State v. Ybarra

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 51777

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: December 10, 2025
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
ISAAC ANTHONY YBARRA, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Bonneville County. Hon. Dane H. Watkins, Jr., District Judge.

Judgment of conviction for rape, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Sally J. Cooley, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kacey L. Jones, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

HUSKEY, Judge
Isaac Anthony Ybarra appeals from his judgment of conviction for rape. Ybarra argues the
district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We hold the
district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Ybarra’s motion to withdraw his guilty
plea because the reasons Ybarra asserted for withdrawing his plea were contradicted by the record
and, even if considered, Ybarra failed to establish a just reason to withdraw his guilty plea.
Ybarra’s judgment of conviction is affirmed.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Ybarra was charged with rape, Idaho Code § 18-6101(5). In exchange for Ybarra’s guilty
plea, the State agreed to dismiss three pending cases in Bonneville County; not file any charges
arising out of a Bonneville County Sheriff’s Office report evidencing malicious injury to property;
and recommend a sentence of no more than twenty years. The plea agreement further stated, “no

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other agreements or conditions have been made or represented . . . except those terms of the plea
agreement which are set forth within this written agreement.” Ybarra signed the plea agreement
acknowledging he read and understood its terms and the consequences of pleading guilty, had
sufficient time to discuss the agreement with his attorney, and agreed to be bound by the terms of
the agreement. At the change of plea hearing, Ybarra confirmed he signed the plea agreement and
stated that he read and understood the terms of the agreement. Ybarra’s counsel also confirmed
he reviewed the plea agreement twice with Ybarra prior to the hearing. After an extensive colloquy
with Ybarra, the district court found Ybarra’s guilty plea was made knowingly, freely, and
voluntarily.
Approximately six months later, before the presentence investigation report (PSI) was
prepared, Ybarra moved to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting he believed a pending
Fremont County case would also be dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. To support his
motion, Ybarra filed an affidavit asserting he: (1) “did not fully read the Plea Agreement he
signed”; (2) “was just doing what his attorney told him to do”; and (3) believed a Fremont County
case would also be dismissed. Following a hearing, the district court found Ybarra did not establish
a just reason for withdrawing his guilty plea and denied the motion. Ybarra appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea lies in the discretion of the district
court and such discretion should be liberally applied. State v. Lee, 165 Idaho 254, 259, 443 P.3d
268, 273 (Ct. App. 2019). Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited
to determining whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as distinguished from
arbitrary action. Id.
When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the lower court: (1) correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently
with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision
by an exercise of reason. State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018).

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III.
ANALYSIS
Ybarra argues the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw
his guilty plea because he asserted a just reason to withdraw his guilty plea. In response, the State
argues the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ybarra’s motion because Ybarra’s
asserted reasons for withdrawing his plea are contradicted by the record. Additionally, the State
argues all the factors set forth in State v. Sunseri, 165 Idaho 9, 437 P.3d 9 (2018) weighed against
allowing withdrawal.
Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) provides that a defendant may move to withdraw a guilty plea
prior to sentencing. “The timing of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is critical to identifying the
governing legal standard.” Sunseri, 165 Idaho at 13, 437 P.3d at 13. If a defendant files a motion
to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing, the motion is subject to the just reason standard, which
the district court is encouraged to apply liberally. Id. at 13-14, 437 P.3d at 13-14. Although the
just reason standard is not particularly onerous, there is no automatic right to withdrawal of a guilty
plea before a sentence is imposed. Id. at 14, 437 P.3d at 14.
The first step in analyzing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing is to
determine whether the plea was constitutionally valid. Id. A constitutionally valid plea requires
the defendant to enter the plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Id. If the plea is
constitutionally valid, the trial court must then determine whether there are any other just reasons
for the plea withdrawal. Id. This is a factual determination committed to the trial court’s discretion
but, among other factors, the trial court should consider:
(1) whether the defendant has credibly asserted his legal innocence; (2) the length
of delay between the entry of the guilty plea and the filing of the motion;
(3) whether the defendant had the assistance of competent counsel at the time of
the guilty plea; and (4) whether withdrawal of the plea will inconvenience the court
and waste judicial resources.
Id. The defendant’s failure to present and support a plausible reason will dictate against granting
withdrawal, even absent prejudice to the prosecution. State v. Hartsock, 160 Idaho 639, 641, 377
P.3d 1102, 1104 (Ct. App. 2016). Ultimately, “the good faith, credibility, and weight of the
defendant’s assertions in support of his motion to withdraw his plea are matters for the trial court
to decide.” State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 537, 211 P.3d 775, 782 (Ct. App. 2008). If the
trial court determines the defendant provided a just reason for withdrawal, the burden shifts to the

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State to show that prejudice would result if the trial court were to grant the defendant’s motion.
Hartsock, 160 Idaho at 641, 377 P.3d at 1104.
The district court determined Ybarra’s plea was made knowingly, freely, and voluntarily.
Ybarra does not challenge this factual finding on appeal. Rather, Ybarra contends he otherwise
established a just reason to withdraw his plea.
Although the district court did not explicitly find Ybarra’s proffered reasons for
withdrawing his plea were contradicted by the record, Ybarra’s reasons are in fact contradicted by
the record in this case. Where the claimed reasons for pleading guilty are contradicted by the
record, it is unnecessary to decide whether the reasons are just. State v. Randall, 175 Idaho 103,
111, 562 P.3d 459, 467 (Ct. App. 2024).
First, Ybarra claimed he did not fully read the plea agreement. However, Ybarra signed
the agreement acknowledging he read the written plea agreement and understood its terms and the
consequences of entering into the agreement. During the change of plea hearing, the district court
engaged in an extensive colloquy to ensure that Ybarra’s plea was constitutionally valid. Ybarra
completed and signed the plea agreement with the assistance of counsel and informed the district
court he had enough time to talk with his attorney, had shared with his attorney everything his
attorney would need to assist him, and his attorney had done everything Ybarra asked him to do.
As to the second reason for withdrawing his guilty plea, Ybarra claimed he was “just doing
what his attorney told him to do.” At the change of plea hearing, the district court confirmed with
Ybarra’s counsel that Ybarra was able to make decisions when counsel reviewed the plea
agreement with him the night before and the morning of the hearing. Ybarra then confirmed with
the district court that no one had pressured or coerced him, intimidated or threatened him, nor
offered him a reward to plead guilty. Ybarra stated he was not under the influence of alcohol,
drugs, or controlled substances. Ybarra confirmed he understood the consequences of pleading
guilty, such as waiving the right to have a jury trial, the right to confront witnesses called by the
State, and the right to present a defense. Ybarra confirmed he understood what a PSI was and
would cooperate with completing the presentence investigation. Ybarra acknowledged the State
was recommending a combined unified sentence of twenty years, but each party was free to argue
the determinate portion of that sentence and the district court was not bound by the plea agreement.
Lastly, Ybarra stated he understood he was waiving his right to be free from incriminating himself
for the purpose of explaining to the district court how he was guilty of the charged crime.

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Finally, as his third reason for withdrawing his guilty plea, Ybarra claimed he mistakenly
believed a Fremont County case would also be dismissed. The plea agreement explicitly states
that “the State will dismiss the balance of the Defendant’s charges in Bonneville County,” and
then lists the three case numbers that would be dismissed in exchange for Ybarra’s guilty plea in
this case. The State further agreed to “not file any charges arising out of Bonneville County
Sheriff’s Office Report No. [], evidencing malicious injury to property.” Nowhere does the plea
agreement indicate charges arising out of Fremont County, or any other county, would be
dismissed. Rather, the agreement only references cases arising out of Bonneville County that
would either be dismissed or not pursued by the State. Furthermore, the plea agreement
specifically states no other agreements or conditions, aside from the terms set forth in the written
plea agreement, were made or represented to Ybarra.
Thus, because Ybarra’s reasons are contradicted by the record, it is unnecessary to decide
whether his reasons are just. Even assuming a just reason analysis is required, Ybarra has failed
to show any error in the district court’s analysis of the just reason factors articulated by the Idaho
Supreme Court in Sunseri.
At the hearing on Ybarra’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the district court addressed
each of the Sunseri factors. The district court first found Ybarra’s affidavit in support of his motion
did not assert his innocence. Next, the district court found the length of delay cut against Ybarra
because there were six months between the entry of Ybarra’s guilty plea and the filing of his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court then found Ybarra had the assistance of
competent counsel with more than twenty years of legal experience. Finally, the district court
found that granting Ybarra’s motion to withdraw would inconvenience the courts and waste
judicial resources during a time of higher demand upon trial courts.
On appeal, Ybarra takes issue only with the district court’s analysis of the fourth Sunseri
factor and argues his “right to a jury trial should not be denied where his trial would be no more
burdensome than a typical criminal jury trial.” Ybarra asserts “every criminal proceeding will use
some judicial resources and cause some inconvenience to the court” and “[t]he court identified
nothing about [his] case that would go beyond the typically anticipated use of resources and time.”
Ybarra further contends he “cannot be held responsible for the Covid-19 pandemic and the courts’
schedule due to the staying of jury trials.” However, nothing in the record indicates the district
court held Ybarra responsible for the Covid-19 pandemic or the courts’ schedule. Consequently,

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we agree with the district court that Ybarra has failed to demonstrate a just reason to withdraw his
guilty plea. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Ybarra’s motion
to withdraw his guilty plea.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Ybarra’s motion to withdraw
his guilty plea. Accordingly, Ybarra’s judgment of conviction is affirmed.
Judge LORELLO and Judge TRIBE, CONCUR.

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