State of Iowa v. Francisco Martinez-Pena

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0281
Filed April 1, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Francisco Martinez-Pena,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County,
The Honorable Ashley M. Sparks, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Chad R. Frese of Frese & Waters, LLP, Marshalltown, attorney for
appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Sheryl Soich, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Buller, P.J., Sandy, J., and Telleen, S.J.
Opinion by Sandy, J.

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SANDY, Judge.

This appeal asks us to second-guess the jury’s decision to find credible
the child victim of sexual abuse. Because that is not our role, we affirm.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Francisco Martinez-Pena was charged in Marshall County with
second-degree sexual abuse in violation of Iowa Code sections 709.1
and 709.3(1)(b) (2021), and indecent contact with a child in violation of
section 709.12(1)(a).

The charges arose from acts occurring in October 2021 involving
Martinez-Pena and his granddaughter, M.C., who was eight years old at the
time. M.C. resided with her grandparents in Marshalltown, Iowa. On the
evening in question, a thunderstorm caused M.C. to become fearful and
reluctant to sleep alone. She asked Martinez-Pena to lie in bed with her, and
he did so.

According to the evidence presented at trial, while in bed, Martinez-
Pena placed his hand underneath M.C.’s clothing and touched her chest and
genital area. M.C. testified that the contact occurred beneath both her
pajamas and underwear and involved a rubbing motion. She suggested that
the touching made her uncomfortable, although she remained in bed and
eventually fell asleep. The following morning, M.C. reported to her
grandmother that Martinez-Pena had touched her chest. Later that day, while
at school, she disclosed additional details of the incident to a school
counselor, who, as a mandatory reporter, initiated a report that led to a
criminal investigation.

At trial, M.C. testified regarding both the chest and genital touching.
She also expressed some uncertainty about whether Martinez-Pena may have

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been asleep during the incident, noting that his eyes were closed and that he
had been snoring, although she could not consistently recall whether he was
snoring at the time of the contact.

The State presented testimony from a forensic interviewer, who
explained that disclosures of child sexual abuse may occur incrementally over
time rather than in a single, complete account. Martinez-Pena testified in his
own defense, acknowledging that he was in bed with M.C. during the storm
but denied any sexual contact. Following a two-day jury trial in
September 2024, the jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts.

On January 24, 2025, the district court entered judgment and
sentence. Martinez-Pena was sentenced to an indeterminate term of
incarceration not to exceed twenty-five years on the second-degree sexual
abuse conviction, subject to the statutory requirement that he serve at least
seventy percent of the sentence before parole eligibility. On the indecent
contact conviction, the court imposed an indeterminate term not to exceed
two years. The sentences were to run concurrently.

The court also imposed applicable surcharges, costs, and restitution
provisions, required Martinez-Pena to register as a sex offender, and imposed
a lifetime special sentence. On appeal, Martinez-Pena contends that there
was insufficient evidence to convict him.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims are reviewed for the correction of
errors at law. State v. Lacey, 968 N.W.2d 792, 800 (Iowa 2021).

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DISCUSSION
Martinez-Pena said it best in his brief—“[t]he fact pattern presented
to the jury was, in essence, a ‘he said/she said’ scenario.” And because the
jury viewed M.C. as more credible than Martinez-Pena in answering the “he
said/she said” question, we defer to their answer. See State v. Lang, 30
N.W.3d 757, 764 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (“[C]redibility questions are reserved
for the factfinder, such that we do not reverse criminal convictions because
of disagreements over whether testimony was believable.”).

Martinez-Pena’s arguments focus primarily on three points: (1) the
alleged lack of corroborating physical evidence, (2) inconsistencies or limited
detail in the child’s disclosures, and (3) his contention that any contact may
have occurred while he was asleep, negating the requisite intent. In other
words, Martinez-Pena asks us to resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass upon
witness credibility, and weigh the evidence anew. But those functions are
exclusively reserved for the jury. See id. (“The lack of corroboration for
victim testimony is irrelevant to a sufficiency analysis, which assumes the
jury credited victim testimony absent corroboration.”); State v. Donahue, 957
N.W.2d 1, 11 (Iowa 2021) (“Inconsistencies and lack of detail are common in
sexual abuse cases and do not compel a jury to conclude that the victim is not
credible.”); State v. Musser, 721 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Iowa 2006) (holding the
trial court cannot assume the jury would believe the defendant’s testimony).

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the State, substantial
evidence supports the jury’s verdict on both counts. First, the victim testified
that the defendant placed his hand beneath her clothing and touched both
her chest and genital area. She described the nature of the contact and
confirmed it made her uncomfortable. This testimony, if believed by the jury,
was sufficient to establish the elements of both offenses, including the

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existence of a “sex act” and the act of fondling or touching with the requisite
intent.

Second, the absence of physical or forensic evidence does not render
the evidence insufficient. See State v. Skahill, 966 N.W.2d 1, 15 (Iowa 2021)
(“Corroborating evidence, physical or otherwise, is not required.”). The
charged conduct involved brief hand-to-body contact occurring in a private
setting. The jury could reasonably conclude that such conduct would not
necessarily produce physical evidence.

Third, the defendant’s reliance on perceived inconsistencies in the
victim’s disclosures does not undermine the verdict. See Donahue, 957
N.W.2d at 11. The jury heard evidence that the victim initially disclosed only
part of the conduct and later provided additional details. The jury was
entitled to consider this context and to determine what weight, if any, to give
the timing and scope of the disclosures. See State v. Williams, 315 N.W.2d 45,
58 (Iowa 1982) (explaining that “credibility of witnesses and the weight to be
given their testimony is the sole province of the jury”); State v. Trammell, 458
N.W.2d 862, 863 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (“The very function of the jury is to
sort out the evidence presented and place credibility where it belongs.”).

Finally, the jury was free to reject Martinez-Pena’s claim that he was
asleep or otherwise unaware during the incident. Although the victim
expressed some uncertainty on that point, she also described purposeful
contact, including placement of the defendant’s hand beneath her clothing
and movement consistent with intentional touching. The jury could
reasonably infer from the nature and circumstances of the conduct that it was
not accidental or unconscious. Questions of intent are rarely susceptible to
direct proof and may be inferred from the defendant’s actions and the
surrounding circumstances. State v. Evans, 672 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Iowa 2003)

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(“Intent is a matter that is seldom capable of direct proof.”). Sex crimes tend
to not occur in the open.

In sum, this case presented competing accounts of Martinez-Pena’s
conduct. The jury was tasked with resolving those conflicts. By returning
guilty verdicts, the jury necessarily credited the victim’s testimony and
rejected Martinez-Pena’s denial. On our review, we are bound by that
determination so long as it is supported by substantial evidence. Because a
rational jury could find the essential elements of both offenses proved beyond
a reasonable doubt, the convictions are supported by substantial evidence.
Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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