State v. Martinez

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 51809

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: September 29, 2025
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
JORGE MORALES MARTINEZ, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Twin
Falls County. Hon. Benjamin J. Cluff, District Judge.

Order denying motion to suppress, affirmed; judgment of conviction for trafficking
in heroin, possession of fentanyl with intent to deliver, and possession of
methamphetamine, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Andrea W. Reynolds, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Elizabeth H. Estess, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

GRATTON, Chief Judge
Jorge Morales Martinez appeals from his judgment of conviction for trafficking in heroin,
possession of fentanyl with intent to deliver, and possession of methamphetamine. Martinez
claims that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress arguing the officer lacked
reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Deputy McBride observed two Kia Optima vehicles with matching make, model, color,
and temporary Arizona registration tags, traveling in tandem. Based on his training and experience
in drug interdiction, Deputy McBride recognized this as a common pattern used by drug
traffickers, in which one vehicle acts as a “load car” carrying contraband, and the other as a “chase
car” intended to distract or obstruct law enforcement.

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Deputy McBride positioned his patrol car parallel to the first vehicle, driven by Martinez,
for approximately one mile. When Deputy McBride activated his turn signal to merge behind
Martinez, the second vehicle accelerated to block his maneuver. Deputy McBride then activated
his rear overhead lights to merge safely. Although the second vehicle briefly yielded, it quickly
accelerated again and swerved to within a foot of the patrol car as Deputy McBride attempted to
merge behind Martinez’s vehicle.
Eventually, Deputy McBride was able to position himself behind Martinez’s vehicle.
Deputy McBride paced the vehicle’s speed at fifty miles per hour in a forty-five mile-per-hour
zone and initiated a traffic stop. With Martinez’s consent, Deputy McBride conducted a search of
the vehicle and discovered approximately 11.69 pounds of fentanyl and over 1,200 grams of heroin
concealed in the trunk. Additionally, a small amount of methamphetamine was found on
Martinez’s person during a search prior to arrest. Martinez was arrested and subsequently charged
with trafficking in heroin, Idaho Code § 37-2732B(a)(6)(C), possession of fentanyl with intent to
deliver, I.C. § 37-2732(a)(1)(A), and possession of methamphetamine, I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1).
Martinez filed a motion to suppress, challenging the legality of the traffic stop and the
scope of the subsequent detention. The district court denied the motion, finding that the stop was
supported both by reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation and by reasonable suspicion of drug
trafficking based on the totality of the circumstances. Martinez later entered a conditional guilty
plea, reserving the right to appeal the order denying the motion to suppress. Martinez appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion
to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by
substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts
as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a
suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts,
weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina,
127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d
659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).

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III.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Martinez claims the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress
because Deputy McBride lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Martinez for speeding. Martinez
argues that, since Deputy McBride did not record Martinez’s speed with radar or have video
evidence of Martinez speeding, the evidence was insufficient to conclude that Deputy McBride
possessed reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop.
Martinez challenges only the district court’s finding that Deputy McBride had reasonable
suspicion to stop Martinez’s vehicle for speeding. However, the district court alternatively found
that Deputy McBride had reasonable suspicion that Martinez was involved in drug-related activity
prior to initiating the traffic stop. This reasonable suspicion was based on the deputy’s observation
of two vehicles of the same color, make, and model traveling in tandem, a commonly used scheme
by those involved in drug trafficking. Deputy McBride’s suspicions were strengthened when the
other vehicle behaved as a chase car and almost struck Deputy McBride’s patrol car when he tried
to merge behind the front vehicle. On appeal, Martinez does not challenge the district court’s
alternative finding of reasonable suspicion for the stop based on drug-related activity.
Where a trial court’s ruling rests on an unchallenged, independent ground, appellate courts
must affirm. See Grove v. State, 161 Idaho 840, 855-56, 392 P.3d 18, 33-34 (Ct. App. 2017); State
v. Goodwin, 131 Idaho 364, 366-67, 956 P.2d 1311, 1313-14 (Ct. App. 1998). Martinez did not
challenge the drug-related basis for the stop in his “Statement of Issues” or in any separate section
of his briefing on appeal. In MacLeod v. Reed, 126 Idaho 669, 889 P.2d 103 (Ct. App. 1995), this
Court held:
The review of a trial court’s action is inappropriate when the action has not
been listed as an issue on appeal and no argument or authority on the issue is
contained in the brief on appeal. Similarly, where a judgment of the trial court is
based upon alternative grounds, the fact that one of the grounds may be in error is
of no consequence and may be disregarded if the judgment can be sustained upon
one of the other grounds.
Id. at 671, 889 P.2d at 105 (internal citation omitted). Thus, regardless of Martinez’s argument
that Deputy McBride did not use radar or have video evidence of Martinez traveling fifty miles
per hour in a forty-five mile-per-hour zone, Martinez does not challenge the district court’s
alternative finding of evidence sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion that Martinez was
involved in drug-related activities justifying the stop. Without any argument or authority from

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Martinez as to this alternative finding, we will not presume error by the district court and affirm
the denial of the motion to suppress on the alternative basis. Thus, we need not address finding of
reasonable suspicion for the stop based on speeding.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Martinez failed to challenge the independent and alternative ground of drug-related activity
supporting the traffic stop. Accordingly, the district court’s order denying Martinez’s motion to
suppress and his judgment of conviction are affirmed.
Judge HUSKEY and Judge TRIBE CONCUR.

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