State v. Reeder

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 45593

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: January 30, 2019
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk
v. )
)
MIRANDA RIANNA REEDER, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Kootenai County. Hon. John T. Mitchell, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction for one count of felony possession of a controlled
substance and one count of misdemeanor possession of a controlled
substance, affirmed.

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jenny C. Swinford,
Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Russell J. Spencer, Deputy
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

LORELLO, Judge
Miranda Rianna Reeder appeals from her judgment of conviction for one count of felony
possession of a controlled substance and one count of misdemeanor possession of a controlled
substance. Reeder challenges the district court’s order denying her motion to suppress. For the
reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At approximately 1:30 a.m., an officer noticed a vehicle parked on the side of the road
with its lights off and its engine running. The officer parked his patrol car approximately twenty
feet behind the vehicle, but did not activate the patrol car’s overhead lights or sirens. When the
officer approached the vehicle, he saw two occupants inside who appeared to be sleeping or

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passed out; the passenger was later identified as Reeder. The officer waited for a backup officer
before making contact with the vehicle’s occupants. After the backup officer arrived, he tapped
on the window on the passenger side of the car while the first officer asked the driver if he could
roll down the window. When the driver indicated the window was broken, the officer asked the
driver if he could open the door. The officer smelled the odor of marijuana within seconds of the
driver opening the door. During a subsequent search of Reeder and her purse, the officer
discovered heroin, marijuana, and paraphernalia.
The State charged Reeder with felony possession of a controlled substance (heroin),
misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance (marijuana), and possession of paraphernalia.
Reeder filed a motion to suppress, alleging she was unlawfully seized. The district court denied
Reeder’s motion. Reeder thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea to the two possession of a
controlled substance charges, reserving her right to challenge the denial of her motion to
suppress, and the State dismissed the paraphernalia charge. Reeder appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a
motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by
substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts
as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a
suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts,
weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina,
127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d
659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).
III.
ANALYSIS
Reeder contends that the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress, asserting
the district court’s decision was based on an erroneous factual finding regarding the tone of the
officer’s statements and an erroneous legal conclusion regarding the nature of the encounter.
The State responds that Reeder has failed to show clear error in the district court’s factual finding
and that the district court correctly concluded “the driver’s initial contact with police was

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consensual and not a seizure.” Reeder has failed to show error in the district court’s factual
finding or its conclusion that Reeder was not entitled to suppression.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and its counterpart, Article I,
Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution, guarantee the right of every citizen to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. However, not all encounters between the police and citizens
involve the seizure of a person. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968); State v. Jordan, 122
Idaho 771, 772, 839 P.2d 38, 39 (Ct. App. 1992). Only when an officer, by means of physical
force or show of authority, restrains the liberty of a citizen may a court conclude that a seizure
has occurred. State v. Fry, 122 Idaho 100, 102, 831 P.2d 942, 944 (Ct. App. 1991). A seizure
does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual on the street or other
public place, by asking if the individual is willing to answer some questions, or by putting forth
questions if the individual is willing to listen. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991);
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983). Unless and until there is a detention, there is no
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and no constitutional rights have been
infringed. Royer, 460 U.S. at 498. Even when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular
individual, they may generally ask the individual questions and ask to examine identification.
Fry, 122 Idaho at 102, 831 P.2d at 944. So long as police do not convey a message that
compliance with their requests is required, the encounter is deemed consensual and no
reasonable suspicion is required. Id. Only when an officer, by means of physical force or show
of authority, restrains the liberty of a citizen may a court conclude that a seizure has occurred.
Id. Importantly, the critical inquiry is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances
surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person
that he or she was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his or her business.
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436.
The United States Supreme Court, in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554
(1980), stated:
Examples of circumstances that might indicate seizure, even where the person did
not attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of several officers, the
display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the
citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the
officer’s request might be compelled.

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Other circumstances that may indicate a seizure include whether an officer used overhead
emergency lights or took action to block a vehicle’s exit route. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho
482, 487-88, 211 P.3d 91, 96-97 (2009); State v. Schmidt, 137 Idaho 301, 302-03, 47 P.3d 1271,
1272-73 (Ct. App. 2002); Fry, 122 Idaho at 103, 831 P.2d at 945.
The following facts were found by the district court. At approximately 1:30 a.m., an
officer found a vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was running, but its lights
were off. The driver and passenger inside the vehicle were “slumped over to the side.” The
officer called for backup. After the backup officer arrived, the backup officer tapped on the
vehicle’s window and the first officer said: “Post Falls police. Can you roll your window down,
please?” The driver responded by explaining that the window was broken, to which the officer
replied: “Can you open the door?” 1 The district court found that the inflection in the officer’s
voice was more consistent with a question than a command and that the driver opened the door
consensually. The officer smelled marijuana “within seconds” of the door opening. Based on
these findings, the district court denied Reeder’s motion to suppress.
Reeder raises two challenges to the district court’s decision. First, Reeder argues that the
district court made an erroneous factual finding when it determined that the officer’s “statement
was a question, not a command.” Second, Reeder argues that the district court erred in finding
the encounter consensual because a reasonable person in her position would not feel at liberty to
ignore the officer and terminate the encounter. We will address each argument in turn.
First, the district court’s factual finding that the inflection in the officer’s voice was more
consistent with a question than a command was not clearly erroneous. Findings are clearly
erroneous only when unsupported by substantial and competent evidence. State v. Kinser, 141
Idaho 557, 560, 112 P.3d 845, 848 (Ct. App. 2005). The evidence presented at the suppression
hearing included the officer’s testimony and the video exhibit of the encounter. The district

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Reeder does not directly challenge the district court’s factual findings regarding what the
officer said upon making contact with the driver, but notes that the video of the encounter, which
was admitted as an exhibit, reflects that the officer said “Post Falls PD” rather than “Post Falls
police” and said “Can you roll your window down for me please?” rather than “Can you roll
your window down, please?” Reeder is correct regarding the precise language used by the
officer, but the differences identified between the district court’s factual findings and the video
exhibit do not change our analysis.

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court stated it “paid particular attention to the tone” of the officer’s voice and concluded that the
officer’s request that the driver roll down his window was a question and that the driver’s act of
opening the door was consensual. In making this finding, the district court considered the
officer’s testimony at the suppression hearing as well as other statements the officer made on the
video recording. The officer’s testimony included explaining that his “tone” was “audible
enough to be heard through the window, but it wasn’t demanding in any way.” The video
exhibit supports this description and the district court’s characterization of the officer’s tone.
Thus, there was substantial and competent evidence to support the district court’s factual finding.
That Reeder’s assessment of the officer’s tone is different than the district court’s does not
demonstrate clear error based upon a lack of substantial and competent evidence. 2
Second, the district court’s conclusion that suppression was not warranted in this case
was correct. On this point, we first note that the evidence presented to the district court centered
on the officer’s interaction with the driver of the vehicle and not on any specific interaction with
Reeder. It is well-established that a traffic stop of a vehicle and detention of its driver is
generally a detention of any passengers such that passengers have standing to contest the
reasonableness of the detention. See State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 650, 51 P.3d 461, 464
(Ct. App. 2002). However, the detention in this case was not the result of a traffic stop. While
the officer’s interaction with the driver is relevant as part of the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the encounter, the Fourth Amendment question in this case is whether the police
conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person in Reeder’s position that she was not
at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about her business. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436.
Reeder argues that no reasonable person in her position would have believed she was free to

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Recently, in State v. Andersen, 164 Idaho 309, 312, 429 P.3d 850, 853 (2018), the Idaho
Supreme Court indicated that, in the “unusual situation” where the parties at a suppression
hearing stipulate to have the district court decide the issue based solely on exhibits (such as a
transcript and video) without the presentation of live testimony, the appellate court does “not
extend the usual deference to the district court’s evaluation of the evidence.” We do not read this
modified standard of review as eliminating the traditional deference to a district court’s factual
findings regarding tone when evaluating the totality of the circumstances surrounding an alleged
seizure where, as here, the appellate court does not have “exactly the same evidence before it as
was considered by the district court.” Id. Indeed, the Court in Andersen was clear that it is only
in the limited circumstances where the evidence is “exactly the same” that free review is
appropriate. Id.

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terminate the encounter following the officer’s “command” to the driver to roll down the window
and “order” to open the door because she “would have been unable to open [her] door without
forcing the officer to move or hitting the officer with the door.” Reeder further argues “it would
be unreasonable to believe a passenger--having been transported to that location by the
driver--would be free to abandon the vehicle and go about her business” because the passenger
“would not have immediate transportation” and “would be effectively stranded in the officer’s
presence.” There are two flaws in Reeder’s argument. The first flaw is that the argument
ignores the district court’s finding that the officer’s statements were questions, not commands.
The second flaw in Reeder’s argument is that it is partly based on evidence that was not
presented to the district court. It was Reeder’s burden to show she was seized. See State v.
Cardenas, 143 Idaho 903, 907, 155 P.3d 704, 708 (Ct. App. 2006). The district court did not
make any findings regarding the backup officer’s position in relation to the passenger door, how
Reeder came to be a passenger in the car, or whether she would be “stranded” if she decided to
get out of the car and walk away. Presumably, the district court did not make findings of this
nature because the officer, who was the only witness who testified at the suppression hearing,
was not asked about these details, nor are these details apparent from the portions of the video
exhibit presented to the district court. Although the entirety of the video was admitted as an
exhibit pursuant to stipulation, Reeder did not play any portion of the video at the suppression
hearing. The State played a brief portion of the video, up to approximately minute 1:22, which is
when the driver opened the door and the officer smelled marijuana. In its findings, the district
court noted it reviewed the video “to the extent it was played in court.” While the video reflects
Reeder telling the officer, at approximately minute 2:40, that the driver picked her up from her
mom’s house, Reeder did not play this portion of the video at the suppression hearing or argue to
the district court that this was evidence that a reasonable person in her position would not feel
free to leave due to a lack of transportation. Moreover, Reeder did not make that statement to the
officer in the context of explaining an inability to leave. Rather, Reeder made the comment
when she and the driver were explaining that they were waiting to see if they could stay the night
at the driver’s mom’s house who the driver reported lived directly across the street from where
they were parked. To the extent Reeder’s argument is predicated on a theory not presented to the
district court, we will not consider it on appeal. Appellate court review is limited to the

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evidence, theories, and arguments that were presented below. State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162
Idaho 271, 275, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017). Even considering the totality of the evidence
presented, we conclude that the circumstances surrounding the initial encounter between Reeder
and the officers show it was consensual. The officers could lawfully engage the occupants of the
vehicle, and the officer’s requests to the driver to roll down the window and open the door did
not convey a message that Reeder was not free to leave. See State v. Zubizareta, 122 Idaho 823,
827, 839 P.2d 1237, 1241 (Ct. App. 1992) (concluding the driver of a car was not seized when an
officer walked up to his car, tapped on the window, and engaged the driver in brief
conversation). Nor was there any evidence presented that Reeder was “trapped” by virtue of her
status as a passenger. Once the driver opened the door, the odor of marijuana gave the officers
reasonable suspicion to detain the driver and Reeder. Compare with State v. Pieper, 163 Idaho
732, 735, 418 P.3d 1241, 1244 (Ct. App. 2018) (concluding that initial consensual encounter
with occupants of a parked vehicle evolved into a detention based on reasonable suspicion when
the officers saw marijuana in plain view within seconds of making contact).
Based on the totality of the circumstances, the district court did not err in its conclusion
that the encounter between Reeder and law enforcement was consensual up until there was
reasonable suspicion that Reeder possessed marijuana. The district court did not err in denying
Reeder’s motion to suppress.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The district court correctly concluded the initial encounter between Reeder and law
enforcement was consensual. Reeder was not detained until there was reasonable suspicion that
she possessed marijuana. Therefore, Reeder has failed to show the district court erred in denying
her motion to suppress. Accordingly, Reeder’s judgment of conviction for one count of felony
possession of a controlled substance and one count of misdemeanor possession of a controlled
substance is affirmed.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge HUSKEY, CONCUR.

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