The State charged Carter with four counts of lewd conduct with a child under sixteen (Idaho
Code § 18-1508) and one count of sexual abuse of a child under sixteen years of age
(I.C. § 18-1506). At trial, the State moved to admit the video recording of the child’s CARES
interview. Carter objected, contending that admitting the interview when the child did not testify
deprived Carter of his constitutional right to confront witnesses and violated his right to due
process. The district court overruled the objection, concluding that the primary purpose of a
CARES interview is to “establish the needs and potential for medical--ongoing medical or
psychologic treatment” and that admission would not violate Carter’s due process rights. The jury
found Carter guilty of all counts. Carter appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently
with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision
by an exercise of reason. State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018).
Where a defendant claims that his or her right to due process was violated, we defer to the
trial court’s findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence. State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712,
720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001). However, we freely review the application of constitutional
principles to those facts found. Id.
III.
ANALYSIS
Carter argues the district court erred by admitting the recording of the CARES interview
when the child did not testify at trial because admitting the interview deprived Carter of a fair
opportunity to confront and challenge the evidence against him and because the interview was
testimonial in nature and therefore inadmissible. The State responds that the district court acted
within its discretion because the interview was conducted primarily for medical and protective

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purposes and that admission of the interview did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. We
hold that Carter has failed to show that the district court erred in admitting the CARES interview.1
The right to confront adverse witnesses is a fundamental component of due process, and
although confrontation issues are often analyzed under the Sixth Amendment’s testimonial
framework, that framework ultimately serves the broader due process goal of ensuring fairness
and reliability in criminal trials. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). The Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment prohibits admission of testimonial statements unless the declarant
is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine. Id. at 51. Statements
are testimonial when the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 356 (2011);
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). By contrast, statements made to resolve an
ongoing emergency and ensure safety are generally non-testimonial. Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237,
246-48 (2015). The inquiry turns on the objective purpose of the encounter, based upon the totality
of the circumstances. State v. Parsons, 173 Idaho 435, 448-49, 543 P.3d 465, 478-79 (2024).
Thus, whether a statement is testimonial remains relevant to our due process inquiry because
testimonial characteristics may bear on the fairness of admitting such evidence.
At trial, Carter objected to the admission of the CARES interview on constitutional
grounds, arguing that the presence of law enforcement observers, the structured and forensic nature
of the questioning, the absence of an immediate medical emergency, and the absence of the child’s
testimony at trial rendered the recording testimonial and unfairly prejudicial. Carter asserted that
the interviewer followed a standardized protocol designed to document potential abuse for
investigative purposes rather than to diagnose or treat the child. The district court overruled the
objection, finding that the CARES interview was conducted as part of a medical protocol and that
its purpose was to obtain information necessary to guide the medical examination that immediately
followed and not to develop evidence for prosecution. The district court determined that the nurse

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Carter also maintains that the State will be unable to show that any alleged error in
admitting the interview was harmless. The State responds that Carter has not demonstrated error
because the interview here was conducted primarily for medical and protective purposes, not to
establish evidence for prosecution. Because we hold that Carter has failed to show that a
constitutional error occurred, we do not address his harmless-error argument.

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practitioner observed the interview in real time and immediately conducted a physical examination
based on the information obtained.2 The district court concluded that the interview’s medical and
protective purpose, together with the reliability of the circumstances, supported the admission of
the interview without violating Carter’s constitutional rights.
On appeal, Carter argues that the interview was testimonial and unreliable. Carter relies
on Parsons, asserting that the forensic format, the involvement of law enforcement, and the
absence of an active emergency render the CARES interview testimonial. He further argues that,
because the child was already in her mother’s custody at the time of the interview, no continuing
threat to the child’s safety existed. Carter’s arguments are unpersuasive.
In Parsons, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a CARES interview of a five-year-old child
was testimonial where the evidence showed no ongoing emergency or medical need. Parsons, 173
Idaho at 446, 543 P.3d at 476. There, the child had already been examined by an emergency room
physician immediately following disclosure, treated for an infection, and removed from the alleged
abuser’s home. The subsequent CARES interview occurred nearly a month later. The Court
concluded that “there [was] simply no evidence that [the child’s] CARES interview was part of an
ongoing emergency or that she was at risk of imminent harm” and that “the totality of the
circumstances shows that the primary purpose of eliciting [the child’s] statements during the first
CARES interview was to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution rather than to provide medical care, as the State contends.” Id. at 448-49, 543 P.3d at
478-79.
Contrary to Carter’s argument, the holding in Parsons does not support his assertions.
Unlike in Parsons, the child here had not received any medical evaluation before the CARES
interview, nor had a medical professional assessed whether the child faced physical or
psychological trauma. The interview occurred only eleven days after disclosure, while Carter still
retained custodial rights. Law enforcement advised the child’s mother that she could temporarily

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We acknowledge that the district court misspoke when it described the interviewer as a
nurse or medical professional. The record shows the interview was conducted by a licensed master
social worker. That misstatement, however, is immaterial. The interview occurred in a medical
setting, was contemporaneously observed by a nurse practitioner, and directly guided a subsequent
medical examination.

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keep the child in mother’s care during the investigation, but no judicial order had modified custody.
Thus, the child’s safety and welfare remained unresolved. These circumstances resemble the
“ongoing emergency” described in Clark, 576 U.S. at 246-47, where adults sought information
primarily to protect a child from immediate harm.
Here, unlike in Parsons, the CARES interview was integrated into a coordinated medical
process. The nurse practitioner testified that the interview provided the “history of present illness”
and was “the most important piece” of the nurse practitioner’s medical evaluation. The interview’s
findings shaped the subsequent physical exam, which checked for injuries and reassured the child
about her health. This record demonstrates that the interview was part of an ongoing medical
assessment, not an isolated forensic exercise. By contrast, in Parsons, the medical portion of the
child’s examination had been completed twenty-four days before the CARES interview took place,
leaving the CARES interview detached from any medical purpose. The Parsons Court found no
evidence that the interviewer sought to inform diagnosis or treatment, which supported its
conclusion that the questioning was primarily investigative. Parsons, 173 Idaho at 446-47, 543
P.3d at 476-77. Here, the opposite is true: the interview’s integration with the medical evaluation
underscored its protective and diagnostic purpose.
The child’s age further supports this conclusion. At five years old, she lacked the capacity
to appreciate the legal consequences of her statements. The United States Supreme Court has
recognized that statements by very young children will rarely, if ever, implicate the Confrontation
Clause because they cannot grasp that their words may later be used in court. Clark, 576 U.S. at
247-48. Like the child in Clark, the child in this case spoke to a trained adult in a clinical setting
designed to protect the child’s health and safety, not to generate courtroom testimony.
Considering the totality of these circumstances, we agree with the district court’s
conclusion that the primary purpose of the CARES interview was medical, i.e., to assess the child’s
immediate health and safety, not to establish or prove past events for prosecution, and its admission
did not violate Carter’s due process rights.

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IV.
CONCLUSION
The CARES interview in this case was not testimonial because the primary purpose of the
interview was to assess the child’s health and safety. Therefore, Carter has failed to show that the
district court erred in admitting the interview. Accordingly, Carter’s judgment of conviction for
four counts of lewd conduct with a child under sixteen and one count of sexual abuse of a child
under sixteen years of age is affirmed.
Judge HUSKEY and Judge LORELLO, CONCUR.

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