In the Interest of H.L., A.L., Z.L., and B.L., Minor Children

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-1869
Filed March 8, 2023

IN THE INTEREST OF H.L., A.L., Z.L., and B.L.,
Minor Children,

Sh.L., Father,
Appellant,

Sc.L., Father,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County, Adam D.

Sauer, District Associate Judge.

Two fathers appeal from the termination of their parental rights. AFFIRMED

ON BOTH APPEALS.

Becky Wilson of Becky E. Wilson, Attorney, PLLC, Iowa Falls, for appellant

father Sh.L.

Cameron M. Sprecher of Sprecher Law Office, Mason City, for appellant

father Sc.L.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Michelle R. Becker, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Carrie J. Rodriguez, Garner, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor

children.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Greer and Chicchelly, JJ.
2

GREER, Judge.

In a series of October 2022 orders, the juvenile court terminated the

parental rights of Sc.L. and Sh.L.1 Sc.L. is the biological father of three of the four

children in this case and the legal father to the fourth, who is Sh.L.’s biological

child. Both fathers separately challenge the grounds for termination, the court’s

denial of their respective requests for a six-month extension, and the court’s

decision to not apply the permissive factor allowing it to forgo termination based

on finding the strength of each father’s bond with his child or children made

termination detrimental to them. Sc.L. also argues termination is not in the

children’s best interests. Because we find the State proved the grounds for

termination as to both fathers, the barriers to reunification for both fathers would

not be remedied in six months, termination of Sc.L.’s parental rights is in the

children’s best interests, and the bond between the fathers and their children would

not make termination of their parental rights detrimental to the children, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.

On December 9, 2020, the mother, who is not party to this appeal,

prematurely gave birth to twins following an alleged act of domestic violence2 by

her husband, Sc.L., while the three older children were present. Sc.L. was

arrested, and all five of the mother’s children were placed in temporary custody of

1 At the time of the termination order, the four children at issue were ages six,
three, three, and one year old. A fifth child died during the pendency of the child-
in-need-of-assistance proceedings.
2 According to the child abuse assessment, Sc.L. allegedly sexually assaulted the

mother two days before the physical assault. The mother had injuries to her lip,
neck, arms, legs, and back. The mother reported that, during the physical assault,
her water broke and Sc.L. refused to allow her to seek help. She eventually
managed to leave the home and call for assistance from a neighbor’s house.
3

the mother under the supervision of the Iowa Department of Health and Human

Services; the children were adjudicated children in need of assistance (CINA) in

January 2021. Tragically, on February 28, one of the twins was found deceased3

and the four other children were removed from the mother’s care; they have

remained in foster care for the duration of this case.

In April, one of the children’s CINA petition was amended to add a putative

father, Sh.L., and subsequent paternity testing confirmed he was that child’s

biological father, though Sc.L. was the legal father. The mother was the protected

party of a no contact order (NCO) with Sh.L. that extended to the child, so Sh.L.

moved to be allowed visits; the district court granted the motion in July to allow for

supervised visits.

The removal order dictated there should be no contact between the mother

and Sc.L., but they regularly violated the order4 and at various times throughout

this child-welfare case the parents moved for it to be removed. In February 2022,

the court removed the contact restriction from the permanency order and Sc.L. and

the mother were doing semi-supervised visits together, and Sc.L. was participating

in anger-management classes as a part of his probation agreement. But in April,

he was arrested and charged with domestic abuse assault against the mother.5

3 While this two-month-old child was dead on arrival at the hospital, at the same
time, the other twin was diagnosed with severe malnutrition and failure to thrive.
From what we can gather based on the testimony at the termination trial,
apparently none of the professionals involved with the family picked up on these
severe health concerns.
4 Multiple times, after violations of the order, care providers noted bruises on the

mother.
5 At the termination hearing, Sc.L. testified there were four or five domestic abuse

incidents in total—including two from 2016 and two during the pendency of this
case—and that he and the mother were dissolving their marriage.
4

A termination hearing took place on September 20 and 27 and October 5,

2022. The juvenile court terminated Sc.L.’s rights to the oldest child under Iowa

Code section 232.116(1)(e) and (f) (2022) and to the younger three children under

section 232.116(1)(e) and (h). Sh.L.’s rights to his child were terminated under

section 232.116(1)(e) and (h).

II. Analysis.

Both fathers appeal. We review a termination of parental rights de novo. In

re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). “On appeal, we may affirm the juvenile

court’s termination order on any ground that we find supported by clear and

convincing evidence.” In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010). We address

each father’s appeal separately.

A. Sc.L.

Sc.L. argues the State failed to prove the statutory grounds for termination.

He also argues the juvenile court should have avoided termination using the

permissive exception found in section 232.116(3)(c).

Sc.L. was still incarcerated at the time of the termination hearing, and the

day of his April 2022 arrest was the last in-person visit he had with the children.

To his credit, providers at the termination hearing testified he did a good job with

the children during his visits while he was available in the community. During his

incarceration, he had one video visit with the two older children and sent five letters

to the children.6 But, the June before the termination hearing, he stopped

6 Because there is now an NCO between the mother and Sc.L., which extends to
the children, the father overcame a number of hurdles put in place by the prison
before he could have contact with the children.
5

communicating with care providers, instead directing them to speak to his attorney.

He was set to appear before the parole board in February 2023, but his discharge

date was to be June 2024. He planned to complete an additional anger-

management course before his release, yet he reported that therapy was not

effective for him. When asked about his plans for housing or employment after

being returned to the community, Sc.L. refused to answer because the mother was

in the room.

Sc.L. challenges the final elements of 232.116(1)(f) and (h), which both

require the State to prove “[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that at the

present time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents.”7

But this challenge fails as Sc.L admitted the children could not be returned to his

care at the time of the termination hearing because of his incarceration. Still, he

thought with a six-month extension, assuming he was released on parole, he could

take over the children’s care. See Iowa Code §§ 232.117(5), .104(2)(b) (allowing

the juvenile court, in its permanency order, to give a parent six additional months

to work toward reunification if the juvenile court decides not to terminate parental

rights). But, to grant an additional six months, the court must be able to “enumerate

the specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes which comprise

the basis for the determination that the need for removal of the child from the child’s

home will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.” Id.

§ 232.104(2)(b). Not only could the district court here not find that the father would

7 Section 232.116(1)(f) relates to children four years of age or older, while
paragraph (h) covers children under four years of age or older. In this case, only
the oldest child is over four years old.
6

be released from prison within six months, the father would not reveal his plan to

have stable housing—which he struggled with before his incarceration—and

employment in that time. Without any clarity about what the next six months would

or could look like, we agree with the juvenile court that an additional six months

could not be granted. See D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 707 (“We do not ‘gamble with the

children’s future’ by asking them to continuously wait for a stable biological parent.”

(citation omitted)).

Sc.L next argues termination is not in the children’s best interests. In this

analysis, we “give primary consideration to the [children’s] safety, to the best

placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the [children], and

to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the [children].” Iowa

Code § 232.116(2). Sc.L. has repeatedly been incarcerated during the duration of

this case for violence toward the children’s mother, including an incident that

caused her to go into premature labor with the youngest child, which he continues

to deny. Moreover, at the termination hearing, he testified he saw no reason the

domestic violence would impact his children apart from causing the current

separation. For their part, as the father recognized, the children are thriving in their

current foster placements. And terminating Sc.L.’s parental rights will allow them

to achieve permanency. We find termination to be in the children’s best interests.

Finally, Sc.L. argues the juvenile court should have relied on a permissive

exception to termination found in section 232.116(3)(c), which allows the juvenile

court not to terminate if “[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the

termination would be detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of

the parent-child relationship.” The burden to prove this exception falls to the parent
7

seeking to avoid termination. In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 476 (Iowa 2018). And

while we do not doubt that Sc.L. loves his children, he has had limited meaningful

contact with them since his incarceration in April 2022. Because he has not shown

that they possess a bond so close as to make termination detrimental to the

children, we decline to use the permissive exception and affirm termination of his

parental rights. See D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 709 (formulating the

section 232.116(3)(c) analysis as “center[ing] on whether the child will be

disadvantaged by termination, and whether the disadvantage overcomes [the

parent’s] inability to provide for [the child’s] developing needs”).

B. Sh.L.

Sh.L. appeals the termination of his parental rights involving his biological

child and argues that the State failed to prove the grounds for termination, the

juvenile court should have avoided termination due to the close bond he and the

child share, and the juvenile court should have granted an additional six months to

work toward reunification.

Sh.L. challenges only the final element of Iowa Code section 232.116(e),

which allows termination if:

There is clear and convincing evidence that the parents have
not maintained significant and meaningful contact with the child
during the previous six consecutive months and have made no
reasonable efforts to resume care of the child despite being given
the opportunity to do so. For the purposes of this subparagraph,
“significant and meaningful contact” includes but is not limited to the
affirmative assumption by the parents of the duties encompassed by
the role of being a parent. This affirmative duty, in addition to
financial obligations, requires continued interest in the child, a
genuine effort to complete the responsibilities prescribed in the case
permanency plan, a genuine effort to maintain communication with
the child, and requires that the parents establish and maintain a
place of importance in the child’s life.
8

It is true Sh.L. had stable housing, the child who is involved in this case got

along well with Sh.L.’s other children (who are not at issue in this case), and both

Sh.L.’s wife and mother testified about his strengths as a parent and the strong

support system provided by his extended family. But, in the time between July

2021 when he began visits and the termination hearing, he missed twenty-seven

of the fifty-two once-weekly visits offered to him—which is 52% of the interactions,

including the weeks leading up to the termination hearing. As far back as the end

of 2021, the department informed Sh.L. that inconsistency with visits was an issue

and he was required to confirm visits the night before; he testified at trial he missed

“a handful” of visits because of illness and family emergencies and others because

he simply forgot to confirm. This inconsistency prevented Sh.L. from ever moving

past supervised visits with the child. He did not attend any of the child’s

appointments or activities, interact with the child’s therapist, or ever call the child’s

foster family to check in.8 Although offered a weekly phone call with the child, he

never followed through with that offer. After the court ordered him to complete

recommended mental-health treatment, he attended one appointment and then

failed to attend any further. As a positive, at the time of the termination hearing,

he had two future appointments scheduled. But in the end, Sh.L. has failed to take

the affirmative steps necessary to take on the responsibilities of parenting in the

year that was critical to proving his ability to caretake.

8 Sh.L. testified he was never asked to attend these events. One of the family
centered services providers explained that Sh.L. was given the foster family’s
information and encouraged to reach out to see about these kinds of events.
9

Like Sc.L., this father also argues he should have been given more time to

work toward reunification. “[O]ur legislature has carefully constructed a time frame

to provide a balance between the parent’s efforts and the child’s long-term best

interests.” D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 707. And when Sh.L. has not taken advantage of

the time he had in the last year to appropriately step up in the child’s life, and he

can provide no evidence or expected change that would make the next six months

any different, we are unable to “enumerate the specific factors, conditions, or

expected behavioral changes which comprise the basis for the determination that

the need for removal of the child from the child’s home will no longer exist at the

end of the additional six-month period.”9 Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b); see also In

re L.L., 459 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 1990) (“Parenting cannot be turned off and on

like a spigot. It must be constant, responsible, and reliable.”).

Further, Sh.L. has not established that he and the child share a bond close

enough that the juvenile court should have avoided termination using

section 232.116(3)(c).10 There was ample evidence provided by the department’s

caseworkers that the child has grown accustomed to Sh.L. but that the bond has

not developed because of Sh.L.’s inconsistency. As the one carrying the burden

to show the exception should have been used, see A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 476, Sh.L.

9 In his appellate brief, Sh.L. argues that he would have been more consistent with
visits had there not been a confirmation requirement. But it was his initial
inconsistency that led to the requirement in the first place.
10 Sh.L. makes conclusory statements that this is a best-interests argument, but

he speaks only to the statutory exception. We limit our discussion in the same
way. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.1401—Form 5 (explaining that, as a parent
challenging termination, “[g]eneral conclusions, such as the ‘the trial court’s ruling
is not supported by law or facts’ are not acceptable”); see also In re C.B., 611
N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000) (“A broad, all encompassing argument is insufficient
to identify error in cases of de novo review.”).
10

has not established that the bond is so strong that termination would be detrimental

to the child, so we decline to use it. Thus, we affirm termination of Sh.L.’s parental

rights.

III. Conclusion

Because the State proved the statutory grounds for termination as to both

fathers and termination of Sc.L.’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests,

and because neither father has shown the bond shared between they and the

children is strong enough to make termination detrimental, we affirm the juvenile

court’s termination of the parental rights of each of these fathers.

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.