52398 IDHW v. Jane Doe / IDHW v. Jane Doe

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket Nos. 52397 & 52398

In the Matter of: Jane Doe I, A Child )
Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age. )
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF ) Filed: August 27, 2025
HEALTH & WELFARE, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
Petitioner-Respondent, )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
v. ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
JANE DOE (2024-46), )
)
Respondent-Appellant. )
)
In the Matter of: John Doe I, A Child )
Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age. )
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF )
HEALTH & WELFARE, )
)
Petitioner-Respondent, )
)
v. )
)
JANE DOE (2024-47), )
)
Respondent-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Third Judicial
District, State of Idaho, Canyon County. Hon. Courtnie R. Tucker, Magistrate.

Judgments terminating parental rights, affirmed.

Nielson Law PLLC; Jeffrey Nielson, Caldwell, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Christopher G. Sletvold, Deputy
Attorney General, Caldwell, for respondent.
________________________________________________
TRIBE, Judge

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Jane Doe (2024-46/2024-47) appeals from the judgments terminating her parental rights.1
We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Doe is the mother of the minor children, B.H. and E.H. At the time of her birth in June
2021, B.H. tested positive for opioids. B.H. was then removed from Doe’s custody and placed in
the physical custody of the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (Department). The magistrate
court vested legal custody of B.H. in the Department. The Department created a safety plan for
E.H as he also tested positive for controlled substances. E.H. resided in a relative’s home, who
was to act as a safety monitor over the child. After a shelter care hearing, the magistrate court
found that it is in the best interests of B.H. to remain in the legal custody of the Department pending
the adjudicatory hearing but should be granted an extended home visit in the same relative’s home
as E.H.
During the pendency of the cases, a search warrant was executed on the relative’s home
where drugs and paraphernalia were found. The relative was charged with possession of
marijuana. Further, the Department learned that Doe was residing in the same home as the
children, contrary to a condition of the safety plan at the time. E.H. was removed from the home
and was placed into the custody of the Department. Doe did not complete the case plan and did
not reunify with the children. The primary permanency goal of the case plan was changed to
termination of parental rights. The Department petitioned to terminate Doe’s parental rights to
both B.H. and E.H. and a termination trial was held regarding both children. At the time of trial,
B.H. had been in the Department’s legal custody for three years and E.H. had been in the
Department’s legal custody for twenty months. The magistrate court terminated Doe’s rights after
finding that Doe had neglected the children and that termination is in the best interests of the
children. Doe appeals.

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The magistrate court held one termination trial and entered one findings of fact and
conclusions of law for both children. However, the magistrate court entered a separate judgment
for each child in their respective cases; therefore, there are two judgments terminating parental
rights. For these reasons, the cases have been consolidated on appeal.

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II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal from a decision terminating parental rights, this Court examines whether the
decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence, which means such evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 243,
245-46, 220 P.3d 1062, 1064-65 (2009). The appellate court will indulge all reasonable inferences
in support of the trial court’s judgment when reviewing an order that parental rights be terminated.
Id. The Idaho Supreme Court has also said that the substantial evidence test requires a greater
quantum of evidence in cases where the trial court’s finding must be supported by clear and
convincing evidence than in cases where a mere preponderance is required. State v. Doe, 143
Idaho 343, 346, 144 P.3d 597, 600 (2006). Clear and convincing evidence is generally understood
to be evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. Roe
v. Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 P.3d 1057, 1060 (2006). Further, the trial court’s decision must
be supported by objectively supportable grounds. Doe, 143 Idaho at 346, 144 P.3d at 600.
III.
ANALYSIS
The State argues that, in her briefs, Doe improperly joined the appeals for B.H. and E.H.
However, because the magistrate court held the termination hearings simultaneously and entered
one findings of fact and conclusions of law, the appeals have been properly consolidated. Further,
Doe’s briefs properly cite only to the record and transcript that were made in the respective case.
We will first discuss the issues that pertain to the children collectively, followed by a discussion
of the issues that pertain to E.H. only.
Doe argues that the magistrate court did not have substantial and competent evidence to
support several factual findings to support its conclusion that Doe neglected B.H. and E.H.
Additionally, Doe argues that the magistrate court did not have substantial and competent evidence
to support the finding that it is in the best interests of the children to terminate Doe’s parental
rights. While Doe challenges that several of the magistrate court’s findings were made without
substantial and competent evidence, Doe’s arguments seek to have this Court reweigh the evidence
presented at trial. This Court’s review, however, is limited to whether substantial and competent
evidence supports the magistrate court’s decision. See, e.g., Doe, 148 Idaho at 245-46, 220 P.3d

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at 1064-65 (noting review is whether substantial and competent evidence supports decision). This
Court will not reweigh the evidence. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (2017-5), 162 Idaho
400, 407, 397 P.3d 1159, 1166 (Ct. App. 2017). While most of Doe’s arguments are supported by
citations to the transcript, she fails to consider the transcript as a whole and, rather, effectively asks
this Court to identify the cited portions as more persuasive than any other portion.
A. B.H and E.H.
1. Neglect
A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her
child. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 760, 53 P.3d 341,
343 (2002). This interest is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007). Implicit in the
Termination of Parent and Child Relationship Act is the philosophy that, wherever possible, family
life should be strengthened and preserved. I.C. § 16-2001(2). Therefore, the requisites of due
process must be met when terminating the parent-child relationship. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 383,
386, 146 P.3d 649, 652 (2006). Due process requires that the grounds for terminating a parent-
child relationship be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Because a fundamental liberty
interest is at stake, the United States Supreme Court has determined that a court may terminate a
parent-child relationship only if that decision is supported by clear and convincing evidence.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982); see also I.C. § 16-2009; Doe v. Dep’t of Health &
Welfare, 146 Idaho 759, 761-62, 203 P.3d 689, 691-92 (2009); Doe, 143 Idaho at 386, 146 P.3d at
652.
Idaho Code § 16-2005 permits a party to petition the court for termination of the parent-
child relationship when it is in the child’s best interests and any one of the following five factors
exist: (a) abandonment; (b) neglect or abuse; (c) lack of a biological relationship between the child
and a presumptive parent; (d) the parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities for a
prolonged period that will be injurious to the health, morals, or well-being of the child; or (e) the
parent is incarcerated and will remain incarcerated for a substantial period of time. Each statutory
ground is an independent basis for termination. Doe, 144 Idaho at 842, 172 P.3d at 1117.
First, Doe argues that the magistrate court erred in finding that she did not comply with the
case plan or demonstrate the ability to safely parent her children. Doe argues that the Department

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failed to make reasonable efforts to facilitate the completion of the case plan. “It is well-settled
that the Department’s efforts at reunification are not relevant to the magistrate court’s termination
decision under I.C. § 16-2005.” Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (2019-31), 166 Idaho
357, 361, 458 P.3d 226, 230 (Ct. App. 2020). Thus, Doe’s arguments--that the Department
assigned several people to act as case managers, which made it difficult to communicate
effectively, and that there were times when the case managers did not respond to Doe or the case
managers would only respond to Doe days or “weeks later”--are not relevant to her claim that the
magistrate court erred in terminating her parental rights. For the same reason, Doe’s mother’s
testimony--that Doe experienced difficulty with communicating with the case managers--is
similarly irrelevant. Additionally, in contrast to Doe’s testimony, one of the case managers
testified that Doe failed to contact the case manager upon Doe’s release from incarceration to
discuss the case plan. Doe also testified that she relapsed, which occurred approximately forty-
five days prior to trial, and interfered with her ability to complete tasks in her case plan. Finally,
the most recent case manager testified that, when she tried to set up appointments after Doe’s
release from incarceration, she would cancel or not show up to the appointments. The case
manager also testified that Doe missed drug testing without an explanation. Nonetheless, Doe has
failed to demonstrate that the Department’s efforts or lack thereof excuse her failure to comply
with the case plan or demonstrate the ability to safely parent her children.2
Next, Doe argues that the magistrate court erred in finding that she never stabilized during
the time that her children were in the custody of the Department. Doe argues that she stabilized
while she lived in her parents’ home. However, the magistrate court also heard testimony that Doe
did not have steady employment, had not completed drug treatment, relapsed, and was incarcerated
during large portions of the life of the cases. Doe testified that throughout the life of the cases she
was “struggling with [her] addiction.” While Doe testified that she was “in the process of kind of

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The parties dispute whether Doe adequately raised an impossibility defense either in the
magistrate court or in her opening brief on appeal. Impossibility may be asserted as a defense to
a claim of neglect founded upon failure to comply with the requirements of a case plan. Idaho
Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (2026-14), 161 Idaho 596, 600, 389 P.3d 141, 145 (2016). We
agree that Doe has not properly raised the impossibility defense but, nonetheless, has failed to
show that either the lack of reunification efforts by the Department or her periods of incarceration
made compliance with the case plan impossible.

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getting into [her] own place per se” by getting an RV, Doe fails to identify any steps she has taken
to show that this has or would come to fruition. An intent or wish to move into an RV does not
contradict the finding of the magistrate court.
Next, Doe argues that the magistrate court erred in finding that she had not addressed her
substance abuse issues, continued to use controlled substances, and had incurred several new legal
charges. Doe testified that she was enrolled in outpatient treatment and was “supposed to start
[that] next week.” Doe also testified that she noticed her anxiety had increased and she did not
realize how bad she “suffered with depression until recently” and that she was “seeing a
psychiatrist.” However, the case worker also testified that Doe was discharged from an addiction
treatment facility for failing to attend treatment. While Doe may have had plans to begin treatment
in the future, this does not serve to counter the magistrate court’s finding that, up until the
termination trial, Doe did not address her substance abuse issues.
At trial, Doe acknowledged that she had been incarcerated for about a third of the case.
Further, Doe testified that, within a week of trial, she “had to go in for [forty-eight] hours” and
that it was to “[take] care of [a warrant]” for a probation violation. Doe also testified that she had
an upcoming hearing for that probation violation and that she missed a meeting for her
misdemeanor probation because she was more focused on tasks associated with her felony
probation. The magistrate court also heard testimony that Doe was not able to be referred to a
protective parenting class because it required five weeks of sobriety--a benchmark Doe had not
met. Doe testified that she did not drug test as required. Finally, the magistrate court heard
testimony that--during the time the children had been in the custody of the Department--Doe
amassed approximately seven criminal charges, was on probation, and had two charges for
controlled substances.
Next, Doe argues that the magistrate court erred in finding that she never established a safe
and stable home and that she never demonstrated the ability to meet the financial needs of her
children. Doe points to her relative’s testimony that, while in the relative’s care, B.H. “was always
smiling.” Further, Doe argues that she partially relies on her parents for her financial needs and
points to her father’s testimony that he is “financially okay” and has a “house that is adequate.”
However, while Doe testified that she had a couple of job interviews and was planning on a few
others as well, at the time of trial, she was not employed and had not been employed since before

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E.H. was born.3 She testified that, other than “being incarcerated and being homeless,” she had
been living with her family which is where she was living at the time of trial. The magistrate court
also heard testimony that a search warrant was executed on the relative’s home--where E.H. and
B.H. lived--which yielded marijuana, fentanyl, methamphetamine, and drug paraphernalia. While
Doe alluded to an intention to move out of the home and into an RV, this plan for the future did
not negate the unsafe conditions in the home and her inability to financially support the children
during the life of the cases.
Finally, Doe argues that the magistrate court erred in finding that she did not engage in
regular visitation with her children and did not attend their service appointments. Doe claims that
she attempted to reach out to the Department to facilitate visitations, but the Department frustrated
those efforts. She also points to her mother’s trial testimony that Doe had visitation with the
children. However, Doe acknowledged that she was incarcerated for approximately twelve out of
the thirty months the children were in the custody of the Department. The magistrate court heard
testimony that, even when Doe had been notified and was not incarcerated, she did not regularly
attend medical or other service appointments for the children.
Each of the challenged findings of the magistrate court are supported by substantial and
competent evidence. Doe has failed to meet her burden to show that the magistrate court lacked
substantial and competent evidence in each of the challenged findings.
2. Best interests
Once a statutory ground for termination has been established, the trial court must next
determine whether it is in the best interests of the child to terminate the parent-child relationship.
Tanner v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 120 Idaho 606, 611, 818 P.2d 310, 315 (1991). When
determining whether termination is in the child’s best interests, the trial court may consider the
parent’s history with substance abuse, the stability and permanency of the home, the
unemployment of the parent, the financial contribution of the parent to the child’s care after the
child is placed in protective custody, the improvement of the child while in foster care, the parent’s
efforts to improve his or her situation, and the parent’s continuing problems with the law. Doe

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While Doe indicated that she had been a stay-at-home mom since E.H. was born, she also
indicated the children’s father was not an available parent.

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(2015-03) v. Doe, 159 Idaho 192, 198, 358 P.3d 77, 83 (2015); Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare
v. Doe, 156 Idaho 103, 111, 320 P.3d 1262, 1270 (2014). A finding that it is in the best interests
of the child to terminate parental rights must still be made upon objective grounds. Idaho Dep’t
of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 152 Idaho 953, 956-57, 277 P.3d 400, 403-04 (Ct. App. 2012).
Doe argues that the magistrate court made several unsupported findings in its analysis of
whether termination is in the best interests of the children. First, she argues that the magistrate
court erred in finding that she was unstable. As stated above, the magistrate court heard testimony
that Doe’s recent living circumstances consisted of living with relatives, being incarcerated, and
being homeless. The magistrate court also heard testimony that Doe had amassed seven new
criminal charges during the pendency of the case and was on probation at the time of trial. Doe
testified that she had recently been incarcerated for forty-eight hours for missing a meeting for her
misdemeanor probation.
Next, Doe argues that the magistrate court erred in finding that she did not have a safe
home for the children. Doe testified that, when she was not homeless or incarcerated, she lived
with relatives. However, this was the home where law enforcement found marijuana, fentanyl,
methamphetamine, and drug paraphernalia. The relative at the home was cited for possession of
marijuana. Further, the magistrate court heard evidence that there was a “domestic violence
incident” in the relative’s home when B.H. and E.H. were present.
Doe further argues that the magistrate court erred in finding that it is unclear how she would
meet the financial needs of the children. Again, Doe testified that she was not employed at the
time of trial and had not been employed since before the birth of E.H.
Doe also argues the magistrate court erred in finding that she continued to struggle with
addiction and mental health issues. Doe testified that she relapsed approximately forty-five days
prior to trial, had increased levels of anxiety, and suffered from depression. Doe also testified that
she had met with a psychiatrist once to address these mental health issues.
Finally, Doe argues the magistrate court erred in finding that she never demonstrated
enhanced parenting skills over the course of a prolonged child protection case, where services were
implemented to assist her to stabilize and reunify with the children. The magistrate court heard
testimony that Doe failed to appear for or cancelled appointments with her case manager, was

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unable to enroll in parenting classes due to her lack of sobriety, had recently relapsed, and was
incarcerated for approximately twelve out of the thirty months during the pendency of the case.
Each of the challenged findings of the magistrate court are supported by substantial and
competent evidence. Doe has failed to meet her burden to show that the magistrate court did not
have substantial and competent evidence to support its findings.
B. E.H.
Doe challenges each of the same findings regarding E.H. as she challenges regarding B.H.
However, in addition, Doe also argues that the magistrate court’s finding--that she neglected E.H.
by failing to comply with the court’s orders or case plan within the time standards required--is not
supported by substantial and competent evidence. Further, Doe challenges the magistrate court’s
finding that E.H. had been in the Department’s custody for approximately twenty months.
However, Doe only states that she “challenges” these findings but fails to provide argument or
citation to the record to support these challenges. We will not comb the record on appeal for error.
Dawson v. Cheyovich Fam. Tr., 149 Idaho 375, 383, 234 P.3d 699, 707 (2010). The Idaho
Supreme Court stated: “We will not consider issues that lack ‘citations to the record, citations of
applicable authority, or comprehensible argument.’” Kelly v. Kelly, 171 Idaho 27, 45, 518 P.3d
326, 344 (2022) (quoting Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 791, 229 P.3d 1146, 1153 (2010)); see
also Owen v. Smith, 168 Idaho 633, 646, 485 P.3d 129, 142 (2021) (“We will not consider the
merits of the Owens’ claims because they consist of conclusory statements that lack citations to
the record.”). It is not the role of this Court to search the record on appeal for citation or argument.
See Dickenson v. Benewah Cnty. Sheriff, 172 Idaho 144, 150, 530 P.3d 691, 697 (2023). For these
reasons, the challenges to these findings are waived.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Doe has failed to show that the magistrate court lacked substantial and competent evidence
to find she neglected B.H. and E.H. and that termination of Doe’s parental rights is in the best
interests of B.H. and E.H. Therefore, the magistrate court’s judgments terminating Doe’s parental
rights are affirmed.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge HUSKEY, CONCUR.

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