Kenney v. Reid

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 51457

KELSEY and ROMAN KENNEY, )
husband and wife, ) Filed: April 3, 2025
)
Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants- ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
Respondents, )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
v. ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
RENEE REID, aka RENEE REID- )
WYATT, )
)
Defendant-Counterclaimant- )
Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Kootenai County. Hon. John T. Mitchell, District Judge.

Judgment of the district court, affirmed.

Bistline Law, PLLC; Arthur M. Bistline, Coeur d’Alene, for appellant.

Kelsey Kenney and Roman Kenney, Cocolalla, for respondents. (Respondents did
not participate in appeal.)
________________________________________________

HUSKEY, Judge
Renee Reid appeals from the judgment awarding Kelsey and Roman Kenney (collectively,
“the Kennys”) $2,5001 and the dismissal of her counterclaims with prejudice. Reid argues the
district court erred in finding that the Kenneys did not leave the home in a damaged condition and
were entitled to the return of the security deposit. Reid argues the district court further erred in
awarding attorney fees and costs to the Kenneys because the fees and costs were the result of the
Kenneys unreasonably refusing settlement and pursuing trial on damage claims to which they were

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The Kenneys were awarded treble damages pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-317 by the district
court. The amount of the award is not contested in this appeal.
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not entitled. Neither Kelsey Kenney nor Roman Kenney are a participant in this appeal. For the
following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
I.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Reid is the owner of real property in Hayden, Idaho which she offers for rent. Reid
contracted with Kathryn Ellefloot to manage the property with Reid’s ex-husband, Richard Wyatt,
who was acting as the contact person for any major issues related to the property. The Kenneys
leased the property from Reid for a period beginning November 1, 2020, through May 18, 2021,
and paid Reid a $2,500 refundable security deposit. Although the Kenneys’ lease agreement
included the residence, the lease specifically excluded access to two locked closets and the garage.
The lease agreement provided that Reid had twenty-one days following the end of the lease to
return the security deposit and/or provide an itemized list of deductions. During the time of the
Kenneys’ tenancy, two major issues arose that caused damage to the property including issues with
the septic system and water damage from an overflowing bathtub and sink. Ellefloot worked with
Wyatt to coordinate repairs of the property.
In February 2021, Kelsey Kenney accessed one of the locked closets and the garage to
determine and resolve the problem with the septic system. Located in the garage was Wyatt’s
personal vehicle, which Kelsey later used without Wyatt’s knowledge or permission. Upon
learning of this, Wyatt instructed Ellefloot to collect approximately $10,000 from the Kenneys,
which the Kenneys paid with $4,500 in cash and gold coins valued at $9,963.95. The Kenneys
claimed this money was an additional refundable deposit; other evidence indicated it was money
Wyatt demanded in exchange for not reporting Kelsey’s unauthorized use of his vehicle to the
police. At the end of the lease, the Kenneys paid for a deep clean of the property, including steam
cleaning the carpets and rugs, which Ellefloot testified left the property in substantially the same
condition as when the Kenneys took possession. The Kenneys vacated the property on
May 17, 2021. Reid did not provide an itemized statement of deductions and did not return any
portion of the security deposit within the twenty-one-day timeline as required by the lease.
The Kenneys filed a complaint alleging Reid violated the lease agreement by failing to
return the security deposit or provide an itemized list of any damages claimed and amounts
lawfully retained. The Kenneys identified the amount of security deposit as being in excess of
$10,000 and sought treble damages. Reid filed a counterclaim asserting the Kenneys breached the

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lease agreement by causing damage to the property and Reid’s personal property, by not paying
rent for the unauthorized access to parts of the house excluded under the lease, and for stealing
Reid’s personal property. Prior to trial, Reid offered to settle the dispute by paying the Kenneys
$2,500; the amount of the original security deposit. The Kenneys declined the offer.
The district court found that Reid was solely responsible for determining the amount and
collection of security deposits and, therefore, Wyatt acted outside the scope of his authority when
he demanded and collected an additional payment of $10,000 from the Kenneys. The district court
determined the amount of the security deposit was $2,500 and Reid failed to return any portion of
the deposit or provide an itemized statement of any amounts lawfully retained as required under
the lease agreement and Idaho Code § 6-321. The district court awarded treble damages to the
Kenneys pursuant to I.C. § 6-317 with respect to the original $2,500 security deposit. The district
court found Reid failed to establish that the Kenneys committed conversion of her personal
property or that the Kenneys breached the lease agreement by leaving the property in a damaged
condition. The district court also found the Kenneys did not owe additional rent for accessing the
garage. Reid filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment and a motion to disallow costs and
fees to plaintiffs. The district court denied the motion and awarded the Kenneys attorney fees and
costs in the amount of $57,986.11. Reid appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Where a trial court sits as a finder of fact without a jury the court is required to enter
findings of fact and conclusions of law. I.R.C.P. 52(a); Estate of Hull v. Williams, 126 Idaho 437,
440, 885 P.2d 1153, 1156 (Ct. App. 1994). Our review of the trial court’s decision is limited to
ascertaining whether substantial, competent evidence supports the findings of fact, and whether
the trial court correctly applied the law to the facts as found. Borah v. McCandless, 147 Idaho 73,
77, 205 P.3d 1209, 1213 (2009); Cummings v. Cummings, 115 Idaho 186, 188, 765 P.2d 697, 699
(Ct. App. 1988). Thus, we defer to findings of fact that are not clearly erroneous, but we freely
review the trial court’s conclusions of law reached by applying the facts found to the applicable
law. Staggie v. Idaho Falls Consol. Hosps., 110 Idaho 349, 351, 715 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Ct. App.
1986).
When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the lower court: (1) correctly perceived the

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issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently
with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision
by an exercise of reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194
(2018).
III.
ANALYSIS
Reid contends the district court erred in finding the Kenneys did not leave the home in a
damaged condition and were entitled to the return of the security deposit because the district court
relied on the testimony of witnesses who lacked the appropriate knowledge of the condition of the
home prior to the Kenneys’ tenancy. Reid argues Roman Kenney admitted significant damage
occurred and additional funds were owed to repair the damage. Reid contends the district court
further erred in finding the Kenneys were the prevailing party and awarding attorney fees and costs
because the Kenneys received no more than what Reid offered as settlement prior to trial and, in
fact, were awarded a judgment far less than they were seeking. The Kenneys did not participate
in this appeal.
A. Damage To The Property
“Appellate courts are not permitted to substitute their own view of the evidence for that of
the trial court, or to make credibility determinations.” Wilde v. Wilde, __ Idaho __, __, 556 P.3d
830, 836 (2024). “We reaffirm the oft-cited maxim that appellate courts in Idaho do not reweigh
evidence.” Wilson v. Mocabee, 167 Idaho 59, 68, 467 P.3d 423, 432 (2020). “Instead, we defer
to the trial court’s unique ability to ‘accurately weigh the evidence and judge the demeanor of the
witnesses’ while taking into account the trial court’s ‘superior view of the entire
situation.’” Lunneborg, 163 Idaho at 866-67, 421 P.3d at 197-98.
The district court described the witness credibility determinations in its findings of fact and
conclusions of law stating:
12. This Court has considered the demeanor as witness of Defendant and
Wyatt, as well as the consistency of their testimony and any contradiction of their
statements. This Court finds the credibility of these two witnesses to be low.
13. Based on the same observations and criteria, this Court finds Kelsey’s
credibility to be moderate, and Roman Kenney’s credibility to be somewhat higher.
14. The highest credibility is attributed to the non-party witnesses the Court
heard. These include Ellefloot, Sgt. Jason Bates of the Kootenai County Sherriff’s
Office, and Dennis Heavey, who performed the steam cleaning of the property’s
carpets and noticed no damage attributed to animal odors.

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On appeal, Reid argues the district court’s finding that the rental property had not been left
in a damaged condition and, as a result, the Kenneys were entitled to the return of their security
deposit is not supported by substantial and competent evidence. We disagree.
The record provides substantial and competent evidence to support the district court’s
findings that the property was not left in a damaged condition and the Kenneys were entitled to
the return of their security deposit. Reid points to Ellefloot’s description of the property as
“looking like a bomb went off” as proof that the property was damaged. That statement, when
placed in context, does not suggest what Reid implies. During Ellefloot’s testimony when she
made the comment, she explained that she was at the property to do a walkthrough to assess the
water damage that just occurred, not to do an inspection, and that some rooms were tidy and others
were “not to the slightest” tidy. She also noticed that artwork was taken off the walls and placed
elsewhere. Ellefloot was asked about the condition of the property when she was there a month
later while the Kenneys were moving out, and she testified that the property “was almost back to
its original condition.” She hedged her answer with “minus the cosmetic damage” which she
explained was the water damage. She did not testify that she observed any other cosmetic damages
and did not notice any odor in the home or damage to the carpets. The observed condition of the
property during the Kenneys’ tenancy shortly after the extensive water damage is irrelevant to the
observed condition at the end of their tenancy as it is the condition at the conclusion of their
tenancy that is at issue.
The house cleaners, Dennis Heavey and his wife Monica Heavey, testified they did not
notice any damage to the property and, based on their experience, they found the carpets to be high
quality and in reasonable shape, showing only normal wear and tear. The district court found the
house cleaners credible. In June 2021, Reid listed the property for sale and the purchaser of the
Reid property, Carrie Booten, testified that upon becoming the owner, no significant repairs were
needed. Aside from a bare assertion by Reid that the house had in excess of $35,000 of damage
caused by the Kenneys, there was no evidence submitted to support Reid’s claim. Substantial and
competent evidence presented at trial supports the district court’s factual findings that significant
damage was not visible by the end of the Kenneys’ tenancy.
Reid highlights Roman Kenney’s statements about the likelihood of damage and his
willingness to pay additional amounts as being dispositive that the Kenneys caused damage.
However, Roman also testified that he was intimidated by Wyatt and was looking to ease the

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tension of the situation. Where there is conflicting evidence, it is the trial court’s task to evaluate
the credibility of witnesses and to weigh the evidence presented. Desfosses v. Desfosses, 120 Idaho
354, 357, 815 P.2d 1094, 1097 (Ct. App. 1991). We will not set aside the trial court’s factual
findings as clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial and competent, even if
conflicting, evidence. Kennedy v. Schneider, 151 Idaho 440, 442, 259 P.3d 586, 588 (2011).
Evidence is substantial and competent if a reasonable trier of fact would accept that evidence and
rely on it to determine whether a disputed point of fact was proven. Hull v. Giesler, 156 Idaho
765, 772, 331 P.3d 507, 514 (2014); Hutchison v. Anderson, 130 Idaho 936, 940, 950 P.2d 1275,
1279 (Ct. App. 1997). Here, the district court weighed all the evidence presented, including any
conflicting evidence, and reached its conclusion that the Kenneys had not left the property in a
damaged condition. Because that conclusion is supported by substantial and competent evidence,
we decline Reid’s request to reweigh the evidence, and we affirm the district court’s award to the
Kenneys.
B. Attorney Fees
Reid argues the district court erred in finding the Kenneys were the prevailing party and
entitled to attorney fees because the Kenneys were awarded an amount that is less than their claim
and is identical to Reid’s settlement offer prior to trial. Reid contends that the proper analysis is
whether acceptance of an offer of judgment would have ended the case and when applied here,
had the Kenneys accepted the $2,500 offer, there would have been no need for trial because the
Kenneys knew the additional sums paid to Wyatt “were not an additional damage deposit.”
Therefore, the Kenneys should not have been awarded fees.
As an initial matter, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 68(d) provides for offers of judgment
and the adjustment and award of costs in the event an offer of judgment is not accepted, and the
offeree receives an award less than the offer. Reid does not seek application of I.R.C.P. 68.
Instead, Reid argues that the district court, in its prevailing party determination, should have
considered that the Kenneys received no more in an award than the offer of judgment and incurred
substantial costs and attorney fees unnecessarily by rejecting the offer and going to trial. In Zenner
v. Holcomb, 147 Idaho 444, 210 P.3d 552 (2009), the Court noted that settlement offers should be
considered in the prevailing party analysis, however, they should not be the only, or most
significant factor, in the prevailing party analysis. Id. at 444, 210 P.3d at 557. “The determination
of who is the prevailing party for purposes of an award of attorney fees is within the trial court’s

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discretion.” Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474, 484, 129 P.3d 1223, 1233 (2006). In determining
which party prevailed where there are claims and counterclaims between opposing parties, a court
determines who prevailed in the action from an overall view, not through a claim-by-claim
analysis. Oakes v. Boise Heart Clinic Physicians, PLLC, 152 Idaho 540, 545, 272 P.3d 512, 517
(2012).
During the hearing on Reid’s motion to alter or amend the judgment, the district court
considered Reid’s arguments and rejected them. As to the offer of judgment, the district court
stated, “I am not persuaded by the offer of judgment argument submitted by the defense. I
understand it, but I think it’s an improper use of the offer of a judgment vehicle.” Reid makes no
argument on appeal that the district court failed to consider the offer of a judgment or its import in
the prevailing party analysis. Instead, Reid argues that the Kenneys proceeded after the offer of
judgment on a damages claim on which they knew that they would prevail and, in fact, did not
prevail. Although Reid argued that the “only relief sought by the Kenneys after the offer of
judgment was the additional sums paid to Wyatt, sums they knew were not an additional damage
deposit,” this is not an established fact. The Kenneys and Ellefloot testified that the $10,000 paid
to Wyatt was an additional deposit and there was some expectation of the money being returned
after a determination of any damage to the vehicle and the excluded areas of the property. Beyond
arguing that the $10,000 was not an additional deposit, Reid fails to explain how the district court
abused its discretion in rejecting her prevailing party argument.
In considering the gravamen of the complaint, the district court stated:
The court found, number one, “Reid wrongfully retained the security
deposit.” Plaintiff prevailed on that issue. Number two, “The Kenneys did not
damage the property.” Plaintiff prevailed on that issue. These are all counterclaims
brought by the defendant. Three, “The Kenneys did not use more of the rental
property than that which they were entitled to use,” again, plaintiffs prevailed, and
four, “The Kenneys did not steal from Reid,” again, plaintiffs prevailed.
Reid’s argument is based purely on the monetary award versus the amount of money presented in
the offer of judgment, which the district court found to be an inappropriate basis as the sole reason
for determining the prevailing party. The district court found the eventual judgment amount is not
determinative, although it is a considered factor, in the prevailing party analysis and denied Reid’s
motion to alter or amend the judgment. The district court recognized its discretion and acted
consistently and within the bounds of that discretion to determine the prevailing party. The district
court explained its reasoning and identified each of the substantive claims and who factually

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prevailed. From an overall view, the Kenneys prevailed on all claims and Reid prevailed on none.
Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining the Kenneys were the prevailing
party and awarding attorney fees and costs.
Reid claims attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 6-324. Reid is not the
prevailing party on appeal and is therefore not entitled to the award of attorney fees and costs in
bringing the appeal pursuant to I.C. § 6-324 or Idaho Appellate Rule 41. The Kenneys did not
participate in the appeal and thus, are not entitled to attorney fees or costs.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The district court did not err in awarding judgment to the Kenneys because substantial and
competent evidence established that they were entitled to the return of the $2,500 security deposit,
and Reid neither returned the deposit nor provide an itemized statement of any amounts lawfully
retained as required. The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the Kenneys
attorney fees and costs as the prevailing party. We affirm the judgment of the district court.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge TRIBE, CONCUR.

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