State v. Raynor

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 51104

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: January 28, 2025
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
KEVIN MICHAEL RAYNOR, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Jason D. Scott, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction for lewd conduct with a minor child under sixteen,
affirmed.

Silvey Law Office Ltd; Greg S. Silvey, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; John C. McKinney, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

GRATTON, Chief Judge
Kevin Michael Raynor appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The State charged Raynor with two counts of lewd conduct with a minor child under
sixteen in violation of Idaho Code § 18-1508. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Raynor pled guilty to
one count of lewd conduct, and the remaining count was dismissed. Three days before the
sentencing hearing, Raynor filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court denied
Raynor’s motion, finding his plea was constitutionally valid and that, based on its application of
the factors in State v. Sunseri, 165 Idaho 9, 14, 437 P.3d 9, 14 (2018), Raynor had failed to show
a just reason for withdrawing his guilty plea. Raynor appeals.

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II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is reviewed under the abuse of
discretion standard. State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 483, 861 P.2d 51, 53 (1993). When a trial
court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered
inquiry to determine whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
(2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards
applicable to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018).
III.
ANALYSIS
Raynor claims the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to withdraw
his guilty plea. Raynor further argues that the sentence imposed by the district court was
unreasonable. The State asserts the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Raynor’s
motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it correctly determined the Sunseri factors weighed
against granting the motion. The State further argues that Raynor has not shown that the district
court abused its sentencing discretion.
A. Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
Whether to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea lies in the discretion of the district
court and such discretion should be liberally applied. State v. Freeman, 110 Idaho 117, 121, 714
P.2d 86, 90 (Ct. App. 1986). Nevertheless, withdrawal of a guilty plea before sentence is imposed
is not an automatic right. Dopp, 124 Idaho at 485, 861 P.2d at 55; State v. Ward, 135 Idaho 68,
72, 14 P.3d 388, 392 (Ct. App. 2000). A defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty plea before
sentencing must show a just reason for withdrawing the plea. Dopp, 124 Idaho at 485, 861 P.2d
at 55; Ward, 135 Idaho at 72, 14 P.3d at 392. The just reason standard does not require that the
defendant establish a constitutional defect in his or her guilty plea. State v. Henderson, 113 Idaho
411, 413, 744 P.2d 795, 797 (Ct. App. 1987). However, as a threshold matter, the defendant can
establish just cause as a matter of law by showing that the plea was not taken in compliance with
constitutional due process standards, which require that a plea be entered voluntarily, knowingly,
and intelligently. Sunseri, 165 Idaho at 14, 437 P.3d at 14. Once the defendant has met this burden,
the State may avoid a withdrawal of the plea by demonstrating the existence of prejudice to the

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State. Dopp, 124 Idaho at 485, 861 P.2d at 55; Ward, 135 Idaho at 72, 14 P.3d at 392. The
defendant’s failure to present and support a plausible reason will dictate against granting
withdrawal, even absent prejudice to the prosecution. Dopp, 124 Idaho at 485, 861 P.2d at 55;
Ward, 135 Idaho at 72, 14 P.3d at 392.
Raynor’s motion was filed prior to sentencing so he must show a just reason to withdraw
his guilty plea. Dopp, 124 Idaho at 485, 861 P.2d at 55. The Idaho Supreme Court has explained
application of the just reason standard as follows:
The determination whether a defendant has shown a just reason for
withdrawal of the plea is a factual decision committed to the discretion of the trial
court. Given the fact-intensive nature of the inquiry, this Court has not previously
attempted to define what constitutes a “just reason” for withdrawal of a guilty plea.
Among other factors, the trial court should consider: (1) whether the defendant has
credibly asserted his legal innocence; (2) the length of delay between the entry of
the guilty plea and the filing of the motion; (3) whether the defendant had the
assistance of competent counsel at the time of the guilty plea; and (4) whether the
withdrawal of the plea will inconvenience the court and waste judicial resources.
Sunseri, 165 Idaho at 14, 437 P.3d at 14. The good faith, credibility, and weight of the defendant’s
assertions in support of a motion to withdraw a plea are matters for the trial court to decide. State
v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 537, 211 P.3d 775, 782 (Ct. App. 2008).
As a preliminary matter, Raynor has failed to show his guilty plea was not entered
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The district court stated:
The motion doesn’t give me anything that I can use to arrive at a conclusion
that the plea wasn’t knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. I, of course,
took the plea myself. I recall the plea hearing. I listened to the tape of the plea
hearing before--before today again, and there was nothing in my mind that was
irregular in some way or cast doubt on the voluntariness of the plea.
And when it came time to inquire of the defendant about what he did to be
guilty, the defendant responded to my questions in a very matter of fact and
appropriate way. There was no hemming and hawing. There was no--there was
no--there was no apparent dodge of any sort. He admitted--he admitted the
allegation, and I have no reason to doubt that he understood full well what he was
doing at the time, so the plea is constitutionally valid. So that’s the end of the first
step of the analysis.
Raynor claims that the district court “knew enough” to address and not simply “pass over”
the constitutionality of Raynor’s guilty plea. Contrary to Raynor’s claim, the district court
considered the arguments, reviewed the record, and took time to explain why the plea was
constitutional. Raynor further claims that the district court should have inquired of Raynor as to
what he meant by ineffective assistance of counsel. On appeal, Raynor suggests that such alleged
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ineffectiveness may have played a role in the guilty plea, especially because counsel advised the
district court that an Alford1 plea had been discussed and rejected. First, Raynor cites no authority
for the proposition that the district court had a duty to inquire. A party waives an issue on appeal
if either authority or argument is lacking. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970
(1996). Second, Raynor did not argue to the district court that counsel had been ineffective
incident to the entry of the guilty plea. Moreover, the district court had been advised that Raynor
did not wish to put the particulars of his claim of ineffective assistance on the record, so there was
no reason for the district court to inquire further. Therefore, Raynor has failed to show that his
guilty plea was not taken in compliance with constitutional due process standards.
Raynor also fails to show a just reason to withdraw his guilty plea. The first Sunseri factor
requires the defendant to credibly assert legal innocence. The district court found this factor did
not weigh in Raynor’s favor because his motion to withdraw effectively amounted to a bare
assertion of innocence. Furthermore, the district court stated that Raynor’s assertion of innocence
contradicted the “straightforward way” he pled guilty. While, on appeal, Raynor claims that his
explanation of his conduct was consistent, the district court found that Raynor’s “story” as to his
innocence was not particularly plausible or credible. Therefore, the district court did not err in
finding the first Sunseri factor weighed against withdrawal of the guilty plea.
The second Sunseri factor requires a trial court to consider the length of delay between the
entry of a plea and the motion to withdraw. Here, there were over two months that passed between
the entry of the guilty plea and filing the motion to withdraw. Additionally, Raynor filed his
motion to withdraw only three days before sentencing. Raynor contends the district court should
have considered that his first counsel, at the time of hearing on counsel’s motion to withdraw as
counsel, heard several weeks before sentencing, indicated that Raynor may file a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea when determining the length of delay. However, Raynor provides no
authority that such an indication of intent is relevant to the standard measuring “the length of delay
between the entry of the guilty plea and the filing of the motion.” Sunseri, 165 Idaho at 14, 437
P.3d at 14. The record supports the district court’s finding that this factor weighs against Raynor’s
motion to withdraw.

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See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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The third Sunseri factor asks whether the defendant had competent counsel at the time of
the guilty plea. The district court found:
[Raynor] did have the assistance of competent counsel. I understand he’s
dissatisfied with counsel, but I don’t have any--I don’t have any explanation as to
why, so I’m not able to evaluate that. And so that--it seems to me that factor also
favors against--weighs against finding a just reason to withdraw the plea.
As noted by the district court, Raynor provided no explanation as to why he felt his counsel may
have been ineffective. Raynor’s suggestions on appeal as to how counsel may have been
ineffective were not presented to the district court and, moreover, are not supported by the record.
The district court correctly found that the third Sunseri factor also weighs against Raynor’s motion
to withdraw.
The fourth Sunseri factor asks whether the withdrawal of the plea will inconvenience the
trial court and waste judicial resources. The district court concluded that this factor was neutral
because there were no particularly troubling inconveniences the court or counsel would face.
Neither party disputes the finding.
Raynor’s guilty plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The district court’s findings
relative to the Sunseri factors are supported by the record. The district court correctly applied the
Sunseri factors. Raynor has failed to show that the district court erred in denying his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.
B. Sentencing
Lastly, Raynor contends that his sentence is excessive. Sentencing is a matter for the trial
court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the factors to be considered in evaluating the
reasonableness of the sentence are well established and need not be repeated here. See State v.
Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106
Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568,
650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the
defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Our
role is limited to determining whether reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion as the
district court. State v. Biggs, 168 Idaho 112, 116, 480 P.3d 150, 154 (Ct. App. 2020). Applying
these standards, and having reviewed the record in this case, we cannot say that the district court
abused its discretion.

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IV.
CONCLUSION
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Raynor’s motion to withdraw his
guilty plea or in sentencing. Therefore, Raynor’s judgment of conviction for lewd conduct with a
minor child under sixteen is affirmed.
Judge HUSKEY and Judge TRIBE CONCUR.

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