State v. Rodriguez, Jr.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 51134

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: September 23, 2025
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
RAMON LUIS RODRIGUEZ, JR., ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Jonathan Medema, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Brian R. Dickson, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________
TRIBE, Judge
Ramon Luis Rodriguez, Jr. appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of a
controlled substance. On appeal, Rodriguez argues that the district court erred by denying his
motion to suppress. The State argues there was no error. For the reasons below, we affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Although the district court did not make any factual findings, it emphasized that its holding
was based on the only evidence presented--an officer’s on-body camera footage.1 Therefore, this
Court’s analysis will be similarly limited to a review of the contents of the video.

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The district court declined to make factual findings, seemingly out of concern that a higher
court might later deem those findings clearly erroneous. It is the trial court’s obligation to make
findings of fact incident to a motion to suppress. This Court does not second guess such findings.

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The video shows that three officers approached Rodriguez’s parked, non-running vehicle
in a parking lot and contacted Rodriguez while he sat in the driver’s seat. Officer Henman
explained the contact was prompted by reports of suspicious behavior, namely a vehicle driving
up and down the road with the driver looking into other vehicles. Rodriguez denied he did this but
added that his transmission was failing. Rodriguez demonstrated his transmission was faulty by
starting the engine and shifting gears. At Officer Henman’s request, Rodriguez turned the vehicle
off and provided his identification. While retrieving his identification, Rodriguez answered
questions about his destination and confirmed that he was on parole. Rodriguez again described
his transmission problems, explained his presence in the parking lot, and said he planned to call
his mother for a ride. When the officer asked Rodriguez if the officer could search the vehicle,
Rodriguez consented to the search. The video ends at this point; however, it is not disputed that
the officers located narcotics and paraphernalia in the vehicle.
Ultimately, the State charged Rodriguez with possession of a controlled substance and
possession of drug paraphernalia. Rodriguez filed a motion to suppress, alleging the officer who
contacted him “abandoned the original purpose of his stop and began detaining him without
reasonable, articulable suspicion to pursue a drug investigation.” The State could not produce
witnesses for the suppression hearing. The only evidence the State and Rodriguez submitted for
the hearing was the recording of the officer’s on-body camera video.
The district court denied Rodriguez’s motion to suppress. The district court concluded
Rodriguez was not seized because a reasonable person in his situation would have felt free to leave.
Rodriguez entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance (Idaho Code
§ 37-2732(c)(1)) reserving his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. Rodriguez
filed a timely notice of appeal.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion
to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by
substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts

Only if the trial court makes findings that are clearly unsupported will this Court hold them to be
erroneous.

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as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a
suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts,
weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina,
127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d
659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999). However, where this Court has exactly the same evidence before it as
was considered by the trial court (such as a transcript and video), without the presentation of live
testimony, this Court does “not extend the usual deference to the district court’s evaluation of the
evidence.” State v. Andersen, 164 Idaho 309, 312, 429 P.3d 850, 853 (2018).
III.
ANALYSIS
Rodriguez argues that he was seized without reasonable suspicion in violation of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution.
Rodriguez also argues that, when analyzing whether a seizure occurred, the district court erred by
failing to consider Officer Henman’s request for Rodriguez’s identification. Rodriguez further
argues that, even if he was not seized under the United States Constitution, he was seized according
to the Idaho Constitution. Finally, Rodriguez argues that, even if he was seized under the Idaho
Constitution, his seizure was unlawful as the officers prolonged the detention by abandoning the
mission of the stop.
The district court did not make explicit findings of fact when denying Rodriguez’s
suppression motion. However, the district court concluded that, although the officers had no
reasonable suspicion to initiate contact with Rodriguez, they did not detain him. The failure to
make explicit findings of fact is not fatal to the determination of a suppression motion. Instead,
we should “examine the record to determine the ‘implicit’ findings which underlie the judge’s
order.” State v. Middleton, 114 Idaho 377, 380, 757 P.2d 240, 243 (Ct. App. 1988). To properly
ascertain the implicit findings, we look at the evidence available to the district court at the time of
the ruling which (at that time) was the officer’s on-body camera video.2
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and its counterpart, Article I,
Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution, guarantee the right of every citizen to be free from

2
The first 29 seconds of the video are muted.

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unreasonable searches and seizures. However, not all encounters between the police and citizens
involve the seizure of a person. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968); State v. Jordan, 122
Idaho 771, 772, 839 P.2d 38, 39 (Ct. App. 1992). Only when an officer, by means of physical
force or show of authority, restrains the liberty of a citizen may a court conclude that a seizure has
occurred. State v. Fry, 122 Idaho 100, 102, 831 P.2d 942, 944 (Ct. App. 1991). A seizure does
not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual on the street or other public
place, by asking if the individual is willing to answer some questions or by putting forth questions
if the individual is willing to listen. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991); Florida v. Royer,
460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983). Unless and until there is a detention, there is no seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment and no constitutional rights have been infringed. Royer, 460
U.S. at 498. Even when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may
generally ask the individual questions and ask to examine identification. Fry, 122 Idaho at 102,
831 P.2d at 944.
On the other hand, the United States Supreme Court has outlined circumstances that might
indicate a seizure “even where the person did not attempt to leave.” United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). Such circumstances include the threatening presence of several officers,
an officer displaying a weapon, some physical touching of the person, the use of language or tone
of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled. Id. Other
circumstances that may indicate a seizure include whether an officer used overhead emergency
lights or took action to block a vehicle’s exit route. See State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 487-
88, 211 P.3d 91, 96-97 (2009); State v. Schmidt, 137 Idaho 301, 302-03, 47 P.3d 1271, 1272-73
(Ct. App. 2002); Fry, 122 Idaho at 103, 831 P.2d at 945.
Rodriguez argues that the initial encounter with the officers was not consensual and that
he was seized without reasonable suspicion when the officers approached his vehicle on each side,
shined flashlights into the vehicle, requested that he turn off his vehicle, and asked for his
identification. Rodriguez further argues that a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave
upon being asked for identification pursuant to I.C. § 49-316 which requires a driver to surrender
a driver’s license to a police officer upon demand.
First, the officers did not block Rodriguez’s vehicle nor activate their patrol vehicles’
overhead emergency lights. Second, the officers’ use of flashlights did not make the encounter

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more intrusive. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the use of lights to illuminate an area can
significantly enhance officer safety and does not constitute a seizure of people in the illuminated
area. State v. Baker, 141 Idaho 163, 167, 107 P.3d 1214, 1218 (2004). Third, the officers did not
display their weapons or make any physical contact throughout the initial encounter. Nor did the
officers use a tone of voice indicating compliance with their requests might be compelled. Fourth,
the officer’s request to turn off the vehicle was not indicative of a seizure because the officer did
not exercise any authority for Rodriguez to comply with the order but, rather, it was a request after
Rodriguez turned on the vehicle to demonstrate mechanical issues. See State v. Zubizareta, 122
Idaho 823, 828, 839 P.2d 1237, 1242 (Ct. App. 1992) (stating that “there is no doubt that the officer
requested Zubizareta to turn off the motor, as opposed to ordering him to do so. There was no sign
of force or authority beyond the officer’s uniform to require Zubizareta to submit or to limit his
ability to refuse”). Finally, the officer lawfully asked Rodriguez for identification. Even when
officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask the individual
questions and ask to examine identification. Fry, 122 Idaho at 102, 831 P.2d at 944. It was at this
moment that Rodriguez consented to the officer’s request to search his vehicle. Thus, the officers
did not seize Rodriguez without reasonable suspicion. Because the initial encounter with the
officers was consensual, Rodriguez is not entitled to suppression of any evidence resulting from
the alleged illegal seizure and the district court correctly denied his motion to suppress.
Rodriguez further argues that the officers were in violation of the Idaho Constitution which
he contends provides greater protection from governmental interference than the United States
Constitution. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the guarantees under the United States
Constitution and the Idaho Constitution are substantially the same. State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81,
88, 90 P.3d 306, 313 (2004). However, the Idaho Supreme Court has, at times, construed the
provisions of our Constitution to grant greater protection than that afforded under the United States
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal Constitution. For example, in State v. Webb, 130
Idaho 462, 943 P.2d 52 (1997), the Court concluded the United States Supreme Court’s definition
of curtilage for a Fourth Amendment analysis did not adequately reflect the privacy interests of
Idaho citizens under Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution. Moreover, in State v.
Henderson, 114 Idaho 293, 756 P.2d 1057 (1988), the Idaho Supreme Court held that roadblocks
established to apprehend drunk drivers violate Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution,

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while, in Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990), the United States Supreme
Court held that such roadblocks do not violate the Fourth Amendment. In State v. Thompson, 114
Idaho 746, 760 P.2d 1162 (1988), the Idaho Supreme Court held that the installation of a pen
register device by the government constitutes a search under the Idaho Constitution, even though,
in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), the United States Supreme Court held that it did not
constitute a search under the United States Constitution. In these cases, the Idaho Supreme Court
provided greater protection to Idaho citizens. However, none of the factors in these cases support
a divergence from the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment by the United States Supreme Court
given the facts of this case.
Finally, Rodriguez argues that the officers prolonged his detention by deviating from the
initial mission of their investigation--searching for a suspicious person driving up and down the
road and looking in vehicles. Rodriguez contends that Officer Henman’s questions regarding his
parole status and the presence of potential contraband impermissibly prolonged the duration of the
stop. Because this Court affirms the district court’s finding that Rodriguez was not detained and
the encounter was consensual, the stop could not have been unlawfully prolonged.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The district court did not err in finding that Rodriguez was not unlawfully seized during
his encounter with the officers. Rodriguez did not meet his burden to show that the district court
erred in denying his motion to suppress. Therefore, Rodriguez’s judgment of conviction for
possession of a controlled substance is affirmed.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge HUSKEY, CONCUR.

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