Pearson v. ITD

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 51241

BRAYDON JOSEPH PEARSON, )
) Filed: October 22, 2024
Petitioner-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
DEPARTMENT, ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
)
Respondent-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District, State of Idaho, Nez
Perce County. Hon. Mark T. Monson, District Judge.

Decision of the district court, reversing an administrative order suspending a
driver’s license after failing a blood alcohol test, is reversed.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Mark A. Jackson, Deputy Attorney
General, Coeur d’Alene, for appellant.

Blewett, Mushlitz, & Hally, LLP; Jonathan D. Hally, Lewiston, for respondent.
________________________________________________

MELANSON, Judge Pro Tem
The Idaho Transportation Department (ITD) appeals from a decision of the district court
upon judicial review, reversing the ITD’s order suspending a driver’s license after a failed blood
alcohol concentration (BAC) test. We reverse the decision of the district court.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At approximately 2:30 a.m., a police officer stopped a vehicle driven by Braydon Joseph
Pearson for exceeding the posted speed limit. As the officer approached the vehicle, he observed
what he described as furtive movements by both Pearson and the front-seat passenger. Initially,
the officer approached the vehicle from the passenger’s side and knocked on the rear side window.
The passenger looked back and rolled down his window. The officer identified himself and

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explained that the reason for the stop was exceeding the posted speed limit and asked, “Any reason
for the speed?” to which the passenger responded, “No.” The officer then requested Pearson’s
driver’s license. By that time, the officer noticed an open container of beer near the passenger’s
feet. The officer asked, “Who’s bottle of alcohol is that?” The passenger said it was his and the
officer then requested the passenger’s identification just as Pearson was handing over his driver’s
license. The passenger was talkative, and the officer believed that the passenger was trying to
divert the officer’s attention from Pearson. The officer told the passenger that he was not going to
be cited for an open container violation.1
At the officer’s direction, the passenger then exited the vehicle and poured out the beer.
The officer observed that the passenger smelled of alcohol and that the passenger (and a passenger
in the back seat who remained in the vehicle and did not interact with the officer) appeared to be
intoxicated. The officer also observed that Pearson was not talkative and appeared to be nervous.
While the officer and the front-seat passenger were still talking, Pearson handed his proof of
insurance and registration to the officer. Approximately four minutes from the beginning of the
stop, the officer returned to his patrol vehicle to check the information on Pearson and the
passenger and noted that Pearson’s insurance was expired. The officer radioed the information to
dispatch and began walking back to Pearson’s vehicle when a back-up officer arrived.
The officer told the back-up officer that he intended to conduct a driving under the
influence (DUI) investigation. More specifically, the officer stated: “I need to pull [Pearson] out.
His buddy in the passenger seat . . . had an open container . . . so I had him dump that out, and I
just want to make sure that this guy is not 8004.”2 The officer then left Pearson’s license,
registration and proof of insurance and the passenger’s identification in the patrol vehicle.
Approximately six minutes from the beginning of the stop, the officer went to Pearson’s side of
his vehicle. He asked Pearson to exit his vehicle telling him, “I just want to make sure you’re not

1
With some exceptions, I.C. § 23-505 prohibits possession of an open container of an
alcoholic beverage by a person in a motor vehicle on a public highway or right-of-way. Violation
of the statute is a misdemeanor for the driver of the vehicle and an infraction for passengers.
2
An apparent reference to I.C. § 18-8004, which prohibits driving while under the influence
of alcohol.

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under any influence.” After Pearson exited his vehicle, the officer noted numerous signs that
Pearson was under the influence, including glassy, red, and watery eyes; an odor of alcohol; slurred
speech; and swaying while standing. Pearson failed the field sobriety tests and submitted to a BAC
test, which indicated that his blood alcohol level was over the legal limit. The officer charged
Pearson with speeding, failure to provide proof of liability insurance, and DUI.
Because Pearson failed the BAC test, his driver’s license was administratively suspended
by the ITD pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002A. Pearson requested a hearing before an ITD hearing officer
and his driver’s license suspension was sustained. Pearson appealed to the district court by way
of a petition for judicial review. The district court reversed the decision of the hearing officer and
held that Pearson’s license suspension should be reinstated. The ITD appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAPA) governs the review of ITD decisions
to deny, cancel, suspend, disqualify, revoke, or restrict a person’s driver’s license. See I.C.
§§ 49-201, 49-330, 67-5201(2), 67-5270. In an appeal from the decision of the district court acting
in its appellate capacity under the IDAPA, this Court reviews the agency record independently of
the district court’s decision. Marshall v. Idaho Dep’t of Transp., 137 Idaho 337, 340, 48 P.3d 666,
669 (Ct. App. 2002). This Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the
weight of the evidence presented. I.C. § 67-5279(1); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669.
This Court instead defers to the agency’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.
Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 923, 926, 950 P.2d 1262, 1265 (1998); Marshall, 137
Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. In other words, the agency’s factual determinations are binding on
the reviewing court, even where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the
determinations are supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record. Urrutia v.
Blaine Cnty., ex rel. Bd. of Comm’rs, 134 Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000); Marshall, 137
Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669.
A court may overturn an agency’s decision where its findings, inferences, conclusions, or
decisions violate statutory or constitutional provisions; exceed the agency’s statutory authority;
are made upon unlawful procedure; are not supported by substantial evidence in the record; or are
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. I.C. § 67-5279(3). The party challenging the

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agency decision must demonstrate that the agency erred in a manner specified in I.C. § 67-5279(3)
and that a substantial right of that party has been prejudiced. Price v. Payette Cnty. Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs, 131 Idaho 426, 429, 958 P.2d 583, 586 (1998); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at
669. If the agency’s decision is not affirmed on appeal, it shall be set aside and remanded for
further proceedings as necessary. I.C. § 67-5279(3).
III.
ANALYSIS
The administrative license suspension (ALS) statute, I.C. § 18-8002A, requires that the
ITD suspend the driver’s license of a driver who has failed a BAC test administered by a law
enforcement officer. The period of suspension is ninety days for a driver’s first failure of an
evidentiary test and one year for any subsequent test failure within five years. I.C.
§ 18-8002A(4)(a). A person who has been notified of such an administrative license suspension
may request a hearing before a hearing officer designated by the ITD to contest the suspension.
I.C. § 18-8002A(7). At the administrative hearing, the burden of proof rests upon the driver to
prove any of the grounds to vacate the suspension. I.C. § 18-8002A(7); Kane v. State, Dep’t of
Transp., 139 Idaho 586, 590, 83 P.3d 130, 134 (Ct. App. 2003). The hearing officer must uphold
the suspension unless he or she finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the driver has shown
one of several grounds enumerated in I.C. § 18-8002A(7) for vacating the suspension. Those
grounds include:
(a) The peace officer did not have legal cause to stop the person; or
(b) The officer did not have legal cause to believe the person had been
driving or was in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of the provisions of
section 18-8004, 18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code; or
(c) The test results did not show an alcohol concentration or the
presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of section 18-8004,
18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code; or
(d) The tests for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating
substances administered at the direction of the peace officer were not conducted in
accordance with the requirements of section 18-8004(4), Idaho Code, or the testing
equipment was not functioning properly when the test was administered; or
(e) The person was not informed of the consequences of submitting to
evidentiary testing as required in subsection (2) of this section.

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I.C. § 18-8002A(7). The hearing officer’s decision is subject to challenge through a petition for
judicial review. I.C. § 18-8002A(8); Kane, 139 Idaho at 589, 83 P.3d at 133.
In setting aside Pearson’s driver’s license suspension, the district court, citing State v.
Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 389 P.3d 150 (2016) and State v. Karst, 170 Idaho 219, 508 P.3d 1148
(2022), ruled that the traffic stop of Pearson for speeding was impermissibly extended when the
officer approached Pearson and had him exit his vehicle intending to investigate him for DUI. The
district court concluded that “the hearing officer’s ultimate determination that [the police officer]
possessed legal cause [before Pearson exited his vehicle] to detain [him] for evidentiary testing is
in conflict with the 4th Amendment’s prohibitions on unreasonable search and seizure and must
be reversed.” On appeal, the ITD argues that the district court erred in concluding that the officer
impermissibly extended the traffic stop.
A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle’s occupants and implicates
the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct.
App. 1996). Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible
criminal behavior if there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven
contrary to traffic laws. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); State v. Flowers, 131
Idaho 205, 208, 953 P.2d 645, 648 (Ct. App. 1998). The reasonableness of the suspicion must be
evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances at the time of the stop. State v. Ferreira, 133
Idaho 474, 483, 988 P.2d 700, 709 (Ct. App. 1999). The reasonable suspicion standard requires
less than probable cause but more than mere speculation or instinct on the part of the officer. Id.
An officer may draw reasonable inferences from the facts in his or her possession, and those
inferences may be drawn from the officer’s experience and law enforcement training. State v.
Montague, 114 Idaho 319, 321, 756 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Ct. App. 1988).
However, a traffic stop only remains a reasonable seizure while the officer diligently
pursues the purpose of the stop. A traffic stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for
which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.
Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 350 (2015).
As explained by the Idaho Supreme Court in Linze:

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The United States Supreme Court has plainly established that a traffic stop is a
seizure, but it is not an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment so long
as there is reasonable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic
laws. The stop remains a reasonable seizure while the officer diligently pursues the
purpose of the stop, to which that reasonable suspicion is related. However, should
the officer abandon the purpose of the stop, the officer no longer has that original
reasonable suspicion supporting his actions. Indeed, when an officer abandons his
or her original purpose, the officer has for all intents and purposes initiated a new
seizure with a new purpose; one which requires its own reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment. This new seizure cannot piggy-back on the reasonableness of
the original seizure. In other words, unless some new reasonable suspicion or
probable cause arises to justify the seizure’s new purpose, the seized party’s Fourth
Amendment rights are violated when the original purpose of the stop is abandoned
(unless that abandonment falls within some established exception).
Linze, l6l Idaho at 609, 389 P.3d at 154 (citation omitted). The Court in Linze also held:
[T]he United States Supreme Court reached a much broader holding: a police stop
exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made
violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures. This rule is both
broad and inflexible. It applies to all extensions of traffic stops including those that
could reasonably be considered de minimis.
Id. at 608, 389 P.3d at 153 (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 350. However, abandonment of the
purpose of the stop by an officer is not what violates the Fourth Amendment. Rather it is the
passage of time, even a de minimis time, beyond that required for the purpose of the traffic stop
which violates the Constitution. As the Idaho Supreme Court has explained:
[t]he officer does not have to “abandon” the mission of the traffic stop for a Fourth
Amendment violation to occur. Merely “detouring” (the word used in Rodriguez)
or “deviating” (the word used in Linze) from that mission, even if the delay is de
minimis, runs afoul of the protections of the Fourth Amendment.
Karst, 170 Idaho at 227, 509 P.3d at 1156 (holding delay of nineteen seconds constitutionally
impermissible), overruling State v. Still 166 Idaho 351, 458 P.3d 220 (Ct. App. 2019).
In Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court held that the mission of a traffic stop has
two pillars--to “address the traffic violation that warranted the stop” and to “attend to related safety
concerns.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354. The Idaho Supreme Court has explained the scope of the
mission of a traffic stop “includes, but is not limited to, addressing the traffic violation that
precipitated the stop and determining whether to issue a traffic ticket.” State v. Hale, 168 Idaho
863, 869, 489 P.3d 450, 456 (2021) (holding that questioning defendant regarding his permission
to drive vehicle did not unlawfully prolong a stop for failure to display license plates) (citing

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Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354-55). During the traffic stop an officer is permitted to make “ordinary
inquiries incident to the traffic stop” such as checking the driver’s license, registration, and
insurance and checking for outstanding warrants. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355. For officer’s safety,
“certain negligibly burdensome precautions” may be taken by the officer such as asking the vehicle
occupants to exit and by conducting a criminal background check. Id. at 356.
However, authority for the stop ends when “tasks tied to the traffic [stop] are--or reasonably
should have been--completed.” Id. at 354. However, a “seizure remains lawful only ‘so long as
[unrelated] inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.’” Id. at 355 (quoting
Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009). In other words, an officer is not prohibited from
making certain unrelated inquiries or performing certain unrelated checks, but the officer may “not
do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to
justify detaining an individual.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355.
Accordingly, “[o]n-scene investigation into other crimes” and “safety precautions taken in
order to facilitate such detours,” when extending the duration of the stop, must be supported by
their own reasonable suspicion. Id. at 356-57 (holding investigation into other crimes is outside
the scope of the stop’s mission and cannot be justified on that basis); see also Linze, 161 Idaho at
608-09, 389 P.3d at 153-54 (holding that an officer violated a defendant’s Fourth Amendment
rights by detouring from the stop’s mission to provide back-up for a drug-detecting dog sweep
without reasonable suspicion of drug activity). Conversely, the duration of a stop is permissibly
extended when the officer develops reasonable suspicion for a crime distinct from the one
precipitating the stop. See State v. Pylican, 167 Idaho 745, 477 P.3d 180 (2020) (holding that an
officer had reasonable suspicion to investigate a defendant’s presence at a closed storage facility
after initially stopping the defendant for failing to use a turn signal).
There is no question that the stop of Pearson’s vehicle for speeding was prolonged by the
officer’s interaction with the passenger. That, however, did not unlawfully prolong the stop. As
soon as the officer saw the open container of beer at the passenger’s feet the officer was
constitutionally permitted to investigate further and have the passenger exit the vehicle and dispose
of the beer. “[A] traffic stop may be permissibly extended if, during the course of effectuating the
stop’s mission, officers develop reasonable suspicion of some unrelated criminal offense.” Hale,
168 Idaho at 868, 489 P.3d at 455. The question posed by this case is whether the officer’s decision

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to further prolong the stop to investigate Pearson for DUI detoured or deviated from the mission
of the stop thus rendering further delay unconstitutional absent reasonable suspicion that Pearson
was driving under the influence. The ITD argues that the officer was permitted to approach
Pearson and have him exit the vehicle as part of the mission of the traffic stop, notwithstanding
the officer’s stated intention to investigate Pearson for DUI. In the alternative, the ITD argues that
the officer had independent reasonable suspicion to detain and investigate Pearson for DUI.
Pearson argues that the officer did not have legal cause to change the scope of the detention from
speeding to DUI.
Citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), the ITD argues that the officer was
permitted to require Pearson to exit his vehicle as part of the traffic stop without reasonable
suspicion of additional illegal activity. Pearson argues that Mimms only dealt with the narrow
question of whether a driver, once detained, could be required for officer safety to wait outside his
or her vehicle while the officer completed the mission of the stop. We need not decide whether
the holding in Mimms is limited to officer safety concerns or whether an officer’s subjective intent
in having a driver exit his or her vehicle is relevant. When the officer approached Pearson and
asked him to exit his vehicle, the officer had a reasonable suspicion that Pearson was driving under
the influence. Therefore, the officer was constitutionally permitted to investigate that crime.
When the officer approached Pearson and told him to exit his vehicle so that the officer
could investigate whether Pearson had been driving under the influence, the salient facts known to
the officer were: (1) Pearson had been speeding but his driving pattern was otherwise
unremarkable; (2) there were furtive movements (not otherwise described) by Pearson and the
passenger as the officer approached Pearson’s vehicle; (3) there was a full, open bottle of beer at
the passenger’s feet (claimed by the passenger to be his); (4) the passenger was talkative, and the
officer believed the passenger was trying to divert the officer’s attention from Pearson; (5) both
passengers appeared to be under the influence; and (6) Pearson was not talkative and appeared to
be nervous.
The Idaho Supreme Court has explained that an officer’s reasonable suspicion to conduct
an investigatory detention depends on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the
time of the stop. State v Maahs, 171 Idaho 738, 745, 525 P.3d 1131, 1138 (2023) (citations
omitted). More than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch is required. Id. Rather,

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specific, articulable facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts are required. Id. It
may well be that none of the facts observed by the officer prior to approaching Pearson would have
been sufficient alone to lead to a reasonable suspicion that Pearson was driving under the influence,
but all of the facts known to the officer, taken together, lead to that conclusion. Because the officer
developed a reasonable suspicion of another offense after the stop, he was constitutionally
permitted to prolong the stop in order to investigate that offense. A traffic stop may be permissibly
extended if, during the course of effectuating the stop’s mission, officers develop reasonable
suspicion of some unrelated criminal offense. Hale, 168 Idaho at 868, 489 P.3d at 455.
The officer lawfully stopped Pearson for speeding. The officer’s interactions with the
passenger after the stop did not unlawfully extend the stop because the officer observed a separate
offense (open container of alcohol in a motor vehicle) and was lawfully permitted to investigate
that offense. By the time the officer approached Pearson and had him exit his vehicle, the officer
had reasonable suspicion to investigate whether Pearson had been driving under the influence
separate from the initial purpose of the stop. Accordingly, the district court erred on judicial review
in reversing Pearson’s driver’s license suspension.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Pearson failed to show that the ITD erred in a manner specified in I.C. § 67-5279(3).
Therefore, the decision of the district court on judicial review is reversed. As the prevailing party,
costs are awarded to the ITD on appeal.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge LORELLO, CONCUR.

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