State v. Wallette

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 51598

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: October 22, 2025
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
JOSEPH MILES WALLETTE, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Kootenai County. Hon. Barry McHugh, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jenny C. Swinford, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; John C. McKinney, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

LORELLO, Judge
Joseph Miles Wallette appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of a
controlled substance. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
An officer was patrolling an area known for drug activity when he noticed a vehicle parked
in front of a house. The officer observed that the vehicle’s license plate “had several severe gouges
and scratches that made the license plate clearly not legible.” As the vehicle pulled away from the
house, the officer initiated a traffic stop. The officer approached the vehicle and identified Wallette
as the driver. The officer informed Wallette that his license plate was not clearly legible as required
by Idaho law. When asked to provide his driver’s license, Wallette informed the officer Wallette

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did not have a valid license because he failed to pay a reinstatement fee. As Wallette looked for
identification, the officer requested the assistance of a canine unit. The officer had Wallette exit
the vehicle and began issuing a citation for driving without privileges. During that time, the officer
informed Wallette that a canine unit was en route and that a drug dog would be conducting a “free
air” sniff of the vehicle. When asked whether Wallette had any illegal substances in the vehicle,
he indicated there were “crumbs of some sort.” The officer approached the vehicle and, using his
flashlight to look through the open window, saw “little crystals” he believed were consistent with
“methamphetamine crumbs or shake on the seat itself.” Based on the officer’s training and
experience with narcotics, his observations and Wallette’s statements, the officer conducted a
search of the vehicle and discovered methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia.
The State charged Wallette with felony possession of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine) and misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance (marijuana). Wallette
filed a motion to suppress, asserting the officer did not have reasonable suspicion for the traffic
stop and that the stop was unlawfully extended. The district court held a hearing on the motion, at
which it heard testimony from the officer and reviewed his bodycam and dashcam footage.
Ultimately, the district court denied Wallette’s motion. The district court found the officer’s
testimony credible and determined he had reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle
because the license plate was not legible. Additionally, the district court found that the traffic stop
was not unlawfully extended and concluded the officer had probable cause to search the vehicle
under the automobile exception after he saw the methamphetamine crumbs in plain view on the
driver’s seat.
Thereafter, Wallette entered a conditional guilty plea to felony possession of a controlled
substance (I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1)), reserving his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his
motion to suppress. As part of the plea agreement, the State dismissed the additional charge.
Wallette appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion
to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by
substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts

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as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a
suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts,
weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina,
127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d
659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).
III.
ANALYSIS
“Mindful of the district court’s credibility and factual findings,” Wallette argues the district
court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the officer “did not have reasonable
suspicion for the stop and unlawfully extended the stop.” The State responds that the record and
applicable law support the district court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. We hold that
Wallette has failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.
A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle’s occupants and implicates
the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct.
App. 1996). Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible
criminal behavior if there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven
contrary to traffic laws. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); State v. Flowers, 131
Idaho 205, 208, 953 P.2d 645, 648 (Ct. App. 1998). The reasonableness of the suspicion must be
evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances at the time of the stop. State v. Ferreira, 133
Idaho 474, 483, 988 P.2d 700, 709 (Ct. App. 1999). The reasonable suspicion standard requires
less than probable cause but more than mere speculation or instinct on the part of the officer. Id.
An officer may draw reasonable inferences from the facts in his or her possession, and those
inferences may be drawn from the officer’s experience and law enforcement training. State v.
Montague, 114 Idaho 319, 321, 756 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Ct. App. 1988).
In the traffic stop context, authority for a seizure ends when the tasks related to the stop
are, or reasonably should have been, completed. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005).
Tasks related to a traffic stop include addressing the traffic violation that precipitated the stop;
determining whether to issue a traffic ticket; and making inquiries incident to the traffic stop, such
as checking the driver’s license, inspecting the vehicle’s proof of insurance and registration, and

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conducting a criminal record check of the driver. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354-55
(2015); State v. Hale, 168 Idaho 863, 867, 489 P.3d 450, 454 (2021). Officers may not deviate
from the purpose of a traffic stop by investigating (or taking safety precautions incident to
investigating) other crimes without reasonable suspicion. See Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 356.
However, the justification for a motorist’s detention is not permanently fixed at the moment the
traffic stop is initiated. State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 183, 125 P.3d 536, 539 (Ct. App. 2005).
An officer’s observations, general inquiries, and events succeeding the stop may--and often
do--give rise to legitimate reasons for particularized lines of inquiry and further investigation by
an officer. State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 613, 798 P.2d 453, 458 (Ct. App. 1990). Furthermore,
even without reasonable suspicion, officers may engage in lines of investigation unrelated to an
otherwise lawful traffic stop as long as doing so does not prolong the stop. See Caballes, 543 U.S.
at 409 (holding that a dog sniff conducted during an otherwise lawful traffic stop does not violate
the Fourth Amendment); Hale, 168 Idaho at 867, 489 P.3d at 454 (recognizing the officers may
“conduct certain unrelated checks” during a traffic stop).
In this case, the officer testified at the hearing on Wallette’s motion to suppress. According
to the officer, he was on patrol when he noticed a vehicle parked at a house that he “had been
watching and been successful getting drugs out of” in the past. The officer noted that the vehicle’s
license plate “had several severe gouges and scratches that made the license plate clearly not
legible.” Based on the vehicle’s “equipment violation,” the officer initiated a traffic stop. The
district court found the officer’s testimony credible and “largely corroborated by the video
evidence” (i.e., the officer’s bodycam and dashcam footage). The district court discussed the
then-applicable statute pertaining to the “proper display of license plates” (I.C. § 49-428(2)) and
emphasized the requirement that the license plate “be legible in the sense that it is clearly legible
in the way that a license plate would normally be read.” Relying on the officer’s testimony and
video evidence, the district court found that the “condition of the license plate led to the illegibility
of the plate numbers, which provide[d] reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle was
being driven contrary to the traffic laws.” As a result, the district court concluded that the officer
“had a factual and legal basis for stopping the vehicle being driven by Wallette as a result of the
damaged license plate of the rear of the vehicle.”

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Next, the district court considered whether the officer unlawfully extended the stop. The
officer testified that he was “engaged in conversation” with Wallette and was “multitasking” while
writing his information on the ticket that the officer intended to issue regarding the vehicle’s
license plate. The officer indicated that his conversation with Wallette did not cause the officer to
abandon writing the citation. During this conversation, the officer informed Wallette that a canine
unit was en route to conduct a “free air” sniff and asked Wallette whether there were any illegal
substances in the vehicle. Wallette indicated “there might be something in there,” specifying that
there could be “crumbs of some sort” in the vehicle. Based on his training and experience, the
officer testified that he believed Wallette was referring to “meth” when he said “crumbs.” The
officer asked Wallette when he last “used,” to which Wallette answered, “I [do not] know, a few
hours ago.” The officer’s conversation with Wallette prompted the officer to approach the vehicle.
Using his flashlight to look inside the vehicle, the officer “could see little crystals” on the “driver’s
seat” of the vehicle in plain view. Based on this evidence, the district court determined that there
was no “unlawful extension of the stop; rather, the character of the stop morphed as the
conversation” between Wallette and the officer “took place.” The district court found that “at no
time was there any prolonging of the stop” and that the video evidence confirmed the officer “was
multitasking” and “working on the citation” while “carrying on a conversation with” Wallette.
According to the district court, once the officer had Wallette’s admission about crumbs and the
officer “corroborated the fact that it looked like, in his training and experience, there was some
methamphetamine shards or pieces clearly visible in plain view,” the officer “developed probable
cause to search the entire motor vehicle under the automobile exception.” The district court
concluded that, “under the totality of the circumstances,” Wallette failed to establish “there was
an unlawful prolonging or extension of the traffic stop.”
On appeal, Wallette argues the district court erred in finding that the officer had reasonable
suspicion for the traffic stop. Mindful of the district court’s findings to the contrary, Wallette
maintains the evidence showed “the license plate was ‘clearly legible’ despite its alleged
condition.” Wallette’s argument is not supported by the record. Based on the officer’s testimony
and video evidence presented, the district court determined that the vehicle’s license plate had
“gouges and scratches and dents” which rendered the plate “not clearly legible.” Wallette does
not challenge these findings on appeal, and we will not presume error. The district court’s findings

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are therefore supported by substantial and competent evidence. Further, Wallette’s argument that
the officer’s “dashcam video does not confirm the license plate’s condition” is unpersuasive. That
Wallette does not believe the officer’s dashcam footage confirms the condition of the vehicle’s
license plate does not establish error in the district court’s reasonable suspicion finding based on
the totality of the evidence presented.
Wallette also argues that, even if the officer had reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic
stop, the district court erred in denying Wallette’s motion to suppress because the officer
“unlawfully extended the traffic stop to initiate a drug investigation.” Once again, mindful of “the
district court’s credibility and factual findings that [the officer] was actively working on the
citation while questioning Wallette about drugs in the” vehicle, he contends the officer “unlawfully
extended the stop to question him about drugs.” We disagree. The district court concluded that
the officer’s bodycam footage confirmed that he “was multitasking” and “was working on” the
citation and “carrying on a conversation with” Wallette. Like his previous argument, Wallette
does not challenge these findings on appeal, and we will not presume error.
Wallette has failed to show error in the district court’s finding that the officer had
reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle Wallette was driving because the vehicle’s rear license
plate was not “clearly legible.” Wallette has also failed to show the district court erred in
concluding that his detention was not unlawfully extended.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Substantial evidence supports the district court’s findings that the officer had reasonable
suspicion to conduct a traffic stop and that the officer did not unlawfully extend the stop. As a
result, Wallette has failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.
Accordingly, Wallette’s judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance is
affirmed.
Judge HUSKEY and Judge TRIBE, CONCUR.

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