IDHW v. John Doe

CourtListener 10667738IdahoctappSep 8, 2025

Full text

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 53009

In the Matter of: Jane Doe I, )
A Child Under Eighteen (18) Years of )
Age. )
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF )
HEALTH AND WELFARE, ) Filed: September 8, 2025
)
Petitioner-Respondent, ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
)
v. ) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
JOHN DOE (2025-19), ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
)
Respondent-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Second Judicial
District, State of Idaho, Nez Perce County. Hon. Karin Seubert, District Judge.

Judgment terminating parental rights; affirmed.

Magyar, Rauch & Associates, PLLC; Jacob E. Reisenauer, Lewiston, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Briana Allen, Deputy Attorney General,
Lewiston, for respondent.
________________________________________________

HUSKEY, Judge
John Doe appeals from the judgment terminating his parental rights to Jane Doe I (Child).
Doe argues his due process rights were violated when the magistrate court changed the permanency
goals from reunification to termination of parental rights and adoption shortly after Doe was added
as a party to the case. The magistrate court’s judgment terminating Doe’s parental rights is
affirmed.

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I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Doe is the biological father of Child. In October 2024, the Idaho Department of Health
and Welfare (Department) filed a Child Protective Act (CPA) petition on behalf of Child.1 The
magistrate court held an adjudicatory hearing on the petition, found Child fell within the purview
of the CPA, and placed Child in the custody of the Department. Doe’s paternity was later
established, and he was added as a party to the case. After being notified of his paternity, Doe did
not participate in any of the offered visitations with Child.
Doe was involved in other child protection proceedings that sometimes overlapped. Prior
to this case, Doe’s parental rights to Child’s older sibling were terminated in May 2024. In another
child protection proceeding, Doe’s parental rights to two other children were terminated in
January 2025. Based on Doe’s lack of visitation, continued substance abuse, and the other child
protection proceedings, the Department filed a motion for a finding of aggravated circumstances;
the motion was subsequently withdrawn. Approximately two weeks after Doe had been added to
the case, the State filed a motion to change permanency goals. The Department noted that
regardless of whether the magistrate court changed the permanency goals, the Department would
be moving to terminate Doe’s parental rights based on the termination of his parental rights in the
two other cases, and his on-going and admitted substance abuse and the resulting criminal charges.
Following a hearing, the magistrate court granted the motion.
The Department filed a petition to terminate Doe’s parental rights based on neglect, Idaho
Code § 16-2005(1)(b), as further defined by I.C. §§ 16-2002(3)(a) and 16-1602(31)(a) (Child was
without proper care and control or subsistence, medical, or other care and control necessary for
Child’s well-being because of the conduct or omission of Doe) and I.C. § 16-1602(31)(b) (Doe is
unable to discharge his responsibilities for Child, and as a result, Child lacked the parental care
necessary for her health, safety, and/or wellbeing). The Department also alleged that Doe is unable
to discharge his parental responsibilities, and such inability would continue for a prolonged
indeterminate period of time, pursuant to I.C. § 16-2005(1)(d).
The magistrate court held a trial on the petition in June 2025, and despite receiving proper
service of the petition and notice of the trial, Doe did not attend the trial. At trial, the magistrate

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The biological mother’s rights to Child were also terminated; that termination is not at issue
in this appeal.
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court heard testimony from the foster mother and the case worker. The magistrate court
subsequently issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order terminating parental rights.
The magistrate court found that Doe neglected Child and it is in Child’s best interests to have
Doe’s parental rights terminated. Doe appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal from a decision terminating parental rights, this Court examines whether the
decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence, which means such evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 243,
245-46, 220 P.3d 1062, 1064-65 (2009). The appellate court will indulge all reasonable inferences
in support of the trial court’s judgment when reviewing an order that parental rights be terminated.
Id. The Idaho Supreme Court has also said that the substantial evidence test requires a greater
quantum of evidence in cases where the trial court’s finding must be supported by clear and
convincing evidence than in cases where a mere preponderance is required. State v. Doe, 143
Idaho 343, 346, 144 P.3d 597, 600 (2006). Clear and convincing evidence is generally understood
to be evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. Roe
v. Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 P.3d 1057, 1060 (2006). Further, the magistrate court’s decision
must be supported by objectively supportable grounds. Doe, 143 Idaho at 346, 144 P.3d at 600.
III.
ANALYSIS
Doe does not challenge the magistrate court’s findings that he neglected Child on alternate
bases and is also unable to discharge his parental duties. Doe also fails to challenge the magistrate
court’s findings that it is in Child’s best interests to terminate Doe’s parental rights. Instead, Doe
argues the magistrate court’s decision to change the permanency goals to termination of Doe’s
parental rights only a month after Doe was added to the case prevented Doe from having a full and
fair opportunity to work his case plan. The Department argues Doe has waived any claim on
appeal because any challenge to the permanency plan had to be raised in the CPA case, not during
the termination proceeding. Similarly, the Department argues Doe’s failure to challenge the
statutory bases for neglect or the best interests finding results in the waiver of the argument on
appeal. Finally, the Department argues the magistrate court’s findings regarding the statutory

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bases for termination of Doe’s parental rights and its finding regarding the best interests of Child
are supported by substantial and competent evidence.
As an initial matter, all issues waived in this appeal are waived by Doe’s failure to cite to
the record on appeal in his appellant’s brief. Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6) requires that the
appellant cite to authorities, statutes, and parts of the transcript relied upon. Doe’s appellate
briefing fails to comply with this rule. This Court will not search the record on appeal for error.
Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 150 Idaho 103, 113, 244 P.3d 247, 257 (Ct. App. 2010).
A party waives an issue on appeal that is not supported by argument and authority. Idaho
Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 163 Idaho 707, 711, 418 P.3d 1216, 1220 (2016). Here, the
magistrate court found that Doe neglected Child pursuant to I.C. § 16-2005(1)(b), as further
defined by I.C. § 16-1602(31)(a) and (b). The magistrate court also found that Doe was unable to
discharge his parental responsibilities pursuant to I.C. § 16-2005(1)(d). Doe has not challenged
any of these statutory bases; consequently, he has waived any claim of error on appeal. Similarly,
Doe has not challenged the magistrate court’s finding that it is in Child’s best interests to terminate
Doe’s parental rights, so that issue is also waived on appeal. As a result, we affirm the magistrate
court’s findings that Doe neglected Child on two alternate statutory bases and that Doe was unable
to discharge his parental responsibilities. We also affirm the magistrate court’s order that
terminating Doe’s parental rights was in the best interests of Child.
The only order Doe challenges on appeal is the order granting the State’s motion to change
permanency goals. Doe argues his due process rights were violated when the permanency plan
was changed from reunification to termination because he did not have a full and fair opportunity
to work his case plan. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the “inquiry into reunification efforts
is not relevant for the court to terminate parental rights.” Dep’t of Health and Welfare v.
Doe (2017-21), 163 Idaho 83, 96, 408 P.3d 81, 94 (2017). Thus, any challenges to reunification,
including changing the permanency goals, should have been raised in the CPA case and are not
relevant during a termination proceeding. Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that
there is no due process violation vis-á-vis the Department’s reasonable efforts at reunification (or
lack thereof) where a subsequent termination trial requires the Department to prove the statutory
grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. Matter of Doe I, 164 Idaho 883, 890,
436 P.3d 1232, 1239 (2019). Consequently, Doe’s challenge to the magistrate court’s order

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changing the permanency goals to termination of parental rights is irrelevant to the termination
proceeding in this case.
However, even if reviewed on the merits, Doe’s argument fails. Once a statutory ground
for termination has been established, the trial court must next determine whether it is in the best
interests of the child to terminate the parent-child relationship. Tanner v. State, Dep’t of Health &
Welfare, 120 Idaho 606, 611, 818 P.2d 310, 315 (1991). When determining whether termination
is in the child’s best interests, the trial court may consider the parent’s history with substance
abuse, the stability and permanency of the home, the unemployment of the parent, the financial
contribution of the parent to the child’s care after the child is placed in protective custody, the
improvement of the child while in foster care, the parent’s efforts to improve his or her situation,
and the parent’s continuing problems with the law. Doe (2015-03) v. Doe, 159 Idaho 192, 198,
358 P.3d 77, 83 (2015); Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 156 Idaho 103, 111, 320 P.3d
1262, 1270 (2014). A finding that it is in the best interests of the child to terminate parental rights
must still be made upon objective grounds. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 152 Idaho
953, 956-57, 277 P.3d 400, 403-04 (Ct. App. 2012).
A review of the record supports the magistrate court’s findings that there were three
independent statutory grounds on which to terminate Doe’s parental rights. Similarly, the record
supports the magistrate court’s findings that terminating Doe’s parental rights is in the best
interests of Child.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The magistrate court did not err in finding statutory grounds for termination of Doe’s
parental rights and that termination is in Child’s best interests because its findings are supported
by substantial and competent evidence. Therefore, the judgment terminating Doe’s parental rights
is affirmed.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge TRIBE, CONCUR.

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