State v. Allan

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 51731

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: December 29, 2025
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
)
ALEXANDER GRANVILLE ALLAN, OPINION AND SHALL NOT
)
BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Deborah A. Bail, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction for aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, leaving the
scene of an injury accident, and misdemeanor eluding a peace officer, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jenny C. Swinford, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

HUSKEY, Judge
Alexander Granville Allan appeals from his judgment of conviction for aggravated battery
with a deadly weapon, leaving the scene of an injury accident, and misdemeanor eluding a peace
officer. Allan argues the district court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial because a police
officer testified to conducting a “felony stop” when describing the officer’s actions in conducting
the traffic stop. We conclude the district court did not err in denying Allan’s motion for a mistrial.
Allan’s judgment of conviction is affirmed.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The State charged Allan with aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, Idaho Code §§ 18-
903(a), -907(1)(b); leaving the scene of an injury accident, I.C. § 18-8007; and misdemeanor
eluding a peace officer, I.C. § 49-1404(1). Allan pleaded not guilty, and the case proceeded to a
jury trial.

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During a conference held immediately before trial commenced, Allan raised concerns
regarding Officer Joe Martinez’s use of the term “felony” during the preliminary hearing. The
State responded by explaining it informed Officer Martinez not to say the word “felony” during
trial. The district court agreed the word “felony” should not be used during the trial but allowed
the State to elicit testimony from the officer about why he had heightened security concerns and
took additional steps, including the use of a pit maneuver, when conducting the stop and,
ultimately, arresting Allan.
At trial, the evidence showed Allan, while driving his red Jeep Cherokee on a two-lane
road, nearly sideswiped a bicyclist riding in the bike lane and traveling in the same direction as
Allan. Allan corrected his driving and moved back into the lane of travel designated for motor
vehicles. Shortly thereafter, the road split into a four-lane road (two lanes in each direction). Allan
stayed in the left lane, leaving an empty lane between himself and the bicyclist. Allan then slowed
down to the same speed as the bicyclist, crossed from the left lane, over the right lane, and into the
bike lane, hit the bicyclist, and drove away. The collision threw the bicyclist onto the sidewalk
where he rolled a few times before coming to a stop underneath a guardrail. As a result of the
collision, the bicyclist sustained injuries including a fractured rib and abrasions. Another driver
traveling behind Allan witnessed the accident and called police.
Officer Martinez was dispatched to the reported hit-and-run accident. The dispatch report
described the suspect as a white male driving a red Jeep Cherokee. Officer Martinez located a red
Jeep Cherokee with a male driver, later identified as Allan, and activated his emergency lights to
initiate a traffic stop. Allan did not yield or make any efforts to stop. Officer Martinez then
activated his siren, but Allan still did not yield. However, other vehicles, including a vehicle in
front of Allan, yielded to Officer Martinez’s lights and sirens. Allan drove around the vehicle in
front of him and continued driving. Officer Martinez followed Allan with his emergency lights
and sirens activated for approximately one-half mile. During the pursuit, Officer Martinez was
informed the earlier crash may have been intentional and was possibly an assault with a deadly
weapon. This caused Officer Martinez concern about added danger to the public.
After receiving this additional information, Officer Martinez believed he needed to engage
in extra security measures to stop Allan. Officer Martinez decided to perform a pursuit
intervention technique called a “pit maneuver.” Officer Martinez explained that during a “pit
maneuver,” a patrol car strikes the back of the suspect vehicle, which causes the suspect vehicle

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to spin around and, ideally, become disabled. Once the suspect vehicle has spun around, the patrol
car makes contact with the front of the suspect vehicle while other officers box in the suspect
vehicle with their patrol cars to prevent the suspect from driving away. Officer Martinez testified
this technique is used only after considering multiple factors, including the risk the suspect vehicle
poses to the general public, the current road conditions, oncoming traffic, vehicle speed, room to
maneuver, and the presence of pedestrians or cyclists.
Officer Martinez conducted a pit maneuver, which spun Allan’s vehicle around to face the
front of Officer Martinez’s patrol car. While both vehicles were face to face, Officer Martinez
pulled his patrol car forward and made contact with the front of Allan’s vehicle. Another officer
made contact with the back of Allan’s vehicle, boxing in Allan and preventing him from driving
away.
Officer Martinez testified, “as soon as I made positive contact and both vehicles came to a
stop, I immediately jumped out of my vehicle and started performing what we call a felony stop.”
Allan objected and the district court sustained the objection. The district court then instructed
Officer Martinez “to confine [himself] to what [he] did as far as the stop” and Officer Martinez
“need not characterize” the stop.
Officer Martinez then testified about what he did after completing the pit maneuver.
Officer Martinez got out of his patrol car, but stayed by his driver’s side area, and commanded
Allan to put his hands where they could be seen. Assisting officers pulled in next to the passenger
side of Officer Martinez’s patrol car, putting Allan in their direct line of sight, and walked directly
to Allan while Allan was boxed in between two police cars. Once the assisting officers reached
Allan’s driver’s side door, Allan was asked to step out of his vehicle, and police took him into
custody.
After the State’s direct examination of Officer Martinez, Allan moved for a mistrial based
on Officer Martinez’s use of the phrase “felony stop” while testifying. The State argued Officer
Martinez’s use of the phrase “felony stop” was inadvertent and was a “general term or phrase” to
describe the type of stop initiated to extract Allan from his vehicle safely and was not a reference
to the charges Allan was facing. The district court found the use of the term “felony stop” did not
amount to the level of prejudice that would warrant a mistrial. The district court found the term
was referring to the more significant measures that had to be taken to stop Allan’s vehicle and
when considering the context of the statement, it was “very clear” the officer was talking about a

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“pretty major maneuver” that was used because of the “magnitude of the events the officer is
operating under.” Thus, the district court found that, in context, the term was reasonably
understood to refer to the significance of the maneuver. The district court also noted the jury had
already been informed that Allan was facing charges for aggravated battery, leaving the scene of
an injury accident, and eluding. As a result, the district court concluded the use of the phrase did
not amount to the kind of prejudice that would warrant a mistrial and denied Allan’s motion.
After denying Allan’s motion for a mistrial, the district court offered to provide a limiting
instruction to the jury despite not finding the challenged testimony required a limiting instruction.
Allan never acted upon the offer and no limiting instruction was given. Allan did not ask for any
additional instructions, nor did he object to any instruction provided during the jury instruction
conference after both parties rested. The jury found Allan guilty of all counts. Allan appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In criminal cases, motions for mistrial are governed by Idaho Criminal Rule 29.1. A
mistrial may be declared upon motion of the defendant, when there occurs during the trial an error
or legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the courtroom, which is prejudicial
to the defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair trial. I.C.R. 29.1(a). Our standard for
reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion for mistrial is well established:
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably exercised his
discretion in light of circumstances existing when the mistrial motion was made.
Rather, the question must be whether the event which precipitated the motion for
mistrial represented reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record.
Thus, where a motion for mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the “abuse of
discretion” standard is a misnomer. The standard, more accurately stated, is one of
reversible error. Our focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident
that triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge’s refusal to declare a mistrial will
be disturbed only if that incident, viewed retrospectively, constituted reversible
error.
State v. Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 95, 665 P.2d 1102, 1105 (Ct. App. 1983).
III.
ANALYSIS
Allan argues the district court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial after the jury heard
Officer Martinez testify that he conducted a “felony stop.” Allan asserts this constitutes reversible
error because the term signaled to the jury that Allan was facing a felony charge and enticed the

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jury to consider punishment when they rendered a guilty verdict. The State argues Officer
Martinez’s testimony was in reference to the nature of the traffic stop, not the characterization of
the charges as felonies, and, ultimately, the use of the term did not deprive Allan of a fair trial. We
hold the district court did not err in denying Allan’s motion for mistrial.
In reviewing the denial of a motion for mistrial in a criminal case, this Court focuses on
the continuing impact on the trial of the incident giving rise to the motion. Id. at 95, 665 P.2d at
1105. The denial of the motion for mistrial will be disturbed on appeal only if the incident giving
rise to the motion, viewed retrospectively, constituted reversible error. Id. Appellate courts apply
the harmless error test to determine whether the error that forms the basis for a motion for mistrial
is reversible. State v. Smith, 170 Idaho 800, 810, 516 P.3d 1071, 1081 (2022). The harmless error
test requires weighing the probative value of the record, as a whole, while excluding the erroneous
evidence and at the same time comparing it against the probative force of the error. Id. “When
the effect of the error is minimal compared to the probative force of the record establishing guilt
beyond reasonable doubt without the error, it can be said that the error did not contribute to the
verdict rendered and is therefore harmless.” Id. (quoting State v. Garcia, 166 Idaho 661, 674, 462
P.3d 1125, 1138 (2020) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
It is not disputed that Officer Martinez used the term “felony” and he had been instructed
not to use the term. However, the district court did not err in denying Allan’s motion. Prior to
Officer Martinez testifying that he conducted a “felony stop,” the district court instructed the jury
that Allan was charged with aggravated battery, leaving the scene of an injury accident, and
eluding a peace officer. As such, the jury was already aware of the seriousness of Allan’s charges.
Also prior to Officer Martinez’s testimony, the victim testified that Allan drove from the left lane,
across the right lane, into the bike lane, and hit the victim. The collision threw the victim onto the
sidewalk where he rolled underneath a guardrail and sustained significant injuries before Allan
drove away. Additionally, the driver traveling behind Allan testified about witnessing the
accident. Officer Martinez testified about Allan’s behavior in failing to stop when Officer
Martinez activated his emergency lights and then his sirens, Officer Martinez’s heightened security
concerns, the factors he considered, and the final decision to perform the pit maneuver. Therefore,
the jury had already been informed about the seriousness of the charged crimes and heard evidence
about the crimes prior to Officer Martinez testifying to conducting a “felony stop.”

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The district court found the phrase “felony stop” used by Officer Martinez referred to the
significant measures law enforcement took to stop Allan, rather than a characterization of Allan’s
behavior or the nature of the charges Allan faced. We agree. Officer Martinez’s testimony did
not reference the level of criminal conduct charged or characterize Allan’s actions as felonies but,
rather, the type and level of action Officer Martinez took when he initiated and conducted the stop.
Officer Martinez testified he performed a “felony stop” to differentiate between a routine traffic
stop and the increased need for police force in this case, which included: boxing in Allan’s vehicle
between two patrol cars to prevent Allan from driving away; commanding Allan to keep his hands
where police could see them; and the necessity of assisting officers taking Allan into custody.
Therefore, the district court did not err when it found that Officer Martinez’s testimony about
conducting a “felony stop” did not signal to the jury that Allan was charged with a felony but,
rather, referred to the significant measures taken to stop Allan’s vehicle and take him into custody.
As such, Allan has not shown the district court erred in denying his I.C.R. 29.1(a) motion for
mistrial.
Allan speculates the use of the phrase “felony stop” would entice the jury to consider
punishment when they rendered a verdict.1 However, the district court instructed the jury not to
concern themselves with the subject of penalty or punishment and penalty or punishment must not
affect their verdict. We presume the jury followed the district court’s instructions. See State v.
Kilby, 130 Idaho 747, 751, 947 P.2d 420, 424 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Hudson, 129 Idaho 478,
481, 927 P.2d 451, 454 (Ct. App. 1996). Nothing in the record suggests the jury did not follow
the district court’s instructions not to concern themselves with the penalty or punishment. Nor has
Allan directed this Court to any language in the record or transcript showing the jury did not follow
the district court’s instructions. Allan’s speculative assertion fails to show the alleged error was
more than minimal or that it had a continued effect on the trial.
When weighing the probative force of the record while excluding the one-time use of the
phrase “felony stop” and at the same time comparing it against the probative force of that

1
The district court provided the standard Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction No. 106 as
Instruction No. 18 after both parties rested. That instruction reads: “Do not concern yourself with
the subject of penalty or punishment. That subject must not in any way affect your verdict. If you
find the defendant guilty, it will be my duty to determine the appropriate penalty or punishment.”
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statement, we conclude any error was harmless. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying
Allan’s motion for a mistrial.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The district court did not err in denying Allan’s motion for a mistrial. Allan’s judgment of
conviction is affirmed.
Judge LORELLO and Judge TRIBE, CONCUR.

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