CourtListener 4441422•In the Interest of T.H. Jr., A.R., A.C., and A.K., Minor Child, R.K., Father, T.H., Father, K.K., Mother
In the Interest of T.H. Jr., A.R., A.C., and A.K., Minor Child, R.K., Father, T.H., Father, K.K., Mother
CourtListener 4441422IowactappNov 8, 2017
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 17-1328
Filed November 8, 2017
IN THE INTEREST OF T.H. Jr., A.R., A.C., and A.K.,
Minor Child,
R.K., Father,
Appellant,
T.H., Father,
Appellant
K.K., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jasper County, Steven J.
Holwerda, District Associate Judge.
A mother and two fathers appeal the termination of their parental rights.
AFFIRMED.
Shane P. O’Toole, Des Moines, for appellant-father R.K.
Jennie L. Wilson-Moore of Wilson Law Firm, for appellant-father T.H.
Andrew Tullar of Tullar Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant-
mother.
Meegan M. Langmaid-Keller of Keller Law Office P.C., Altoona, attorney
and guardian ad litem for minor children.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Ana Dixit, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Tabor and Bower, JJ.
2
VOGEL, Presiding Judge.
K.K., the mother of four children—A.C., born 2005; A.R., born 2010; T.H.
Jr., born 2014; and A.K., born 2015—appeals the termination of her parental
rights. Two of the four fathers also appeal: T.H. appeals the termination of his
rights to T.H. Jr., and R.K. appeals the termination of his rights to A.K.1
The children were initially removed from the home in December 2015,
after the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) was informed A.R., then
four years of age, had set herself on fire, resulting in burns over twenty-one
percent of her body. In addition, A.R. tested positive for methamphetamine. At
the time, the mother was living with T.H., who was known to be abusive and an
active drug user, which posed a threat to all the children. The children were
returned to the mother a few months later but removed again on June 2, 2016,
on allegations that inappropriate people were living in the home with access to
the children, and that the mother was selling marijuana. The mother then tested
positive for methamphetamine. On September 1, the mother was arrested on
drug and weapons-related charges and remained in jail until December 8.
Following the mother’s failure to follow through with the extensive
reunification services offered to her, the State filed a petition to terminate her
parental rights as well as the fathers’ rights to their respective children. The
matter came on for hearing on June 30 and July 21, 2017, after which the
mother’s parental rights were terminated under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f)
(2017) as to A.C. and A.R., (h) as to T.H. Jr. and A.K., and (e) as to all four
1
The parental rights of the father of A.C. and the father of A.R. were also terminated.
A.C.’s father does not appeal; A.R.’s father is deceased.
3
children.2 T.H.’s and R.K.’s parental rights were both terminated under Iowa
Code section 232.116(1)(e) and (h). The mother and the two fathers appeal.
Standard of Review.
We review termination of parental rights proceedings de novo, giving
deference to the district court’s findings but not being bound by them. In re C.B.,
611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000).
The Fathers’ Appeals.
Both fathers, T.H. and R.K., request we reverse the findings of the district
court under section 232.116(1)(e). As neither contests the findings made under
(h), we affirm the termination of both father’s parental rights under that
subsection. See Hyler v. Garner, 548 N.W.2d 864, 870 (Iowa 1996) (“[O]ur
review is confined to those propositions relied upon by the appellant for reversal
on appeal.”). Even if we were to address the terminations under the preserved
issue of section 232.116(1)(e), we would affirm as the record fully supports the
conclusion that neither father maintained “significant and meaningful contact”
2
Paragraph (e) provides termination is warranted if:
The court finds that all of the following have occurred:
(1) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance
pursuant to section 232.96.
(2) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the
child’s parents for a period of at least six consecutive months.
(3) There is clear and convincing evidence that the parents have
not maintained significant and meaningful contact with the child during the
previous six consecutive months and have made no reasonable efforts to
resume care of the child despite being given the opportunity to do so. For
the purposes of this subparagraph, “significant and meaningful contact”
includes but is not limited to the affirmative assumption by the parents of
the duties encompassed by the role of being a parent. This affirmative
duty, in addition to financial obligations, requires continued interest in the
child, a genuine effort to complete the responsibilities prescribed in the
case permanency plan, a genuine effort to maintain communication with
the child, and requires that the parents establish and maintain a place of
importance in the child’s life.
4
over the course of their respective child’s life. R.K. also asserts he should be
given an additional six months to work towards reunification; however, the district
court found:
[R.K.] was minimally involved in [A.K.’s] life before he went to
prison but not involved at all while he was in prison. [R.K.’s] only
efforts to be a father to [A.K.] consist of one request for a visit with
[A.K.], and that request did not occur until June 23, 2017; only one
week before the termination hearing, but one month after he was
served with the Termination Petition and 15 months after he was
served with the CINA Petition. [R.K.’s] disinterest in [A.K.’s] life is
obvious. He has never provided support for [A.K.], never cared for
[A.K.], and still has no parent-child bond with him. . . . The Court
cannot imagine any circumstances where the need for removal will
no longer exist at the end of an additional six-month period.
The record fully supports these observations and findings of the district
court. See Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b) (providing a court may authorize a six-
month extension of time if it determines “the need for removal of the child from
the child’s home will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month
period”).
The Mother’s Appeal.
The mother contests the findings of the district court that supported
termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e), (f), and (h), as well as
asserting the DHS failed to provide her with reasonable efforts towards
reunification and termination is not in the children’s best interests.
Visitation with the children remained supervised during the entirety of
these proceedings. The mother’s claim that she was not offered additional
visitation rings hollow as the record supports the mother was not compliant with
the expectations for safe visits with the children. We agree with the district
court’s findings:
5
The DHS made reasonable efforts to increase the mother’s time
with the children but the mother chose not to follow the rules that
were in place. The Court declines to find that the DHS failed to
make reasonable efforts toward reunification.
The mother has struggled for many years with issues, inhibiting her ability
to safely parent her children.3 In August 2016, during the pendency of these
CINA proceedings, the mother was arrested when she was a passenger in a
vehicle containing a large quantity of methamphetamine. After four months in
jail, the mother pled guilty to a weapons charge and was sentenced to 120 days
in jail, with credit for time served. The mother has been offered substance abuse
treatment but has failed to adequately comply with the services offered, including
periodic drug screening. Her drug involvement has subjected her children to
harm, which has been a barrier for the safe return of the children to her care. As
the DHS worker testified, concerning the mother’s substance abuse issues:
[The mother] doesn’t use drugs as much as she has a history of
selling drugs, and services were recommended for her to complete
substance abuse treatment, still outpatient, to address those kinds
of concerns. The provider had also mentioned concerns of [the
mother’s] decision making with—often she becomes involved with
males, or boyfriends and such, that get her into trouble and cause
neglect or harm due to substance abuse issues with the children.
So those things were all things that she was working with in
treatment.
Q. And as far as the treatment, has that been successfully
completed? A. No.
As to the grounds for termination under section 232.116(1)(f)4 regarding
A.C. and A.R., the district court found:
3
The mother has seven children, but only the four youngest are the subject of the
current proceedings. From 2003 through 2016, there have been seven founded child
abuse assessments against the mother, primarily involving her drug use and drug
selling.
4
Paragraph (f) provides termination is warranted if:
6
Given the mother’s continued lack of progress; refusal to
consistently participate with recommended mental health services,
substance abuse services, and drug screens; refusal to consistently
attend the children’s medical and mental health appointments;
failure to progress beyond supervised visits; and failure to establish
any semblance of stability during the two years this case was open;
as well as the children’s detachment from her, the children cannot
be returned to her custody at the present time or in the immediate
future.
As to T.H. and A.K., the court found under section 232.116(1)(h):5
Given the mother’s failure to progress beyond supervised visits; her
failure to provide any requested random drug screens; her failure to
complete or even consistently attend her mental health sessions,
substance abuse sessions, and her children’s medical
appointments; and her failure to establish any semblance of
stability during the two years this case was open, neither [T.H. Jr.]
nor [A.K.] can be returned to her custody at the present time or in
the immediate future.
The record fully supports these findings.
The court finds that all of the following have occurred:
(1) The child is four years of age or older.
(2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance
pursuant to section 232.96.
(3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the
child’s parents for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or for the
last twelve consecutive months and any trial period at home has been
less than thirty days.
(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that at the present time
the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as
provided in section 232.102.
5
Paragraph (h) provides termination is warranted if:
The court finds that all of the following have occurred:
(1) The child is three years of age or younger.
(2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance
pursuant to section 232.96.
(3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the
child’s parents for at least six months of the last twelve months, or for the
last six consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less
than thirty days.
(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot be
returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided in section
232.102 at the present time.
7
Finally, the mother asserts termination is not in the children’s best
interests as she was “making progress.” However, the district court found:
The mother’s ability to care for her children is obviously
affected by her lifestyle of instability, poor choices, and failure to
follow through. She has seven “founded” abuse reports and been
involved with the juvenile court now for the fourth time. She knows
what is expected of her, yet she continues to put forth only a
minimal effort. She continues to use drugs as evidenced by her
“positive” drug screen in the middle of this case. She continues to
associate with the drug culture, as evidenced by her relationship
with [R.K.] (allowing [R.K.] to be around [A.K.] and exposing her to
methamphetamine), her relationship with [T.H.] (allowing [T.H.] to
be around the children while he was actively using drugs, resulting
in removal of the children), and her recent arrest in a car full of
methamphetamine. She refuses to submit to random drug screens.
She refuses to consistently engage in mental health and substance
abuse treatment unless or until reminded or prodded to do so. And
she refuses to consistently attend her children’s appointments and
sessions unless or until repeatedly reminded or asked to do so.
Her children have not been a priority for her and they are now
growing distant from her. After almost two years of involvement
with the DHS in this case, now her fourth, [the DHS worker] testified
that “nothing has changed to move her forward.” She has not been
able to care for the children for over the past thirteen months and
will not be able to do so in the near future. Her problems, as
recited above, have prevented her from providing for the children’s
safety, long-term nurturing and growth, and physical, mental and
emotional needs, and will continue to prevent her from doing so for
the foreseeable future.
In making a best-interest determination, we “give primary consideration to
the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and
growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and
needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). The mother’s claim of recent
progress is overshadowed by the present needs of these children for stability.
Further, in determining the future actions of this mother, her past conduct is
instructive. See In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa 2006). We agree the best
8
interests of the children are served by the termination of the mother’s parental
rights.
AFFIRMED.
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