Valdovinos v. State

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 51308

IVAN MARROQUIN VALDOVINOS, )
) Filed: April 4, 2025
Petitioner-Appellant, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
)
STATE OF IDAHO, )
)
Respondent. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Kootenai County. Hon. Cynthia K.C. Meyer, District Judge.

Judgment summarily dismissing petition for post-conviction relief, affirmed.

Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP; Alycia T. Moss, Catherine Yenne, Coeur
d’Alene, for appellant. Alycia T. Moss argued.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; John C. McKinney, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent. John C. McKinney argued.
________________________________________________
TRIBE, Judge
Ivan Marroquin Valdovinos appeals from the district court’s judgment summarily
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Valdovinos pled guilty to possession of a controlled
substance. At the change of plea hearing, in compliance with Idaho Criminal Rule 11(d), the trial
court gave Valdovinos the following admonition:

[I]f you are not a citizen of the United States, the entry of a guilty plea could have
consequences of deportation or removal or inability to obtain legal status in the
United States or the denial of an application for United States citizenship. Do you
understand everything that the Court has said to you?

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Valdovinos responded in the affirmative. As part of the presentencing proceedings, the trial court
ordered the preparation of a presentence investigation report (PSI). Prior to his sentencing,
Valdovinos and his trial counsel received the report. At sentencing, Valdovinos represented to the
trial court that he had reviewed the PSI with his trial counsel and had no corrections. The trial
court sentenced Valdovinos to eighteen months of supervised probation and entered a withheld
judgment on January 7, 2019. Valdovinos did not appeal his withheld judgment. Valdovinos
successfully completed probation, and an order of dismissal was entered on March 5, 2021.
Valdovinos retained an immigration attorney in the spring of 2022. At that time, the
immigration attorney notified Valdovinos of the immigration consequences of his prior guilty plea
to possession of a controlled substance. Valdovinos’ immigration attorney started communicating
with Valdovinos’ trial counsel in July of 2022. Valdovinos’ trial counsel indicated to the
immigration attorney that trial counsel was not aware of the Padilla1 requirements with respect to
advice regarding immigration consequences related to convictions in criminal cases.
On December 1, 2022, Valdovinos’ trial counsel signed an affidavit stating he could not
remember whether he advised Valdovinos of the immigration consequences. On March 8, 2023,
Valdovinos filed a petition for post-conviction relief and a motion to dismiss. In his petition,
Valdovinos alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, stating that his trial counsel failed to advise
Valdovinos of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty in the underlying criminal case.
Because his petition was filed beyond the one-year statutory timeframe following the finality of
his criminal conviction, Valdovinos argued equitable tolling should apply to render his post-
conviction petition timely filed. The district court summarily dismissed the petition on the grounds
that it was untimely and therefore procedurally barred. The district court further concluded that
there was no basis for applying an equitable tolling exception to the time bar. Valdovinos timely
appeals.

1
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).

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II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal from an order of summary dismissal, we apply the same standards utilized by
the trial courts and examine whether the petitioner’s admissible evidence asserts facts which, if
true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925, 929
(2010); Sheahan v. State, 146 Idaho 101, 104, 190 P.3d 920, 923 (Ct. App. 2008). Over questions
of law, we exercise free review. Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 1066, 1069
(2009); Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 370, 33 P.3d 841, 844 (Ct. App. 2001).
III.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Valdovinos argues that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his
post-conviction petition as untimely and by not conducting a hearing. Valdovinos asserts that,
because of his trial counsel’s failure to inform Valdovinos of the potential immigration
consequences, his post-conviction petition was eligible for equitable tolling; therefore, it was
timely.
The State responds that the district court correctly dismissed Valdovinos’ petition for post-
conviction relief as untimely. To be timely, a petition for post-conviction relief must be filed
“within one (1) year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an
appeal or from the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later.” Idaho
Code § 19-4902(a). There is no dispute that Valdovinos failed to timely file his petition pursuant
to I.C. § 19-4902(a). Thus, the issue is whether Valdovinos’ alleged ineffective assistance of
counsel claim triggered an “equitable tolling” of the statute.
The district court held that Valdovinos’ petition was untimely and ineligible for equitable
tolling. The district court did not find any exceptional circumstances, including due process issues,
to justify equitable tolling of Valdovinos’ petition. The district court found that, at the time he
pled guilty in 2018, Valdovinos was informed of the adverse immigration consequences by the
trial court. The district court concluded this admonition placed Valdovinos on notice, precluding
his equitable tolling claim. Finally, the district court noted that, even if equitable tolling applied,
Valdovinos failed to file his post-conviction petition within a “reasonable time.”

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A. Equitable Tolling
Valdovinos argues that his trial counsel’s deficient performance violated Valdovinos’
constitutional due process rights, making him eligible for equitable tolling. In the alternative,
Valdovinos argues that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his claim without an
evidentiary hearing. In response, the State argues that the district court correctly dismissed
Valdovinos’ post-conviction claim as untimely.
The district court held that ineffective assistance of counsel claims can or should be known
at the time the criminal proceedings are concluded. The district court found that Valdovinos was
notified of potential immigration consequences associated with his guilty plea at the time of the
change of plea hearing. The district court determined that its admonition put Valdovinos on notice
regarding potential immigration consequences well before his judgment of conviction was entered.
As a result, Valdovinos was not entitled to equitable tolling of his petition.
In the context of equitable tolling, the reviewing court “exercises free review over ‘the
district court’s application of the relevant law to the facts.’” Bahr v. State, 172 Idaho 373, 378,
533 P.3d 282, 287 (2023) (quoting Rankin v. State, 170 Idaho 463, 465, 512 P.3d 161, 163 (Ct.
App. 2021) (“Although we have never explicitly stated it before, the Court of Appeals’ de novo
standard of review over whether to grant equitable tolling, given a set of assumed facts or facts
found, is correct.”).
The standard for equitable tolling has two prongs: (1) petitioner has been pursuing his
rights diligently, and (2) some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way. Bahr, 172 Idaho at
379, 533 P.3d at 288. Equitable tolling of the statute of limitations in a post-conviction case is
allowed if it is necessary to protect the petitioner’s due process right to have a meaningful
opportunity to present his claims. Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383, 385-86, 256 P.3d 791, 793-94
(Ct. App. 2011); Rankin, 170 Idaho at 465, 512 P.3d at 163. The standard for application of
equitable tolling in post-conviction actions is a stringent one. Schultz, 151 Idaho at 386, 256 P.3d
at 794; see also Mahler v. State, 157 Idaho 212, 215, 335 P.3d 57, 60 (Ct. App. 2014) (noting bar
for equitable tolling in post-conviction cases is high). The petitioner bears the burden of showing
the circumstances warrant the tolling of the one-year statute of limitation. Kriebel v. State, 148
Idaho 188, 190, 219 P.3d 1204, 1206 (Ct. App. 2009).

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Idaho has recognized equitable tolling relating to post-conviction petitions where the
petitioner was incarcerated in an out-of-state facility on an in-state conviction without legal
representation or access to Idaho legal materials and where mental disease or psychotropic
medication rendered a petitioner incompetent, thereby preventing the petitioner from pursuing
challenges to his conviction earlier. Sayas v. State, 139 Idaho 957, 960, 88 P.3d 776, 779 (Ct.
App. 2003). Neither of these circumstances apply to Valdovinos. However, Idaho has also
recognized that, in limited circumstances, tolling may be available if the asserted claims raise
important due process issues. Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 250-51, 220 P.3d at 1069-70; Schultz, 151
Idaho at 386, 256 P.3d at 794. Valdovinos contends such circumstances exist in this case.
Valdovinos alleges he was entitled to equitable tolling because he was unaware of his trial
counsel’s deficient performance until Valdovinos’ immigration attorney contacted trial counsel
and trial counsel indicated he was unaware of the requirements in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S.
356 (2010). According to Valdovinos, his trial counsel’s deficiency in this regard implicates an
important due process issue that triggers equitable tolling. More specifically, Valdovinos argues
that he was entitled to a reasonable time to file his petition, which he contends should be measured
from the point that he concluded discovery and obtained sufficient evidence to support his petition.
Applying this standard to this case, Valdovinos argues the tolling time should be measured from
his trial counsel’s affidavit indicating he did “not recall advising [Valdovinos] of the immigration
consequences.” The State argues that reasonable time should be measured from the time
Valdovinos learned of the adverse immigration consequences.
In Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007), the Idaho Supreme
Court noted that, in instances of a Brady2 violation, “there may be a tolling of the one-year statute
of limitations until discovery of the Brady violation.” The Court applied the same “reasonable
time” standard as in post-conviction petitions in capital cases. Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 905, 174
P.3d at 875. Even claims raising important due process issues are deemed waived if not brought
within a reasonable time of when the claims were known or should have been known. Rhoades,
148 Idaho at 251, 220 P.3d at 1070. For claims that do not meet the required timeliness standard,
a petitioner “shall be deemed to have waived such claims for relief as were known, or reasonably

2
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

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should have been known.” I.C. § 19-2719. The Court determines what a reasonable time is to file
a successive petition on a case-by-case basis. Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 905, 174 P.3d at 875.
Relying on Charboneau, Valdovinos asserts that his due process claim is akin to a Brady
violation because, he contends, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on Padilla
implicates due process just like a Brady claim. Valdovinos contends that, since a Brady violation
tolls the statute of limitations to the discovery of such violation, a Padilla violation should also
toll the deadline until discovery of the deficient performance. We disagree.
First, the nature of the due process violation in Charboneau is distinguishable from the one
Valdovinos alleges. The fundamental difference between an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim and a Brady violation is the individual’s access to the materials or information that forms
the basis of the claim. Brady violations occur when the prosecution fails to disclose information,
at trial or pretrial proceedings, that is exculpatory and material to either guilt or punishment. A
Brady violation occurs because the defense has no access to, or knowledge of, the exculpatory
information that was withheld; thus, a Brady claim can receive the benefit of tolling to the time
when the petitioner discovers the evidence. Conversely, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
rests on the performance of defense counsel, not on the acts of the prosecutor. An individual
cannot claim ignorance when the proceedings took place in his presence. See Rhoades, 148 Idaho
at 253, 220 P.3d at 1072 (“The facts of the case, being particularly within the knowledge of the
defendant should be sufficient to alert a defendant to the presence of ineffective assistance of
counsel.”). Accordingly, Idaho courts have repeatedly held that ineffective assistance of counsel
claims can or should be known at the conclusion of trial. Id.
In this case, the trial court informed Valdovinos of potential immigration consequences
associated with pleading guilty to felony possession of a controlled substance. Because
Valdovinos was told about the risk of immigration consequences at the time of his conviction, it
was squarely within his knowledge whether he had discussed his immigration status and any
potential consequences with his trial counsel. Therefore, we conclude that the district court
properly found that Valdovinos’ ineffective assistance of counsel claim did not warrant tolling of
the one-year statute of limitation.
Second, Valdovinos contends that he could not file his post-conviction petition without an
affidavit from his trial counsel admitting the failure to advise of the immigration consequences.

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Because his trial counsel did not sign his affidavit until December 1, 2022, Valdovinos contends
that he filed his claims within a reasonable time from that date. Valdovinos’ contention is contrary
to Idaho law.
Even in capital cases, the Idaho Supreme Court has measured timeliness from the date of
notice, not from the date a petitioner assembles a complete cache of evidence to support his claims.
Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 905, 174 P.3d at 875. A different, more lenient standard does not apply
in a noncapital case. Id. The statutory requirements for filing a post-conviction petition are
consistent with this conclusion. An application for post-conviction relief must be verified with
respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records or other
evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, or the application must state why such
supporting evidence is not included with the application. I.C. § 19-4903. An affidavit from trial
counsel was not, and has never been, required in order to file a post-conviction petition alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel. Valdovinos’ immigration attorney possessed sufficient
information from her client to satisfy the statutory requirements for filing a post-conviction
petition. We therefore affirm the district court’s finding that Valdovinos’ delay was unreasonable,
even under circumstances involving an immigration-based ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Valdovinos has failed to show that his petition was timely filed, that he was entitled to
equitable tolling, or that his petition was filed within a reasonable time even if equitable tolling
was an option.
B. Padilla-Based Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
Even if Valdovinos was entitled to equitable tolling, he failed to allege a genuine issue of
material fact entitling him to an evidentiary hearing on his Padilla-based ineffective assistance of
counsel claim.
“Summary dismissal of a petition for post conviction relief is the procedural equivalent of
summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56 and this Court must determine whether a genuine issue of
material fact exists, with inferences liberally construed in favor of the petitioner.” State v. Dunlap,
155 Idaho 345, 361, 313 P.3d 1, 17 (2013). A court must conduct an evidentiary hearing on issues
when a genuine issue of material fact exists. Id. One of the reasons claims in a petition for post-
conviction relief may be summarily dismissed is if the petitioner’s allegations do not justify relief
as a matter of law. I.C. § 19-4906(c); Sims v. State, 159 Idaho 249, 253, 358 P.3d 810, 814 (2015).

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Criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel
during all critical stages of a criminal proceeding, including sentencing. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner must show that the
attorney’s performance was deficient and that the petitioner was prejudiced by the deficiency.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Self v. State, 145 Idaho 578, 580, 181 P.3d
504, 506 (Ct. App. 2007). To establish a deficiency, the petitioner has the burden of showing that
the attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State,
114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988); Cuc Phuoc Ho v. State, 163 Idaho 173, 177, 408
P.3d 928, 932 (Ct. App. 2017).
There is no genuine issue of material fact that Valdovinos’ trial counsel failed to advise
Valdovinos of the potential immigration consequences. Valdovinos’ trial counsel submitted an
affidavit admitting his failure to discuss immigration consequences. The district court treated
Valdovinos’ trial counsel’s failure to mention adverse immigration consequences as a forgone
conclusion. Instead, in its analysis, the district court focused on the trial court’s notice to
Valdovinos regarding the potential for immigration consequences. There is no need for an
evidentiary hearing to present evidence of undisputed facts.
Even disregarding the district court’s immigration consequence advisory, the deficient
performance prong is dispositive. Counsel’s failure to advise a client about “succinct, clear, and
explicit” immigration consequences for a conviction is constitutionally deficient performance
under the Sixth Amendment. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368. In Padilla, the petitioner’s defense counsel
did not inform the petitioner that he was pleading to an aggravated felony that rendered him
categorically deportable. Id. at 368-69. While immigration consequences can be complex, counsel
in Padilla could have determined that Padilla’s crime was an aggravated felony “simply from
reading the text of the statute.” Id. at 368. The Supreme Court held that counsel’s failure to review
the statute, and counsel’s “false assurance” that the conviction would not result in removal from
the country, constituted deficient performance. Id. at 368-69.

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In this case, as noted, it is undisputed that Valdovinos’ trial counsel did not inquire about
Valdovinos’ immigration status. The applicable immigration statute,3 which is the same statute
applied in Padilla, is “succinct, clear, and explicit” in defining the removal consequences for the
felony convictions associated with controlled substances. 559 U.S. at 368. Valdovinos’ trial
counsel could have easily determined from the statute’s text alone that Valdovinos’ guilty plea
would result in his eligibility for removal. Valdovinos argues that his trial counsel’s failure to
advise Valdovinos of the potential removal is sufficient to constitute deficient performance by his
trial counsel and cannot be cured by a general admonition from the district court. Valdovinos cites
Cosio-Nava v. State, 161 Idaho 44, 383 P.3d 1214 (2016) to support his argument. However,
Cosio-Nava is distinguishable. Cosio-Nava’s counsel knew of Cosio-Nava’s immigration status
and advised Cosio-Nava accordingly. But, Valdovinos’ trial counsel did not have any knowledge
of Valdovinos’ status as a foreign national.
Thus, the dispute in this case is the extent to which Valdovinos’ trial counsel had an
obligation to make such an inquiry in the first place. Valdovinos argues that, considering the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla, his trial counsel had an affirmative duty to
investigate Valdovinos’ immigration status in an effort to provide correct advice regarding adverse
immigration consequences.
The Padilla decision does not appear to impose a duty on counsel to determine whether his
or her client is a noncitizen such that the failure to make this determination automatically

3
(a) Classes of deportable aliens
Any alien (including an alien crewman) in and admitted to the United States shall, upon
the order of the Attorney General, be removed if the alien is within one or more of the following
classes of deportable aliens:
....
(2) Criminal offenses
....
(B) Controlled substances
(i) Conviction
Any alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a
violation of . . . any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a
foreign country relating to a controlled substance . . . is deportable.
8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (West).

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constitutes deficient performance. 559 U.S. at 370 (“When attorneys know that their clients face
possible exile from this country and separation from their families, they should not be encouraged
to say nothing at all.”). Instead, the United States Supreme Court has addressed whether advice
about immigration consequences is under the purview of the Sixth Amendment. See Chaidez v.
United States, 568 U.S. 342, 349 (2013) (“Padilla considered a threshold question: Was advice
about deportation ‘categorically removed’ from the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.”). Ultimately, Padilla concluded that “Strickland applies to Padilla’s claim.” Chaidez,
U.S. at 353 (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366).
Because Padilla does not categorically impose a duty on counsel to determine whether his
or her client is a noncitizen such that the failure to make this determination automatically
constitutes deficient performance, Valdovinos has failed to allege a genuine issue of material fact
entitling him to an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Alternatively, under a Strickland analysis, the district court was correct in not holding an
evidentiary hearing. The Strickland test can be applied to many issues without breaking new
ground or imposing new obligations. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000); see also
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 381 (2005) (“A standard of reasonableness applied as if one
stood in counsel’s shoes spawns few hard-edged rules.”). Under the Strickland reasonableness
standard, there may be no obligation to inquire into a client’s immigration status where counsel
did not know or did not have reason to know that the client was a noncitizen. There may also be
circumstances under which counsel’s failure to inquire is unreasonable and amounts to deficient
performance.
Here, the record is devoid of any evidence that would cause Valdovinos’ trial counsel to
question Valdovinos’ citizenship status. Valdovinos argues that “discrepancies” in the PSI,
specifically his place of birth, should have triggered his trial counsel to investigate his immigration
status. According to Valdovinos, because the PSI indicates that he was born in Michoacan,
Mexico, his trial counsel should have suspected potential immigration issues. However, the PSI
also reports that Valdovinos: (1) is a United States citizen; (2) attended a school in California;
(3) did not reside outside of the United States; (4) was employed in Washington; and (5) has
extended family that resides in the United States. Moreover, during sentencing, Valdovinos
confirmed that he had read the PSI, discussed it with his trial counsel, understood it, and had no

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corrections. Given the circumstances, it was reasonable for Valdovinos’ trial counsel not to inquire
about Valdovinos’ immigration status.
Consequently, the record establishes that Valdovinos did not meet his burden of alleging a
genuine issue of material fact that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient.
C. Attorney Fees
Pursuant to I.C. § 12-121, Valdovinos requests an award of attorney fees incurred in
connection with this appeal. Valdovinos’ arguments were unsuccessful and therefore he is not
entitled to an award of attorney fees.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Valdovinos has failed to meet his burden of proof to show that equitable tolling of the
statute of limitations is necessary to protect his due process rights based on ineffective assistance
of counsel. Valdovinos also failed to allege a genuine issue of material fact entitling him to an
evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Accordingly, the district court’s
judgment summarily dismissing Valdovinos’ petition for post-conviction relief is affirmed.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge LORELLO, CONCUR.

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