Vincent Lamar Harris Jr. v. State of Iowa

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 21-1166
Filed January 11, 2023

VINCENT LAMAR HARRIS JR.,
Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Kellyann M.

Lekar, Judge.

Vincent Harris Jr. appeals the dismissal of his application for postconviction

relief. AFFIRMED.

Christopher A. Clausen of Clausen Law Office, Ames, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Israel Kodiaga, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., Chicchelly, J., and Danilson, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2023).
2

DANILSON, Senior Judge.

In 2013, the district court entered judgment and sentence on Vincent Harris

Jr.’s guilty plea to lascivious acts with a child, in violation of Iowa Code

section 709.8 (2013). Harris voluntarily dismissed his direct appeal. Procedendo

issued in 2014.

In 2019, Harris filed a pro se application for postconviction relief (PCR),

contending “the courts did not have any evidence [against him], they went by the

police report.” Harris later filed an amended application through counsel, raising

various claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and claiming he “would not

have plead guilty but for counsel’s failure to perform essential duties.” The State

filed a motion to dismiss, arguing Harris’ application should be dismissed “in its

entirety” because it was time-barred under Iowa Code section 822.3 (2019).

A hearing took place on the State’s motion, during which PCR counsel

alleged, for the first time, Harris was “asserting his actual innocence” as an

exception to the statute of limitations,1 his trial counsel coerced him into pleading

guilty, and he “suffered from ADHD and he was also referred for a competency

evaluation by the attorney” during his criminal proceeding. PCR counsel asserted

Harris “should be allowed an evidentiary hearing” to develop these claims. The

PCR court thereafter entered an order granting the State’s motion and dismissing

Harris’ application, noting in part:

1 See Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 797 (Iowa 2018) (“For an applicant to
succeed on a freestanding actual-innocence claim, the applicant must show by
clear and convincing evidence that, despite the evidence of guilt supporting the
conviction, no reasonable fact finder could convict the applicant of the crimes for
which the sentencing court found the applicant guilty in light of all the evidence,
including the newly discovered evidence.”).
3

The Court finds that the State has sustained its motion for
summary disposition on the grounds that the claims made by the
Petitioner on post-conviction relief are barred based upon the
applicable three-year statute of limitations. The Supplemental
Amendment to Petition does not contain a substantive claim or
argument of actual innocence. The only substantive assertion of
actual innocence by the Petitioner was made by counsel at the time
of the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss. Those assertions were to
general claims of actual innocence without any basis or detail
provided to the Court concerning newly discovered evidence, a
recanting witness or other substantive grounds upon which a claim
of actual innocence is typically based. The Petitioner seeks
additional time to do discovery and further develop the evidence,
however, the Petitioner provides the Court with no basis on which to
hang any belief that additional time would lead to new evidence or
further development of existing evidence. In short, the pleadings and
briefing filed by the Petitioner do not back up the assertion of a
definable or actionable assertion of a claim of actual innocence. A
mere undefined claim of actual innocence at the Motion to Dismiss
hearing is insufficient to permit this PCR action to continue. The
Petitioner does not provide this Court with any reasonable ground on
which to delay the entry of disposition in this matter on the basis that
further discovery or development of the case would render this
matter not subject to being time barred by the statute of limitations.

On appeal, Harris challenges the court’s order, acknowledging “[i]t may be

that discovery would not uncover any information which would amount to newly

discovered evidence or proof of actual innocence,” but “[t]he only way in which a

person in Harris’ situation could explore evidence which would amount to newly

discovered evidence is to allow him to develop his case through the use of

discovery procedures and materials.”

“We typically review postconviction relief proceedings on error. However,

when the applicant asserts claims of a constitutional nature, our review is de novo.”

Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2021) (internal citation omitted).

Upon our review, we conclude the court properly applied the law in evaluating

Harris’ application. See, e.g., Dewberry v. State, 941 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Iowa 2019)
4

(rejecting actual-innocence claim, and observing “[a]s this claim was first

presented to the district court, it was not a claim of actual innocence,” but rather “it

was simply a belated request to go to trial”). Harris alleged no specific facts or

evidence to support his claim. The PCR court properly found his application time-

barred under section 822.3. We affirm the court’s dismissal of Harris’ PCR

application.

AFFIRMED.