Todd Hinkel v. Chad Hinkel

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0205
Filed May 13, 2026
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Todd Hinkel,
Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
Chad Hinkel,
Defendant–Appellee.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County,
The Honorable Lars G. Anderson, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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John C. Wagner, John G. Daufeldt, and Colin W. Smyka of John C. Wagner
Law Offices, P.C., Amana, attorneys for appellant.

Peter C. Riley of Tom Riley Law Firm P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, attorney for
appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Badding and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Sandy, J.

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SANDY, Judge.

On June 12, 2020, Todd Hinkel drove his ailing father to a parking lot
in Johnson County, held him steady while he signed a deed, and verified his
identity to the notary. Four years later, Todd asks this court to declare that
his father lacked the mental capacity to do what Todd helped him do. We
decline that invitation. Upon our de novo review, we affirm.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURE
Dewey Hinkel was born in 1936 and owned a roughly ten-acre property
in North Liberty, Iowa. Dewey and his wife, Patricia, had two children
together: Todd and Chad. Patricia died in 2005 and Dewey died in 2022. This
action was filed before Dewey’s death.

Chad lived with Dewey on the property for multiple years until
May 2020, when Dewey’s health deteriorated and he could no longer live at
home. It is undisputed that Dewey’s physical health declined as he got older.
On May 10, 2020, Dewey suffered a stroke and Chad brought him to the
University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics (UIHC). Dewey stayed at UIHC for
ten days, until he was moved to a rehab facility. Dewey had to go back to
UIHC when it became clear he needed more assistance than could be offered
to him at home. Dewey ultimate moved to Solon Care Center in June, where
he lived until he passed away in 2022.

After Dewey suffered his stroke, Chad became concerned about how
the expenses from Dewey’s time in the nursing home could affect his father’s
assets. Chad contacted Kyle Wilcox, an attorney who primarily practices in
estate planning, taxation, and related matters, including Medicaid planning.
None of the Hinkels knew Wilcox before Chad contacted him.

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On June 8, 2020, Chad, Todd, and Wilcox had an hour-long meeting
to discuss, among other things, how to protect Dewey’s assets without having
to sell them. Wilcox testified that generally someone cannot give away assets
within five years of moving to a nursing home without those assets counting
against them for purposes of Medicaid eligibility. An exception to this rule
allows someone to convey their home to another person living in the home
for two or more years. This was the case with Chad, and Wilcox discussed
the possibility of Dewey deeding the property to Chad to protect it. Wilcox
testified at trial that both Todd and Chad agreed to the plan, that he was
representing Dewey, and that he needed to meet with Dewey to explain and
see if he understood and agreed to the plan. Wilcox testified that both Chad
and Todd told him that Dewey was competent to execute a deed at that time.
Chad corroborated Wilcox’s recollection of the meeting, but Todd testified
that it went differently. Todd claimed that the meeting only lasted fifteen to
twenty minutes, and that he did not understand nor have knowledge of the
plan to convey the property to Chad. The district court did not find Todd’s
testimony credible.

The next day, Todd facilitated a phone call between Dewey and
Wilcox. Wilcox testified that the call lasted approximately twenty to thirty
minutes and that Dewey provided little feedback throughout the call. Wilcox
testified that he was able to verify that Dewey wanted to proceed with the
plan to deed the property to Chad. Chad testified that he discussed the
conversation with his brother and that Todd said it went well without any
issues. Wilcox then had the necessary documents prepared.

Wilcox never met Dewey in person, and he did not speak with Dewey
on the day the deed was executed. He was also not fully aware of Dewey’s
health situation and was unaware of Dewey’s will that provided for his

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property to be divided equally between Chad and Todd. Wilcox was also
unaware that Chad and Todd had a difficult relationship, and he testified that
he would probably have proceeded differently knowing what he knows now.
The district court found Wilcox’s testimony to be credible.

Dewey signed the deed on June 12. The two other people present for
the signing were Todd and Brandy Raschke, an employee of the law firm
where Wilcox worked. Todd drove Dewey from UIHC to the signing, and
Todd testified that Dewey was out of it that day. Todd testified that Dewey
never said anything or asked any questions about any of the documents and
did not read the documents before signing. Todd also testified that he had to
help Dewey sign the documents.

Raschke prepared the deed transferring the property from Dewey to
Chad at the instruction of Wilcox. Because of COVID-19 protocols in effect
at the time, arrangements were made for Raschke to meet Dewey and Todd
in the parking lot and to have Dewey sign the documents there. Raschke
testified that Dewey did not speak the day they met, but that Todd did verify
his identity for her. She further testified that she did not engage in an
assessment of Dewey, but that she felt sad for him based on his physical
condition. Raschke testified that Dewey had difficulty signing the documents
and that Todd had to hold him up while he signed. Raschke also testified that
she explained the documents to Dewey before he signed, but that he did not
ask any questions or read the documents before he signed. She finally testified
that Dewey’s signature improved between the first and second document,
and she confirmed it was not “the worst signature [she had] ever seen.”

Chad and Todd’s relationship came to a head after a dispute about
Todd’s use of the property, leading to Chad telling Todd that he nor his
belongings were allowed on the property. Todd filed suit against Chad,

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arguing that Dewey lacked the mental capacity to execute the deed. The
district court’s decree denied and dismissed Todd’s petition in its entirety.
Todd now appeals the decree.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
“In equity cases review is de novo.” Iowa R. App. P. 6.907; see In re Est.
of Roethler, 801 N.W.2d 833, 837 (Iowa 2011). “In equity cases, especially
when considering the credibility of witnesses, the appellate court gives
weight to the fact-findings of the district court, but is not bound by them.”
Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(g); see Roethler, 801 N.W.2d at 837.

DISCUSSION
Todd argues that the district court erred in finding that he failed to
carry his burden to show Dewey lacked the mental capacity to execute the
deed which conveyed the property to Chad. Todd asserts the district court
did not consider and properly weigh all relevant factors.

As the party challenging Dewey’s capacity to execute the deed, Todd
“carries the burden of proving by clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence
that” Dewey did not have “sufficient consciousness or mentality to
understand the import of [his] acts when the deed was executed.” In re Est.
of Todd, 585 N.W.2d 273, 276 (Iowa 1998) (cleaned up). Clear and convincing
evidence means there is “no serious or substantial doubt about the
correctness of a particular conclusion drawn from the evidence.” In re N.C.,
952 N.W.2d 151, 153 (Iowa 2020). When analyzing the issue of mental
capacity, we consider several factors:
[the grantor’s] physical condition; the adequacy of consideration; whether
or not the conveyance was improvident; the relation of trust and
confidence between the parties to the conveyance, and the weakness of

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mind of the grantor as judged by his other acts within a reasonable time
prior and subsequent to the act sought to be impeached.

Daughton v. Parson, 423 N.W.2d 894, 896 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998) (quoting
Brewster v. Brewster, 188 N.W. 672, 674 (Iowa 1922)).

Upon our review, Todd did not prove by clear, convincing, and
satisfactory evidence that Dewey lacked the capacity to execute the deed. We
reach this conclusion by considering (1) the district court’s credibility
determinations; (2) conflicting testimony regarding Dewey’s mental
faculties around the time the deed was signed; (3) Todd’s failure to retain any
expert witnesses to testify to Dewey’s capacity; and (4) the high burden the
clear and convincing evidence standard imposes on Todd.

The district court “did not find Todd’s testimony that he had no clue
what was going on in connection with the deed from Dewey to Chad to be
credible.” Todd’s claim that he had no idea what was going on is not
consistent with Chad and Wilcox’s testimonies, which the district court
found more credible. In direct contravention with his testimony that he did
not know what was going on with the deed, Todd still helped arranged for
Wilcox to speak with Dewey, drove Dewey to sign the deed, and assisted
Dewey in signing the documents.

Testimony from other witnesses was indeterminant as to Dewey’s
mental condition. Todd called several witnesses who testified that in the
relevant timeframe, Dewey would get tired easily and was sometimes
confused. Holly Hinkel, Todd’s daughter and Dewey’s granddaughter,
testified that Dewey was often in and out of sleep, could not converse well,
and did not seem like himself when she visited him on June 7, 2020. Holly
also testified that when she spoke to Dewey on a video call on June 12 that he
was unable to have much of a conversation and was not coherent. Bryce

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Hinkel, who is also Todd’s daughter and Dewey’s granddaughter, testified
that she observed Dewey to be confused during the relevant timeframe.

Todd also called two witnesses whose testimony was partially objected
to by Chad: a social worker from Solon Care Center named Mandy Clarke,
and a physician with UIHC who also sometimes worked at Solon Care Center
named Dr. Scott Eberly. Todd did not retain either witness as an expert, and
neither witness provided a “summary of the facts and opinions to which the
witness is expected to testify” under Iowa Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.500(2)(c). The district court took evidence from both witnesses
nonetheless. Based on his observations, Dr. Eberly testified that Dewey
sometimes had trouble responding to questions and would avoid responding
to difficult questions. Mandy Clarke testified to mostly the same. Of note,
neither witness testified that Dewey was incompetent.

Although Chad did not see Dewey on June 12, he testified that in the
several times he saw Dewey leading up to the signing that Dewey was groggy
and a little confused when he woke up but was fine otherwise. Chad also
called several witnesses, all of whom testified that despite Dewey’s physical
decline, he did not appear to have any cognitive issues. One of the witnesses
Chad called was Amy Donnelly, one of Dewey’s closest friends. Donnelly
testified that she had regular contact with Dewey, seeing him or speaking with
him on the phone almost every day. She testified that although she observed
a physical decline, Dewey’s cognitive health appeared to be fine. While
Donnelly did not see Dewey on June 12, she testified that she never observed
Dewey to be confused or mentally impaired. Donnelly had the most contact
with Dewey outside of family members and did not have an interest in the
outcome of this case.

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It is clear that Dewey was in poor physical health during the timeframe
he deeded the property to Chad. He also seemed to be somewhat confused
around that timeframe. But our supreme court has reiterated:
Mere mental weakness in a grantor will not invalidate a deed. To have that
effect, the mental powers must be so far deteriorated or destroyed that the
grantor is incapable of understanding in a reasonable degree the nature and
consequences of the instrument he executes.

Conservatorship of Geerdes v. Cruz, 7 N.W.3d 22, 35 (Iowa 2024) (citation
omitted). The conflicting lay testimony and the lack of expert testimony
regarding Dewey’s mental state, along with the district court’s determination
that Todd’s testimony about Dewey’s competency was “somewhat suspect,”
all points toward the conclusion that Todd did not meet his high burden. We
agree that the evidence as to whether Dewey lacked capacity when he signed
the deed is unclear, but Todd has the burden to prove by “clear convincing,
and satisfactory evidence that [Dewey] failed to possess sufficient
consciousness or mentality” at the time the deed was executed. See Todd, 585
N.W.2d at 276 (cleaned up).

Todd also argues the district court did not properly weigh the lack of
consideration, lack of independent counsel, or the improvidence of the
execution. But Wilcox did represent Dewey and the execution of the deed
was logical under the tax plan asserted. Either “Uncle Sam” or Chad were
getting the property. So it makes sense that Dewey would want to keep the
property in the family. Todd helped arrange the meeting between Dewey and
Wilcox to discuss deeding the property to Chad. This transaction was
conducted to protect the property from sale without negatively impacting
Dewey’s Medicaid eligibility.

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CONCLUSION
The district court’s summation of the evidence surrounding the
June 2020 deed is astute:
Todd and Chad both wanted to protect the Property from potential claims
relating to Dewey’s illness. When Wilcox told them they could do so by
conveying the property to Chad, Todd and Chad both agreed, and they both
came to an understanding that Chad would make it right with Todd down
the road.

....

. . . Todd’s actions in arranging for Wilcox to speak to Dewey,
driving Dewey to sign the deed, and then actually helping Dewey get in
position to physically sign the deed, support the fact that he was a knowing
and active participant. These actions make no sense unless Todd was fully
onboard with the plan to deed the Property to Chad.

This estimation, as the district court acknowledges, does not directly answer
the relevant question: can Todd prove by clear, convincing, and satisfactory
evidence that Dewey lacked the mental capacity to execute a deed of the
property to Chad? The inconclusiveness of the testimony, lack of expert
witnesses, and the district court’s witness credibility determinations all make
clear that he cannot. We thus affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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