In the Interest of K.J., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 26-0383
Filed May 13, 2026
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In the Interest of K.J., Minor Child,
B.J., Father,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County,
The Honorable Carrie K. Bryner, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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David R. Fiester, Cedar Rapids, attorney for appellant father.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee State.

Robin Himes, Cedar Rapids, attorney and guardian ad litem
for minor child.
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Considered without oral argument
by Schumacher, P.J., and Ahlers and Badding, JJ.
Opinion by Badding, J.

1
BADDING, Judge.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to a daughter
born in April 2025. 1 The child first came to the attention of the Iowa
Department of Health and Human Services when she was three days old due
to concerns about the parents’ ability to care for a newborn. Both the mother
and the father live with intellectual disabilities that make learning new skills
difficult. And according to hospital staff, they declined to participate in
feeding, changing, or bonding with their new baby after she was admitted to
an intensive care unit. The child was removed from the parents’ custody and
placed with her maternal grandparents, who were already caring for an older
sibling.

To help with reunification, the juvenile court ordered the father to
complete a mental-health evaluation, a substance-abuse evaluation, IQ
testing, and a SafeCare parenting course. But he failed to meet these
requirements—largely because of his volatile behavior. The father stormed
out of a psychological evaluation. He was discharged from the SafeCare
program due to repeated outbursts. And he was banned from attending the
child’s medical appointments after he threatened her providers.

After a termination hearing in October 2025, the juvenile court found
the father had “failed to make any effort to complete the responsibilities
prescribed in the case permanency plan,” “resisted all parenting direction,”
and “exhibited emotional dysregulation on a consistent basis.” The court
terminated his parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e) and (h)

1
The juvenile court also terminated the parental rights of the child’s mother, but
she does not appeal.

2
(2025). We review that ruling de novo. In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa
2022).

The father challenges the statutory grounds for termination.2
Although the court cited two grounds in its order, we only need to find one
to affirm. In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012). Here, we focus on
section 232.116(1)(h). The father disputes the fourth element—whether the
child could be safely returned to his custody at the time of the termination
hearing. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h)(4); In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 473
(Iowa 2018). The father argues that he “made several positive steps”
towards reunification by securing an apartment, a working vehicle, and “all
the supplies K.J. could need.” See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h)(4).

But this child was not removed for a lack of equipment. The concern
was with the father’s parenting abilities—and he wasted the chance to
develop those skills by resisting services and routinely mistreating providers.
As a result, the father continues to lack the skills necessary to care for a young
child with special medical needs. He acknowledged that he did not know
how to clean or operate his daughter’s feeding tube. And he questioned
whether he could stomach “doing diapers.” A caseworker also testified to
unresolved concerns with the father’s hygiene, the unsanitary condition of

2
We have generously construed the father’s petition to allow a merits review. Its
single issue heading asserts the juvenile court “erred when it failed to find a permissive
exception to termination.” But the father never asked the court to apply a permissive
exception—nor did the court address that question—so that claim is not preserved. See
In re J.R., 20 N.W.3d 839, 843 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc) (finding a parent waived
her permissive-exception argument by failing to raise it at the termination hearing). In any
event, we read the substance of the father’s petition to challenge the other steps of the
termination analysis. Although we could find these arguments waived for failure to
comply with our rules for issue presentation, see In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 534 n.2 (Iowa
Ct. App. 2025) (en banc), we choose to address the merits.

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the parents’ home (from which they had recently been evicted), and his
inattention to the child during supervised visits. On this record, we agree
with the juvenile court that the child could not have been safely returned to
the father’s custody at the time of the termination hearing. See In re A.B.,
956 N.W.2d 162, 169 (Iowa 2021) (affirming termination where the mother
“had not really advanced as a parent”).

The father also asserts that termination is not in the child’s best
interest, citing his emotional bond to her. We do not doubt he loves his
daughter, but “the existence of a bond is not enough” to tilt the best-interests
balance. Id.; see also In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 535 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en
banc) (explaining that the parent-child bond is a “relevant consideration in
the best-interests analysis,” but giving little weight to a father’s bond
argument where he had never cared for the child and had not advanced
beyond supervised visits). Instead, we must give “primary consideration” to
the child’s safety, long-term growth, and physical, mental, and emotional
needs. Iowa Code § 232.116(2). When it comes to those factors, the juvenile
court said it best:
[K.J.] is a child in need of a safe, stable home that is also clean and
sterile. Further, she needs parents who can maintain stability, care for
themselves and importantly understand and care for her many medical
needs. She deserves a family to love and care for her each and every day.
Her parents are not in a position to provide her with that stability and
safety at this time. . . . [T]he child’s need for permanency, security, safety,
physical and intellectual health dictate that it is in her best interests to have
parental rights terminated.

Reviewing the record with fresh eyes, we reach the same conclusion.
Termination will provide this young girl with the safety and permanency she
deserves. We therefore affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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