State v. Saucedo

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 50850

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: January 31, 2025
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
ANTHONY LEE SAUCEDO, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Derrick J. O’Neill, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Sally J. Cooley, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kacey L. Jones, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________
TRIBE, Judge
Anthony Lee Saucedo appeals from his judgment of conviction for trafficking in
methamphetamine. Saucedo argues the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress. We
affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Probation and Parole officers, Lee and Hamidovic, performed a compliance check at the
home of a probationer. During that visit, the officers performed a search of the probationer’s
phone, which revealed text messages from “Anthony” and indicated the probationer was intending
to purchase methamphetamine from “Anthony.” The number was traced to Saucedo. One of the
text messages from Saucedo indicated that he was with a person named “Amber.” Upon checking

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the probationer’s phone, the officers located a phone number for “Amber” who was on probation.
The officers went to Amber’s home and were given permission by a supervisor to search the home.
Officer Lee knocked on the door of Amber’s home and she opened the door. Upon entering
the home, Officer Lee saw Saucedo sitting on a couch. Saucedo wore a necklace from which a
knife hung. Officer Lee asked Saucedo to remove the knife from around his neck, exit the home,
and go outside toward Officer Hamidovic. Saucedo complied. Officer Hamidovic then performed
a pat search of Saucedo, which yielded a baggie of methamphetamine in his shirt pocket. A search
of the home yielded a backpack with Saucedo’s keys, methamphetamine, and drug paraphernalia.
Although Saucedo originally denied the backpack belonged to him, he later admitted that the
backpack and the methamphetamine were his. The methamphetamine weight from the backpack
was a trafficking amount.
Saucedo was charged with felony trafficking in methamphetamine and misdemeanor
possession of drug paraphernalia. Saucedo filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained on his
person and in the backpack. The district court denied the motion to suppress. Saucedo entered a
conditional guilty plea to felony trafficking in methamphetamine Idaho Code § 37-
2732B(a)(4)(A), reserving his right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. Saucedo
appeals.1
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion
to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by
substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts
as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a
suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts,
weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina,
127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d
659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).

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On appeal, Saucedo argues only that the methamphetamine obtained from inside of his
shirt pocket was found in violation of his rights. Saucedo has not challenged the discovery of the
methamphetamine in his backpack.

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III.
ANALYSIS
Saucedo argues the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Specifically,
Saucedo contends the officer exceeded the scope of a permissible Terry2 frisk and a subsequent
search inside Saucedo’s shirt pocket was not permissible under the plain-feel doctrine, thus he
argues that his rights under the Fourth Amendment were violated.3 The State responds that the
district court properly found the officer had a reasonable belief that Saucedo was armed and
dangerous justifying the initial external frisk and the plain-feel doctrine justified the officer
entering and removing the contents of Saucedo’s shirt pocket.
A. Terry frisk
Saucedo argues that the district court erred in concluding that the initial Terry frisk was
legal because the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the frisk did not
lead to the conclusion that Saucedo posed a safety risk. The Fourth Amendment protects the “right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV. A warrantless search is presumptively
unreasonable unless it falls within certain special and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant
requirement. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); State v. Ferreira, 133
Idaho 474, 479, 988 P.2d 700, 705 (Ct. App. 1999). In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the
United States Supreme Court created a stop-and-frisk exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement. The stop and the frisk constitute two independent actions, each requiring a distinct
and separate justification. State v. Babb, 133 Idaho 890, 892, 994 P.2d 633, 635 (Ct. App. 2000);
State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 556, 989 P.2d 784, 788 (Ct. App. 1999).
Saucedo does not challenge the legality of the stop. However, merely because there are
reasonable grounds to justify a lawful investigatory stop, such grounds do not automatically justify
a frisk for weapons. Babb, 133 Idaho at 892, 994 P.2d at 635. An officer may frisk an individual
if the officer can point to specific and articulable facts that would lead a reasonably prudent person

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See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
3
Saucedo acknowledges that no argument was presented in the district court in his motion
to suppress regarding his rights pursuant to Article 1 § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. Therefore,
Saucedo does not raise a state constitutional claim on appeal.

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to believe that the individual may be armed and presently dangerous and nothing in the initial
stages of the encounter serves to dispel this belief. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; Babb, 133 Idaho at 892,
994 P.2d at 635; Fleenor, 133 Idaho at 555, 989 P.2d at 787. In our analysis of a frisk, we look to
the facts known to the officer on the scene and the inferences of risk of danger reasonably drawn
from the totality of those specific circumstances. Babb, 133 Idaho at 892, 994 P.2d at 635; Fleenor,
133 Idaho at 555, 989 P.2d at 787.
Saucedo argues that the district court’s conclusion relied solely on the finding that, upon
their arrival in the home, the officers saw a knife hanging from Saucedo’s neck. The State argues
that the district court properly denied the motion to suppress because the Terry frisk was lawful
given all the information known to the officers at the time of the frisk. The State argues that the
information known to the officers included the “text messages from Saucedo indicating that he
was currently in possession of methamphetamine and looking to sell it, a search of a different
probationer’s trailer that took place late in the evening, and that Saucedo was wearing a knife
around his neck.”4
Our inquiry is to determine whether it was objectively reasonable for the officer to
conclude a pat down search was necessary for the protection of himself or others. State v. Henage,
143 Idaho 655, 661, 152 P.3d 16, 22 (2007). “[W]here nothing in the initial stages of the encounter
serves to dispel [the officer’s] reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety,” the officer is entitled
to “conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover
weapons.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
In Henage, the Idaho Supreme Court reviewed whether an officer was justified in a
pat-down search, after the original purpose for the traffic stop was completed, because the
individual subject to the frisk told the officer he had a knife and appeared nervous. The district
court found that those facts and the officer’s testimony, that “once a person tells me they’re in
possession of a weapon, it compromises my safety,” sufficiently justified the search. Henage, 143
Idaho at 662, 152 P.3d at 23. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the presence of a knife, by itself,
does not present a safety risk when there is no objective indication that an individual posed a threat.

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Saucedo emphasizes that the officer admitted he did not know the difference between a pat
search and a full search. However, the officer’s understanding of the difference is not instructive
of whether the frisk violated the Fourth Amendment.

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Id. The Court further held that the officer’s generalized statements of a feeling of concern for
safety did not inform the objective analysis and the safety concerns were not particularized to the
facts present with this particular individual with whom the officer was familiar and had a cordial
relationship. Id. at 661, 152 P.3d at 22.
After Henage, the Idaho Supreme Court provided a nonexhaustive list of factors that could
influence whether a reasonable person in the officer’s position would believe that a particular
individual was armed and dangerous. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 819, 203 P.3d 1203, 1218
(2009). These factors include:

[W]hether there were any bulges in the suspect’s clothing that resembled a weapon;
whether the encounter took place late at night or in a high crime area; and whether
the individual made threatening or furtive movements, indicated that he or she
possessed a weapon, appeared nervous or agitated, appeared to be under the
influence of alcohol or illegal drugs, was unwilling to cooperate, or had a reputation
for being dangerous.
Id. Any single factor could be sufficient to justify a Terry frisk under the totality of the
circumstances standard. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 819, 203 P.3d at 1218; see State v. Saldivar, 165
Idaho 388, 392, 446 P.3d 446, 450 (2019).
Although the district court’s analysis highlighted Saucedo’s possession of a knife as
justification for a Terry frisk, it made other findings relevant to the analysis. In particular, the
district court found that Saucedo sent a text message to Amber and “wanted to sell
methamphetamine” and that the search of Saucedo occurred in the evening in the context of a
search of a probationer’s home. Under Henage, the district court’s analysis relied too heavily on
the mere presence of the knife.
We conclude, however, that a reasonable person in the officer’s position would believe that
a particular individual was armed and dangerous under an objective view of the totality of the
circumstances. Similar to the officer in Henage, Officer Hamidovic knew Saucedo possessed a
knife. Unlike in Henage, Officer Hamidovic had no known previous interactions with Saucedo
such that the officer could be assured that Saucedo did not pose a threat. Also, unlike the officer’s
unparticularized statement in Henage, the officer testified that he performed a pat-down search of
Saucedo due to safety concerns that were present at the time of the search. Further, unlike Henage
where the officers performed a Terry frisk following a routine traffic stop, here the officers were

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at the home of a known methamphetamine user with information that Saucedo was planning to
sell methamphetamine. Therefore, upon the first encounter with Saucedo, Officer Lee knew they
were “possibly going to be finding some criminal activity or suspicious behaviors” unlike what
would be expected from a routine traffic stop where the officer’s only reason for the stop is a traffic
violation.
Saucedo has failed to show the district court erred in concluding that it is objectively
reasonable for a person in the same situation as Officer Hamidovic, with all the facts mentioned,
to perform a Terry frisk for the safety of himself and others.
B. Plain-Feel Exception
Saucedo argues that, even if the Terry frisk was justified, a further intrusion into his shirt
pocket was not supported by sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the officer felt an object that
was immediately identifiable as contraband. Saucedo argues that the officer had a mere hunch
which is insufficient to warrant the intrusion. The State argues that the district court correctly
found that the officer was justified in removing the methamphetamine from Saucedo’s shirt pocket
because Officer Hamidovic testified to being familiar with methamphetamine, that it felt like “little
rocks,” and to seeing the text messages from Saucedo earlier in the day that indicated he had
methamphetamine.
The plain-touch or plain-feel exception to the warrant requirement applies when, during
the course of a Terry frisk for weapons, an officer feels an object whose contour or mass makes its
identity as contraband immediately apparent. State v. Doe, 145 Idaho 980, 984, 188 P.3d 922, 926
(Ct. App. 2008). If the object’s identity as contraband is immediately apparent, an officer is
justified in conducting a warrantless seizure of that object by removing the object from a suspect’s
pocket on the basis of probable cause. Id.
Saucedo argues that the district court erred and points to the preliminary hearing where
Officer Hamidovic testified that the object “felt like a baggy with a pebble-like substance.”
However, Officer Hamidovic clarified at the motion to suppress hearing that the pebble-like
feeling made it immediately apparent to him that the object was methamphetamine due to his
previous experience feeling methamphetamine and holding a baggie of methamphetamine.
Saucedo has failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence
found in his shirt pocket.

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IV.
CONCLUSION
Because the initial frisk was a lawful Terry frisk and the subsequent search inside
Saucedo’s shirt pocket was justified under the plain-feel doctrine, the district court did not err in
denying Saucedo’s motion to suppress. Therefore, Saucedo’s judgment of conviction for
trafficking in methamphetamine is affirmed.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge LORELLO, CONCUR.

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