State v. Brown

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 51068

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: April 18, 2025
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
WILLIAM B. BROWN, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho, Canyon
County. Hon. Randall S. Grove, District Judge.

Order denying motion to dismiss and judgment of conviction, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jenny C. Swinford, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; John C. McKinney, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

HUSKEY, Judge
William B. Brown appeals from his judgment of conviction for one count of lewd conduct
with a child under the age of sixteen years and two counts of sexual abuse of a child under the age
of sixteen years. Brown argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss based
on an alleged violation of his speedy trial rights. The district court did not err in denying Brown’s
motion to dismiss because his speedy trial rights were not violated. Therefore, Brown’s judgment
of conviction is affirmed.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 10, 2021, the State charged Brown with one count of lewd conduct with a child
under the age of sixteen years, Idaho Code § 18-1508, and two counts of sexual abuse of a child
under the age of sixteen years, I.C. § 18-1506(1)(b) (first case). On June 24, 2021, the State

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dismissed the first case. The same day, the State refiled the same charges against Brown (second
case) and Brown remained in custody. The district court scheduled a jury trial in the second case
for October 5, 2021. Due to administrative orders related to the coronavirus (COVID-19)
pandemic, Brown’s jury trial was postponed to December 27, 2021. On December 7, 2021, the
district court postponed Brown’s jury trial because Brown’s case had “low priority.” Because of
another administrative order related to the COVID-19 pandemic, Brown’s jury trial was again
rescheduled to March 21, 2022. On March 18, 2022, the State dismissed the second case and
Brown was released from custody. On August 10, 2022, the State charged Brown with the same
crimes as were charged in the first and second cases (third case). Brown remained out of custody.
The district court scheduled a jury trial in the third case for January 3, 2023.
On December 21, 2022, the district court ordered a mediation pursuant to the parties’
request. On January 26, 2023, Brown advised the district court that mediation was unsuccessful
and requested a jury trial. The district court scheduled a jury trial for February 27, 2023. On
February 22, 2023, the State filed a motion to continue the jury trial because one of its witnesses,
a detective, would be out of the country. Brown objected to the motion and asserted his speedy
trial rights. At a hearing on the motion, the district court granted the State’s motion to continue,
reserved its ruling on Brown’s speedy trial argument, and rescheduled the trial for April 3, 2023.
On March 10, 2023, Brown filed a motion to dismiss the third case arguing that his statutory and
constitutional rights to a speedy trial had been violated. At a hearing on Brown’s motion, the
district court denied Brown’s motion finding that, although the ten-month delay was sufficient to
trigger the Barker1 balancing test, it was not an unreasonable delay that violated Brown’s
constitutional speedy trial rights. The case proceeded to trial and the jury found Brown guilty on
all counts. Brown appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether there was an infringement of a defendant’s right to speedy trial presents a mixed
question of law and fact. State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 257, 16 P.3d 931, 933 (2000). We will
defer to the trial court’s findings of fact if supported by substantial and competent evidence;
however, we will exercise free review of the trial court’s conclusions of law. Id.

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Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
2
III.
ANALYSIS
Brown argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to dismiss because the
delay of his trial violated his constitutional rights to a speedy trial.2 The State responds that the
district court did not err because the district court properly applied and weighed the Barker factors
in determining that Brown’s constitutional speedy trial rights were not violated.
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States guarantees to criminal
defendants the right to a speedy trial. State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 117, 29 P.3d 949, 953 (2001).
This right is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. In addition,
Article I, § 13 of the Constitution of the State of Idaho guarantees the accused in a criminal case
the right to a speedy trial. Id. To determine whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial was
violated under both the United States and Idaho Constitutions, appellate courts employ the
balancing test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). State v. Avila, 143 Idaho 849,
853, 153 P.3d 1195, 1199 (Ct. App. 2006). Under the Barker test, the court must weigh four
factors to determine whether there has been a violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial:
(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his or her
right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay. State v. Brackett, 160 Idaho 619,
625, 377 P.3d 1082, 1088 (Ct. App. 2016).
A. Length of Delay
“The first factor, the length of delay, is a triggering mechanism.” Young, 136 Idaho at 117,
29 P.3d at 953. This factor serves a dual role in the analysis of the right to a speedy trial; it is a
factor, but also serves as the triggering mechanism, for “[u]ntil there is some delay which is
presumptively prejudicial, it is unnecessary to inquire into the other three factors.” Id. “Under the
Sixth Amendment, the period of delay is measured from the date there is ‘a formal indictment or

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Brown raised his claim of speedy trial violation under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article 1, section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. Brown does not
argue that his state constitutional claim should be analyzed any differently than his federal
constitutional claim. Thus, we will apply the federal analysis for this case but recognize that, for
purposes of the state constitutional analysis, the period of delay is measured from the date formal
charges are filed or the defendant is arrested, whichever occurs first. See State v. Davis, 141 Idaho
828, 836, 118 P.3d 160, 168 (Ct. App. 2005). Brown also raised a statutory speedy trial violation.
The district court found there was no statutory speedy trial violation; Brown does not challenge
that ruling on appeal.
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information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer to a criminal
charge.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971)). “Under the Idaho
Constitution, the period of delay is measured from the date formal charges are filed or the
defendant is arrested, whichever occurs first.” Young, 136 Idaho at 117, 29 P.3d at 953.
Barker’s four-part speedy trial test creates no bright line boundaries. Rather, the United
States Supreme Court noted that because of the imprecision of the right to a speedy trial, the length
of delay that will provoke an inquiry into whether those rights have been violated is dependent
upon the peculiar circumstances of the case. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31. The nature of the case
is also important in determining the period of delay that can be tolerated, for example, the period
that is reasonable for prosecution of an “ordinary street crime” is considerably less than for a
complex criminal charge. Id. at 531; State v. Lopez, 144 Idaho 349, 353, 160 P.3d 1284, 1288 (Ct.
App. 2007). The Idaho Supreme Court has held a delay of one year in a lewd conduct case, State
v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 333, 256 P.3d 735, 741 (2011), and thirteen months in a complex drug
trafficking case, State v. Rodriquez-Perez, 129 Idaho 29, 34, 921 P.2d 206, 211 (Ct. App. 1996),
were sufficient to trigger analysis.
The time between Brown’s initial arrest on May 7, 2021, and the beginning of the jury trial
on April 3, 2023, was approximately twenty-three months. To determine the length of delay, the
district court subtracted the five months attributed to the period between when Brown’s second
case was dismissed, and the charges were refiled for the third case. On appeal, both parties agree
that the district court accurately determined the total time of delay was eighteen months. Here, the
State concedes that a delay of eighteen months is sufficient to trigger a full examination of the
Barker factors. “Once the balancing test is triggered, the length of the delay also becomes a factor
in the balancing itself.” Lopez, 144 Idaho at 353, 160 P.3d at 1288. Factors to consider in this
analysis include whether the case languished with inactivity, the complexity of the case, whether
witnesses were lost, trouble marshaling evidence, and any other mitigating circumstances
justifying the delay. State v. Ciccone, 154 Idaho 330, 339, 297 P.3d 1147, 1156 (Ct. App. 2012);
Lopez, 144 Idaho at 353, 160 P.3d at 1288.
Brown argues that the length of delay factor weighs heavily in his favor because the delay
was unreasonable considering the moderate complexity of the case and the State did not offer any
mitigating circumstances that justified the delay. The State argues that the first factor only weighs

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marginally in favor of Brown because the eighteen-month delay was only moderately longer than
the time that is generally sufficient to trigger further analysis.
The district court found that the eighteen-month delay weighed in favor of dismissal. We
agree with the district court that, while the first factor weighs in favor of dismissal, it does not
favor Brown as strongly as Brown suggests. This case involved a serious crime, the victim was a
young child, and the duration of the criminal acts spanned approximately three years. The State,
however, failed to present any mitigating circumstances for its difficulty in assembling witnesses,
which is factored in the analysis. Lopez, 144 Idaho at 353, 160 P.3d at 1288. Thus, the district
court correctly concluded that the first factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
B. Reason for Delay
“The second factor is the reason for the delay.” Young, 136 Idaho at 117, 29 P.3d at 953.
The United States Supreme Court has explained, “different weights should be assigned to different
reasons.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. “A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the
defense should be weighted heavily against the government.” Id. In contrast, “[a] more neutral
reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless
should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the
government rather than the defendant.” Id. However, “a valid reason, such as a missing witness,
should serve to justify appropriate delay.” Id. Pretrial delay is often inevitable and wholly
justified. State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828, 837, 118 P.3d 160, 169 (Ct. App. 2005).
In this case, the district court found that although the length of delay totaled eighteen
months, only ten of those months were attributable to the State for purposes of analyzing the
second factor in the speedy trial analysis. Because neither party disputes this finding on appeal,
the delay attributable to the State was ten months. The district court found that the ten-month
delay weighed in favor of dismissal.
Brown argues the district court erred because it should have held that the second factor
weighed strongly in favor of dismissal. Specifically, Brown asserts the district court erroneously
held that one of the State’s witnesses, Detective Cowdery, was unavailable, rather than
inconvenienced, for trial. The State argues that the second factor should either be a neutral factor
or weigh very slightly against the State because there was no evidence of intentional acts causing
delay.

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On February 22, 2023, the State filed a motion to continue the jury trial set for
February 27, 2023. The motion indicated that “Detective Cowdery will be out of the country on a
trip that was scheduled prior to the setting of this Jury Trial. Detective Cowdery cannot reschedule
his trip.” Brown objected to a continuance. The district court held a hearing on the motion, where,
according to the court minutes, the State explained that Detective Cowdery was out of the country
on a trip that was planned in October of 2021. The State explained that Detective Cowdery
attempted to notify the prosecutor’s office by email but accidentally sent his notice to an invalid
email address, so the State was unaware Detective Cowdery was traveling internationally on the
dates set for trial. The district court issued its oral ruling granting the State’s motion to continue
the jury trial and reserved its ruling on Brown’s speedy trial argument until Brown’s counsel had
an opportunity to file a motion and have a hearing on that issue. Shortly thereafter, Brown filed a
motion to dismiss based on a violation of his speedy trial rights, and the district court held a hearing
on the motion. At the hearing, the State argued that Detective Cowdery was actually unavailable
because at the time of trial, Detective Cowdery was out of the country and could not be served.
The State also argued Detective Cowdery was actually unavailable, not merely inconvenienced,
because he had booked the trip long before the trial was scheduled and would have had to forfeit
all his non-refundable deposits. Because of the inadvertent use of the incorrect email address, the
State was unaware of Detective Cowdery’s scheduled trip and resulting absence until five days
before trial.
The district court agreed with the State and issued its oral ruling on Detective Cowdery’s
availability:
The Court is persuaded by case law and by argument of the parties that if this is a
matter of inconvenience, then it’s inappropriate, but the Court finds that under the
particular circumstances of this case that requiring that this witness appear would
have worked a real hardship. My understanding is based on the representation that
this particular witness had paid for and booked a trip out of the country before this
case was even set for trial. I understand that there was some difficulty in
communication, but ultimately that was scheduled and paid for before this case was
even set.
I think we would reach a different result if after this witness has been
subpoenaed he went ahead and scheduled this, but this was already scheduled. The
Court finds it would be a hardship for this witness to forfeit the money already paid
and, again, as the State has noted, really is unavailable for service now he’s out of
the country. So the Court does find good cause under the statute.

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Thus, the district court ruled on two alternate bases regarding Detective Cowdery’s availability:
(1) Detective Cowdery was actually unavailable because he could not be served; and (2) Detective
Cowdery’s absence was more than an inconvenience; he was unavailable because requiring him
to appear would have “worked a real hardship” on him. On appeal, Brown does not address the
district court’s ruling that Detective Cowdery was actually unavailable because he could not be
served; thus, we must affirm the district court’s decision on that basis. State v. Goodwin, 131
Idaho 364, 366-67, 956 P.2d 1311, 1313-14 (Ct. App. 1998).
However, even if we address Brown’s argument regarding Detective Cowdery’s
unavailability, it fails. Brown argues the district court erred because, although it certainly would
have been inconvenient and burdensome for Detective Cowdery to cancel his trip, his trip did not
make him unavailable. Brown contends that the State’s desire to accommodate a witness’s
schedule is insufficient to constitute a legal excuse for the delay. The Supreme Court has noted
there is an “enormous difference” between being inconvenienced and being unavailable. Clark,
135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936; Davis, 141 Idaho at 837, 118 P.3d at 169. True unavailability
suggests an unqualified inability to attend, while inconvenience merely implies that attendance at
trial would be burdensome. Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936; Davis, 141 Idaho at 837, 118
P.3d at 169. In Clark, the Idaho Supreme Court found that Clark’s speedy trial rights were violated
because one of the State’s witnesses, French, did not qualify as an unavailable witness. Clark, 135
Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936. French could have attended a September 22 trial, and in fact was
compelled to do so by a magistrate’s previous order. Id. The State, however, not wishing to have
French travel from out of state only to face postponement of the trial, requested that Clark’s trial
either be given top priority on September 22 or moved to a date in which the trial would have first
priority. Id. at 260-261, 16 P.3d at 936-937. The Court remanded the case, finding that “the desire
to accommodate French’s schedule cannot be said to comprise a reason that rises to the level of a
legal excuse for the delay.” Id. at 261, 16 P.3d at 937.
Brown argues that his situation is similar to that in Clark because Detective Cowdery’s trip
did not present an unqualified inability to attend the trial, so the State’s desire to accommodate the
detective’s travel schedule should be weighed heavily against the State. We disagree. In this case,
at the time of the motion hearing, Detective Cowdery was already traveling internationally, and no
previous court order directed him to be available. Thus, unlike Clark, the State’s motion to
continue the trial was not made to accommodate Detective Cowdery’s future schedule, nor was

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Detective Cowdery’s absence in violation of a court order. Further, the motion to continue was
not a deliberate attempt to delay the trial to hamper the defense; according to the record, Detective
Cowdery mistakenly used an incorrect email address to inform the State of his travel schedule.
That is not to say the State’s motion to continue the trial should not weigh against the State for
speedy trial purposes; it simply does not weigh against the State as strongly as Brown suggests.
As a result, we find that the second factor weighs in favor of Brown.
C. Assertion of Right
“The third factor is the accused’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial.” Young, 136 Idaho
at 117, 29 P.3d at 953. The defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial is entitled to strong
evidentiary weight in determining whether he is being deprived of the right. Barker, 407 U.S. at
531-32; Davis, 141 Idaho at 839, 118 P.3d at 171. The timing of a defendant’s assertion of the
right tends to disclose whether he actually desired a speedy trial. Lopez, 144 Idaho at 353, 160
P.3d at 1288. As such, a defendant’s failure to assert the right will make it difficult for him to
prove that he was denied a speedy trial. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532; Davis, 141 Idaho at 839, 118
P.3d at 171. Here, the State concedes that Brown asserted his speedy trial rights throughout the
case. Thus, the third factor weighs in favor of Brown.
D. Prejudice
The fourth factor in the Barker analysis is prejudice to the accused caused by the delay.
Young, 136 Idaho at 118, 29 P.3d at 954. The nature and extent of prejudice arising out of a delay
in bringing a criminal action to trial is the most important of the Barker factors. State v. McNew,
131 Idaho 268, 273, 954 P.2d 686, 691 (Ct. App. 1998). Prejudice is to be assessed in light of the
interests of defendants that the right to a speedy trial is designed to: (1) prevent oppressive pretrial
incarceration; (2) minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) limit the possibility that
the defense will be impaired. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532; Young, 136 Idaho at 118, 29 P.3d at 954.
Whether a delay hinders the ability of a defendant to adequately prepare his case is the most
significant form of prejudice because it skews the fairness of the entire criminal justice system.
Barker, 407 U.S. at 532; see also Lopez, 144 Idaho at 354-55, 160 P.3d at 1289-90; State v.
Hernandez, 133 Idaho 576, 583, 990 P.2d 742, 749 (Ct. App. 1999).
The district court held that the fourth factor slightly weighed in favor of Brown. On appeal,
Brown argues the district court correctly determined this factor weighed in his favor because he
experienced the first and second forms of prejudice as he was subject to ten months of pretrial

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incarceration and suffered anxiety and concern during the eighteen months of delay. Brown,
however, concedes he did not experience the third form of prejudice--that his defense was
impaired. The State argues the district court erred in holding that the fourth factor weighed in
favor of Brown because the record does not show that Brown was prejudiced by the delay of his
trial in any meaningful way.
In this case, because Brown concedes that he did not experience the third form of prejudice,
the fourth factor should be given very light weight, if any. State v. Hernandez, 163 Idaho 9, 16,
407 P.3d 596, 603 (Ct. App. 2017). For the remaining forms of prejudice, although Brown argues
he was in custody for ten months and suffered anxiety and concern, Brown’s arguments similarly
lack connection to the delay to demonstrate in a meaningful way that he was prejudiced by the
delay. Ciccone, 154 Idaho at 340, 297 P.3d at 1157. As a result, the fourth factor is neutral.
E. Balancing
The four Barker factors must be weighed to determine whether there has been a violation
of Brown’s constitutional rights to a speedy trial. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533. None of the four
Barker factors are “either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the
right of speedy trial,” but are instead, “related factors and must be considered together with such
other circumstances as may be relevant.” Id.
In this case, the district court denied Brown’s motion to dismiss and held that “a delay of
ten months is not an unreasonable delay, despite several Barker factors that weigh in favor of
dismissal.” We agree. For the first factor, although the overall length of the delay was eighteen
months, only ten months of the delay was attributable to the State, which was not an unreasonable
delay for a case that involved multiple felony charges, a very young witness, and criminal acts that
spanned several years. Brackett, 160 Idaho at 628, 377 P.3d at 1091 (finding that a delay of
between nine and ten months attributable to the state was not an unreasonable delay for a case
involving sixteen felony charges). Further, while the length of delay weighs in favor of Brown,
the district court properly concluded that the weight of this factor was minimal in light of the
complexity of the case, the difficulties the State experienced in assembling witnesses, and the
absence of any intentional action by the State to cause the delay. Regarding the second factor,
although it weighs in favor of Brown, we are not persuaded that it weighs heavily in favor of
Brown because Detective Cowdery was an unavailable, rather than an inconvenienced, witness for
trial. The third factor weighs in favor of Brown because he timely asserted his speedy trial rights.

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As to the most important factor, the fourth factor was neutral because Brown failed to demonstrate
that his defense was prejudiced in any meaningful way. McNew, 131 Idaho at 273, 954 P.2d at
691. Thus, after balancing the four Barker factors, we cannot conclude the district court erred in
finding Brown failed to demonstrate that his speedy trial rights were violated. As a result, the
district court did not err in denying Brown’s motion to dismiss.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Brown failed to establish that his constitutional speedy trial rights were violated by the
delays in his proceedings. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying Brown’s motion to
dismiss and Brown’s judgment of conviction is affirmed.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge Pro Tem MELANSON, CONCUR.

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