State v. Struckmeyer

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 50819

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: November 20, 2024
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
PAIGE LINDSEY STRUCKMEYER, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Kootenai County. Hon. Richard S. Christensen, District Judge.

Order denying motion to suppress, affirmed; judgment of conviction, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Kiley A. Heffner, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Mark W. Olson, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

HUSKEY, Judge
Paige Lindsey Struckmeyer appeals from her judgment of conviction for felony possession
of a controlled substance. Struckmeyer argues the district court erred in denying her motion to
suppress because an officer exceeded the scope of Struckmeyer’s consent in searching her vehicle
during a warrantless search. The officer’s search was justified under the plain view exception to
the warrant requirement, a ground not challenged by Struckmeyer on appeal. Additionally, the
search did not exceed the scope of Struckmeyer’s consent. The order denying Struckmeyer’s
motion to suppress and her judgment of conviction are affirmed.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Officer Pierson stopped a vehicle for failing to display a front license plate. Officer Pierson
approached the vehicle, talked with the driver (Struckmeyer), informed her of the reason for the

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stop, and asked for her driver’s license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance. Struckmeyer’s
mother was a passenger in the vehicle. While Struckmeyer was looking for her proof of
registration, Officer Pierson was in radio contact with another officer inquiring whether
Struckmeyer was someone the police were investigating for possible drug crimes. Officer Pierson
then returned to her patrol vehicle to run warrant and driver license checks using Struckmeyer’s
driver’s license and expired vehicle registration. While running Struckmeyer’s information,
Officer Pierson simultaneously inquired of another officer whether Struckmeyer was being
investigated for possible drug crimes. Officer Pierson then got out of her patrol car and informed
Struckmeyer that her driver’s license was suspended and that she could not drive. Officer Pierson
told Struckmeyer that she would “cut [Struckmeyer] a cite and then I’ll let you be on your way.”
Officer Pierson then handed the citation book, Struckmeyer’s driver’s license, and her vehicle
registration to Officer Brown, who had just arrived, and told him to write a citation for driving
while suspended.
Officer Pierson then asked Struckmeyer if she had any illegal drugs in her vehicle. Officer
Pierson asked Struckmeyer if she could search the vehicle. Although initially reluctant,
Struckmeyer consented to Officer Pierson searching her vehicle for marijuana. During the search,
Officer Pierson discovered a cut plastic red straw in Struckmeyer’s purse that she recognized as
drug paraphernalia. The plastic straw contained a white residue that Officer Pierson suspected to
be a controlled substance. Officer Pierson also found a prescription drug container bearing neither
Struckmeyer’s nor her mother’s name and marijuana in Struckmeyer’s purse. Struckmeyer then
asked to speak with Officer Pierson. Struckmeyer informed Officer Pierson that there was a broken
methamphetamine pipe in her purse and she did not want Officer Pierson to get cut by it. Officer
Pierson located the pipe. Shortly thereafter, Officer Brown notified Struckmeyer that he had
completed the citation and handed Officer Pierson her citation book.
The State charged Struckmeyer with felony possession of a controlled substance, Idaho
Code § 37-2732(c)(1), and misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia, I.C. § 37-2734A(1).
Struckmeyer filed a motion to suppress, arguing that, among other issues, the search was unlawful
because Officer Pierson exceeded the scope of Struckmeyer’s consent. The district court held a
hearing, where Officer Pierson, Officer Brown, and Struckmeyer testified. Despite Struckmeyer’s
consent for the officer to search the car, Struckmeyer testified that she would not have allowed
Officer Pierson to search her purse. Subsequently, the district court issued its memorandum

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decision and order on Struckmeyer’s motion to suppress. The district court denied Struckmeyer’s
motion to suppress, finding relevant to this appeal, that although Struckmeyer did not provide
broad consent to search her vehicle for any controlled substances, Officer Pierson’s search was
lawfully within the scope of Struckmeyer’s consent to search for marijuana. Once Officer Pierson
had consent to search, he could lawfully search the purse and examine both the red plastic straw
and the pill bottle because either could have contained marijuana. Alternatively, the district court
found that Officer Pierson’s examination and ultimate seizure of the plastic red straw and
prescription pill bottle were justified by the plain view exception to the warrant requirement, based
on Struckmeyer’s consent.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Struckmeyer entered a conditional guilty plea to felony
possession of a controlled substance, reserving her right to appeal from the district court’s denial
of her motion to suppress. The State dismissed the possession of paraphernalia charge and an
unrelated case. Struckmeyer appealed.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion
to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by
substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts
as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a
suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts,
weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina,
127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d
659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).
III.
ANALYSIS
Struckmeyer argues that mindful of the United States Supreme Court and Idaho precedent,
the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress because Officer Pierson exceeded the
scope of Struckmeyer’s consent when she examined the pill bottle and plastic red straw inside her
purse. The State argues that the district court correctly denied Struckmeyer’s motion to suppress
because Officer Pierson’s search of the purse and examination of the plastic red straw and pill
bottle was within the scope of Struckmeyer’s consent that the officer could search for marijuana.

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The State also argues that the district court denied the motion on an alternate basis--that to the
extent the reading of the words on the prescription pill bottle and the examination of the plastic
red straw exceed the scope of consent to search for marijuana, the officer’s actions were justified
by the plain view exception to the search warrant, and because Struckmeyer does not challenge
that basis on appeal, the district court’s decision must be affirmed.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches
and seizures. Warrantless searches are presumed to be unreasonable and therefore, violative of
the Fourth Amendment. State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 290, 900 P.2d 196, 198 (1995). The
State may overcome this presumption by demonstrating that a warrantless search either fell within
a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the
circumstances. Id. One such exception is the plain view doctrine, which permits an officer to
seize evidence viewed from an area where the officer has a right to be if it is immediately apparent
to the officer that the items viewed are contraband or evidence of a crime. State v. Claiborne, 120
Idaho 581, 586, 818 P.2d 285, 290 (1991).
Struckmeyer does not challenge the district court’s finding that Officer Pierson’s
examination and ultimate seizure of the plastic red straw and prescription pill bottle were justified
by the plain view exception. Where a lower court’s alternative ground for its relevant
determination is unchallenged on appeal, the appellate court will not presume error and must
uphold the lower court on the unchallenged ground. State v. Goodwin, 131 Idaho 364, 366-67,
956, P.2d 1311, 1313-14 (Ct. App. 1998). Here, because Struckmeyer does not challenge the
district court’s finding that the search was justified by the plain view doctrine, we affirm the district
court’s denial of Struckmeyer’s motion to suppress.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The district court did not err in denying Struckmeyer’s motion to suppress because the
search was justified under the plain view and consent exceptions to the warrant requirement and
the search did not exceed the scope of Struckmeyer’s consent. The district court’s order denying
Struckmeyer’s motion to suppress and her judgment of conviction are affirmed.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge TRIBE CONCUR.

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