State of Iowa v. Julien Martell Skipper

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-0944
Filed March 29, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

JULIEN MARTELL SKIPPER,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Jeffrey D. Bert, Judge.

A defendant seeks resentencing, alleging a breach of the plea agreement

and an abuse of discretion in running the new sentences consecutive to his parole

revocation. AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie L. Knipfer, Assistant

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Anagha Dixit, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ.
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TABOR, Presiding Judge.

In a bargain with the State, Julien Skipper pleaded guilty to domestic abuse

assault resulting in bodily injury and a sex offender registry violation. For its part,

the State agreed that it would not resist his request for concurrent sentences.

When sentencing rolled around, the State did not oppose concurrent terms for

those two pleas but urged the district court to run those terms consecutive to

Skipper’s probation revocation. Skipper now contends the State breached the plea

agreement. He also maintains that the court abused its discretion in adopting the

State’s recommendation.

Because the plea agreement did not encompass the probation revocation,

the State’s recommendation involving that separate sentence was not a breach.

And seeing no abuse of discretion at the sentencing hearing, we affirm.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

This sentencing appeal involves three criminal cases. But the plea bargain

embraced only two of them. The first negotiated case (FECR419243) stemmed

from Skipper’s domestic violence against his girlfriend. The State charged him

with domestic abuse assault by strangulation, a class “D” felony, in violation of

Iowa Code section 708.2A(5) (2021). The State reduced that charge to domestic

abuse assault causing bodily injury, in violation of section 708.2A(2)(b), a serious

misdemeanor, in return for Skipper’s guilty plea.

The second negotiated case (FECR419630) dealt with his sex offender

registry violations. The State charged Skipper with two counts of failing to notify

the sheriff of changes to relevant information about his principal place of residence,

each as a second or subsequent offense, class “D” felonies, in violation of Iowa
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Code sections 692A.101(23)(a)(21) and 692A.111(1). The State also announced

its intent to seek sentencing enhancements based on Skipper’s status as a

habitual offender. Under the agreement, Skipper pleaded guilty to one violation,

and the State dismissed the other count.

The memorandum of plea agreement also included this provision:

What wasn’t in the plea agreement was any mention of the parole

revocation. When he committed the current offenses, Skipper was subject to a

special sentence of lifetime parole for 2007 convictions for lascivious acts with a

child (FECR300399). See Iowa Code § 903B.1. The court revoked his parole and

imposed five years incarceration. So he was back in prison at the time of this

sentencing.

Before sentencing, Skipper sent the district court a letter asking the judge

to “run [his] class D felony with [his] lifetime special sentence.” He expressed

remorse “for being incarcerated” and asserted that he had been “report free” and

hadn’t had “a conviction in eight years.” He also noted his completion of domestic

violence education, a cognitive awareness program, and a parenting course. The

court treated that communication as part of Skipper’s sentencing allocution.

At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended that the court impose

concurrent sentences for the domestic abuse assault and the sex offender registry

violation, as stated in the plea agreement. But it recommended those terms run

consecutive to the parole-revocation sentence that Skipper was serving. In
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support of its latter recommendation, the State pointed to Skipper’s criminal

history, “which is not short and also includes some very serious offenses.” The

State also noted that Skipper “has violated his probation and has at least one

conviction for being a fugitive from justice.” The State clarified that the current

conviction was Skipper’s third sex offender registration violation and he was on

“special parole when these offenses occurred.” The prosecutor concluded: “He’s

already incarcerated as it stands from his parole revocation, and I think running

this concurrent to his parole revocation would simply not serve the protection of

the community and the rehabilitation needs of Mr. Skipper.” The presentence

investigation report also recommended incarceration run consecutive to the parole

revocation.

Defense counsel reiterated Skipper’s written request that the new

sentences be imposed concurrent to the parole revocation. Skipper—who agreed

to appear by video conferencing—then told the court: “I’ve been trying to build

myself up, Your Honor, since 2014. I was able to get my own place, and I was

able to have a job.” Skipper said he was “not denying” that he had been in a “toxic

relationship” and he was “very remorseful” for being back in court. Skipper also

reminded the court that he was “on a lifetime parole.”

The court followed the parties’ recommendation that the sentences for the

two new offenses be served concurrently but was “persuaded by the State’s

argument” to run them consecutive to the parole revocation. As the court

announced its sentence, Skipper interjected: “I’ve got rights. I’m on parole.” When

warned not to interrupt, Skipper persisted: “This ain’t right. This ain’t fair. Listen,

sir, I did—I took this deal because, sir, I can’t have this running consecutive.
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Whatever, man, this is crazy.” Before the court had him muted, Skipper added: “I

did not take this deal. No.”

Skipper appeals.1

II. Scope and Standard of Review

We review sentences for correction of legal error. Patten, 981 N.W.2d

at 130. We will reverse if the record reveals an abuse of discretion or a defect in

the sentencing procedure. Id. The State’s breach of a plea agreement counts as

a defect. Id. On the choice of sentence, we will reverse only if the district court

exercised its discretion on grounds or for reasons that were clearly untenable or

unreasonable. State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 106 (Iowa 2020).

III. Analysis

A. Breach of Plea Bargain

A plea bargain is like a contract. State v. Beres, 943 N.W.2d 575, 582 (Iowa

2020). Both sides receive a benefit. Id. But because the accused waives

fundamental rights by pleading guilty, the prosecution must “scrupulously honor

the letter and spirit of plea agreements to maintain the integrity of the plea-

bargaining process.” State v. Lopez, 872 N.W.2d 159, 161 (Iowa 2015). Even

technical compliance with the terms is not enough if the prosecutor otherwise

“undercuts” the bargain. Beres, 943 N.W.2d at 582.

Skipper contends that the prosecutor’s advocacy for the new concurrent

sentences to run consecutive to the parole revocation undercut their agreement.

1Because Skipper challenges his sentence rather than the guilty pleas, he has
good cause to appeal under Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a)(3). State v. Patten,
981 N.W.2d 126, 129–30 (Iowa 2022).
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Although the memorandum expressly limited the agreement to the “filed and

pending charges” in FECR419243 and FECR419630, Skipper contends the

reference to “concurrent sentences” did “not exclude the revocation.” He also

asserts that he was “completely taken aback when the court imposed consecutive

sentences.” He relies on that reaction as proof that the prosecutor acted contrary

to his “justified expectations.” See Patten, 981 N.W.2d at 131.

At first blush, Skipper’s contention has some appeal. Indeed, the

prosecution gave a more full-throated endorsement of its desire for the new

sentences to run consecutive to the parole revocation than it did for the agreement

to concurrent sentences in the plea agreement.

Trouble is, nothing in the plea agreement prevented the prosecution from

pushing that position. The State only agreed not to “resist” concurrent sentences.

And the parole revocation was outside the scope of the negotiations. When read

in the context of the entire agreement, the phrase “concurrent sentences” included

only the domestic abuse assault and the sex offender registry violation. We

interpret a contract as a whole. See Iowa Fuel & Minerals, Inc. v. Iowa State Bd.

of Regents, 471 N.W.2d 859, 863 (Iowa 1991). That same principle holds for a

plea agreement. The agreement only prevented the prosecution from resisting

concurrent terms for the two new offenses. The prosecution honored that

agreement.

On the issue of justified expectations, the record does not support the notion

that Skipper reasonably believed that the prosecutor was bound to recommend the

new sentences run concurrent to the parole revocation. In his letter to the court,

Skipper asked the judge to “give [him] a chance” to serve the class “D” felony
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sentence concurrent to the lifetime special sentence. And at sentencing, his

counsel echoed that request. Neither Skipper nor his attorney claimed that the

more lenient approach was part of the plea agreement.

But did the prosecution’s act of “piling on of bad things Skipper had done”

undermine its promise not to resist concurrent sentences for the two new offenses,

as Skipper contends? Did it deprive Skipper of the benefit of his bargain? The

answer is no. The court imposed concurrent terms for the two offenses addressed

in the plea agreement. The State was free to make any other recommendation.

Skipper received the benefit of his bargain. We decline to order resentencing on

this ground.

B. Sentencing Discretion

After announcing the new concurrent sentences would be consecutive to

the parole revocation, the court stated: “The reasons for the sentence are because

of Mr. Skipper’s criminal history, particularly his record on supervision, which is not

good. . . . The reason the sentence is consecutive to [FECR]300399 is because

they are separate offenses and because this crime was committed while he was

on parole.”

Skipper contends the court ignored the mitigating factors mentioned in his

letter. In his view, the court overlooked the fact that he completed studies in

domestic violence, cognitive awareness, and parenting. And that he delivered a

“sincere and extensive apology.”2

2 The district court did not comment on the sincerity of Skipper’s allocution. But
Skipper’s word choice left some doubt. He told the court he was “very remorseful
for being incarcerated.” And he expressed no concern for his victim; rather, he
admitted being “in a toxic relationship.”
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True, sentencing courts must consider mitigating circumstances. See State

v. Witham, 583 N.W.2d 677, 679 (Iowa 1998). But they are not “required to

specifically acknowledge each such claim of mitigation urged by a defendant.”

State v. Boltz, 542 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). The court told Skipper that

he considered Skipper’s allocution. It’s just that the court was more persuaded by

the State’s argument on Skipper’s criminal record and probation violations. The

court did not abuse its discretion.

AFFIRMED.