Quinlin v. Garrett

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 51408

THOMAS QUINLIN, )
) Filed: December 5, 2024
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
MARIE GARRETT, in her individual ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
capacity; JEREMY GARRETT, in his ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
individual capacity, RUSSELL )
SPRIGGS, in his individual capacity; and )
JEANNE CONSIDINE, in her individual )
capacity, )
)
Defendants-Respondents. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, Bonner
County. Hon. Lamont C. Berecz, District Judge.

Judgment dismissing complaint with prejudice, affirmed.

Thomas Quinlin; Sandpoint, pro se appellant.

Marie Garrett; Bonners Ferry, pro se respondent.

Jeremy Garrett; Bonners Ferry, pro se respondent.

Wilson Law Firm; Eric A. Anderson, Bonners Ferry, for respondents, Russell
Spriggs and Jeanne Considine.
________________________________________________

HUSKEY, Judge
Thomas Quinlin appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing the complaint with
prejudice. Quinlin argues the district court erred in dismissing his complaint with prejudice
because the complaint was meritorious and not a collateral attack on the underlying small claims
issue, but rather a new complaint based on new events. Quinlin argues the district court further
erred in denying his motion for leave to amend his complaint. Marie and Jeremy Garrett (the
Garretts), Russell Spriggs, and Jeanne Considine argue the district court did not err because the
complaint sets out criminal allegations, which Quinlin lacks standing to bring, and civil allegations

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based on what occurred in the small claims action, which renders the complaint a collateral attack
on the small claims action. Furthermore, they argue the allegations relate to statements and
testimony made during the small claims action and, thus, are protected by the litigation privilege
and are therefore immune from suit. We affirm the judgment dismissing the complaint with
prejudice.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The underlying case is a small claims action filed by the Garretts to recover approximately
$1,600 from Quinlin based on a transaction involving a solar generator. After a small claims
proceeding, the magistrate court found in favor of the Garretts.
Quinlin filed a complaint in the district court against the Garretts, Spriggs, and Considine
alleging six claims: (1) perjury, Idaho Code § 18-5401; (2) libel, I.C. §§ 18-4801, -4802;
(3) conspiracy, I.C. § 18-1701; (4) conspiracy, 42 U.S. § 1985(3); (5) common law conspiracy;
and (6) negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Garretts filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failing to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. Spriggs and Considine also filed a motion to dismiss, incorporating by
reference the Garrett’s motion for dismissal, and confining the remainder of their argument to the
dismissal of the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. A hearing was scheduled on the
motions to dismiss. Quinlin’s initial complaint was deficiently pleaded, and he filed an amended
complaint. The district court struck the amended complaint because it was neither timely filed nor
filed with permission from the opposing parties or the court as required by I.R.C.P. 15. Quinlin
then filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint.
Seven days after Quinlin sought permission to amend his complaint, the scheduled hearing
on the motions to dismiss was held. In the district court’s memorandum order and decision, the
court dismissed Quinlin’s complaint and denied his request to amend. The district court explained
that, during the hearing, Quinlin “acknowledged that there were significant defects in his initial
complaint.” Quinlin also stated that rather than oppose the motion to dismiss, he filed a motion to
amend. The district court determined that through Quinlin’s own admissions and motion to amend,
Quinlin agreed to dismiss counts 1, 2, 4, and 6. The court held counts 1-3 were subject to dismissal
because Quinlin lacked standing and authority to bring alleged violations of the criminal code.
The court further held that all counts were barred as a collateral attack on the small claims action

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and by the litigation privilege. Finally, the court found the complaint subject to dismissal because
Quinlin failed to follow the proper procedures to appeal from a decision in a small claims action.
The district court granted the motions to dismiss and dismissed Quinlin’s complaint with prejudice.
The district court also denied Quinlin’s motion to amend. Quinlin appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The Court reviews a district court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to amend for abuse
of discretion.” DAFCO LLC v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 156 Idaho 749, 753, 331 P.3d 491, 495
(2014). When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court, the sequence of
inquiry requires consideration of four essentials. Whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived
the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and
(4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863,
421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018).
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a court to dismiss a claim if the plaintiff
“fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). A district court’s
dismissal of a complaint under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) is reviewed de novo. Fulfer v. Sorrento Lactalis,
Inc., 171 Idaho 296, 300, 520 P.3d 708, 712 (2022).
A 12(b)(6) motion looks only at the pleadings to determine whether a claim
for relief has been stated. On review of a dismissal, this Court determines whether
the non-movant has alleged sufficient facts in support of his claim, which if true,
would entitle him to relief. In doing so, the Court draws all reasonable inferences
in favor of the non-moving party.
Id. (quoting Hammer v. Ribi, 162 Idaho 570, 572, 401 P.3d 148, 150 (2017)) (internal quotations
and citations omitted). Courts are not required, however, to deem legal conclusions as admitted
merely because they were pleaded as factual allegations. CMJ Properties, LLC v. JP Morgan
Chase Bank, N.A., 162 Idaho 861, 863, 406 P.3d 873, 875 (2017).
III.
ANALYSIS
Quinlin asserts the district court erred in denying his motion to amend his complaint and
by dismissing his complaint with prejudice. On appeal, Quinlin asserts four claims: (1) the denial
of his motion for leave to amend his complaint resulted in a violation of his constitutional due
process rights; (2) the district court was punitive in dismissing his complaint with prejudice;
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(3) Quinlin’s rights were violated under the Idaho Constitution by being deprived of property
without due process of law; and (4) the district court erred in awarding attorney fees and costs.
The Garretts, Spriggs, and Considine argue the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Quinlin’s motion for leave to amend because the motion was untimely filed in violation of
I.R.C.P. 15(a) and the amendment would have been futile. The Garretts, Spriggs, and Considine
further argue that Quinlin failed to provide argument for his assertion that he has been deprived of
property without due process. Finally, the Garretts, Spriggs, and Considine argue the district court
correctly awarded costs and attorney fees pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1) and I.C. § 12-121 as they
were the prevailing party and Quinlin failed to provide argument or authority regarding any error
by the district court.
As a procedural note, neither party identified the abuse of discretion standard of appellate
review to review the grant of a motion to dismiss a complaint and failure to allow amendment of
the complaint. Further, Quinlin fails to identify issues that can be resolved by the appellate courts.
For example, Quinlin asks this Court to make factual determinations, which we cannot do. Angelos
v. Schatzel, ___ Idaho ___, 556 P.3d 441, 449 (2024) (holding an appellate court does not act as
fact finder on appeal). Regardless, we address the issues on appeal.
A. Denial of Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint
Quinlin asserts the district court violated his due process rights by denying his motion for
leave to amend his complaint because he had a right to be heard and by denying his motion, he
was deprived of his constitutional right. The Garretts, Spriggs, and Considine contend the district
court correctly denied the motion to amend because the amended complaint was not only filed
outside the twenty-one-day deadline set forth in I.R.C.P. 15, but the amended complaint also failed
to set out a valid claim. They assert the district court did not abuse its discretion.
Although Quinlin frames his issue as one of a denial of due process, whether to grant a
party leave to amend a complaint is a discretionary decision for the court. McCreery v. King, 172
Idaho 598, 604, 535 P.3d 574, 580 (2023). The boundaries of that discretion require that “[t]he
court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” I.R.C.P. 15(a)(2). Further, that discretion
permits the trial court to consider:
whether the amended pleading sets out a valid claim, whether the opposing party
would be prejudiced by any undue delay, or whether the opposing party has an
available defense to the newly added claim. The court may not, however, weigh
the sufficiency of the evidence related to the additional claim.

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Atwood v. Smith, 143 Idaho 110, 115, 138 P.3d 310, 315 (2006) (quoting Spur Products Corp. v.
Stoel Rives LLP, 142 Idaho 41, 44, 122 P.3d 300, 303 (2005)).
The district court held that permitting Quinlin to amend his complaint would be futile. The
proposed amended complaint alleged three causes of action: (1) fraud by intentional
misrepresentation; (2) conspiracy; and (3) tortious interference. The district court found that the
proposed amended complaint had the same defects as the initial complaint in that all three causes
of action would be based solely on statements made during the small claims proceedings and the
litigation privilege would still apply. Thus, even if the amendment were permitted, the claims
would still have been dismissed, resulting in the same outcome. We agree.
“The litigation privilege is deeply rooted in the common law doctrine that attorneys are
immune from civil suits for defamation or libel when they arise out of communications made in
the course of judicial proceedings.” Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 836, 243 P.3d 642, 652
(2010). “In fact, ‘[a]t common law, the litigation privilege blanketed all participants in the court
system; private attorneys were treated no differently than judges, government lawyers, and
witnesses.’” Id. (quoting Loigman v. Twp. Comm. of Twp. of Middletown, 889 A.2d 426, 435
(2006)). “This privilege is predicated on the long-established principle that the efficient pursuit of
justice requires that attorneys and litigants must be permitted to speak and write freely in the course
of litigation without the fear of reprisal through a civil suit for defamation or libel.” Taylor, 149
Idaho at 836, 243 P.3d at 652. Although Quinlin asserts Taylor is distinguishable from his situation
because that case only addresses libel and slander, and not “other causes of action such as perjury,
much less fraud” like his, he misunderstands the application of the principle. Quinlin’s complaint
alleging perjury, fraud, and conspiracy relies on statements made during the small claims action.
In small claims court, attorneys are not permitted and parties act as their own attorneys and
witnesses. See I.R.S.C.A. 8(b). Therefore, as the district court noted, the parties are the “litigants”
as included in the rule, and statements made in the proceedings are protected by the litigation
privilege. The Idaho Supreme Court has consistently applied the litigation privilege broadly to
statements made in the course of judicial proceedings when there is some relation to the cause of
action. Dickinson Frozen Foods, Inc. v. J.R. Simplot Co., 164 Idaho 669, 678-79, 434 P.3d 1275,
1284-85 (2019).
The claims in Quinlin’s amended complaint were subject to the same litigation privilege
and, thus, the amended complaint would have been dismissed for the same reason the initial

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complaint was dismissed. Because the outcome would have been the same, there was no reason
to grant the motion to amend. The district court understood it had discretion to grant the motion
for leave to amend, acted within the bounds of its discretion, acted consistently with the legal
standards applicable to the choices, and reached its decision by the exercise of reason. Therefore,
the district court did not err in denying Quinlin’s motion for leave to amend his complaint.
B. Dismissal of the Complaint With Prejudice
Quinlin asserts the district court acted punitively by dismissing his complaint with
prejudice because it denied Quinlin an opportunity to refile the pleadings correctly and have his
complaint heard on the merits. Quinlin challenges the district court’s characterization of his
complaint as a collateral attack and asserts “he had valid probable cause to bring a legitimate new
complaint.” Quinlin contends that because the parties are not identical to those in the underlying
small claims action and the issues are distinctly different, his complaint is not seeking to challenge
the final decision in the small claims action. The Garretts, Spriggs, and Considine contend the
district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint with prejudice because, as
the district court explained in its memorandum order and decision, the entirety of the complaint is
based upon statements and testimony from the small claims court hearing, which, as previously
explained, is immune from suit under the litigation privilege. Additionally, challenging what
occurred in the small claims hearing seeks to undermine the decision in that case, which is the
definition of a collateral attack.
A collateral attack is defined as “[a]n attack on a judgment in a proceeding other than a
direct appeal; esp., an attempt to undermine a judgment through a judicial proceeding in which the
ground of the proceeding (or a defense in the proceeding) is that the judgment is ineffective.”
Collateral Attack, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). Final judgments, whether right or
wrong, are not subject to collateral attack. Cuevas v. Barraza, 152 Idaho 890, 894, 277 P.3d 337,
341 (2012) “[A] party cannot collaterally attack a judgment in a case belonging to a class of cases
over which a court has jurisdiction merely because a party believes the judgment is wrong.” Baird-
Sallaz v. Sallaz, 157 Idaho 342, 346, 336 P.3d 275, 279 (2014).
The district court found that Quinlin’s complaint amounted to a collateral attack on the
small claims judgment. The district court explained there is a procedure to appeal a small claims
judgment and Quinlin did not follow that procedure. The district court further stated:

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In a nutshell, Plaintiff’s theory is that the Defendants conspired against him
to testify falsely in the small claims case. While Plaintiff complains about the
judge’s decision in that case, Plaintiff, ultimately, disclaims that he is appealing the
small claims court judgment. Rather, he couches this case as a separate suit for
damages he suffered due to the Defendants’ testimony in the small claims case.
This is a distinction without a difference. One can imagine the never-ending
iterations that future litigation would take if Plaintiff’s approach were allowed.
Under Idaho Rule on Small Claims Actions 15(a), “any aggrieved party may appeal to the
district court as provided in these rules and by law.” The court will conduct the appeal as a trial
de novo. I.R.S.C.A. 15(c). This was the proper mechanism for Quinlin to pursue his issues with
the outcome of the small claims proceeding. Quinlin began an appeal, but then withdrew, vacating
the trial de novo. He instead chose to file a new suit in district court, challenging the small claims
decision by accusing the opposing parties and witnesses of conspiring against him and lying on
the stand. The district court correctly identified the claims and arguments as collateral attacks on
the judgment from the small claims action. Thus, the district court did not err in determining that,
even if drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Quinlin, there were not sufficient facts
entitling him to relief.
C. Violation of Rights Under the Idaho Constitution
Quinlin asserts his rights were violated under Article 1, section 13, of the Idaho
Constitution by being deprived of property without due process of law. Quinlin fails to provide
cogent argument or authority in support of this claim. A party waives an issue on appeal if either
argument or authority is lacking. Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 128, 937 P.2d 434, 440 (Ct.
App. 1997). Thus, we decline to address this claim.
D. Attorney Fees
Quinlin asserts that the district court erred by improperly awarding attorney fees because
the award of fees is only permissible when a party is adversely affected by frivolous conduct. He
contends his complaint was not frivolous. Quinlin fails to support his argument with anything
more than conclusory statements that the district court did not apply settled law. A party waives
an issue on appeal if either argument or authority is lacking. Id. Thus, we decline to address this
claim.

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IV.
CONCLUSION
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Quinlin’s motion for leave to
amend his complaint because the amendment would have been futile. The district court did not
err in its determination that there were insufficient facts entitling Quinlin to relief. Therefore, we
affirm the judgment of the district court dismissing the complaint with prejudice.
Judge LORELLO and Judge TRIBE CONCUR.

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