State v. Blyth

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 52157

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: October 23, 2025
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
LISA MARIE BLYTH, aka LISA ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
MARIE COOKSEY, ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Peter G. Barton, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction and sentence for trafficking in methamphetamine,
affirmed; order denying motion to suppress, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jenny C. Swinford, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Elizabeth H. Estess, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

GRATTON, Chief Judge
Lisa Marie Blyth appeals from the judgment of conviction for trafficking in
methamphetamine. Blyth argues the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress. We
affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Police obtained a warrant to search for evidence of drug-related crimes at a residence
occupied by Blyth, her husband Dennis Cooksey, and others. The warrant provided: “You are
commanded to execute this warrant on or before _______ (not to exceed 14 days)” during daytime
hours (capitalization omitted). The line for a specific date was left blank. Twelve days later, the
police executed the warrant. Prior to the search, upon information from a confidential informant

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inside the residence, officers observed and arrested an individual who was leaving the house; that
individual was found to be in possession of guns and drugs. Police also observed Blyth leave the
residence and arrested her on an active arrest warrant. Blyth admitted to possessing drugs in her
car and in the residence and described where her bedroom was. Officers then began the search of
the residence.
In the bedroom, which Blyth shared with Cooksey, officers located marijuana, two baggies
containing approximately twenty grams of methamphetamine, and multiple items of drug
paraphernalia. Officers also found and opened a locked safe under the bed which contained
approximately one pound of methamphetamine and a digital scale. The State charged Blyth with
felony trafficking in methamphetamine (400 grams or more), Idaho Code §§ 37-2732B(a)(4)(B),
18-204; felony possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, I.C. §§ 37-2732(a), 18-204; and
misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, I.C. §§ 37-2734A, 18-204.
Blyth filed a motion to suppress. Blyth argued that the search warrant was invalid because
the specific date to execute the warrant was left blank, contrary to Idaho Criminal Rule 41(d) and
I.C. § 19-4412. Blyth also argued the police exceeded the scope of the warrant when they opened
the locked safe found underneath the bed. The district court denied the motion finding that Blyth
had standing to challenge the search; the search warrant was valid and did not violate I.C.R. 41(d)
and I.C. § 19-4412 because it explicitly stated that it must be and was exercised within fourteen
days of its issuance; any statute or rule violations were not constitutional violations for suppression
purposes; and the officers did not exceed the scope of the warrant because the safe was a plausible
repository for illegal drugs.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Blyth pled guilty to trafficking in methamphetamine,
amended down to “two hundred (200) grams or more,” reserving her right to challenge the denial
of her motion to suppress. The State dismissed the remaining charges. Blyth appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion
to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by
substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts
as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a
suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts,

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weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina,
127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d
659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).
III.
ANALYSIS
“Mindful” of State v. Wright, 115 Idaho 1043, 772 P.2d 250 (Ct. App. 1989), Blyth argues
the warrant’s blank expiration date violated I.C.R. 41(d) and I.C. § 19-4412, requiring suppression
of the evidence. “Mindful” of State v. Smith, 119 Idaho 11, 802 P.2d 1223 (Ct. App. 1990), Blyth
argues the police exceeded the scope of the warrant when the officers opened the locked safe in
her bedroom.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 17 of the
Idaho Constitution protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures “in their persons,
houses, papers and effects.” In Wright, this Court held, “Although courts strictly enforce the
statutory time period for a warrant’s validity, failure of the issuing magistrate to actually specify
in the warrant the period--within which the warrant must be executed--will not lead to
suppression.” Wright, 115 Idaho at 1048, 772 P.2d at 255. In addition, if the officers execute the
warrant within the fourteen-day limit, and the defendant cannot demonstrate any resultant
prejudice from the lack of a specific date on the face of the warrant, the failure to include the
specific date is not fatal to the search warrant or the admissibility of the evidence seized. Id. Blyth
acknowledges that the police executed the warrant within fourteen days, and she alleged no
prejudice as required by Wright. In accordance with this Court’s holding in Wright, Blyth’s claim
that the warrant was invalid and void because it did not specify an expiration date for the search is
without merit. In addition, we note that the suppression of evidence is a court-created remedy to
ensure compliance with constitutional standards, and it is not appropriate to extend that remedy to
violations that are merely statutory. State v. Lancaster, 171 Idaho 236, 241, 519 P.3d 1176, 1181
(2022); see State v. Bussard, 114 Idaho 781, 787, 760 P.2d 1197, 1203 (Ct. App. 1988) (defects in
the return of a warrant, as required by I.C.R. 41(d), do not require suppression).
Additionally, Blyth argues the police exceeded the scope of the warrant when the officers
opened the locked safe in her bedroom. Blyth, however, acknowledges this Court’s holding in
Smith where we stated that when conducting a search for material described in a warrant, an officer
is not limited to what is immediately apparent on sight, but may open plausible repositories for

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such material. Smith, 119 Idaho at 13, 802 P.2d at 1225. In State v. Lewis, 170 Idaho 267, 271,
509 P.3d 1196, 1200 (Ct. App. 2022), this Court held that containers situated within a residence
which are the subject of a validly issued warrant may be searched if it is reasonable to believe that
the container could conceal items of the kind described in the warrant. Blyth does not challenge
the district court’s factual finding that the safe was a possible repository for controlled substances.
In accordance with this Court’s holding in Smith, Blyth’s claim that the officers exceeded the scope
of the warrant by searching the safe is without merit.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Blyth fails to demonstrate error in the district court’s denial of her motion to suppress.
Therefore, the judgment of conviction and sentence for trafficking in methamphetamine and the
district court’s order denying Blyth’s motion to suppress are affirmed.
Judge LORELLO and Judge Pro Tem MELANSON CONCUR.

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