In the Interest of R.S. and R.W., Minor Children

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-1985
Filed March 29, 2023

IN THE INTEREST OF R.S. and R.W.,
Minor Children,

E.S., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Joan M. Black,

District Associate Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.

Shawn C. McCullough of Powell and McCullough, PLC, Coralville, for

appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

David R. Fiester, Cedar Rapids, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor

children.

Considered by Bower, C.J., and Badding and Buller, JJ.
2

BADDING, Judge.

A mother who was just nine days sober from methamphetamine at the time

of the termination hearing appeals the termination of her parental rights to her two

children—born in 2016 and 2019—under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f)

and (h) (2022).1 She argues (1) the juvenile court erred in denying her request for

more time to work toward reunification and (2) termination is contrary to the

children’s best interests given the closeness of the parent-child bonds. We review

her claims de novo. See In re Z.K., 973 N.W.2d 27, 32 (Iowa 2022).

In July 2021, the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services received

a report that the mother was using and selling methamphetamine in the home she

shared with her two sons. The mother tested positive for methamphetamine and

amphetamines, but she denied using drugs. Family preservation services were

initiated, but the mother did not participate. As a result, the State obtained an order

for temporary removal. The children were placed with their maternal grandmother,

where they have remained. In October, the children were adjudicated as in need

of assistance under Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(c)(2) (2021).

Fast-forward to the termination hearing more than one year later, in

November 2022. Of the fifty-two times the department asked the mother to submit

to drug testing, the mother did not comply with any of them. She explained in her

testimony that she did not comply because the tests would be positive—“I guess

in my head it was, you know, better no test than a positive one.” She admitted to

1 The parental rights of both children’s fathers were also terminated. Only R.S.’s
father appealed. The supreme court dismissed his appeal for failure to comply
with appellate rules.
3

using methamphetamine throughout the proceedings, which was confirmed by her

indicators of use—“sores on her face, scratching at her skin, paranoia, irritability,

and confusion.”

The mother did undergo a substance-abuse evaluation in March 2022, at

which she tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamines. She did not

follow through with recommended intensive outpatient treatment. In candid

testimony, the mother admitted that she is “an addict,” noting her drug of choice is

methamphetamine, which she began using six years earlier. The mother identified

the past year as the worst she had ever experienced with her methamphetamine-

use. She testified that she last used methamphetamine just nine days before the

termination hearing, though she continued to use marijuana “[h]ere and there” to

help with her mental health.

Despite acknowledging that her mental health was a “key component” of

why she was a drug user, the mother dragged her feet on completing a

recommended mental-health evaluation. She finally completed the evaluation in

July 2022, which recommended extended inpatient treatment. The mother

avoided that recommendation, testifying that she wanted to “heal on [her] terms,”

though she did start attending therapy “off and on” in August. But in her termination

report, the social worker observed the mother has “taken a back slide during the

past couple months,” with her “mental health . . . worse than it has ever been.”

When questioned at the termination hearing whether she was “asking the

[c]ourt to return the kids to [her] today,” the mother responded: “I don’t in any way

think that I can take them back today. I think that I have a lot of healing to do

myself.” So she requested another six months to work toward reunification, during
4

which she said that she would continue therapy, begin substance-abuse treatment,

“stay clean,” and “try to mend relationships with [her] family.” Yet the mother

acknowledged that she had no relapse-prevention plan, and she could still get

methamphetamine from her local contacts.

With this backdrop in mind, we turn to the mother’s claims involving the

second and third steps in our termination framework. See Iowa Code

§ 232.116(2), (3) (2022); In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022). On the

best-interests question, we “give primary consideration to the child[ren]’s safety, to

the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the

child[ren], and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the

child[ren].” Iowa Code § 232.116(2).

The mother simply argues termination is not in the children’s best interests

because, before removal, she “provided significant care to the children.” But the

testimony of the mother’s great aunt discloses that care was questionable at best,

identifying domestic violence and the mother’s unstable mental health as

concerns. Since removal, the mother has done nothing to ensure the children’s

safety, foster their nurturing and growth, or tend to their needs. Instead, those

duties have been shouldered by the maternal grandmother. In any event, “to some

extent, the [best-interests] determination must be made upon past conduct,” and

“[w]hile we hope the mother prevails in her battle with substance abuse, we cannot

deprive [children] of permanency after the State has proved a ground for

termination upon such sentiments.” In re C.O., No. 21-1316, 2022 WL 470852,

at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2022) (first alteration in original) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). Given the mother’s unwillingness to meaningfully
5

address her substance-abuse and mental-health issues until the eve of

termination, we agree with the juvenile court that termination is in the children’s

best interests. See In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 2000).

In bare-bones fashion, the mother also argues “[i]t would be detrimental to

the child[ren] to terminate the relationship,” which implicates one of the permissive

exceptions in the third step of the termination framework. Specifically, Iowa Code

section 232.116(3)(c) allows the juvenile court to forgo termination when “[t]here is

clear and convincing evidence that the termination would be detrimental to the

child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship.” On this

question, we ask “whether the child[ren] will be disadvantaged by termination, and

whether the disadvantage overcomes [the mother’s] inability to provide for [the

children’s] developing needs.” In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 709 (Iowa 2010). On

our de novo review, we find that any minimal disadvantage to the children from

termination does not overcome the mother’s parenting deficiencies. As a result,

the exception does not apply.

Lastly, the mother asks for more time to work toward reunification.

Additional time is appropriate only if we can conclude “the need for removal . . . will

no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.” Iowa

Code § 232.104(2)(b). First, the mother claims that “[t]hroughout the case, [she]

demonstrated that she was working toward maintain[ing] sobriety, finding and

maintain[ing] employment, [and] following the recommendations of the

[d]epartment.” Trouble is, the record shows the mother did not do any of these

things. The mother goes on to argue that, despite the concerns for her sobriety

and possibility of relapse, she “provided a detailed plan that indicated her
6

intentions and appointments that she had made to address these concerns.” But

the things the mother said she would do are all things she failed to do up to this

point. The juvenile court did not buy it, and neither do we. The mother was already

granted a seven-month deferral of permanency as to the younger child, which she

squandered. Long story short, “[g]iven the mother’s long history of substance

abuse and unquestionably continuous use throughout these proceedings, she

would need to demonstrate maintenance of sobriety for a long period of time before

the child[ren] could be placed in her care, certainly longer than six months.” In re

S.J., No. 21-0238, 2021 WL 1904646, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 12, 2021). We

agree with the juvenile court that an extension is not warranted in this case.

We affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

AFFIRMED.