IDHW v. John Doe

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 52170

In the Matter of John Doe I, A Child )
Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age. )
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF ) Filed: December 17, 2024
HEALTH & WELFARE, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
Petitioner-Respondent, )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
v. ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
JOHN DOE (2024-39), )
)
Respondent-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial
District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Andrew Ellis, Magistrate.

Judgment terminating parental rights, affirmed.

Barnum Law, PLLC; Randall S. Barnum, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Peter A. Mommer, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

LORELLO, Judge
John Doe (2024-39) appeals from the judgment terminating his parental rights. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In March 2023, an officer brought the mother of Doe’s child, Jane Doe, into custody on an
order for involuntary detention following Jane’s report to medical personnel that she suffered from
homicidal ideations against a family member and had used methamphetamine in the previous
twenty-four hours.1 The officer inspected Jane’s home and found the child with little food to eat

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Termination of Jane Doe’s parental rights is at issue in a separate appeal.

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and no apparent place to sleep. At that time, Doe was incarcerated and had previously only lived
with the child for one three-week period in 2022. The Department of Health and Welfare declared
the child to be in imminent danger and the child was placed in foster care.
A petition under the Child Protective Act was filed. The child was placed into the
Department’s legal custody. It was confirmed that the child has autism and requires a high level
of structure and support at home and in school. In April 2023, the Department approved a case
plan for Doe. The case plan addressed Doe’s prior convictions, employment, mental health, and
parenting skills in order for Doe to acquire the necessary skills to care for and reunite with the
child. The Department raised concerns about Doe’s prior conviction for felony injury to a child
and his inability to complete a mandated protective-parenting course. After his release from
incarceration in August 2023, Doe attended all visits with the child, but the child was moved to a
foster home in Idaho Falls. As a result, Doe was unable to have in-person visits with the child as
often. The first two visits with the child in Idaho Falls were unsupervised. When the Department
required future visits to be supervised, Doe stopped in-person visits. Doe was also authorized to
have two telephone calls per week with the child but stopped making those calls several months
before the termination trial.
The Department filed a petition to terminate Doe’s parental rights. During the termination
trial, the Department presented testimony and exhibits recounting Doe’s failure to complete the
required protective-parenting class, his recent incarceration, his criminal history including a
conviction for felony injury to child, and his untreated anger management problems. Following
the trial, the magistrate court found by clear and convincing evidence that Doe had neglected the
child and that termination of Doe’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests. As a result, the
magistrate court terminated Doe’s parental rights. Doe appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal from a decision terminating parental rights, this Court examines whether the
decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence, which means such evidence as a

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reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.2 Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 243,
245-46, 220 P.3d 1062, 1064-65 (2009). The appellate court will indulge all reasonable inferences
in support of the trial court’s judgment when reviewing an order that parental rights be terminated.
Id. The Idaho Supreme Court has also said that the substantial evidence test requires a greater
quantum of evidence in cases where the trial court’s finding must be supported by clear and
convincing evidence than in cases where a mere preponderance is required. State v. Doe, 143
Idaho 343, 346, 144 P.3d 597, 600 (2006). Clear and convincing evidence is generally understood
to be evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. Roe
v. Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 P.3d 1057, 1060 (2006). Further, the trial court’s decision must
be supported by objectively supportable grounds. Doe, 143 Idaho at 346, 144 P.3d at 600.
III.
ANALYSIS
Doe asserts that the magistrate court erred in finding that he neglected the child and that
termination of his parental rights is in the child’s best interests. The Department responds that
clear and convincing evidence exists that Doe neglected the child and that the termination of Doe’s
parental rights is in the child’s best interests. Because the magistrate court’s findings are supported
by substantial and competent evidence, we affirm the termination of Doe’s parental rights.
A. Statutory Basis for Termination
A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her
child. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 760, 53 P.3d 341,
343 (2002). This interest is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007). Implicit in the
Termination of Parent and Child Relationship Act is the philosophy that, wherever possible, family
life should be strengthened and preserved. I.C. § 16-2001(2). Therefore, the requisites of due

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The Department asserts that a decision terminating parental rights is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. In support of this assertion, the Department cites State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345,
363, 313 P.3d 1, 19 (2013). Although that case accurately states the abuse of discretion standard,
it does so in the context of post-conviction relief. It is unclear why the Department asserts the
abuse of discretion standard is relevant to this appeal. The Department ultimately concludes that
“substantial and competent evidence support the magistrate court’s findings that John Doe
neglected the child.”

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process must be met when terminating the parent-child relationship. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 383,
386, 146 P.3d 649, 652 (2006). Due process requires that the grounds for terminating a parent-
child relationship be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Because a fundamental liberty
interest is at stake, the United States Supreme Court has determined that a court may terminate a
parent-child relationship only if that decision is supported by clear and convincing evidence.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982); see also I.C. § 16-2009; Doe v. Dep’t of Health &
Welfare, 146 Idaho 759, 761-62, 203 P.3d 689, 691-92 (2009); Doe, 143 Idaho at 386, 146 P.3d at
652. Idaho Code Section 16-2005 permits a party to petition the court for termination of the
parent-child relationship when it is in the child’s best interests and any one of the following five
factors exist: (a) abandonment; (b) neglect or abuse; (c) lack of a biological relationship between
the child and a presumptive parent; (d) the parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities
for a prolonged period that will be injurious to the health, morals, or well-being of the child; or (e)
the parent is incarcerated and will remain incarcerated for a substantial period of time. Each
statutory ground is an independent basis for termination. Doe, 144 Idaho at 842, 172 P.3d at 1117.
The magistrate court terminated Doe’s parental rights on the basis of neglect. Idaho Code
Section 16-2002(3)(a) defines “neglect” as any conduct included in I.C. § 16-1602(31). Section
16-1602(31)(a) provides, in pertinent part, that a child is neglected when the child is without proper
parental care and control, or subsistence, medical or other care or control necessary for his or her
well-being because of the conduct or omission of his or her parents, guardian, or other custodian or
their neglect or refusal to provide them. Neglect also exists where the parent has failed to comply with
the court’s orders or the case plan in a Child Protective Act case and the Department has had temporary
or legal custody of the child for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months and reunification has not
been accomplished by the last day of the fifteenth month in which the child has been in the temporary
or legal custody of the Department. I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b).
On appeal, Doe argues that there was no evidence presented to prove that he neglected the
child. Doe also contends that he substantially complied with his case plan. During trial, the magistrate
court found that the Department failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that Doe failed to
comply with the court’s orders or the case plan in the Child Protective Act case. Accordingly, the
magistrate court granted Doe’s motion to dismiss this allegation as a basis for terminating his parental
rights. Doe argues that, once the motion to dismiss was granted, there was no evidence to support the
magistrate court’s finding that Doe neglected the child. In support of this argument, Doe asserts that

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he visited the child in Idaho Falls as often as he was able to and that the magistrate court gave undue
weight to his past actions. In addition, Doe contends he was unable to participate in the protective
parenting class because of factors outside of his control. However, the magistrate court concluded that
Doe neglected the child because the Department had proven by clear and convincing evidence that Doe
had not demonstrated the parenting skills required to meet the physical or emotional needs of his
special needs child.
Doe acknowledges his child has special needs but contends he should be allowed to retain
his parental rights without the child living with him full-time. According to Doe, the magistrate
court should not have taken an “all or nothing” approach in terminating his parental rights just
because he was not prepared to care for the child full-time. We disagree. That Doe believes the
Department should have accommodated part-time parenting does not mean the statutory definition
of neglect was not satisfied. Doe has not demonstrated the ability to meet his child’s special needs
and Doe’s history of violence toward his romantic partners and children interferes with his ability
to safely parent a child, particularly one with special needs. The magistrate court also found that,
while Doe made efforts to substantially complete his case plan, he failed to complete the necessary
protective-parenting class mandated to address the Department’s concerns about Doe’s history of
abusive behavior. In addition, the magistrate court found that the Department has had custody of
the child for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months. The magistrate court’s finding that
Doe neglected the child is supported by substantial and competent evidence.
B. Best Interests
Once a statutory ground for termination has been established, the trial court must next
determine whether it is in the best interests of the child to terminate the parent-child relationship.
Tanner v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 120 Idaho 606, 611, 818 P.2d 310, 315 (1991). When
determining whether termination is in the child’s best interests, the trial court may consider the
parent’s history with substance abuse, the stability and permanency of the home, the
unemployment of the parent, the financial contribution of the parent to the child’s care after the
child is placed in protective custody, the improvement of the child while in foster care, the parent’s
efforts to improve his or her situation, and the parent’s continuing problems with the law. Doe
(2015-03) v. Doe, 159 Idaho 192, 198, 358 P.3d 77, 83 (2015); Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare
v. Doe, 156 Idaho 103, 111, 320 P.3d 1262, 1270 (2014). A finding that it is in the best interests

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of the child to terminate parental rights must still be made upon objective grounds. Idaho Dep’t
of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 152 Idaho 953, 956-57, 277 P.3d 400, 403-04 (Ct. App. 2012).
On appeal, Doe argues that there was no evidence presented to prove that maintaining his
parental rights would be contrary to the child’s best interests. Doe asserts that he has attempted to
build a relationship with the child, exhibited appropriate behavior during visits, and demonstrated
a willingness to learn how to meet the child’s special needs. Doe’s argument is unpersuasive.
At the termination trial, the magistrate court found that Doe’s history of violence toward
children and intimate partners posed an ongoing risk of serious physical harm to the child. The
magistrate court stated that, “seldom is it clear to this court that returning a child to a parent is
likely to result in significant physical harm or death but that is the case here.” Based on the
observations of the Department and Doe’s failure to attend a protective-parenting class, the
magistrate court found it is in the best interests of the child to terminate Doe’s parental rights. Doe
has not shown any error in this finding. The magistrate court’s finding that termination of Doe’s
parental rights is in the best interests of the child is supported by substantial and competent
evidence.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Substantial and competent evidence supports the magistrate court’s findings that Doe
neglected the child and that terminating Doe’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests.
Consequently, Doe has failed to show error in the magistrate court’s decision to terminate his
parental rights. Accordingly, the judgment terminating Doe’s parental rights is affirmed.
Judge HUSKEY and Judge TRIBE, CONCUR.

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