In the Interest of J.C., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 26-0590
Filed May 27, 2026
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In the Interest of J.C., Minor Child,
A.G., Mother,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wapello County,
The Honorable Richelle Mahaffey, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Patricia J. Lipski, Washington, attorney for appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee State.

Sarah L. Wenke, Ottumwa, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.
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Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Chicchelly and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Sandy, J.

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SANDY, Judge.

A mother1 appeals the termination of her parental rights to J.C., born
in 2023. On appeal, the mother argues that termination is not in J.C.’s best
interests and that a permissive exception should be applied. Upon our review,
we affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
J.C. was born in July 2023. At birth, his meconium tested positive for
marijuana/THC, and the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) opened a file on the family. Concerns at the time included parental
substance use, domestic violence between the parents, and the parents’
capacity to provide full-time care for an infant. The parents agreed to a safety
plan placing J.C. with his paternal grandparents, V.C. and R.C.

The State filed a child-in-need-of-assistance petition on March 13,
2024. Following a contested hearing on April 5, 2024, the juvenile court
adjudicated J.C. a child in need of assistance. J.C. was formally removed from
his parents’ care pursuant to the adjudication order and has remained in the
physical care of his paternal grandparents since that time. A dispositional
hearing followed in May. HHS provided the family with services, including
family-centered services and visitation.

A permanency hearing was held in October 2024. At that hearing,
HHS recommended termination of both parents’ parental rights—a
termination petition had already been filed. The matter was set for a
combined termination and permanency hearing on March 4, 2025. At the

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The father’s parental rights were also terminated, but he did not appeal.

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hearing, the parties agreed that the mother had made enough progress to
warrant an extension, and the termination proceedings were continued.

But on May 27, the State moved for a scheduling conference and
requested a combined permanency review and termination hearing. That
hearing was held in July. The father consented to termination of his parental
rights. The mother contested termination. In a July 31 order, the juvenile
court terminated the father’s parental rights but declined to terminate the
mother’s parental rights, instead placing J.C. in a legal guardianship with
V.C. and R.C. The court concluded that permanency could be achieved
through guardianship.

On October 3, the juvenile court entered an order transferring the
guardianship to probate court. The CINA case, however, was not closed.

The events between the July 31, 2025, order and the second
termination hearing in February 2026 are characterized differently by the
parties, though the central facts are not in dispute. Shortly after the July 2025
hearing, the mother relocated to Illinois to live with her mother. She testified
at the February 2026 hearing—and stated in correspondence attached to her
post-trial motion—that the move was prompted by her mother’s serious
health issues and was intended to be temporary, pending approval of a
voucher under the Housing Choice Voucher Program (Section 8) which
would allow her to return to the Ottumwa area. In September 2025 and again
in October, she applied for state benefits in Illinois and indicated on those
applications that J.C. was in her physical care, although J.C. always remained
with his paternal grandparents. The benefits issue was ultimately resolved
with the help of the social work case manager.

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Following the October order transferring the guardianship to probate
court, the mother believed the juvenile guardianship had been finalized and
the CINA case closed. She did not maintain regular contact with the assigned
HHS worker until shortly before the February 2026 termination hearing. In
November 2025, the court ordered a paper file review, and a second
termination petition was filed that same month.

The mother’s contact with J.C. during this period was the subject of
conflicting evidence. The HHS February 2026 update and the testimony of
J.C.’s grandmother described the mother’s contact as inconsistent, ebbing
and flowing, with no in-person visits between August 2025 and January 2026,
despite planned visits around Thanksgiving and Christmas. The mother
testified that she maintained regular phone and video contact and that she
returned to visit J.C. in person when circumstances allowed.

The combined permanency review and termination hearing was held
on February 17, 2026. The mother testified that she had obtained a Section 8
voucher and was searching for housing within roughly thirty minutes of J.C.’s
residence, had maintained sobriety from marijuana and other illegal
substances for a lengthy period, had completed outpatient substance-use
treatment, was engaged in mental-health counseling, and intended to pursue
training to become a licensed ultrasound technician. She testified that she did
not seek to disrupt J.C.’s placement with his grandparents, who she
acknowledged were providing him with excellent care, but sought to preserve
her relationship with him and to finalize the previously ordered guardianship.
The State and the guardian ad litem questioned the mother’s intentions and
recommended termination as the more favorable option for permanency. The
paternal grandmother testified that she and her husband wished to adopt J.C.,

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believed termination and adoption to be in his best interests, and would
continue to support the relationship between J.C. and his mother.

By order entered February 26, 2026, the juvenile court terminated the
mother’s parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e) and (h)
(2025), found termination to be in J.C.’s best interests under
section 232.116(2), and concluded that no permissive exception under
section 232.116(3) precluded termination. The court directed that
guardianship and custody remain with HHS pending adoption.

The mother moved to reconsider. The motion challenged the court’s
findings concerning her progress, her contact with J.C., the best-interests
determination, and the court’s treatment of the section 232.116(3)
exceptions. It also attached a written statement from the mother. The
juvenile court denied the motion, concluding that it raised no new legal
issues, identified no new material facts, and pointed to no specific errors in
the record. The mother now appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review termination of parental rights proceedings de novo.” In re
J.H., 952 N.W.2d 157, 166 (Iowa 2020). “While we are not bound by the
juvenile court’s factual findings, we accord them weight, especially in
assessing witness credibility.” Id.

DISCUSSION
We use a three-step process to determine whether (1) a statutory
ground has been established, (2) termination is in the child’s best interests,
and (3) any permissive exceptions to termination should be applied. In re
A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280, 294 (Iowa 2021). If a parent does not challenge a step,
we need not address it. In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 39 (Iowa 2010). The mother

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does not contest the statutory grounds for termination. Instead, she argues
that termination is not in J.C.’s best interests under Iowa Code
section 232.116(2), and that a permissive exception to termination under
section 232.116(3)(c) should be applied due to the closeness of the parent-
child bond.

I. Best Interests

We apply the best-interests framework under Iowa Code
section 232.116(2), giving “primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the
best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the
child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the
child.” We consider the child’s long-term and immediate interests. J.H., 952
N.W.2d at 171. We must look at what the future may hold for the child if they
are to be returned to the parent’s care. Id. We do this by reviewing a parent’s
past performance, as it is a helpful predictor of the quality of care the parent
can provide in the future. See id.

After reviewing the record, we find that termination of the mother’s
parental rights is in the child’s best interests. J.C. has lived with his paternal
grandparents since July 2023—nearly his entire life. They wish to adopt him.
They have provided him with stability through every chapter of this case,
including those in which his mother could not. The juvenile court found, and
the record confirms, that J.C. is loved and well cared for in their home.

The mother argues that the bond she shares with her son makes
termination contrary to his best interests. We do not doubt the bond. But best
interests under section 232.116(2) is not a contest of affection. See In re A.M.,
843 N.W.2d 100, 113 (Iowa 2014) (observing that, although the mother loved
the child, the child also had a close relationship with the grandparents with
whom she had been placed for most her life). It is an inquiry into where this

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child’s long-term safety, stability, and growth are best secured. Past
performance is probative of future performance. After the juvenile court
declined to terminate her rights in July 2025 and placed J.C. in a guardianship
with his grandparents, the mother relocated to Illinois. She did not see J.C.
in person between August 2025 and January 2026, despite planned visits at
Thanksgiving and Christmas. Her phone and video contact was inconsistent.

The mother testified that she had recently obtained a Section 8
voucher, intended to return to the Ottumwa area, and had maintained
sobriety. We credit those efforts. But J.C. is two-and-a-half years old. He
cannot wait on the prospect of housing yet to be found, employment yet to
be obtained, and proximity yet to be reestablished. Our supreme court has
been plain: a court “cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has
proved a ground for termination . . . by hoping someday a parent will learn to
be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” Id. at 112
(citations omitted). Hope is not a permanency plan.

The mother urges that guardianship—the disposition that the juvenile
court ordered in July 2025—should be reinstated. But “a guardianship is not
a legally preferable alternative to termination.” In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467,
472 (Iowa 2018) (citation omitted). What the mother did with the
guardianship after July 2025 is itself the answer to whether guardianship can
serve the goal of permanency here. Demands that J.C. be moved to Illinois,
benefit applications misstating his custody, months without an in-person
visit—these are not the ordinary stresses of a guardianship. They are the
reason the juvenile court concluded, on this record, that guardianship would

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not deliver the stability J.C. requires. We agree.2 Termination is in J.C.’s best
interests.

II. Permissive Exception

The State contests error preservation, noting that A.G. did not invoke
section 232.116(3)(c) at the termination hearing and raised it only generally
in her Rule 1.904(2) motion. Even assuming error is preserved, the mother’s
argument fails on the merits.

Section 232.116(3)(c) permits—but does not require—a court to
decline termination upon clear and convincing evidence “that the
termination would be detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness
of the parent-child relationship.” The burden rests on the parent. See A.S.,
906 N.W.2d at 475–76. A bond, without more, will not do. See In re A.B., 956
N.W.2d 162, 169–70 (Iowa 2021). The question is “whether the child will be
disadvantaged by termination, and whether the disadvantage overcomes” the
parent’s inability to meet the child’s developing needs. In re D.W., 791
N.W.2d 703, 709 (Iowa 2010).

The mother relies heavily on the juvenile court’s July 2025 order,
suggesting that order found a subsection (3)(c) exception applied. It did not.
The July 2025 order denied termination because permanency could be
achieved through guardianship and expressly declined to reach section
232.116(3).

On the record before us, the mother has not carried her burden. The
bond she describes is undermined, not supported, by the period between

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The grandmother’s testimony bears noting. She supports termination and
adoption. She also intends to maintain the relationship between J.C. and his mother.
Termination ends a legal relationship; it does not necessarily end a familial relationship.

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August 2025 and January 2026—five months without an in-person visit,
inconsistent phone and video contact, and her missed planned visits during
the holidays. Whatever closeness existed at the time of the July 2025 order,
the months that followed strained rather than strengthened it.
Section 232.116(3)(c) requires evidence that termination will be detrimental
at the time of termination. The record does not bear that finding here.
Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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