In the Interest of I.O. and A.C., Minor Children

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-1657
Filed January 25, 2023

IN THE INTEREST OF I.O. and A.C.,
Minor Children,

D.N., Father of I.O.,
Appellant,

M.C., Father of A.C.,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Daniel L. Block,

Associate Juvenile Judge.

Two fathers separately appeal the termination of their parental rights.

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.

Andrew C. Abbott of Abbott Law Office, P.C., Waterloo, for appellant father

D.N.

Michele R. McCann of McCann Law, PLLC, Cedar Falls, for appellant father

M.C.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Ellen Ramsey-Kacena (until

withdrawal), Mary A. Triick, and Natalie Hedberg, Assistant Attorneys General, for

appellee State.

Mark A. Milder of Mark Milder Law Firm, Denver, attorney and guardian ad

litem for minor children.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Schumacher and Chicchelly, JJ.
2

TABOR, Presiding Judge.

The fathers of eight-year-old I.O. and six-year-old A.C. challenge the

termination of their parents rights.1 Both fathers contest the grounds for

termination and contend that termination was not in their child’s best interests

because of their close bond. In the alternative, they urge that permanency should

have been deferred for six months. After an independent review of the record, we

affirm the juvenile court’s decision to end the children’s legal relationships with

their fathers.2 Neither I.O.’s father, Dejoni, nor A.C.’s father, Malik, have

participated in the unification services ordered by the court and the Iowa

Department of Health and Human Services. And, on this record, postponing

permanency would conflict with the mandates of Iowa

Code section 232.104(2)(b) (2022).

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

I.O. and A.C. were removed from their mother’s custody in March 2021

because of her inadequate supervision, drug use, and unsanitary conditions in the

home. On top of those concerns, kindergartner I.O. had missed almost a month

of school. After removing the children, the department contacted their fathers. 3

Dejoni conceded he was not currently “in a position” to care for his son. Malik’s

whereabouts were unknown. Given their unavailable fathers, the children were

1 The children’s mother does not appeal.
2 We review termination orders de novo. In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313
(Iowa 2022). We respect the juvenile court’s factual findings, but they do not
dictate our result on legal questions. Id. The State must prove the grounds for
termination by clear and convincing evidence. Id.
3 The mother told case workers that the fathers had not been active in their

children’s lives.
3

placed with other relatives: I.O with his paternal great-grandmother and A.C. with

her paternal aunt.

As the months wore on, neither father participated in court-mandated

services or visited their children through official channels. For example, in July

2021, the court ordered Dejoni to obtain a substance-abuse evaluation and follow

through with any recommended treatment. But he failed to complete the

evaluation. And while Dejoni had some contact with I.O. at his grandmother’s

home, the department could not measure his parenting skills because the family

interactions were unsupervised.

As for Malik, for months his sister told the department that she did not know

how to get ahold of him. Only later did case workers learn that she had been

allowing her brother clandestine contact with A.C. During one of those unapproved

visits, A.C. was operating a lemonade stand when she witnessed her father be

shot in the back. Malik’s injuries from the bullet required hospitalization followed

by an extended stay at a rehabilitation center. Malik suffered nerve damage that

prevented him from visiting A.C. And he faced criminal charges unrelated to the

shooting.

After the shooting, the department moved A.C. into the same relative

placement as her brother. The case worker reported that the children were glad

to be reunited. What’s more, their difficult behaviors stabilized in the care of I.O.’s

great-grandmother, who wants to adopt them both.

The State petitioned to terminate parental rights in April 2022. The juvenile

court heard from both fathers at the trial. In September, the juvenile court granted
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the State’s petition under Iowa Code section 232.116(1), paragraphs (e) and (f).

The fathers both challenge the termination order.

II. Analysis

A. Dejoni’s Appeal

Dejoni argues that the State did not prove the grounds for termination. 4

When the juvenile court terminates under more than one paragraph of

section 232.116(1), we may affirm on any ground supported by clear and

convincing evidence. In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012). Looking to

paragraph (f),5 we find sufficient evidence to support the termination.

In a single sentence in the petition on appeal, Dejoni argues that he

“presented evidence that he was capable of caring for the child and that the child

could be placed in his care—or with additional time could ultimately be placed in

his care.” We disagree. Dejoni refused to engage in unification services. As the

juvenile court observed, the father “has demonstrated that he is not desirous of

4 Dejoni’s petition on appeal cites both grounds for termination in its issue heading,
but focuses on the “significant and meaningful contact” element of paragraph (e),
asserting that he “regularly saw his son” at the grandmother’s home. Further
confusing the issue, counsel mistakenly refers to a different client in the body of
the argument.
5 Termination is proper under that paragraph if the court finds that all of the

following have occurred:
(1) The child is four years of age or older.
(2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of
assistance pursuant to section 232.96.
(3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of
the child’s parents for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or
for the last twelve consecutive months and any trial period at home
has been less than thirty days.
(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that at the present
time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents
as provided in section 232.102.
Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f).
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being a placement for the child, only choosing to visit the child as it suits him.”

Termination was proper under paragraph (f).

Next Dejoni argues that termination of his parental rights was not in I.O.’s

best interests and, in fact, was detrimental to the child because of the closeness

of the father-son bond. See Iowa Code §§ 232.116(2), (3)(c). True, the record

shows that I.O. enjoys spending time with his father at the grandmother’s home.

But when we apply the framework in section 232.116(2), we find the child’s long-

term nurturing and growth will be furthered by moving toward adoption. In fact,

even Dejoni testified that he believed it was in I.O.’s best interest to stay in the

custody of the grandmother. And Dejoni has not met his burden to show that the

permissive factor in section 232.116(3)(c) should prevent termination. See In re

A.H., 950 N.W.2d 27, 42 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020) (explaining a court may bypass

termination if there is clear and convincing evidence that the termination would be

detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child

relationship). The closeness of the parent-child relationship is not a reason to

forego termination here. And luckily, their relationship need not end. The

grandmother has “voiced a willingness” to maintain contact between I.O. and

Dejoni after termination.

Finally, Dejoni suggests that “no adjudicatory harm would come to the child”

if he was given more time to work toward unification. See In re W.T., 967

N.W.2d 315, 323 (Iowa 2021) (“[T]he juvenile court may deny termination and give

the parent an additional six months for reunification only if the need for removal

‘will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.’” (quoting Iowa
6

Code § 232.104(2)(b))). But Dejoni offers nothing to show that he would be

prepared to parent I.O. full time within six months.

After giving careful consideration to all of Dejoni’s arguments, we affirm the

termination of his parental rights.

B. Malik’s Appeal

Like Dejoni, Malik challenges the grounds for termination. He argues that

the State did not present clear and convincing evidence that A.C. could not be

safely placed in his custody. He asserts that he has “obtained housing and

employment and, once physically healed from the gunshot wound, would be able

to provide a secure living environment for his daughter.” In explaining the shooting,

he insists that “he had no enemies and did not know he was being targeted by any

individuals.”

Targeted or not, Malik faced his own criminal charges at the time of the

termination hearing. And he did not meaningfully engage in services during the

child-welfare case. Malik attended only one authorized visit with A.C. And he

recognized that because of his recuperation from the gunshot, A.C. could not have

been placed in his custody “at the present time.” See Iowa Code

§ 232.116(1)(f)(4); In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010) (defining “at

the present time” as the time of the termination hearing). Termination was proper

under paragraph (f).

Malik next argues termination was not in A.C.’s best interests and should

have been precluded by their strong bond. See Iowa Code §§ 232.116(2), (3)(c).

He asserts that after recovering from his gunshot injury, he will be “prepared to

fully address the physical, mental and emotional needs of his daughter.” In
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describing their bond, he testified that A.C. knows him and cries when it’s time for

her to leave.

We don’t question Malik’s love for his daughter. But we find that her best

interests are served by termination of his parental rights. The record shows that

Malik has not been involved in his daughter’s life.6 And the child is thriving in the

care of I.O.’s grandmother. In fact, Malik acknowledged in his testimony that A.C.

was “in a good placement” and benefitted from being with her brother. We find

A.C.’s safety and physical, mental, and emotional needs are best met in that

placement. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2). We also find that Malik has not shown

“the type of bond [with A.C.] that would make termination in this case improper.”

See W.T., 967 N.W.2d at 324.

Finally, Malik makes a plea for delayed permanency. At first glance, his

request for more time to recover from the gunshot wound before uniting with his

daughter seems like a reasonable ask. But we can’t view his current situation in a

vacuum. Before the shooting, he did not interact with the department or the

juvenile court to confirm his ability to parent A.C. As the State points out, he has

not shown that he can provide a safe home for his daughter. Without “specific

factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes” that justify believing the need

for removal from parental care would no longer exist after six months, a delay is

not warranted. See Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b).

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.

6 Malik testified that he stayed away from A.C. when he was “a major fugitive on
the run” so he did not place her in harm’s way. But once he resolved the
outstanding warrants, he tried to start a relationship with her.