State v. Rodriguez

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 47748

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: June 10, 2021
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
JUAN MARTIN RODRIGUEZ, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Samuel A. Hoagland, District Judge.

Order denying Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a) motion, vacated and case remanded.

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Erik R. Lehtinen, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

BRAILSFORD, Judge
Juan Martin Rodriguez appeals from the denial of his motion to correct an illegal
sentence under Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a). We vacate the district court’s denial of Rodriguez’s
Rule 35 motion and remand the case for entry of an order consistent with this opinion.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In May 2015, Rodriguez pled guilty to felony driving under the influence (DUI) (2015
case). The district court sentenced Rodriguez to ten years of imprisonment with two years
determinate but suspended the sentence and placed him on probation. As a condition of
probation, the court ordered Rodriguez to serve ninety days in jail. Additionally, the court
suspended Rodriguez’s driver’s license for five years, commencing “on the date of [his] release
from incarceration, or upon conclusion of any other current driver’s license suspension,

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whichever is later.” 1 Rodriguez completed his ninety-day jail service in August 2015, at which
time his suspension in the 2015 case commenced.
While on probation in the 2015 case, Rodriguez was stopped in December 2017 for
numerous traffic violations. After Rodriguez failed a breathalyzer test and the officer learned
Rodriguez had two active warrants for his arrest, the officer arrested Rodriguez. As a result, the
State charged Rodriguez with felony DUI and driving without privileges. Rodriguez pled guilty
to DUI and the State dismissed the remaining charge. The district court sentenced Rodriguez to
ten years with three years determinate to run concurrently “with all other sentences currently
being served” and retained jurisdiction. The court also suspended Rodriguez’s driver’s license
again for a period of five years. This suspension stated in relevant part that “[Rodriguez’s]
driver’s license is suspended for a total of five (5) years, commencing upon [his] release from
incarceration.”
As a result of Rodriguez’s arrest in December 2017, which gave to this case, the State
also charged Rodriguez with a probation violation in the 2015 case. After Rodriguez’s probation
was revoked in the 2015 case, he received a period of retained jurisdiction in that case to run
concurrently with the retained jurisdiction in this case. Rodriguez completed the concurrent
riders, and thereafter the district court placed Rodriguez on probation in this case and reiterated
the terms of the driver’s license suspension, including that Rodriguez’s driver’s license was
suspended for five years “commencing upon [his] release from incarceration.” The court,
however, relinquished jurisdiction in the 2015 case, and Rodriguez remained incarcerated.
While Rodriguez was still incarcerated in the 2015 case, he filed a pro se Rule 35 motion
to correct an illegal sentence in this case. On appeal, the parties agree that Rodriguez’s motion
asserted his sentence in this case was illegal for failing to give him credit against the driver’s
license suspension for the time during which he was incarcerated while on a rider. 2 The district
court, however, construed Rodriguez’s argument to request that his two suspensions--one in the
2015 case and another in this case--not last more than five years collectively. After framing

1
The judgment in the 2015 case is not in the appellate record in this case. The district
court, however, quotes the driver’s license suspension language in the 2015 case in its ruling, and
neither party disputes that language.
2
On appeal, Rodriguez concedes his motion is “exceptionally difficult to follow” and “a
challenging read.” Meanwhile, the district court characterized the motion as “confusing.”

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Rodriguez’s argument in this manner, the court then rejected that argument and denied
Rodriguez’s motion.
The district court concluded that Rodriguez’s driver’s license suspension in the 2015 case
had “run a little over two years” and had “a little less than three years” remaining; 3 his
suspension in this case “never started running” because Rodriguez had not been released from
incarceration following the revocation of his probation in the 2015 case; and as a result, “his
driver’s license suspension will total a little less than eight years” based on the two separate
suspensions. Further, the court concluded that Idaho Code § 18-8005 4 provides driving
privileges may be suspended for up to five years; neither of the judgments provided the two
suspensions would run concurrently; and the collective suspension of Rodriguez’s license for
more than five years did not impose an illegal sentence. The result of the court’s conclusions
was an implicit ruling that Rodriguez’s suspension in this case runs consecutive to the
suspension in the 2015 case.
Rodriguez timely appeals the denial of his Rule 35 motion.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court exercises free review of whether a sentence is illegal from the face of the
record under Rule 35(a). State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 84, 218 P.3d 1143, 1145 (2009). The
term “illegal sentence” under Rule 35 is narrowly interpreted as a sentence that is illegal from the
face of the record; i.e., resolving the issue does not involve significant questions of fact or
require an evidentiary hearing. Clements, 148 Idaho at 86, 218 P.3d at 1147. Rule 35 is a
“narrow rule,” and because an illegal sentence may be corrected at any time, the authority
conferred by Rule 35 should be limited to uphold the finality of judgments. Clements, 148 Idaho
at 86, 218 P.3d at 1147; State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 735, 170 P.3d 397, 400 (2007).
Rule 35 is not a vehicle designed to reexamine the facts underlying the case to determine
whether a sentence is illegal; rather, the rule only applies to a narrow category of cases in which

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This calculation appears to be based on the time between Rodriguez’s release from
incarceration on August 26, 2015, in the 2015 case and his arrest on December 22, 2017, in this
case and to take into account that a driver’s license suspension “cease[s] to run if the individual
is reincarcerated.” Idaho Code § 18-8011.
4
Idaho Code § 18-8005 was amended in July 2019. That amendment, however, did not
affect subsection (6)(d), which is at issue in this case.
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the sentence imposes a penalty that is simply not authorized by law or where new evidence tends
to show the original sentence is excessive. Clements, 148 Idaho at 86, 218 P.3d at 1147; see also
State v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55, 65, 343 P.3d 497, 507 (2015) (“Rule 35’s purpose is to allow courts
to correct illegal sentences, not to reexamine errors occurring at trial or before the imposition of
the sentence.”).
This Court also exercises free review over the application and construction of statutes.
State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Ct. App. 2003). Where the language of
a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the statute as written, without
engaging in statutory construction. State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219
(1999); State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct. App. 2000). The language of
the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659,
978 P.2d at 219. If the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for the Court to
resort to legislative history or rules of statutory interpretation. Escobar, 134 Idaho at 389, 3 P.3d
at 67.
II.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Rodriguez argues the district court erred by ruling that a driver’s license
suspension--which is silent as to whether it runs concurrently or consecutively to another
suspension--is necessarily consecutive. He contends neither I.C. § 18-8005(6)(d) nor I.C. § 18-
8011 “expressly permits a sentencing court to impose consecutive license suspensions.” In
response, the State does not address Rodriguez’s statutory argument, the district court’s ruling
that Rodriguez’s suspensions are consecutive, or Rodriguez’s actual argument according to the
parties that he should receive credit against his suspension for the time he was incarcerated while
on a rider. Instead, the State argues the suspension in this case is “facially legal” under I.C. § 18-
8005(6)(d) and that, as a result, this Court should affirm the district court’s denial of Rodriguez’s
Rule 35 motion. In reply, Rodriguez notes the State does not dispute that the district court
denied his motion for the wrong reason and argues the court “effectively lengthened the license
suspension by retroactively making the two suspensions consecutive.”
As an initial matter, we address under the free review standard Rodriguez’s argument
which the parties agree he actually made in his Rule 35 motion. That argument is that the district
court purportedly imposed an illegal sentence by failing to give Rodriguez credit against his

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driver’s license suspension for the time he was incarcerated on a rider. We disagree that
Rodriguez was entitled to credit against his suspension in this case for that period of time.
Both the original judgment in this case and the subsequent judgment ordering probation
expressly provide that Rodriguez’s driver’s license is suspended for five years “commencing
upon [his] release from incarceration.” (Emphasis added.) This term is in accord with the plain
language of I.C. § 18-8005(6)(d), which provides a defendant “[s]hall have his driving privileges
suspended by the court . . . after release from imprisonment.” (Emphasis added). Accordingly,
Rodriguez’s driver’s license suspension in this case begins after his release from incarceration,
and he does not receive any credit against that suspension for the period of time during which he
was incarcerated on a rider. 5 Rodriguez cites no authority and makes no argument to the
contrary.
Next, we address Rodriguez’s argument on appeal that the district court improperly ruled
that his driver’s license suspension in this case runs consecutive to his suspension in the 2015
case. Rodriguez is correct that neither the plain language of I.C. § 18-8005 nor I.C. § 18-8011
provide that multiple suspensions may run consecutively. To the contrary, I.C. § 18-8005(6)(d)
plainly provides, as noted above, that a suspension commences “after release from
imprisonment.” Accordingly, we decline to read a contrary term into the statute allowing for a
suspension to commence only after the expiration of another pending suspension. See Iselin v.
United States, 270 U.S. 245, 251 (1926) (“To supply omissions transcends the judicial
function.”); State v. Coniconde, 166 Idaho 164, 167-68, 456 P.3d 530, 533-34 (Ct. App. 2019)
(“[W]hen a statute is silent as to a term, courts lack the authority to add to what the text states or
reasonably implies.”).
Moreover, the district court’s ruling that Rodriguez’s two driver’s license suspensions are
to run consecutively conflicts with both the original judgment in this case and the subsequent
judgment ordering probation. As noted above, both of these judgments expressly provide

5
We express no opinion on Rodriguez’s driver’s license suspension in the 2015 case. The
language of that suspension, however, suggests the sentencing court may have intended the
suspension to run consecutive to other existing suspensions by providing that the suspension in
the 2015 case commence “on the date of [Rodriguez’s] release from incarceration, or upon
conclusion of any other current driver’s license suspension, whichever is later.” (Emphasis
added.) Regardless, the suspension in this case was not a “current” suspension when the
suspension in the 2015 case was imposed; rather, the suspension in this case did not yet exist at
that time.
5
Rodriguez’s driver’s license is suspended for five years “commencing upon [his] release from
incarceration.” (Emphasis added.) Neither these judgments nor any statute provide a basis to
require Rodriguez’s suspension in this case to commence only after the suspension in the 2015
expires.
III.
CONCLUSION
Although the district court’s ultimate denial of Rodriguez’s Rule 35 motion is not
erroneous, the court’s conclusion that Rodriguez’s driver’s license suspension in this case runs
consecutive to the 2015 case is erroneous. Accordingly, we vacate the court’s order denying the
motion and remand for entry of an order consistent with this Court’s opinion.
Chief Judge HUSKEY and Judge GRATTON CONCUR.

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